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Art. 1.—INSHORE FISHERIES AND NAVAL NEEDS.

1. *Report of the Committee appointed to consider applications of the Devon and Cornwall Local Fisheries Committees for Grants from the Development Fund for assisting Fishermen [etc.]* (Cd. 6752.) London: Wyman, 1913.
2. *Report of the Departmental Committee on Inshore Fisheries.* Vol. I, Report and Appendices. Vol. II, Minutes of Evidence and Index. (Cd. 7373 and 7374.) London: Wyman, 1914.

THE fable of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs is as true to-day as ever it was. It is an old story how the Enclosures Acts stole the common from the goose, expropriated the peasantry, destroyed the old village life, and led to the substitution of tenant farmers on large estates for the famous English yeomen. It may very well be that enclosures did result in improved farming on a larger scale. Quite possibly the old-style farming of the village communities was wasteful and unprogressive. But we have since found that we want a sturdy peasantry on the land. We want healthy villages that are something more than dead-alive, the independence that goes with security of tenure, the intensive cultivation which implies small farms and a personal interest in every yard of them. If what has been done in Ireland by land legislation and the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society had been done in England then, it is probable that the peasantry need never have been driven from the land, and the history of rural England would have been very different and far better. But that

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was thought of too late. The economists of that day had not learnt that it is the function of industry to produce men as well as goods, livelihoods as well as profits.

The analogy of enclosures and agriculture with the inshore fisheries is close. Inshore fishermen are the peasant proprietors of the sea—proprietors, not in virtue of possession, but as having made it their own.

‘The sea is ours, Us uses it;
Us knows its ways, An’ chooses it!’

Two Government Committees, which went round the coast among fishermen, came to the conclusion that they ‘form a community most valuable to the nation and worth every effort to preserve.’ Nevertheless, they have been neglected. They have not been well enough organised to compel attention and maintain themselves. Under the pressure of social and economic forces, they have been declining; but it is not too late to revive them.

The Departmental Committee was much exercised at first by the difficulty of defining an inshore fishery. As well try to define a working man, though everybody knows what he means by the term. And anybody acquainted with fisheries knows quite well what is an inshore fishery, though no hard and fast line of distinction can be drawn. The steam trawlers of Grimsby, the steam drifters of Lowestoft, are obviously deep-sea craft. The crabbers of the west-country coves, the East coast cobles, undecked drifters, the oyster dredgers who work in creeks, and the *pêcheurs à pied*, as the French call them, who go mussel and cockle raking on the mudflats, or wrinkle picking and prawning among the rock pools, as plainly come within the inshore category. But what about the St Ives luggers, which drift for mackerel out by the Scillies, but for herrings close under land? Are they inshore or deep-sea fishermen?

The answer is, that the inshore fisheries are characterised not so much by the size of their boats and the distance of their fishing grounds from land, as by their style of fishing and the nature of their business arrangements. Usually, it is true, the inshore fisherman goes to sea in a comparatively small sailing or rowing boat, though auxiliary motors are rapidly coming into use on

some parts of the coast. Sometimes he fishes out of a small tidal harbour or river, sometimes from a sheltered cove, often from an open beach, where a high degree of skill is necessary to avoid surf accidents in rough weather. It is noteworthy that fisheries do not flourish, as a rule, in commercial harbours; the opportunity of casual work, when fishing is slack, seems to have a bad effect on fishing *morale*; for, though fishing itself is chancy in the extreme, a veritable gamble with the sea, it is not a hand-to-mouth job, in that if a fisherman, when he makes a haul, does not know how to put by a bit of money and keep his gear up, he soon has to go out of fishing. Fishermen do best, indeed, when they keep themselves to themselves.

Only the harbour boats are decked, and not all of those. Hence, although the inshore fisherman does not by any means confine himself to territorial or inshore waters, he cannot keep the sea for long together. Usually he goes out for a day or a night's fishing, according to what he is on upon, and the best time for doing it. No one who has ever squatted, damp and shivering, in an open boat through a long winter's night, will blame him for liking, if possible, to get his feet ashore and himself into a feather-bed once during the twenty-four hours. Unlike the deep-sea men, he does not, if he can help it, ride out great gales; he runs for home; but in shuffling weather he handles his little craft with a skill that amounts to instinct. The old sailing-boat seamanship, which has been lapsing under steam, survives in the inshore fisheries. Motors, on the other hand, will probably make an end of the old feats of endurance in rowing for hours against a headwind.

Whereas the steamers and deep-sea craft are mostly trawlers, drifters, or long-liners, in the inshore fisheries an endless variety of gear is used, some of it, such as the thorn hooks of the Thames Estuary and the kettlenets of Rye, extremely curious and antique. Chief among the nets are drift-nets, which drift with the tide, like a vast curtain, for herrings, mackerel, pilchards, sprats, and on the north-east coast for salmon; the beam or otter trawl, which scrapes up whatever fish may happen to be in its track, mostly flat fish; seines for shooting around and enclosing mackerel, pilchards,

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sprats, mullet, bass, or any fish that shoals near land; and various kinds of moored nets or trammels. Long-lines or boulders, with several hundreds or thousands of baited hooks, are set mainly for cod and rough fish, rays, congers and the like; while handlines are used for catching almost any fish on the feed, including dogfish—nowadays worth up to two guineas a hundred on Plymouth Barbican. Whiffing lines are trailed behind a moving boat for mackerel or pollack. Pots of withy or of stout netting on a frame are used for crabs, lobsters, crayfish, prawns and whelks; but it is to be noted that pot fishermen, whatever they may happen to be catching, are commonly called crabbers. Each variety of gear calls for its own special knowledge. At most fishing stations one or other method of fishing predominates, be it drifting, lining, crabbing or seining. Most distinctively, there are drift ports and crabbing ports. Those places, however, are best proof against runs of ill luck, and consequent distress, which possess the gear to turn from one fishing to another. Inshore motor trawling, for example, permitted in Cornwall though forbidden in most fishery districts, has luckily enabled the East Cornish motor fishermen to pay their way through a succession of bad drift seasons.

Statistics of fish caught and their value are collected for the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, and published in its Annual Report. The share of the inshore fisheries works out at about 10 per cent. by value; but there is reason to suspect a good many of the figures collected of being merely guess-work. Add to that the disinclination of many fishermen to tell what they have caught, the landings where there is no collector, and the fact that large bulks of fish, caught by inshore craft, are landed at deep-sea ports; and it is safe to say that statistics greatly under-estimate the fish and money value of the inshore fisheries.

The ownership of deep-sea craft approximates to that of small merchant vessels. As a rule, they are company-owned, or at any rate shore-owned; and the skipper who becomes his own owner is in a fair way of business to become somebody else's owner. Pay is by wage and commission. An inshore skipper, on the other hand, is almost always his own owner, at least nominally. Where,

however, the class of boat and gear costs more than a young fisherman can save by the time, say, he is thirty or thirty-five, there arises a system of local borrowing on mortgage, which introduces many financial complications and abuses. Pay is entirely by share—a certain share for the boat and gear, and certain shares to the crew. In general, the complete boat and gear belongs to one man, or anyhow to one family; but in some parts, notably West Cornwall, the more co-operative system still lingers of the crew putting nets aboard and taking up net shares as well as body shares. It has the advantage of easing the capital burden on the owner, and of giving each man an additional interest. Its disadvantage is, that there are apt to be too many skippers in one boat.

In most places the fish is sold at the local price to fish-buyers, who forward it, at their own risk and at their own profit, to their customers or to the great central markets for re-sale by auction and distribution. Sometimes the fish is sold to hawkers; sometimes the fisherman avoids the local middlemen and dispatches his fish himself, on commission or on charge, to a salesman in a central market. The local fish-merchant is the business man of many fishing communities, sometimes the moneylender and representative as well. He can thus perform very useful services, for the average fisherman is bad at pen and paper business; and, when there is most to be done ashore, he is most at sea.

The close resemblance between inshore fisheries and small holdings, or the conditions of peasant proprietorship, should now be evident. Fishing villages, indeed, are the modern survivors of the old-time village communities—very close communities into which entry is a privilege. Often it has seemed to me that fishermen would rather be fleeced by one of their own people than benefited by an outsider, at all events until they can say of the outsider, 'Tis like as if you're one of ourselves now.' Though they suffer from economic disabilities enough, they are their own masters; they do not sell themselves, unless forced to it, for wages; and just as, in consequence, they are markedly men of independence and individuality, seldom asking a favour, never humbling themselves for it, and hating the word charity, so

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also each little community has its own spirit and character. Doubtless local conditions are in part responsible, and in part intermarriage. But I may here note, for the benefit of eugenists, that in some of the most inbred villages, where perhaps there are scarcely half-a-dozen surnames to go round, and everybody is related to everybody else, I have noticed that the men are extraordinarily strong and handsome, and idiots are no more numerous than elsewhere. A local merchant, who gives me much help, has remarked to me at one time or another of nearly every fishing village with which we deal: 'Ah, well, you see; they're a funny sort of people there; they're a set to themselves.' And in every case it was true. In certain ports borrowing on mortgage is common; at others, cash is paid for everything. The traveller of a big fishing-gear manufacturer told me during the first weeks of the war, when money was tight, that his fishing customers were paying their accounts if anything better than usual. No better testimony to their general honesty could have cropped up. Where fishermen are apt to go wrong is where the seaside visitor introduces that parasitism which is the curse of watering places. Yet, even there, the old fishing community usually keeps itself somewhat apart, preserving with an admirable tenacity its own broader dialect and its inward scorn of the question-asking land-lubberly visitor.

On seamanship and knowledge of the sea and weather it is needless to enlarge. Without it, fishermen would soon enough find themselves in Davy Jones's locker. They are mainly responsible for manning the lifeboats, but many of their most brilliant feats of rescue are done in their own boats. It must never be forgotten, moreover, that, just as the painter said it had taken him all his life to paint a picture actually done in a couple of hours, so the heroic rescues, which thrill the nation for a day or two, are the result not merely of a momentary courage, but of the lifelong experience of men born and bred to the sea. The inshore fisheries have been described as breeding-grounds for the Navy and Naval Reserve; and that they certainly are, though in modern battleships, crammed with scientific machinery, the fishery recruit scarcely holds, in virtue of seamanship alone, the

place which once was his. But, in so far as naval warfare has recently become a matter of submarines, mosquito craft, minelayers and trickery with neutral ships—in so far as Sir Percy Scott was right—the fisherman has again jumped into prominence; for it obviously becomes of prime importance to have around the coasts or on patrol a numerous body of men, continually on the lookout with practised eye, hardened to exposure, able to find their way about in fog without a compass, and familiar from boyhood with every shoal and fairway, every creek, and every tidal current in every wind. Had the smaller fisheries lost their economic value—which is far from being the case—it would still be needful to foster them by all means possible.

If it is difficult to obtain accurate fish statistics from the inshore fisheries, it is still more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain accurate statistical evidence of an inshore fishery's decline or the reverse. Certainly nothing is to be gained by the too common elaborate working up into tables and percentages of figures wrong to begin with. At few places, even, is it possible to get an accurate record of the boats and men employed during a course of years. The returns of the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen leave out a multitude of small craft, which may or may not be fishing boats within the meaning of the Act, but which nevertheless engage in inshore fishing. Boats, too, may be laid up, or only fitted out when fish are plentiful; so may men; and both may be employed part time. Two or three bad seasons will cause the local people to say their fishery is gone in; only the steadier hands say: 'Us have see'd it aforetime, and will again!' And then, perhaps, with a few good hauls, the place will be all of a buzz, and laid-up boats will be fitting out as quickly as possible. So tangled are the factors to be taken into account, that one needs to know a fishery not as an enquirer, but, so to speak, as a friend, in order to tell whether it is on the up or down grade, whether it is dead, or only waiting its chance. The two best indications of its real state are probably these: what new boats are being built? and how are the youngsters coming on to the fishing? Unless better-paid work has cropped up in the neighbourhood, the answer to the first question gives the fishermen's own estimate of their

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prospects, and the answer to the second gives the community's own judgment on fishing as a trade.

So judged, the inshore fisheries have undoubtedly been declining very seriously, or at most have been only holding their own; and that impression—especially as to the lack of youngsters coming on to replace the older generation—is abundantly confirmed by a letter from the Royal National Life-Boat Institution, together with reports from its inspectors, printed as an appendix to the Departmental Committee's Report:

'The Committee of Management . . . view with grave anxiety the diminution in the number of inshore fishermen, who have, to so large a degree, furnished crews for the life-boats of the Institution. The Committee of Management have already had to close some stations because crews could no longer be procured. They are substituting motor boats for sailing boats where the conditions are suitable; but the process is costly, and must be gradual. They direct me to add that the use of a motor, while it permits of a slight reduction in the crew of a boat and may in some cases render it feasible to close a neighbouring station without injury to the service, does nothing to diminish the need for hardihood and boating skill in the lifeboat crews.'

Both the more recent Committees of Inquiry—the Devon and Cornwall, and the Departmental—found that the decline was serious and progressive; both expressed their apprehension at the diminution in the number of men having 'an inherent aptitude for the sea and ships,' and the impossibility of recreating such communities once they are allowed to die out. Both Committees, furthermore, expressed their surprise that the inshore fisheries had not declined even more than they have done, and their anger at the conditions under which in some places fishermen have been forced to carry on their work.

'It is due . . . to their tenacity and endurance, their genius for "hanging on tough"—that they have continued to follow as cheerfully as may be an industry which offers always the maximum of hardship, and too often the minimum of reward. In some of the fishing stations we have visited . . . the industry is carried on under conditions which are almost incredibly hard. When we find that he [the inshore fisherman] is adopting almost primitive methods of marketing his

fish ; that, except in a few places, he has made no attempt to co-operate with his neighbours for the purpose of doing better business ; that in many places he labours under great difficulties in the matter of transport ; that he pursues his calling in his own way without the educational facilities accorded to other industries ; that he sometimes finds himself deprived of space for boats and gear and provided with insufficient landing facilities—it is a lasting testimony to his character and courage that in many places he has not disappeared altogether.'

But that genius for 'hanging on tough,' as the Cornishmen say, is not a matter of character alone ; it has also an economic basis. Better than any university professor could put it, the primary economic fact of fishing is expressed in an old sea song :

'The husbandman has rent to pay,
Blow, winds, blow !
And seed to purchase every day,
Row, boys, row !
But he who farms the rolling deeps,
Though never sowing, always reaps ;
The ocean's fields are fair and free ;
There are no rent days on the sea.'

No rent is paid for the use of the sea ; the fish cultivate themselves ; and, nationally speaking, fish food is the one import we do not pay for. As in mining, the invested capital is used not for creating, making or growing the commodity, but only for winning it from the sea ; and in addition, unlike mines, a fishery, instead of becoming exhausted, replenishes itself. In consequence, gross and net profits approximate more nearly than in any other industry, and more nearly in the inshore than in the great steam fisheries ; for though the steamer, with its wider range and its power of keeping the sea and fishing it, does in fact earn greater profits, on the other hand its outgoings in first cost, interest on capital, depreciation, and working expenses are also far greater ; so that what may be termed its fishing profits—those which remain within the fishing community—form a smaller proportion of its gross profits than in the case of inshore craft. Steamer owners may get a good return on their invested capital ; an inshore owner may, with reasonable luck,

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expect to earn his living, and pay his mate's share, out of a boat and gear costing, perhaps, 100%. In no other trade (except that of living on one's wits) will so small a capital investment produce so much livelihood; for, though the earnings be small, in no other trade are what may be called the man-earnings—the joint earnings of capital *plus* labour—relatively so great.

There, in part, lies their surprising toughness against adverse modern conditions, and also their economic strength, provided they can so be reorganised that a due proportion of the worth of the catches shall go to the fishermen themselves. It may also be pointed out that, since the upkeep of a small fishing boat and gear costs little, the larger proportion of its earnings are spent by the crew in their own locality; whereas in lodging-houses and shops the larger proportion of the gross earnings goes to landlord and wholesaler. Hence, turnover for turnover, the relatively high value of a fishery to its own locality; it brings so much of its earnings in, and sends so little out. I do not, however, mean to convey that the inshore fisheries are in a profitable or flourishing condition. Far from it. If fishing is, economically speaking, nearly all profit, it does not follow that the profits, in practice, are as great as they might be, or that it is the fisherman who secures his proper share of them. What I do wish to make plain is, first, that there are sound economic reasons for reviving the inshore fisheries, and secondly, that they are capable of revival, inasmuch as their economic advantages are fundamental, and cannot be taken away, while their commercial disabilities are incidental and remediable.

Motors represent a compromise. They increase the capital cost of fishing and also running expenses. On the other hand, that increase is not great—not so great, for example, as to necessitate shore ownership of boats. Motors enable fishermen to get to the fishing grounds quicker, to fish in calms, to catch markets and fish trains better; and by saving time and labour they enable more fishing, or more sorts of fishing, to be done. The complaint of the youngsters against fishing is, that the earnings do not balance the hardships; were the earnings better, they would put up with the hardships readily enough. By increasing the earnings, and by decreasing

the excessive labour, especially in getting to the grounds and in hauling aboard drift-nets and long lines, as well as by adding a mechanical interest which appeals to youth, motors undoubtedly attract young men to the work. Where they have come into use, the fishermen say they would rather lose their boat than their engine. The process of conversion is always the same. At first, motors are regarded as useless, at least for the particular fishery in question; then one or two men try them, often none too successfully; more men try; the technique of motors for the particular fishery is mastered; and soon the best men have them. Finally crews for non-motor boats become hard to get, and in a wonderfully short time the whole fleet is converted to motor power. It is mainly the coming of the marine motor which makes the present seem a specially favourable time for initiating a revival of the inshore fisheries.

Not, of course, that motors are everything, or even the one thing needful. Many other matters urgently need tackling if the decline is to be changed to development. It must be acknowledged that fisheries are a rather distressful, not to say squabblesome, industry. In lucky periods they are apt to undergo an expansion which leads to distress during lean years. One sort of fishing, especially trawling, interferes with other sorts. And the controversy as to how far the fishing grounds are being depleted, who or what is responsible for the depletion, and how to prevent it, has always been very keen. Besides scores of questions in the House, fisheries have been the subject of a good many Government Inquiries, and of several Bills and Acts. Since the Devon and Cornwall Inquiry of 1912-13 and the Departmental Committee of 1913-14 covered the whole of the English and Welsh coast, previous Inquiries need not here be dealt with, except to remark that the important recommendations of the Departmental Committee in respect of undersized fish, simplification of by-laws, and shell-fish culture were anticipated by the House of Lords Committee of 1904 and even the Commissioners of 1866. The latter, among whom was Huxley, remarked:

'Should it [depletion of the fishing grounds] ever be satisfactorily proved to have arisen, we conceive that the best

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remedial measure would be to place a restriction upon the size of the fish permitted to be brought ashore, and to subject the possessor of fish below a certain specified size to penalties; but to avoid interfering with the implements of fishermen, or with their methods of fishing. For the present we advise that all Acts of Parliament which profess to regulate or restrict the modes of fishing pursued in-shore be repealed. . . .'

How little that advice was taken by a generation of prohibitory persons, and with what bad results, the Report of the Departmental Committee shows.

Fisheries have been the ugly duckling, the kicked dogfish, of Whitehall. Formerly attended to by Salmon Inspectors of the Home Office, they were transferred, in 1886, to a Fisheries Department of the Board of Trade. In 1898 a joint Fisheries and Harbour Department of the Board of Trade was formed; but in 1903 the fisheries were again transferred, becoming a division of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, but leaving fishery harbours behind them with the Harbour Department of the Board of Trade. The Departmental Committee left no doubt in its Report of its opinion that the Central Department is still inadequately equipped—in status, funds, staff and empowering legislation—for dealing with the large and complex fishery interests under its charge.

Locally, the fisheries are administered, within the eleven districts into which the coast is at present divided, by Sea Fisheries Committees, formed under the Sea Fisheries Regulation Act of 1888, and in certain estuaries by local bodies having Sea Fisheries powers. Such Committees are made up of two classes of members: (1) those appointed by local authorities contributing funds, and (2) fishery members. The latter, in turn, consist of a representative from each Salmon Board within the District, and of fishery members proper, appointed by the Central Department to represent the fishing interests of the District. As there is no power to pay the expenses, let alone for the loss of time, of fishermen members, men willing to accept appointment are difficult to find, and it is still more difficult for them to attend regularly. In consequence, fishermen are either unrepresented, or are represented by outsiders interested and

willing to serve, or by their fish merchants. The last are usually among the most capable and energetic of the members, but naturally they cannot be expected to work for reform in the methods of fish trading. On every Committee the practical sea fishery members are in a minority. Under various Acts, the Committees have power to regulate inshore fishing in a variety of ways—methods, gear, season, size of shellfish allowed to be taken—but before by-laws can become operative, they must be confirmed by the Central Department. The Central Department can confirm or reject, but it cannot initiate. It can only suggest, and leave the by-law to be brought up again. A more obstructive process for getting anything done quickly would be hard to invent.

For, although the Committees have unquestionably done a great deal of hard work, they themselves suffer from certain fundamental defects not their fault, but imposed upon them. (1) They are an example of spurious decentralisation; they are neither representative of, nor are they elected by, or responsible to, the interests they administer. (2) Their power extends only to the three-mile limit of territorial waters; that is to say, a steam trawler may scrape up hundredweights of immature fish $3\frac{1}{4}$ miles out, while the inshore fisherman, for the protection of the few small fish he can catch, may be prevented from trawling at all with motor power just inside the line; and he has, therefore, to bear the brunt of by-laws intended to improve fishing as a whole. (3) With one exception—the Lancashire and Western Committee—their funds are insufficient for enforcing properly their own by-laws, to say nothing of carrying out constructive work, the scientific research necessary for effective regulation, or the legal defence of fishing rights and facilities. (4) Meeting quarterly, at some railway centre the least inconvenient for the bad coastal communications of the country, the Committees are very remote from the men who have to earn their living on the sea and from the rapid fluctuations of the industry.

It is easy to see that on such Committees the members who say, 'Something's wrong, let's prohibit something!', and who produce a neat little by-law, all ready for adoption, are bound to gain the upper hand of members who want to work out constructive schemes, which

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needs must be hazy to begin with, and which in any case can't be paid for. And, in fact, the coast is covered with an amazing network of by-laws, dissimilar and of unproven efficacy. Naturally, the inshore fisherman resents such interference by outsiders, however well-intentioned, with *his* fishing and grounds, *his* livelihood. 'What do 'em do for me,' he too often says, 'except try to prevent a fellow from earning his living?' The Departmental Committee, whilst recognising fully the difficulties under which the Committees labour, and 'the keenest interest and the most intelligent devotion of a few sympathetic members,' was 'convinced that there are very serious drawbacks in the present system, which in our opinion fails either to stimulate local enterprise or to foster intimate relations between the fishermen and the Fishery Authority.'

If the Sea Fisheries Committees have concerned themselves chiefly with a maze of prohibitive by-laws, it must be recollected in their favour—in addition to the defects of their composition and representation—that the Act is father to the by-law, and that a repressive cast was inevitably given to their work by the Sea Fisheries Regulation Acts of 1888 to 1894. Parliament itself seems to have regarded the fisheries as a free-growing tree, only needing to be pruned to flourish—a view which may have been true of the great steam ports, but was certainly untrue of the smaller fisheries. It empowered the Committees to 'regulate' the fisheries with by-laws and penalties, yet failed to provide them with funds for enforcing even such by-laws as are really necessary, let alone for carrying out constructive schemes. The one constructive provision of the Sea Fisheries Acts (1868-84)—relating to the better cultivation of shellfish—provided for the establishment of shellfish beds by means of Orders too expensive for fishermen to obtain!

Not until the Development Act of 1909 was financial provision made for the development of fisheries, as opposed to their regulation or administration; and it was out of an application to the Development Fund that the Devon and Cornwall Report arose. Grants were being made from the Fund for fishing harbours. The fishermen of Looe in S.E. Cornwall were converting their fleet to motor power, but the drift ports of West

Cornwall, owing largely to a succession of bad years and the competition of steam mackerel drifters from the East Coast, were in a state of great distress. And in Devon the smaller fisheries, at all events, had been 'suffering a steady decline.' The Devon and Cornwall Local Committees, seeing with admirable foresight that motors were bound to come, and might help their fisheries, joined hands in applying, early in 1912, for grants of 10,000*l.* each, for making loans to fishermen to instal motors in their boats. After considerable discussion and recrimination, and doubts as to whether Development money could legally be used for direct loans to individual fishermen, a small Committee of Inquiry was sent West. It visited practically every fishing port and village in the two counties, taking special care to learn the views of fishermen themselves. The Report, which appeared early in 1913, did not support the original schemes.

'Indeed, it is not impossible that fishing ports equipped with motor power by means of State aid might intensify the pressure that at present is exercised by commercial steam competition on neighbouring ports, and notably on the smaller inshore fishing stations. There is, too, the difficulty of selecting the individual fishermen, the pull of ports having preponderant or more active representation on the Committees, and a grave risk of patronage or favouritism. Though we have sought every suitable opportunity of informing ourselves on these points, we do not yet understand how it is proposed, under the scheme we have been invited to review, to proceed with the exceedingly delicate task of allotting the funds that may be applied for; and we must needs say that in regard to these same points—the most difficult parts of the matter in actual working—the schemes themselves are more than a little vague. . . . We are persuaded that, in any scheme of State-aided credit, provision must be made for the close co-operation of the fishermen themselves in carrying out the scheme.'

The Committee, therefore, recommended the foundation of fishermen's credit banks, which may be described briefly as co-operative societies for combining the small credit of all the members in order to borrow money for re-lending to those members who want loans—a method of turning character into security and credit into cash, of making financial bricks out of men of straw. A

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subsidy of 3000*l.* by way of loan on easy terms was suggested for the credit bank of each county, and an additional subsidy of 4000*l.* for the four distressed ports of West Cornwall, namely, Porthleven, Newlyn, Mousehole, and St Ives. Further, since the best method of installing motors in large trawlers, like those of Brixham, and in beach boats, had not been fully worked out, it was recommended that a grant of 2000*l.* should be made to the Devon Committee for that purpose. A Minority Note urged that credit banks, being novel, would take time to establish; that, as usually worked, they are inapplicable to fisheries, since fishermen, unlike small farmers, want largish lump sums for long periods once or twice only in a lifetime, so that the money cannot be turned over frequently; that the need of the West Cornish ports was pressing, if their fisheries were not to die out altogether; and that a loan of 4000*l.* should be made to them on the Sea Fisheries Committees' plan. A third part of the Report advocated improvements in fisheries administration and the subsidised foundation of a Fisheries Organisation Society for improving the shore business of the fisheries on co-operative lines.

In the end, a grant of 2000*l.* was made to Devon for the motor experiments, and a loan of 4000*l.* for 9-12 years to West Cornwall, on condition that the fishermen should be associated with the handling of the fund. Accordingly, a small Administrative Committee was set up in Cornwall; and early last year a Fishermen's Co-operative Society was founded in each of the four ports. Between twenty and thirty motors have been installed out of the loan; and there is evidence that the private conversion of the fleets to motor power has been decidedly stimulated. The atmosphere of the four ports is distinctly less discouraged; the scheme works smoothly; and one of its pleasantest features has been the keenness and good sense of the fishermen committees. If they earn money enough—and in that, after all, the fish will have the biggest say—no one doubts that they will repay the loan. Credit banks, on the other hand, are easier to talk about than to get into working order. The credit banks recommended in the Report have not yet been founded, and consequently the question of subsidising them has not arisen.

Before the Report of the small Devon and Cornwall Committee was out, a heavy-weight Departmental Committee had been appointed 'To inquire into the present condition of the Inshore Fisheries [of England and Wales], and to advise the Board as to the steps which could with advantage be taken for their preservation and development.' It heard a mass of evidence in London, and, what was more important, it went round the coast to see and hear things for itself. Its findings can be read in its very full Report. Suffice it here to say that the advocates of the inshore fisheries were found not to have exaggerated either their value or their present state of decline. The official decorum of the Committee's language rather accentuates than veils the strength of some of its remarks; and its recommendations are pretty sweeping. These divide themselves under four main heads, namely, administration, facilities, fish (including shell-fish cultivation), and business organisation, including finance, marketing, fish-curing, by-products, etc.

Administration.—It was recommended that the Central Department should be strengthened in staff, funds and powers; that, in the composite Board, it should be raised from the position of a Division to a position co-equal with Agriculture; and that its head should be a Permanent Secretary with direct access to the Cabinet Minister responsible. The cost of official fishery administration would be wholly a charge on national funds as in Scotland and Ireland; the making, repealing, simplification, and enforcement of all by-laws and regulations would be a function of the Central Department; and the Sea Fisheries Committees would be reconstituted as smaller advisory bodies, composed of nominees of the Central Department, representatives of Salmon Boards within the Districts, and direct representatives of fishermen's societies and associations, whose reasonable expenses would be paid. A most important recommendation was the division of the coast into four or five districts, and the appointment in each of a 'Resident Local Inspector,' not to enforce by-laws but to be in close contact with the Central Department on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with the fishermen and their difficulties. It was felt that such Inspectors, if well

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chosen, would soon become the champions of the fishermen, to represent them at headquarters, stimulate enterprise, keep them in touch with new markets, new methods, and the outside fishery world, and to help them with those numerous legal and quasi-legal grievances and difficulties, in dealing with which—owing to their notion that law and justice are the same thing—they show themselves at present so helpless.

The recommendation as to the Sea Fisheries Committees raised a storm of protests which were curiously similar in wording, but of which not one exhibited any consideration of the practical outcome of the measure, or any apprehension of the fact that advisory committees, strong in experienced fishery members, would exercise a greater influence on fishery affairs than the present Committees, which are subject always to a veto before their by-laws can become operative.

Facilities.—Almost everywhere the smaller fishermen have been jockeyed out of prescriptive and customary rights, or are being denied the necessary facilities for good fishing, or have relied on verbal promises which have never been fulfilled; and often they are smarting under their grievances to such a degree that they cannot be induced to attend to anything else, much less to any schemes for the patient development of their fisheries. The Departmental Committee recommended that the Central Department should have enhanced powers of 'intervention, legal or otherwise, where public fisheries or fishing rights are imperilled'; also that

'a general survey of all stations and ports where inshore fishing is carried on, in order that expert advice may be forthcoming as to the need of (a) improving existing harbours, (b) constructing harbours where they do not at present exist, and (c) improving the landing facilities where it is not possible to construct harbours, by the provision of slipways and capstans, the removal of rocks, the construction of channels, or the building of breakwaters. This survey should include, and powers should be given to the Central Department to deal with, the adequate provision of boat and gear accommodation for fishermen in places where they have been driven from, or hampered on, their beaches by the construction of esplanades and shoreworks, the dumping of refuse, or the taking away of beach material.'

Fish.—For the protection of immature fish, and in place of the present expensive and ineffective method of trying to restrict fishing and police the sea, the Committee recommended legislation for prohibiting the marketing, sale, or exposure for sale of specified undersized fish; the adoption of such a measure (which would put inshore and deep-sea craft upon the same footing) as the primary general policy for preventing depletion of the fishing grounds; and the consequent simplification of local by-laws.

‘With a view to encouraging the installation of motors in fishing craft and reviving the inshore fisheries, and subject to the above mentioned recommendation with respect to the sale of undersized fish, inshore trawling should, in general, be permitted to inshore craft of limited size propelled by motors.’

In respect of shellfish, the Committee was of opinion that the Central Department should put into operation on a large scale an allotment system of shellfish beds, and that it should take active steps to lease layings more cheaply to fishermen or to fishermen’s associations—preferably the latter, in order to avoid making public fisheries into private property; for the Committee was ‘opposed to perpetual and uncontrolled grants of the shore or bed of the sea to individuals or corporations.’

Organisation.—In dealing with shore-business, the Committee, as may be seen from the guarded yet emphatic language of its Report, was treading on quick-sands. For the provision of boats, motors, and gear it recommended co-operative credit and trading, or in the last resort, State aid on the West Cornish model. In fishery finance a closer investigation around the coast has revealed the fact that in some of the ports, at all events, fishermen who borrowed money for boats and gear have been accustomed to pay interest (at from 5 to 10 per cent.) not merely on their outstanding debt, but on the whole sum borrowed, till the last penny has been repaid. Thus, a fisherman who had borrowed, say 200*l.*, and had repaid 190*l.*, would still be paying interest not on the outstanding 10*l.* but on the whole 200*l.* And when such mortgagee has been a middleman or dealer, the fisherman has usually been tied to him for his gear

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or fish-selling or both. Co-operative credit, with the publicity of its juster terms, may be relied upon to put an end to this abominable system of skimming the financial cream off fishing.

But State aid and care—the preservation and development of fisheries and fishing methods, scientific research, the provision of harbourage, and the installation of motor power—will prove useless to the fisherman himself, perhaps worse than useless, unless he can be placed in a position to secure his due share of the increase. At present he is not even in a position to secure the fruits of his labour, such as they are. To the Departmental Committee only one remedy appeared feasible.

‘At a considerable number of inshore fishing stations it is admitted that practically the whole of the fish-buying is in the hands of one man, without competition. . . . Under such conditions the only check on the power of the buyer is that, to live himself, he must let the fishermen live. . . . We are left with a strong impression that the inshore fisherman’s means and methods of disposing of his fish are highly unsatisfactory. We believe that the only remedy is the improved organisation of fishermen with co-operation as its basis; and we may remark, in passing, that fish merchants who are at present giving the fishermen a proper price for their fish can have little to fear from it.’ . . .

Finally the Committee recommended :

‘The immediate formation of a Fisheries Organisation Society for the purpose of spreading among fishermen the principles of co-operation for credit, for better business in fishing and marketing, and for other purposes incidental to fishery development. In the first instance, at all events, the formation of such a propagandist society should be assisted, if not entirely financed, by national funds, and its work assisted by the Resident Local Inspectors above recommended.’

At the end of its Report, the Departmental Committee added the following passage, unique in official reports, though not a bit too strong for the occasion :

‘We trust that the foregoing recommendations will be carried into effect without delay. Former Committees on fisheries have made important recommendations in the

interests of the inshore and general sea fisheries which have been ignored. Our considered judgment is that our recommendations represent the minimum of what is necessary to be done, and to be done quickly, if the inshore fisheries are to be preserved and developed.'

Most of the Report requires legislation to carry it into effect, and legislation of the constructive rather than of the prohibitory variety, no matter how urgent, is hard to obtain. Meanwhile, the Fisheries Organisation Society has been established at Queen Anne's Chambers, Westminster, with a staff experienced in co-operation, and a grant from the Development Fund of 2000*l*. Subscribers are needed to help shove off the boat, and local workers to put their backs into the oars. The F.O.S. is prepared to initiate co-operative schemes, and to knock them into shape; but one of the most pressing necessities in fisheries, as in agriculture, is a trust or guarantee fund for financing co-operative undertakings in their initial stages.

It will be uphill work, but highly interesting and abundant in reward. Nothing can be more inspiring than the revival of a fishery. It pervades the whole atmosphere of a port, as if the air itself were full of life. In the Devon and Cornwall Report there occurs a description of St Ives as it was about two years ago:

'Men of years and experience have left and are leaving the fishing, and young men are going into other occupations. Some ship in trading vessels, others go to the mines, and large numbers are emigrating. The men that are actively engaged in the fisheries of these ports are despondent and disheartened, even beyond making the best of the chances they still possess. On a grey Sunday afternoon, near about sundown, we walked to Lelant, where the St Ives boats are laid up. There, on one side of the broad sand and mud flats of Hayle Harbour, we saw a fleet of seventy or eighty boats, mostly luggers, moored up with old chains and rotting ropes to rusty railway lines of the old broad gauge on a grass-grown quay. In local phrase, they were the St Ives boats that have died. The unpainted hulls of many were ripe and rotten. On their still standing masts, the running gear, left as it returned from sea for another season that never came, had flapped in the wind till it parted. Only one boat of all the laid-up fleet was being repaired, perhaps not for the St Ives fishing. The picture of that silent dead boats' graveyard

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remains vividly in our minds. It impressed upon us—more than all the sometimes contradictory representations we had heard, far more than angry protests—the decline of the West Cornish Fisheries. In no light spirit we began our investigations. With a deep sense of the tragedy of the present situation we ended them.'

Last autumn, however, the herrings came properly into St Ives Bay, the first time for years; and prices were high. They went as high, some days, as thirteen to fifteen shillings a long hundred. Boats returned laden from sea. Men staggered up the beach inside the harbour under the weight of the hand-barrows, or 'gurries,' of fine full herrings. The women were out counting the fish, or standing by their menfolk's catches. Salesmen and merchants shouted prices; half the town, it seemed, was down along chackling. Ponies strained into their collars, and went at it with a run, to drag the packed barrels up over the steep hill to the station. The gulls shrieked joyously overhead, over the masts, over the beach and the town. People greeted one in the street with news of the latest big catch, the latest price. One motor fisherman came home with 170*l.* worth; and long enough he had waited for such luck. Money was coming into the town, good fish money; and long years, too, the town had waited. Men would be back from the mines, and, if it went on, sons and brothers from America and South Africa. It was as if the most brilliant sunshine imaginable had suddenly come out over the grey little town in its wonderful bay, and over the grey people, who had been 'hanging on tough,' grimly, patiently, with waning hope, and only determined not themselves to expose their poverty.

May such seasons continue! True, it was the war which was responsible for raising the fresh herring prices to a record height. Such a combination of circumstances can seldom occur, though prices, without doubt, can otherwise be raised—and without raising them to the consumer. The revival of the inshore fisheries will be hard slogging work, not without its setbacks, but all the greater will be the satisfaction if some success can be achieved.

STEPHEN REYNOLDS.

Art. 2.—TASSO'S LATER VERSE.

1. *Vita di Torquato Tasso*. By Angelo Solerti. Three vols. Turin: Loescher, 1895.
2. *Tasso*. By E. J. Hasell. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1882.
3. *Tasso and his Times*. By W. Boulting. London: Methuen, 1907.
4. '*Lycidas*.' By the Rev. W. Tuckwell. London: Murray, 1911.

WHEN endeavouring to estimate the permanent value of a famous poet's work—and, like a renewable lease, every claim to immortality comes up periodically for confirmation—we at once ask what his countrymen think and say, and also what they are doing, in this respect. So regarded, there can be little doubt that Tasso is still a living force in literature. Carefully commentated editions of the '*Gerusalemme Liberata*' and other works appear from time to time; the tercentenary in 1895 was adequately celebrated; and one of the most accomplished scholars of our day—also the severest critic of that portion of the verse which now concerns us, and author of the biography standing first on our list—has devoted many of his most fruitful years to a minute investigation of every record bearing on Tasso's career, and the still unsolved riddle of his imprisonment. Carducci, also, in that summing up of his country's literature which has almost the authority of a judicial decision, finds in Tasso the inspiration for some of his happiest pages, associating his name with that of Dante more closely than would carry assent in the case of any other poet. The passage in which this estimate occurs sheds considerable light on our subject, and we give it as quoted by Solerti in the concluding pages of the '*Life*' of Tasso:

'The Cinquecento has no figure at once so grave and gentle as that of Torquato Tasso. He is the legitimate heir to Dante Alighieri; he believes, and reasons upon his belief like a philosopher; he loves, and comments learnedly on love; he is an artist, and writes dialogues full of scholastic speculation intended to be Platonic. Like Dante, he has always something to reproach himself with, in his conscience, as a Catholic; his poem, essentially devotional and chivalric, is presided over by a moral allegory; and yet, he is ever in dread lest

he should have made it too profane; he reconstructs it, and presents it in a purified form; still, not entirely satisfied, he concludes with the poem of the Creation.

'Tasso is the only Christian of our Renaissance; with the spirit of which, on the other hand, he is so saturated that sensualism and mysticism are ever blending in his work; whereat he grieves, and repents, while others delight in it. But of this duality in his existence, fluctuating between ideality and sensualism, between mysticism and art, of this discordance in the life to which he was condemned—he, a paladin of the dark ages, a scholastic of the 13th century, Dante's successor, lost in the later Renaissance between Ariosto and Machiavelli, between Rabelais and Cervantes—of this duality, this discord, he, innocent victim, must bear the pain; at which he becomes disheartened, even to madness. The cry of distress which breaks from him so melodiously amidst the martial strains of his great epic declares him, in this mingling of melancholy and voluptuousness, the first, in point of time, of modern poets. Like Chateaubriand, Byron and Leopardi, Tasso has the malady of the ages of transition.'*

The continued interest thus shown in the author of the 'Gerusalemme' and the 'Mondo Creato' may of course partly depend on his name yet standing for certain principles, which his critics desire to maintain or overthrow. Those of socialistic tendencies see in the earlier of these poems a misleading glorification of the 'Prince,' of the 'super-' or 'archic' man; in the later, a plea for old-world beliefs to which they are bitterly opposed; and they refuse authority to the writer, whatever his poetic eminence, on the ground of incipient or actual insanity. Others, less convinced of the elevating influence on humanity of teaching the many to despoil and oppress the few, are glad to find in one who had learnt to estimate 'values' during the vicissitudes and contrasts of a strangely varied career, and whose genius compels attention, so powerful an advocate of fairer ideals. For, as Beni said in his memorial lines, and in this he was a true prophet:

'Industry, virtue, honour were here manifested that future

* 'Dello svolgimento della letteratura nazionale.' 'Opere di Carducci,' Bologna (Zanichelli), 1889; vol. I, pp. 182-3.

generations may have faith in them; wherefore our Tasso everywhere resounds (*risuona il Tasso*).'

As was seen in the passage just quoted, Carducci associates Tasso not only with Dante but also with some of the foremost men of recent times, suggesting that he epitomised the past and foreshadowed the future. Like Milton—his Puritan counterpart and equal—Tasso stands in fact as the last representative in his own country of the Renaissance, and seems to belong, at least in spirit, to the whole period of the intellectual movement dependent upon the revived learning that originated during the Crusades and is still active among us. As to the times in which his lot was cast, the fifty years of his troubled life (1544–95) appear as the connecting link between two worlds, one dying, the other struggling into existence—if we may slightly vary Matthew Arnold's phrase—yet with a distinctive character of their own, and as epoch-making as any since the Norman Conquest* of England. The treaty of Cateau Cambresis, the victory of Lepanto (which, by reviving a semblance of crusading ardour, helped forward the composition and publication of the 'Gerusalemme'), the Massacre of St Bartholomew, and the defeat of the Armada, fall well within this half century and have only to be mentioned for their historic import to be recognised. Scenes of splendour were also not uncommon; and one at Venice in celebration of Henry III's visit on his way home to assume the crown of France, impressed the popular imagination almost as much as the Field of the Cloth of Gold. This spectacle interests us, since, among the guests who came to honour the young monarch, appeared the sinister figure of Alphonso II of Este, whose murder of his sister's lover in circumstances of peculiar horror and dissimulation show him to have been capable of almost any atrocity.

The names also of many celebrated or notorious

* History is read in so many different ways that perhaps the influence of the Norman Conquest of England on the larger stage of the world may not be so generally recognised as is here assumed. Yet, but for the new direction given by 'Foreign Kings' to English affairs, it seems probable that these islands would have become the conscript appendage of France in the 14th, or of Spain in the 16th century; with the necessary consequence that French or Spanish would now be spoken at the Antipodes, in Africa, and in N. America where English is now the dominant tongue.

persons belong to this epoch and diversify Solerti's pages. Towards the close of Tasso's life—if so remarkable an incident may be taken a little out of its turn—the brigand Sciarra offered him an escort (declined on moral grounds) when journeying through the disturbed country between Naples and Rome. Finding his courtesy refused, yet determined apparently to figure advantageously in the Poet's history, Sciarra withdrew his forces to a distance so that Tasso might pass without alarm. Returning to an earlier period, lovers of Aldine editions will be interested to hear that the head of this famous publishing house paid our author a visit when in prison at Ferrara, where he found him half-clad and ill fed; probably also complaining, as he does in letters about this time (Sept. 1582), of his unwashed condition, his matted hair and beard, and the annoyance caused by cats, whose wild eyes at night, in pursuit of their prey, looked like evil spirits glaring through the darkness. A little later (July 1586), we meet with the young prince of Mantua, who plays so poor a part in legends of the Admirable Crichton, but who here appears in the character of a deliverer and obtains from Alphonso the provisional release of his victim. Apparently the state of Tasso's health, unless he were to be left to die—an alternative the Duke may have shrunk from—necessitated this relief.

It is, however, clear that, while living under Mantuan protection, the poet was in danger of being sent back into confinement; and, some twelve months later, hearing that Alphonso was to visit the young prince, who had now succeeded to the Dukedom, Tasso shortly fled from Sassuolo, the little watering place where he was staying, intending to seek safety in Rome. A day later he arrived at Bologna, where he was entertained with apparent hospitality by a brother poet and man of letters, Costantini, who, in odious contrast to the half-penitent Sciarra, now plays the part of an intentional but ineffective Judas. We will, however, leave Tasso for a moment, as he stands wrapt in his 'long cloak that swept the ground' and takes a courteous farewell at the door of his false friend (who immediately sent information to the Duke), briefly to describe the curious relic of mediæval piety, or superstition, which was the first

important halting-place on this perilous journey, and which to the believing eyes of the hunted man must have appeared like the 'House Beautiful' to Christian.

About fifteen miles south of Ancona, situated on a hill near the coast and with sunny views over the eastern spurs of the Apennines, stands the Sanctuary of Loreto, a shrine that still enjoys much reputation, more than half a million votaries being said to resort to it annually in search of bodily health or mental repose. The object of their veneration is a small brick building, which, according to the legend, was miraculously transplanted from Nazareth (as the relics of the 'Three Wise Men' were carried to Milan before finally resting at Cologne), and is believed to be the same that once sheltered the Holy Family. In 336 A.D. the aged Empress Helena, mother of Constantine, made a pilgrimage to the house, where it originally stood, and caused a basilica to be erected over it; but, owing to Saracenic incursions, the basilica fell into decay, and in 1291 the cottage is said to have been removed by the hands of angels during the night to the coast of Dalmatia, where it remained three years. For some unknown reason it was again removed and deposited near Recanati, where it now stands, on ground then belonging to a widow, named Laureta, whence its name.

Pilgrimages soon began to be organised in honour of this manifestation of Divine power; houses were built for the accommodation of believers, who flocked thither in large numbers; and since that time an ever-increasing tide of suffering humanity has flowed and ebbed round the stately structure, built outside the cottage, and known as the Chiesa della Santa Casa. Among those who have thus testified their reverence for the humble dwelling, all ranks in life are represented; and a complete list would be found to include some of the greatest names in European history. And all bring gifts or peace-offerings of some kind; doubtless whatever they consider most acceptable, or of highest value, whether of gold or precious stones, of which there is great store, or pictures, or statuary, or other forms of art in silver or bronze; or candles, that quickly burn away; or wreaths of flowers, or promises of amendment; or, occasionally, hymns of praise in honour of the patroness of the shrine.

Towards the close of the 16th century the rather straggling collection of houses which had then sprung up obtained the privileges of a town; and in 1587 the façade of the Church was being rebuilt under Pope Sixtus V, whose pontificate, among matters of graver import, will be remembered for the thorough cleansing of the lower quarters of the eternal City from the gangs of spadassins who had gathered there. The little township had just received its new dignity, when, in the autumn of that year, Tasso, who certainly had little beside his poetical compositions to offer—for at the time he was completely penniless—came to this spot, having followed the coast route by Fano, in fulfilment of a vow previously made, to return thanks for help and protection which he believed he had received.

About two years earlier, towards the close of his long imprisonment, his health having entirely given way, he lay one night in a kind of trance, between sleeping and waking, or between life and death as it seemed to him, 'Art and nature unable any longer to assist,' when, as he thought, the Virgin, with the Holy Infant in her arms and the sacred writings in her hand, appeared at the foot of his bed and encouraged him to hope for better things. The vision was so distinct that he had no doubt of its divine origin, and always afterwards attributed his escape from immediate death ('che non perdona mai,' however) to the renewed strength thus strangely imparted. This was in December 1585, and, as we have seen, in the following July, the Duke of Ferrara consented to his provisional release.

At Loreto, he slept in the house of Giulio Amici (for, although without money, the author of the 'Gerusalemme,' in all his wanderings, was rarely at a loss for a hospitable reception); and, in the words of his latest and occasionally eloquent biographer, 'thus was Torquato able to accomplish his vow at this celebrated shrine; and his spirit, stricken with dread in the tumult of this world, seems to have found the peace which it sought in Her who has always brought consolation in sorrow to those who believe.*' The next day he continued his rapid flight, crossing the mountains by way of Macerata and

* Solerti, 'Vita di Tasso,' cap. xxiii, p. 571.

Baccana; and the reality of the danger from which he fled is shown by the powerful influence exerted to have him sent back into Lombardy, after his arrival in Rome (Nov. 5). Here he was received in the house of Scipione Gonzaga, titular Patriarch of Jerusalem, and shortly to be made a Cardinal. The principal agent in these endeavours was his supposed friend, Antonio Costantini, who had followed him from Bologna, and now, with great baseness, employed every imaginable artifice and deception to entice the poet outside the city boundaries; intending to have him put into a litter, bound if necessary, and so conveyed away. In fact, but for the protection of the Pope, who seems to have entertained a thoroughly British conception of the right of asylum, this plan would have been carried out within sight of St Peter's.*

It was while he was defending himself from these covert attacks with an acuteness and determination which showed no trace of the mental infirmity so often alleged, that Tasso finished the 'Canzone,' an English version of which, in similar metre, now follows. The poem was enclosed in a letter dated from Rome about a fortnight after his safe arrival, which, from a passage it contains, he seems to have considered little short of miraculous. It was addressed to his kind entertainer at Loreto, Giulio Amici, in very flattering but appropriate terms. Given the occasion for an act of courtesy and good feeling, Tasso is never less than himself.

TO THE MOST BLESSED VIRGIN IN LORETO.

CANZONE.

'Amidst what tempests, what enduring wrath,
In this wide sea, of angry wave and wind,
O saving Light, hast thou my escort been!
Thou holy Star that reignest o'er my path
Of gloom and dread, and in the minds of men
Createst light; through whom the heart can find
Comfort, which long in utter darkness pined;
Who, with mild ray,
Still show'st the way

* See Solerti, p. 572; also appendix containing letters from Costantini to his employer.

I yet must keep, when tempests hide the Pole
 That should direct me o'er these waves unkind ;
 Else anchorless, dishelmed,
 I sink o'erwhelmed—a dark o'erburdened soul.
 Thy radiance gives me faith—serene and clear
 Star, born of whom was the Serenest Light,
 Light of the loftiest, uncreated Sun,
 The Sun that knows no West—and leads me here,
 Freed from the snares and toils around me spun ;
 Where hope and joy come to me with the sight
 Of thy low dwelling on this rocky height.
 This house, so poor,
 Which all adore,
 In reverence I behold, and seek not now
 To raise high towers of pride in Heaven's despite ;
 But, with humility,
 The fountain see, whence grace and honour flow.
 What towers, what mountains, variously perverse
 Of fruitless knowledge, and unblessed desire,
 My faults, my follies, led me erst to seek !
 Fond spirit, that so oft hast striven to pierce
 Heaven's crystal dome by means thus vain and weak,
 Let this poor cottage worthier thoughts inspire !
 Here weep the pride whereby thou cam'st not nigher
 Thy goal, so high, that still
 Bade thee heap hill on hill,
 Then most abased when seeming most to rise,
 (Ossa on Pelion lift the heart no higher !)
 And find, in thy distress,
 Through humbleness, a pathway to the skies.
 Here angel hands exalt the lowly dwelling ;
 They bore it through the clouds and o'er the sea,
 The roof that sheltered Mary and her child ;
 A miracle in wonder far excelling
 Fables of mountain upon mountain piled ;
 Stranger than aught yet seen, or yet to be !
 This is the holy mount that soars to thee,
 Virgin and queen ;
 These walls have been
 First earthly forms to serve our Lord and Guide ;
 Whence Atlas and Olympus seem to me
 Like pebbles where I stand,
 On grains of sand, thy humble home beside.
 O happy hills whence came the quarried rock
 Of these protecting walls ; and those that yield
 The polished marble outwardly displayed ;

Since so much grace of Heaven they can unlock—
 And grace of Her, in heavenly beams arrayed,
 Whose pity, thus benignantly revealed,
 Is dearer than their skill who deftly wield
 With Phidian intent
 The sculptor's instrument,
 And power and life to senseless stone impart ; *
 Or theirs who tints of Iris have unsealed
 In pictures fair-designed
 To fire the mind—pity that melts the heart ;
 And leads lone troops of wanderers to thy shrine
 That dwell where Tagus, wandering, seeks his West ;
 Pilgrims who bear the olive branch of peace
 And hither come to share thy grace divine.
 And from far realms that gird the frozen seas,
 Beyond the Danube, others in like quest
 Bring gifts, and in thy greater gift have rest.
 For here thy presence charms
 Away all mortal harms,
 And health returns to those that seek thy aid ;
 And clement Kings, whom Heaven's own King loves
 best,
 Rich in His love, bring treasure,
 A sacred measure, upon thy altars laid.
 But thou who seest this earth, yet art in Heaven,
 Where thou art throned in majesty on high
 Above the angels, listening to their quire ;
 Wilt thou not also hear these rhymes uneven,
 And guide the hand that strikes an earthly lyre ?
 Disdain not the unequal strain, if I
 With their immortal harps thus feebly vie.
 The tongue a tribute pours
 To what the heart adores ;
 They love not more who sweeter numbers bring ;
 And, though thy gentle glory fill the sky,
 Thou hearest from me the same,
 The same sweet name—Mary, which they too sing.
 Virgin and Mother, if my lips impure
 With taint of gall or honey seem to thee,
 And hence unworthy to attempt thy praise ;
 Accept these tears—and griefs I still endure
 Make them not scarce, the while this song I raise.

* 'Woe unto him who saith to the wood, Awake ; to the dumb stone,
 Arise.' Habukkuk, c. ii, v. 19.

Pardon and peace I crave; thou well canst see
 My need; canst still my guide and comfort be.
 Avail me, weeping so,
 Hopes that from song might flow,
 And may the sorrowing accents with thee dwell!
 Compassionate, thou wilt regard in me,
 One, who in knightly joust,
 Falls stained with dust—with clinging mire as well.
 Virgin and Queen and Mother, with these tears
 I cleanse my heart; through thee again I rise,
 Through thee discern the glory of the spheres,
 And where my pathway lies.'

We have dwelt at some length on the circumstances that attended the production of the Loreto Ode because it marks a new phase in the poet's life. The knight-errant in Tasso, who had imagined Armida and her lover flying through the sky to their Atlantic bower—the delightful story-teller, who mingled fiction with truth (*intesso fregi al ver*) to make the draught more palatable—had perished in the dungeon at St Anna. But the poet and pietist survived; and piety—an inborn faith in the existence, nearness, and love of God—had ever been the noblest, and now proved the most enduring element in his nature. Even when creating, amidst the distractions of a half-pagan court, the masterpiece of his early manhood, he had transferred his muse from Parnassus to the Christian heirarchy:

'O Muse,* thou, who with laurel that shall die
 Adornest not thy brow in Helicon,
 But amid angel choirs, above the sky,
 Hast of immortal stars a golden crown;
 Inspire my breast with rapture from on high,
 Exalt my song, and, if not all thine own
 The story told, O, let it not offend
 That fables with thy truth sometimes I blend.'

Now, however, it is the Queen of Heaven, the Blessed Virgin herself—that beautiful embodiment of an ideal founded on a natural longing in beings sprung from the

* It has been suggested that the Virgin Mary is here addressed, but Solerti rejects this interpretation.

cradle for something feminine and motherly in the Divine nature—who is to inspire and guide his strain :

'Reggi la penna che vaneggia ed erra,
E prende in grado le cangiate rime.'

Thenceforth every effort of mind, heart and hand must be spent in the service of the Church, and to the greater glory of that Christian goddess who had delivered him from the living tomb at Ferrara.

Nor is there any cause to regret this change, or development, even from an artistic and literary point of view. To have written an *Odyssey*, as was at one time expected of him, narrating the adventures of the Crusaders on their way home after the capture of Jerusalem, would have brought this sincere soldier of Christ into disparaging comparison with Boyardo, Ariosto, Berni, Pulci, and others who (in common with Homer) rely on a fund of humour which Tasso did not possess, to enliven this species of composition. Chance, or Fate, or that higher direction of men's lives, a belief in which good poetry seems intended to sustain, had opened a better path to the child of genius whom doubtless she afflicted, but only to ensure his arrival in due time within sight at least of the promised land. This goal of his desire—the composition and perfecting of a strictly religious masterpiece—was, however, denied to him; yet in the '*Mondo Creato*' he had the honour of being the first to relate with becoming dignity in verse the story of creation as revealed in *Genesis*; and authorities seem to concur in crediting that work with some influence on Milton.

We now give a translation of the first ode or *poemetto* of importance that Tasso wrote after his arrival in Rome. As will be expected, it shows gratitude to the great Pontiff whose protection he enjoyed, yet who seems to have been too much occupied in regenerating the Church to bestow on a mere poet any further attention. The Canzone, '*Pel presepio di nostro signore nella capella di Sisto V in S. Maria Maggiore*,' is a fine example of what Carducci calls the classical Ode, in which a somewhat arbitrary scheme of rhyme is set up in the first strophe and then adhered to in those that follow. As, however, when the strophe is of considerable length, a departure from this

scheme or a blank ending would not readily be detected, it is the natural precursor of 'free verse.'

THE NATIVITY.

'Poor penitent, my spirit, come
And gaze devoutly round thee on this shrine,
Where the new Sixtus newly doth convene
Tall column, soaring arch and pictured dome;
Where the sun's rays benign
Welcome this happy day with gladsome mien.
This day is born, this day apparent, seen,
The visible semblance of the invisible God,
Who of Himself and with His Spirit made
This earth; the same
Whom Moses saw in flame;
Who smote the Egyptian when in pride arrayed;
And traced the ocean path which Israel trod;
The God of Hosts, of spoil, of victory,
Who gives, and takes away;
Heaven's King, who rules on high,
Shown to our eyes, in His own Son, this day.

But why thus shown, and how
Divinity with human substance joined;
And what was hidden, what made evident
To sight or reason, He alone can know
Who the great work designed.
My thought soars not so high, though duly bent
In reverence and awe, and long attent,
To study Nature and the works and ways,
So wondrous, that surround us; but no mind,
That earthly fetters bind,
Though led to truth, and swift to utter praise,
Can pierce the crystal that enshrines above
The Flower of endless Love;
Or tell why, in a world perverse and vile,
A semblance of that Flower should sometimes smile;
Or how a Virgin bore a son,
Or why a King so frail a form put on.
Here to my earnest thought,
Heaven opens, and the glory of that night
Renews itself in me. The skies are gay
With forms angelical, part overwrought
With radiance snowy white,
Beams of glad promise that outshine the day.

The rugged shepherds, by their flocks who stay,
 Wake to the sight, and to the unwonted sound
 Of angel harps, that shake the midnight air.
 There too the humble hostel hidden lies,
 Remote from worldly eyes,
 Of Night in starry state the jealous care,
 Who gathers reverently her shadows round.
 Within, the Ox and Ass attend beside
 The old man at the birth long prophesied.
 Lo! in what poor estate
 She dwells whom all so soon will venerate;
 While in the wonder of a virgin birth
 Heaven's miracles excel not this on earth.

Yet more, clear to my eyes,
 I see, or seem to see, in every sphere
 Of Heaven and Earth His glory magnified;
 War's hideous rapine, lusts and cruelties,
 Symbols and signs of fear,
 Trumpets and standards, engines gaping wide
 With murder, now no more with us abide.
 Nor betwixt men alone shall discord cease,
 And Janus' fabled gates fast locked remain;
 But with this holy birth and glad beginning,
 He who our grace is winning,
 Has on Himself all sin and sorrow ta'en;
 And between God and Man is stable Peace.
 * Nor shall the old enemy disturb His reign
 Who, at man's overthrow, gave presage sure
 Our loss should not endure;
 And opens to our feet, where'er we dwell,
 Steps up to Heaven—a pathway out from Hell.

† Mute is Apollo now,
 Silent his cave, his spring; the gods proved vain,
 Whose death erewhile he had in song foretold.

* 'E puo domar quel empio.' Compare:

'The old Dragon underground
 In straiter limits bound.'

† 'Già divien muto Apollo, e l'antro, e l'onde,
 E gli Dei falsi e vani

La cui morte in canto egli predisse.'

Compare, in the 'Ode to the Nativity,' the passage beginning 'The oracles are dumb' in which most of the same names occur. The idea of decorating a Christian poem with pagan imagery, which pervades 'Paradise Lost,' is strongly Tassian.

Dodona's Oaks sigh to all winds that blow
 But answer not again ;
 The spirit stilled that breathed therein of old,
 Quenched by the doom our sacred books enfold.
 With Mithras' temple strew'd
 Lies Ammon prone upon the billowy waste
 Of Libyan plains, where desert whirlwinds sweep,
 And sands more dread than waters surge around.
 Her yoke of pards unbound,
 Sad Dindymene may no longer keep
 High festival, and antique honours taste ;
 Her Corybants no more on Ida's steep
 Or Phrygian mead, or top of Cretan hill,
 Lament in accents shrill :
 Anubis, Apis, from their altars fled,
 Bark not nor bellow now ; sorrowing, and in dread.*

That truth shown dimly forth
 In the first writings, a new light has been—
 Light which is light of the Eternal Light.
 Run all ye peoples, East, West, South and North,
 Follow this star serene,
 Which to the Master guides your wandering sight ;
 Kneel with these kings, your gifts with theirs unite.
 Kneel with them to your King, though death be nigh ;
 Bring gold and frankincense, and fragrant myrrh ;
 Watch with these shepherds ; let not theirs exceed
 Your tardy heavenward speed :
 Bring all that kindles mind with purest fire ;
 Even with the angels in rejoicing vie.
 Crowned, sit ye in their choir,
 That earthly tongues, with theirs, a hymn of praise
 And love and joy may raise,
 For now, through God in man, to man, thus given,
 Heaven stoops to Earth and Earth soars up to Heaven.

Sixtus, if in thy thought
 These sacred images the spirit lift
 To admiration of celestial things,
 Haply the hand that brings

* The flight and consternation of the older Gods, here briefly but clearly indicated, is dwelt on more fully by Milton in his paraphrase. The Italian is :

'E dagli altari suoi dolente fugge
 Api ed Anubi, e piu non latra, o mugge.'

This hymn in want of a more costly gift,
Some echoings of that early strain hath caught
Borne through the midnight air on angel wings.
Pearls have I none, nor frankincense, nor myrrh;
Statues, nor gems—so lay this offering here.'

(ROME, December 1588.)

Shortly after the date of this Ode, Tasso visited Naples, but returned at the close of the year 1588 to Rome, where he remained till the spring of 1590, when he removed for a short time to Florence. It was a period of great gloom. Dishonest relatives and a tyrannical government had deprived him of his patrimony; piratical publishers intercepted most of the remuneration that might have come to him from his books; and he—of noble birth and gentle culture, as he is rather fond of telling his correspondents—found himself a mendicant at rich men's doors, on one occasion in fact a patient in a public hospital. The sullen silence of Alphonso was also full of menace; and, although all danger of re-incarceration seems now to have passed away, Tasso was not assured of this, and the solitary cell in St Anna—a cave of despair to him—must have ever haunted his vivid imagination.

It is, therefore, little surprising that he should have been deeply stirred by the ceremonies in Holy Week at Monte Oliveto near Siena, through which he passed on his way into Tuscany, and where the fatigue of the journey compelled a rest of some days; or that a feeling of intense depression should pervade the Ode '*Sulla passione del Redentore*' which these ceremonies, or perhaps a picture in an altarpiece contained in this monastery, evoked. It is one of the most faultless and beautiful he ever wrote, and for pathos, delicacy, and sorrow unrelieved save by the greater sorrow of the Redeemer, may be compared with that dirge of Polish freedom—first widely heard in England at a time of national mourning—the Sonata (op. 35) of Chopin. Although undoubtedly commenced at Monte Oliveto near Siena, the monastery of the same name in Florence, where possibly it may have been finished, also claims the honour of having sheltered Tasso at the time of its composition.

THE HOLY CROSS.

'Sad and ailing, spirit mine,
 So fond to flit o'er sea and sky
 And con this strange earth wistfully,*
 Seek not above,
 With curious glance, where Bear and Dragon shine,
 Heroic form or Zodiac sign;
 From thy sad thought all vain deceits remove.
 Heavy with sense of doom,
 Here let us come,
 Where there is saving grace and endless love,
 To-day, while feebly gleam
 This languid light, this tearful beam.

Dark and dolent, spirit mine,
 In pain and penitence look up;
 Look in His face who drank the cup
 Of mortal suffering;
 Think on His sorrow, not on thine;
 Think, o'er this earth, how wide His trophies shine;
 Behold the mount whence heavenward He took wing—
 The head in anguish bent,
 And thorns with blood besprent,
 Crowned on the Cross behold the Eternal King!
 To-day, while sadly gleam
 This languid light, this tearful beam.

Weeps not the Sun this day?
 Weeps not the World, weeps Nature not with Him?
 Who would not weep, this day, so wan and dim—
 Thou, spirit, more than all?
 What tide of tears, what sun with darken'd ray,
 Or moan of gathering storm, in sighs, shall pay
 Enough of brine, of gloom, of sobs? Who would not pall
 His heart in sorrow now,
 Before that awful brow,
 And sights and signs of grief around him call?
 Who but of Heaven will deem
 This languid light, this tearful beam?

* It is this wistful longing for the joyous and beautiful things of earth, dashed by a conviction that some deadly venom is inherent in them, that gives the prevailing tone to this later work. An age steeped in what Ruskin calls the 'venom of the Renaissance'—when the worship of the beautiful became at times hideously orgiastic—could hardly fail to produce this effect on a temperament like Tasso's.

List to the impious din,
 The shout, the jeer, the hammer-stroke of guilt;
 Know that the tears so shed, the blood thus spilt
 Still flow for thee:
 Even yet resound around thee and within
 The words of anguish that redeem thy sin;
 His Cross, His Tomb, caused by thy guilt to be.
 List to the pitying voice
 Of those who make this choice,
 Who share His Crown, His painful Majesty—
 The Saints whom well beseem
 This languid light, this tearful beam.

Soul, let us also die
 With Him, and nail our faults upon this tree,
 With Him that we may dwell perpetually.
 If for man's earthly need
 The Vine, the Figtree and the Palm supply
 Rich produce, sweet to taste, fair to the eye,
 Will not this loftier growth, whereof the seed
 Is Word of God, whose root
 Is in man's heart, bear fruit
 Most fair, whereon all living things shall feed,
 And blossom best where gleam
 This languid light, this tearful beam?

God's perfect med'cine this,
 Which gives from sickness and sick thoughts release;
 The plant whose sap is life, whose fruit is peace.
 Here seek, so Faith compelleth,
 The health, strength, hope and comfort that are His,
 And shall be ours when all infirmities
 Are washed from us away, as His Word telleth.
 Bleed, suffering heart; lay bare
 Thy wounds, and share
 The healing stream that from His substance wellet;
 To-day, and when this dream
 Is passed, light shall be thine,
 A tearless beam.'

(Good Friday, 1590, Monte Oliveto, Siena.)

During the following August, while still at Florence, news arrived that Sixtus V was dead. His successor also died a few days after election; the college of Cardinals seemed in no hurry to elect a new Pope; and, some months later, during the course of the following autumn,

we find Tasso, who had returned to Rome, sternly rebuking the assembled Fathers for their delay in appointing a new head to the Church. The sonnet that contains this fearless expression of opinion concerning the writer's ecclesiastical patrons compares not unfavourably with a similar passage* in *Lycidas* (I, 110/130); and we give it as an indication of the undiminished sanity and vigour of the mind that produced such fruit, together with Solerti's comment thereon:

To the Cardinals on their delay in electing a Pope:

'What! still in consecrated mantles wrapt,
Dyed with the blood of Christ this crimson hue,
Unmoved by shock of quickening fire, sleeps on
Blind will, O Fathers, in your saintly breasts?
Meanwhile the Church of God among so many—
So many, and such dear and honoured sons—
Widowed, disconsolate, and peril near,
Finds none to dry her eyes, her course to guide.
But if, through fault of yours, in this rough sea,
The barque of Peter anchorless, forlorn,
Suffer fresh harm, beware lest from the side
Of Him whose peace and healing fill the world,
Through Whom to you crown and dominion come,
Issue a sword with righteous vengeance charged.'

'This boldness on Tasso's part is unusual, especially at that time; but, in addition to the general feeling and ill-humour aroused by the extraordinary duration of the interregnum, we detect in this sonnet an expression of personal annoyance in the poet at seeing retarded the probability of a support or of a protector in the new pope.' ('Vita,' p. 665.)

Rare indeed may have been the courage at that epoch to address Princes of the Church so bluntly; but the imputation of an unworthy motive in a matter which the writer would have placed above personal considerations seems entirely gratuitous. Unfortunately, the

* 'Cieca voglia' seems to correspond with 'Blind mouths.' St Peter is referred to in his quality of pilot or sailor. Church dignitaries, after having been soundly rated for neglect of duty, are threatened with a mystical engine of punishment.

In addition to the above resemblances (to the passage in *Lycidas*) the word 'scrannel,' which appears here and has puzzled philologists, may have been coined by Milton to reproduce the sound value of 'scrannio' (a mean seat or stool), used occasionally by Tasso as a term of contempt.

remark is also typical (and for this reason we make the quotation) of an otherwise excellent biography. For thoroughness, sincerity, and an intimate knowledge of the period, Solerti's 'Life of Tasso' is quite on a par with the monument to Milton's fame erected by Masson, and our indebtedness to him for assistance in unravelling the truth is so great that one hardly likes to hint a fault; but it will constantly occur to a careful student of these pages that—possibly because he is disgusted at Manso's 'romance,' and therefore inclined to fall into the other extreme—this very able man of letters is more in sympathy with the literary dovescots of the Cinquecento than with the man of genius, the strange Bird of Paradise who took this stormy period to come and dwell among them.

Surely, Tasso deserves the same loving and reverential treatment that English biographers have lavished on Milton; but readers of Masson who take up Solerti expecting to find similar regard for an equally splendid and pathetic figure in the history of devotional poetry will be disappointed. They will also be pained to find mingled with the natural feeling of pity proper in such a case, a certain measure of undeserved contempt for the 'povero amalato' when the strangeness and incoherence, the restlessness and vacillation of these closing years are being considered. We say 'undeserved,' because the nine years which followed the imprisonment are distinguished by a literary output, of prose as well as poetry, equal in quality and quantity to that of any writer who has already produced his *magnum opus*; also by a struggle with misfortune steadfastly and not unsuccessfully maintained. With unflagging industry and zeal, and considerable adroitness, this literary agonist kept himself till the last hour of his life well in the eye of the intellectual public of that day. He had trials, of course, but they never exceeded his powers of endurance, and were frequently relieved by magnificent entertainment in the seats of learning he visited—religious foundations and princes vying for the honour of having provided the environment in which even his shorter pieces were produced, and his briefest halt in a provincial town being considered a sufficient distinction to appear in the municipal archives. Finally, in recognition of his lofty

character and unrivalled faculties, the authorities in Rome granted him an annuity sufficient for his needs, and were about to present him, in his fifty-first year, and in a ceremony that would have taken place before representatives of every civilised state in Europe, with the laurel of Petrarch. Fate willed that this outward token should only be laid upon his brow after death; but, though called away at this supreme hour, his case seems hardly one for disdainful pity:

‘O selig der, dem er im Siegesglanze *
Die blut’gen Lorbeern um die Schläfe windet.’

The long imprisonment had conferred on Tasso a crown like that of martyrdom; and his chief glory on the side of character is that, vaguely aware of this, he suffered no meanness or lapse in conduct to strip him of the right to wear the painful honour thrust upon him.

Early in 1591, and with some misgiving, Tasso consented to accompany Costantini to Mantua, where he stayed the greater part of the year, but where he was so unhappy that on one occasion, refusing to eat, he seems to have determined so to end his days. This is the only attempt on his life he is known to have made, and, as it admitted of reconsideration, need not be taken very seriously. The incident is of some importance in relation to the sufferer's supposed madness, of which, had the attempt been more resolute, it would have furnished the confirmation which is still lacking.

This question, or the allied one of the origin of the Duke's anger, cannot here be discussed. We may, however, suggest that a clue to the bitter personal resentment shown by the Duke, which in the closing years of his life prevented him from writing a line of consolation to the poet when appealed to shortly before the latter's death, might be found in the following madrigal, if the name of the lady concerned were known. The matter referred to must have appeared of supreme importance, or Tasso would not have made it the subject of an address to the Divinity.

* O happy he for whom, in victory's hour,
Death winds the blood-stained laurels round his brow.
(‘Faust,’ I, 1573-4.)

'HE ASKS AID OF CHRIST.'

'Behold how soft, how sweet the light,
Alluringly that leads astray,
Of glossy tress and glances bright;
Look down upon these gardens dight
With flowers that hem the broader way;
See there how smooth, how white
The hand that drew the net so subtly spread;
On me thus erring shed,
Father, a kindly ray
To guide me, that my feet may find
Thine own true path; these toils unbind,
If from offence so deep Heaven's grace can free!
Thy Cross, my sin, make present to my mind,
And turn my steps to thee.'

We now come to the year in which the 'Mondo Creato' was commenced. Tasso had returned to Rome in the suite of the young Duke of Mantua, and early in 1592 set out for Naples, where, as the guest of Prince Conca and later of Count Manso, he remained till the end of April. Like 'Paradise Regained' (and here Solerti accepts Manso's statement) the poem owes its origin to a suggestion from another mind; the Count's mother, who delighted in their guest's religious conversation, having encouraged him to write a purely sacred poem. The analogy which it bears to the previously published 'La Sepmaine' of Du Bartas shows that our author was acquainted with that work; but into his own he has poured such rich stores of learning, speculative philosophy, imagination and moral precept—fact, fable and worldly wisdom—that in this version of the well-known theme we have a distinctly original production. There is conformity of treatment but little imitation, though both writers may have been indebted to Pliny and Lucretius, as well as to more remote Mosaic cosmology.

As the title indicates, 'Le sette Giornate del Mondo Creato' reproduces the Biblical account of the beginning of things, and, Ptolemaic views still prevailing, places the earth at the centre of the Universe. The poem starts with the assumed existence of the Trinity, self-sufficing and eternal, whom the author invokes in the opening numbers, asking that, like a harp struck by its

master's hand, he may produce a strain that will attract all peoples to listen to his assertion of Divine truth. The discourse is divided into seven books, one being assigned to each of the successive acts of creation, and concludes with the appearance of our first ancestors on the scene of their subsequent misfortunes. It will thus be seen that, as Solerti points out, this last work of the poet leaves off where 'Paradise Lost' begins. It is written in blank verse, Tasso having discarded the assistance of rhyme, probably considering *ottava rima* hardly compatible with the dignity of his subject and not caring to walk in the steps of Dante. The poem is didactic, theological and descriptive; and, although unfinished, there is little reason to suppose that the general scheme would have been much altered. At any rate, the first book seems to have received final correction; it is therefore from this, the most polished portion, that we have chosen some examples, chiefly relating to Light. The solemnity of the opening lines shows clearly how deeply Tasso was impressed with the importance of his task; we also perceive how far he has travelled from the semi-paganism of the stanza, previously cited, with which he begins the 'Liberata.'

GIORNATA PRIMA.

'Father of Heaven, and Thou, Eternal Son—
 Son uncreated—of the Eternal Father,
 Only begotten of the Immutable Mind;
 And Divine image of divine perfection,
 Thyself perfection, flame of purest flame;
 And Thou, of both these spirits, both these splendours,
 Or of this two-fold splendour, Fervid Spirit,
 And likewise sacred light and sacred flame—
 Pure stream from purest fountain welling forth—
 In whom, if it become me so to say,
 The first high model refuls himself:
 Thou, Triple Sun, Lord, Messenger and Bond,
 Three holy essences in one conjoined,
 Fire in the hearts, light in the minds of men; *

* Cf. 'Questi ne porta il fuoco invér la luna;
 Questi ne' cor mortali è permotore;
 Questi la terra in sè stringe ed aduna.'

('Paradise,' I, 116-18.)

God, not aloof, in whom all things unite,
 Swift to diffuse themselves again abroad,
 Thyself the high completion of thy will :
 Thou, Divine Love, from Father and from Son
 Descend in me, and host within my heart,
 And bring heaven's grace, and thought and song inspire,
 That I may sing this first and highest work
 By Thee accomplished, which shines forth in Thee,
 Most marvellous, and the fair workmanship
 Of this created world, this six days' task.'

After this invocation Tasso touches various theological subjects, refers to Greek mythology and to

... 'the darkness bred
 In Egypt which obscured the antique world.'

He then continues :

'Not in such darkness shall this song be heard
 (If I be worthy) while I sing of light,
 The eldest born of God's prolific mind
 T'ward which the mind of man vainly aspires.
 Not yet were plain and forest ; from the ground
 Not yet had the first fountains broken forth,
 Nor mountains reared their heads, nor rivers flowed,
 When of his glory God created light.
 With him was light when, of this universe,*
 He cast in adamant the outward sphere ;
 With him, when in the heavens he set the stars,
 And made the deep of waters flow around ;
 When, too, he fixed a limit to the sea,
 And gave its waves his law. When he convened
 The elements that should sustain our earth
 Light made his labour joy ; and in his mansion
 Was ever with him ere he willed this world,
 Ere seasons, varying years, and Time began.'

Earth rising out of Chaos is thus described :

'Darkly emergent was the earth, and bare,
 Newly created, void and unadorned ;

* Tasso (and Milton, with some hesitation) believed the visible universe to consist of a series of concentric spheres encompassing the earth. Heaven and the Empyrean, Chaos and Hell were external to this.

Like some vast theatre with empty seats,
 Unfurnished—none to act or to applaud.
 Her children yet unborn, their wretched eyes
 Saw not the horror of that dreadful waste,
 Those mountainous solitudes and untilled plains.
 No tree umbrageous tresses had unbound
 To make a pleasant shade among the hills,
 Nor shrub put forth its leaves ; nor in the fields
 Had Hyacinth and Narcissus, and their kin,
 Mingled soft colours with the herbs and grass,
 Or sprung in garlands round the limpid pools.
 Like one astounded, Mother Earth, in dread,
 Seemed cowering from the dreadful face of things,
 Her members all unsightly and unformed
 Sunk in black waters, or with darkness veiled.
 Not yet the splendour of the sky was shown
 In gay attire of gold and azure dressed,
 And lucent signs ; not yet the sun had lit
 His ardent lamp, nor moon in humbler state
 Opposed to him her silvery horn, or found
 The steep and devious path she nightly treads.
 Unheard was that first heavenly harmony,
 The carol of the fixed and wandering stars,
 Nor wore the Night her crown. In such aspect
 The nascent world hid from herself in awe.'

Here follows a discourse on the origin of evil ; returning to Light, we have :

'Then was Eternal Light before the world,
 And before darkness which involves the world,
 Light which illumines the mind serenely blest—
 The senses, no ; but that which governs sense.
 Light seen is but the semblance of this light ;
 Semblance, that takes some glory from its model ;
 Model, whereof the sun is but a ray.
 Light uncreated was before the world ;
 Haply created light, through countless ages,
 Through centuries by centuries multiplied,
 Was also shining ere this world began.
 But, like eternities (to use such phrase),
 Preceded still the world, also the time
 In which the second splendours were created
 From the first splendour—Angels sanctified.
 But heavenly Princes, Virtues, Dignities,
 Glorious, immortal armies of the Elect,

Dwelt not in what to all but One seemed dark.
 Hence, with the birth of first created minds
 Was there created light. In joy and song
 They dwelt within that light which was their joy
 As He who is both light and being dwells;
 Singing together in a sacred round,
 With sacrifice of reverence and praise.
 This is the light which, by the ancient Fathers
 Was promised to the just—immortal light,
 Which shall be theirs for ever. But the wicked
 In pain and outer darkness have their part.

So in the darkness of the black abyss,
 And on the waters, moved the Divine Spirit,
 Preparing humid nature for her task;
 Breathing down force and virtue on the waves
 In manner of a bird that brooding sits,
 Who, with her vital warmth, from a frail shell *
 Draws forth the callow offspring yet unformed—
 And said: Let there be light. The Word of God
 Is work accomplished! Of itself, the air,
 Scarce waiting for the sound of loosened tongues,
 Felt and obeyed the impulse of his thought,
 Moved by his Holy Will—the inward Word. . . .

Thus the first voice and first command made light;
 Clear, pure, and splendid light, God's instant gift,
 And image of serene Divinity,
 Upgathered the first day, but, with the fourth,
 Divided and to separate seats assigned;
 Hid Horror her gaunt face; darkness dispersed,
 Left visible the sombre earth; the sky
 Wore a first smile of welcome to the dawn
 And radiantly his changeful tints disclosed;
 On every side North, South, and East, and West,
 All quarters of the world were steeped in light;
 In light, most beautiful, which to our eyes
 And hearts brings swift intelligence of heaven;
 Light that consoles, and heals; our friend, our guide,

* . . . darkness profound

Covered the abyss; but on the watery calm
 His brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread,
 And vital virtue infused, and vital warmth,
 Throughout the fluid mass.

(*'Paradise Lost,' B. VII, i, 233-37.*)

The joy of Nature, of Earth, Sea, and Air,
Of Mind and Sense, and, almost emulous,
Of things that perish and of things eterne.'

We have no space for further quotation from the first book; and those that follow seem generally only the rough draft of a poem—their composition a race with Death—yet seldom does the verse sink below the average of the 'Excursion' or the 'Task' (which in manner it occasionally resembles), and the reader never long forgets that Tasso holds the pen. Judged by its output, Tasso's mind, to the last, burned bright and clear, as may be gathered from his farewell to Mother Earth ('Mondo Creato,' Fifth Day), a passage written when life was fast ebbing away, and with which these observations may appropriately conclude.

'Soon thinking to regain his own dear land,
After long sojourn in a foreign clime
Where Fortune rarely smiles, and joys are few;
The weary exile yet feels some regret,
Cons o'er the toils and dangers of past years,
Remembers help and courtesy received,
And cheer and comfort, and, ere he depart,
Takes friendly leave of trusted host and hostel.
So we, desiring Heaven, our long-delayed
Immortal heritage, for this less loved
Dim, careful, and confined abode of earth,
And of the sea that round about her flows,
Where we have fed and rested, often found
Shelter, and pleasant welcome through long years,
May feel a gentle and allowed regret.
Likewise some thanks we owe, tokens and gifts,
Last offices of love and piety,
Due to this earth, our old kind constant nurse,
Who gathers us when children in her lap,
And still supports us in old age; to this
Wide sea that bears us and so amply feeds;
To this, wherein we breathe, clear deep of air.'

HENRY CLORISTON.

Art. 3.—RECENT PEERAGE CASES.

1. *Petitions, Cases, Minutes of Evidence and Proceedings on claims to Peerage Dignities, 1911-1914.*
2. *The Law Reports. Appeal Cases, 1915 : Part I.* London : Council of Law Reporting, 1915.

THERE can be few fields of study more recondite or unfamiliar than that of peerage law. For, despite its intrinsic interest, there must always be but few to whom it can ever prove of any practical advantage. Claims to peerage dignities are by no means of frequent occurrence ; and only those who are professionally engaged in the prosecution of such claims can find it to their interest to acquire a knowledge of what is in many ways a peculiar branch of the law. An obvious disadvantage of this state of things is that no one can be fairly expected to produce a text-book on the subject, when the limited demand for that work would involve him in certain loss. He would have, in the main, to be content with the thought of the service he was rendering to others. But he would also have the consolation of reflecting that, after his death, lawyers, who, unlike historians, have not yet grasped what an 'authority' means, would be allowed to cite him as 'a great authority on these points.' He might, of course, be wrong in his facts, but that is of small account to the lawyer, who believes that a thing is true because an 'authority' has said so. It is only the historian who troubles to go behind the book and to ask what actual 'authority' the writer had for his statement.

Till recent years, indeed, the only text-book available was that of Cruise on 'The Origin and Nature of Dignities or Titles of Honour,' of which a revised edition appeared in 1823 ; and Cruise confessed that the work he had planned on a more ambitious scale would involve a loss 'greater than any private individual could be expected to incur.' The need for a more modern text-book was supplied, with much public spirit, by a well-known legal writer, Sir Francis Palmer, whose 'Peerage Law in England, a practical treatise for lawyers and laymen,' appeared in 1907. This is a most valuable and comprehensive manual, although one may venture, on certain points, to differ from its learned author. Since the appearance of Sir F. Palmer's work I have dealt with a number of cases,

and the decisions of the House thereon, in 'Peerage and Pedigree' (1910); but the singular rush of claims in the last few years has not only revived interest in the subject, but led also to a series of decisions, or, more strictly, resolutions, of considerable interest and importance. But the pace, if one may be allowed the expression, seems too hot to last. The House has already disposed of claims to one earldom and ten baronies, and the claims to four other baronies are now before it; but up to now the result has been the addition of no more than two baronies to the roll. So far, therefore, there is not much to encourage further claims, nor is the number of ancient dignities which still remain to be claimed so great as it formerly was.

Although, for the benefit of the public at large, one hears much of the 'romance' associated with peerage claims, it would be more correct to say that the necessary proof of pedigree has at times the grim result of forcing a carefully guarded skeleton to emerge from the family cupboard. Questions of marriage or of parentage are usually the source of the trouble; and, accordingly, two contested marriages have recently come before the House. More singular was the fate of two unfortunate ladies, who were duly found by the Committee to be co-heirs to a barony, but who were afterwards discovered to be suffering from technical corruption of blood, due to the misdoing of an ancestor in the 17th century. The Resolution in their favour, which had been adopted by the House, had to be altered accordingly. But I am not here dealing with the 'romance' of the subject, nor am I primarily concerned with its historical interest. It is true that questions of political and of constitutional history have arisen and have been discussed at very great length in cases lately before the House; and Sir William Anson was to be seen, shortly before his death, listening with keen interest to the arguments which arose upon them. As the late Prof. Maitland observed in his lectures on our constitutional history:

'From time to time peerages are claimed by titles which rake up the whole mass of obscure constitutional antiquities; and a committee of privileges of the House of Lords is called on to import into very remote times some definite theory of the

baronage, some theory much more definite than had been conceived by the men of those times. No statute of limitations bars the claim to a peerage, and occasionally claims based on very ancient facts have to be discussed and decided.' (p. 78.)

When all, however, has been said, the ultimate decision must rest, not with political historians or writers on the English Constitution, but with the Committee for Privileges. The *St John* case (1914), for instance, has shown that the question, so keenly controverted of late, as to which was the first valid Parliament, is one which must of necessity be decided by the Lords themselves. For by 'valid' they mean valid for the purposes of Peerage Law; and Peerage Law, as 'settled' and 'ascertained' by themselves, has now, perhaps, less than ever in common with historical fact.

The historian is apt to look with, at best, a good-humoured tolerance on peerage lawyers and their ways. Their methods, indeed, are not his; their conventions strike him as absurd; and their almost superstitious reverence for Coke is enough to drive him to despair. For Coke's authority is now shattered; I have boldly exposed his 'carelessness,' his 'credibility' and his 'fictions'; and the more closely his statements are examined, the more untrustworthy they become. Yet the latest text-book on Peerage Law, that of Sir Francis Palmer (1907), places Coke at the head of 'writers of authority on the subject' and claims that 'his statements of the law and his opinions are entitled to the highest respect, for he is one of the chief oracles of our common law.' No one has exercised so great an influence on the moulding of our Peerage Law; indeed, the doctrine that a barony was created by writ and sitting was not merely, as Sir Francis puts it, 'fully recognised' by him; it was invented by himself. We are, however, here concerned with Peerage Law as now settled, and not with the question whether its doctrines are historically sound.

Viewing from this standpoint the cases recently heard, we must treat the claim to an earldom as belonging to a class apart. The earldom of Oxford created by the Empress Maud and her son for Aubrey de Vere 'and his

heirs' was held under Charles I to be descendible to the heir-male, and became extinct with the last de Vere in 1702. But the recent claim was based on the hypothesis that there were two earldoms—the original dignity, now in abeyance between the heirs-general of the above Aubrey, and a later one limited to heirs male and created in 1392. This question really turned, as in the 17th century, on the effect of the parliamentary proceedings in 1392. For the claimant it was urged that the earldom 'restored,' but in tail male, on that occasion, was legally a new creation; in the view of the Crown it was the old earldom restored with a new limitation. Now only an Act of Parliament can validate a change in the limitation of an existing dignity, as in the case of the earldom of Arundel. What, therefore, had to be decided was whether the charter of restitution '*de assensu Parliamenti nostri*' operated as an Act of Parliament; and, if so, whether it should be construed as restoring an ancient dignity or creating a new one. Much of the ground had been already traversed in 1625-6, but I advanced the new argument that there was a uniform formula at the time for the creation of an earl, and that this formula was quite distinct from that which is used in the charter. This was vigorously, but unsuccessfully, disputed by Sir Robert Finlay; and the Committee promptly disposed of the claim by construing the charter as a restitution of the ancient dignity. This was the same conclusion as that at which Crewe, C.J., had arrived in 1626. The case, had it proceeded, would have presented interesting features, especially the question whether an earldom could fall, like a barony, into abeyance—a point which is still an open one in Peerage Law.

Turning from the earldom to the ten baronies, these can be dealt with as a single group, for they all belong to the same class. Loosely termed 'baronies in fee,' their existence is based upon the doctrine, derived, as I have said, from Coke, that a writ of summons, if followed by a sitting under that writ, creates a barony descendible to the heirs of the party summoned and sitting. It is not easy to find a formula which shall express this doctrine in its present extended form; Sir Francis Palmer states it as above when dealing with 'baronies by writ,' but in a later passage holds it 'essential that a sitting

shall be proved under the writ of summons relied on as creating the barony.' Yet, on the one hand, a series of cases, from that of Vaux (1837) onwards, has established the principle that a writ of summons may be 'presumed' from a valid sitting; and, on the other, the Committee has repeatedly admitted baronies in which the sitting has been much later than 'the writ of summons relied on as creating the barony.' 'It was held,' for instance, according to Sir F. Palmer himself, 'that the Mowbray barony was created by summons and sitting in 11 Edw. I,' although the date of that writ of summons was 1283, while there was no proved sitting till a later generation. Of recent cases Furnival and Martin show a discrepancy of date between the creative writ and the first proved sitting.

In all these cases, therefore, the claimant—or, more strictly, 'the petitioner'—had the same task to accomplish. He had to prove the writ and sitting by which, according to the legal theory, a descendible barony was created; and he then had to prove himself to be one of the heirs in blood of a holder of that barony. The writ usually presents little or no difficulty, but the proof of a sitting is hard to obtain in the case of early baronies, the more so as it has, in strictness of law, to be proved 'by the records of parliament.' It is the duty of those who represent the Crown to watch with special jealousy any attempt to obtain a relaxation of this rule, for the necessary proof of sitting is the one effective barrier against a flood of claims to medieval baronies. The pedigree, although its formal proof may involve great expense, is rarely open to question, unless there is a marriage of doubtful validity or an 'extinction' difficult to establish. Yet, even when he has surmounted his troubles, the claimant has only proved that he is one of the co-heirs, for any one of whom, if the Crown is so pleased, it can 'call out of abeyance' the dignity he seeks to obtain. Indeed, the abeyance need not be 'determined' (i.e. ended) at all. The baronies of Wharton (1845) and Fitzwalter (1844) are among the five cases cited by Sir Francis Palmer 'in which an abeyance has been determined'; but it was not determined in either case.

To the public at large, baronies which descend, as it is vaguely said, 'in the female line' are a cause of frequent perplexity. By the doctrine of abeyance, which

was only developed in the 17th century, baronies which were last heard of five or even six centuries ago, and the very existence of which would probably be denied by historians, can now be claimed by the heirs in blood of those alleged to have held them. This has been the subject of much ridicule; and in the case of the recent claims it would seem, certainly, that the barony of Dudley, which only fell into abeyance in the year 1757, stands on a very different footing from that of Martin, for which the last summons was in 1325, or that of 'Strabolgi,' for which the last was in 1369. In the eye of the law, however, no such difference exists.

Of the ten baronies, in recent cases, claimed as being in abeyance, that of Latymer presented no difficulty; nor did that of Dudley, as no earlier date than 1440 was claimed for its creation. The barony of Martin also was well within what one may term 'the rules of the game'; the Cobham claim was recognised as valid, subject to an unreversed attainder, but the question of its precedence gave rise to an elaborate argument by Mr Cozens-Hardy, who contended, in his own words, for the proposition:

'That where you have a recorded sitting lower down, then under the circumstances of this case (and I am not concerned with other circumstances) you can throw back the date of the creation to the date of the earlier writ, and you need not prove the sitting of the first person to whom the writ was issued.'

Earl of Halsbury: 'I do not understand the logic of that—that because there has been a sitting and there has been proof of that sitting, therefore you are entitled to date the creation of the peerage from that which you admit, and must admit, would not be proof of a peerage. What is the logic of that?'

This criticism is obviously sound; and the position, I hold, is that which was taken by Lord Cottenham in the Hastings case; but counsel, disclaiming logic, produced such a weight of usage that the Committee were induced to pass this Resolution:

'That Henry de Cobham who was summoned to Parliament by a Writ dated the 8th January 6 Edward II (1313) was entitled to a Barony by Writ descendible to the heirs general of his body.'

As there was admitted to be no sitting till the time of Henry's grandson (1377), the above Resolution, taken as it stands, certainly implies that a writ alone could vest a descendible barony in a man who never sat. There is, as Lord Halsbury pointed out, 'no logic in that'; indeed, it is the doctrine against which those who represent the Crown have to be ever on their guard.

Of the remaining claims, that to Dynaunt was abandoned almost at the outset; the claims to Furnival and Fitzwarine raised the question of barony *jure uxoris*, though this only affected the precedence, not the existence, of those dignities; while the only question in the claim to Burgh was whether the creation should date from the first writ (1487) or from two generations later. In spite of long and stubborn argument, the Crown succeeded in proving that the later date was the right one, and thereby established the important point that, at least in this case, a cessation of writs for one generation might involve fresh creation. The Strabolgi and St John claims will be separately dealt with below.

Before proceeding to discuss the points that arose in these cases, I may perhaps be permitted to observe that in four cases the views I had expressed, before they arose, have now prevailed. Burgh has been accepted as a new creation under Henry VIII; the Fitzwarine barony has only been allowed to date from the days of Henry VI (though 1283 was claimed); Lord Cottenham's 'judgement' in the Hastings case has been, in effect, rejected by the St John decision; and the careless acceptance, by Lord Cairns and the rest of the Committee in the Segrave case, of the Parliament of 1283 has at last, it will be seen, been dealt with and not followed. This is by no means the only point that I have deemed it necessary to criticise in the Mowbray and Segrave cases (1877); and it is not improbable that, sooner than any one imagines, the attention of the House may have to be directed to the 'judgements' of Lord Cairns, Lord O'Hagan, and Lord Blackburn on that occasion. The main cause, however, of their questionable decision was that the Attorney-General, apparently, was without proper expert advice, and therefore took no objection to three 'Parliaments,' all of which would now be questioned, and failed, which was more important, to adduce rebutting

evidence on the formal recognition of titles. Lord Redesdale had rightly insisted, in the 'Reports on the Dignity of a Peer,' on 'the apparent want of proper information of facts and circumstances, when the House, in various instances, has been called upon to decide on claims to dignities.'

The status, in these cases, of the Attorney-General is, as it seems to me, somewhat difficult to define. Sir Francis Palmer, we observe, has adopted Cruise's paragraph on the subject, merely altering its form. 'As guardian,' says the former writer, 'of the legal rights of the Crown and privileges of the peerage, it is the Attorney-General's duty to see that no one is admitted to the peerage who does not prove a clear and equitable' (Cruise says 'clear and indisputable') 'title to the dignity.' As being originally the King's Attorney, this officer is clearly 'the guardian of the legal rights of the Crown'; but it is not so apparent why he is the guardian of 'the privileges of the peerage.' One has, however, heard Lord Halsbury appeal to him in Committee as 'our watchdog'; and Lord Cottenham observed in the Wharton case that 'the Committee has a right to the assistance of the Attorney-General's opinion upon the evidence.' It is his recognised duty 'to make such objections to the case and pedigree, as may occur to him,' as Cruise expresses it, or, in the words of Sir Francis Palmer, 'as he may be advised.' The latter phrase, rightly or wrongly, seems to imply that his objections are suggested to him by an adviser. In any case, he is not called upon to oppose for the sake of opposing, although there must, I submit, be instances in which he could point out with advantage the danger of a decision which might be invoked in future cases as a precedent and involve a relaxation in the strictness of the law.

Of the points arising on recent claims, proof of sitting was the difficulty in the case of the strangely named barony of 'Strabolgi.' This title was constructed from the fact that David (of Strathbogie), Earl of Athol, was the ancestor claimed as the first peer, on the ground that he, as Earl of Athol, had been summoned to, and had sat in, Parliament under Edward II. The case turned on whether the single sitting claimed, viz. in

the York Parliament of 1318, was valid. It was, perhaps, an open question. For the Crown it was pointed out, in the first place, that he is not found in the list of those summoned to that Parliament; and that this could not have been an accident, as he was not summoned to those which preceded or those which followed it till he succeeded to Chilham, an old territorial barony, from which time he was summoned continuously. In the second place it was urged that the documentary evidence—a misplaced and separate membrane of a roll discovered since the Rolls of Parliament were printed—records only the meeting of a council of magnates, some of whom, certainly, were not peers. The best and fullest account of this Parliament is found in Prof. Tout's 'The place of the reign of Edward II in English History' (published since the case was heard), in which the learned author detects 'a survival of the old council of magnates acting within a new-fashioned parliament.' This was, in effect, the Crown's contention, the argument being that the earl was only present as a member of 'the King's council in Parliament,' to use the phrase of the time. Unfortunately, this phrase assumed, on the lips of the Attorney-General, the obviously unmeaning form of 'the Parliament in Council, as it is sometimes called' (Minutes, pp. 466, 469, 472). A very interesting question in constitutional history seemed likely to arise; but, even had the argument been correctly presented to their Lordships, these results of the latest learning, and especially of Prof. Maitland's researches, were rather strong meat for so cautious a body. Nevertheless, the Committee resolved to adjourn the claim *sine die* 'for the further production of evidence,' not feeling satisfied as to the proof of sitting. At a later date the whole case was heard over again, with a new Attorney-General; and, after elaborate argument, the sitting was eventually allowed. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of this hearing was the production, at the last moment, of another and 'constructive' sitting, on which their Lordships expressed no opinion. The argument, however, was so ingenious that more is likely to be heard of it. The eventual success of this claim appears to me to extend somewhat the principle of 'presuming' a writ, established in the Vaux and Hastings cases.

The proof of sitting in the Burgh case involves a question which affects several other baronies and illustrates in somewhat startling fashion their Lordships' erratic procedure in the matter of the evidence required. I was able to establish, in a paper on 'Henry VIII and the Peers' ('Peerage Studies,' pp. 330-366), the new and interesting fact that in 1529 the King, hampered in his measures by the strength of the clerical element in the Upper House, resorted to the eminently modern device of creating a batch of new peers. To the twenty-seven lay barons summoned to the opening session (Nov. 3-Dec. 17) he added seven fresh ones, all of whom took their seats within the short space of five days (Dec. 1-4). A further modern touch is added to this transaction by the fact that four out of the seven had been returned to that Parliament as members of the House of Commons. Now let it be clearly understood that this creation of peers rests solely on the authority of a MS. volume in the College of Arms known as 'H. 13.' For the Journals of the House of Lords are, unfortunately, wanting for several years at this period. In 1534, when they recommence, they afford the needful proof of sitting for the newly created peers; but the fact that they were admitted to the House in 1529 rests solely on the authority of 'H. 13.'

The question, therefore, is one of the admissibility of evidence. Either this MS. volume is admissible as proof of sitting, or it is not. If it is, these seven baronies are proved to have been created in the year 1529; if it is not, the earliest proof of the existence of any one of them is afforded by the entry in the Lords' Journals of 1534. I was able, in the above paper, to show that, from the historical standpoint, the evidence in this volume on the subject is worthy of credit and, as such, is of considerable value. But its legal status as proof of sitting is quite another matter. On this point I showed that, in the Wentworth case (1702), at a time when the heralds played a larger part than now—'they produced the heralds' proofs'; and Sir Henry St George described the volume as 'looked upon to be very good.' In 1836 it again made its appearance on a claim to another of these seven baronies, that of Braye. Counsel, who desired to put it in, together with the

Wentworth minute-book, 'were informed that they could not be used as evidence'; but, in spite of this, their Lordships arrived at the formal conclusion that Sir Edmund Braye 'was summoned to Parliament as a Baron of the Realm, by writ, in the twenty-first year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, anno 1529, and sat in Parliament in pursuance of such writ.' Of this Resolution one need only say that for the alleged writ there is no evidence whatever; and for the sitting there is only a volume which, according to themselves, 'could not be used as evidence.' This discrepancy, to which my paper had drawn attention, was duly pointed out by the late Attorney-General at the hearing of the Burgh case in 1912. He reminded the Committee of the proposition that

'the proper way to prove the sitting is by reference to the Journals of your Lordships' House . . . The proper way to prove a sitting in Parliament is by reference to the Parliament Roll (*sic*), and you ought not to prove it by other documents. . . . That is laid down as the true method of proving the sitting.'

But in the Braye case, he admitted, the Committee 'took the date from' H. 13,

'because, apparently, they had not any other. They took 1529 . . . the explanation of it appears to be, so far as one can judge, that in that case the proof of sitting was the Garter Record, which was accepted apparently at that time by their Lordships, although it was said not to be legal evidence' (Minutes, pp. 459-460).

Only a year later than the hearing of the Braye case, the claim to the barony of Vaux came before the House (1837). It was evidently H. 13, which, as 'a contemporary manuscript preserved in the Heralds' College,' again put in an appearance, being cited in order to prove that 'Thomas, Lord Vaux, took his seat . . . in the 22nd of Henry 8.' The Attorney-General, however, objected, and this evidence was rejected. Nor was it allowed to influence their Lordships' Resolution.

So again, in spite of the Braye Resolution, Windsor, another of the seven baronies, was, as I showed, dated, when called out of abeyance (1855), as having been

created no earlier than 1534, 'because' (to continue the above quotation) 'that is the earliest record of the sittings proved according to legal evidence, that is by the Journals of your Lordships' House.' That my criticism of the Braye decision was justified is shown by the confusion it has caused. Sir Francis Palmer, for instance, in 1907, laid down in uncompromising fashion the rule as to 'proof of sitting':

'This rule, that the records of Parliament are the proper and only evidence of a sitting in Parliament, is one which was laid down by Lord Coke, and has been recognised ever since' (*Op. cit.* p. 46).

Yet, only three pages earlier, the learned author had stated, citing the Braye Peerage Case, that 'there it was shown that B[raye] was summoned to Parliament as a baron of the realm by writ in the 21 Hen. VIII, 1529, and that he sat in Parliament in pursuance of such writ.' The writ here alleged was a mere deduction from the sittings; and the sitting was not proved by 'the records of Parliament.'

The law was thus unsettled on this vital point when Burgh, another of the seven baronies (as it has now been decided to be), was claimed in 1911. Two printed cases were presented for the three petitioners, and two sets of counsel employed; but both concurred in citing, as the proof of sitting, not merely the entry in the Journals of 1534, but the College of Arms MS. H. 13, which was alleged to contain 'an account of the opening of Parliament on 3 November, 21 Henry VIII (1529), in which it is stated that the Lord Burgh made his first entry into the Parliament Chamber.' This allegation is but one example of the need for expert verification on behalf of the Crown, and for affording more time and facilities for the task. In this instance I happened to know that what the MS. really proves is that Lord Burgh was only admitted on December 2—a difference of vital consequence, as supporting the Crown's contention that his barony was a new creation ('Peerage Studies,' pp. 334-5). When this was realised, Counsel wished to withdraw the MS. in question; the Crown claimed that it had been put in; but, after discussion, their Lordships held that it had not been put in, and was, therefore, not in evidence. This

matter is so important that I must quote from the Minutes (pp. 345-6) the passage in question :

‘Attorney-General : I do not mind so long as it is not in evidence at all.

‘Earl of Halsbury : I think in strictness the fact that you objected and it was not handed in is conclusive against its being in evidence.

‘Attorney-General : So long, my Lord, as it is not in evidence at all, and it is not referred to again. . . . So long as it is quite clear that your Lordships are satisfied, I have discharged my duty.

‘Earl of Halsbury : . . . I think from what one might call the Common Law method in putting in evidence, if it is withdrawn there is an end of it. You cannot treat it as having been in evidence at all.

‘Attorney-General : My Lord, I am quite satisfied so long as it is not to be referred to ; and then the matter will stand simply that we must strike out altogether the 1529 date, and I can only deal with it as a question whether the admission is to be 1534 or 1487.’

The issue was thus rendered clear beyond dispute. Nevertheless, in their report to the House (July 23, 1912), their Lordships, rejecting, in accordance with the Attorney-General's contention, the date of 1487, adopted that of 1529. Their formal Resolution ran thus :

‘That it is proved that Sir Thomas Burgh sat as a Peer in Parliament next after Lord Windsor in the year 1529 and that the said Sir Thomas Burgh was from that date entitled to the barony by Writ descendible to the heirs general of his body.’

It will be remembered that this date of 1529 was derived *solely* from that MS. volume in the possession of the College of Arms, which had been so explicitly withdrawn that, in the words of Lord Halsbury, ‘you cannot treat it as having been in evidence at all.’ The Burgh Resolution is, if possible, even more amazing than that which, in similar circumstances, was arrived at on the barony of Braye. Speaking, as lawyers say, with submission, one wonders what the Home Secretary would have to say to a bench of magistrates which held a fact to be ‘proved’ by evidence which was not before them and which indeed had been explicitly excluded from their purview.

But this amazing Resolution went further still. It asserted that the first Lord Burgh 'sat as a Peer in Parliament next after Lord Windsor in the year 1529.' So 'Lord Windsor' also was already sitting as a Peer in 1529. But the Letters Patent of October 15, 1855, by which the barony of Windsor was called out of abeyance, expressly dated it as 'originating by writ of summons to Parliament, granted to Sir Andrew Windsor in the *twenty-fifth year* of the reign of King Henry the Eighth (1533-4).' How then can Lord Windsor have 'sat as a Peer' in 1529, if his barony did not even originate till several years later? The 'writ of summons' of the Letters Patent—for the terms of which the Law Officers were, one presumes, responsible—was, as a fact, quite imaginary, as I have shown in 'Studies in Peerage and Family History'; but the point is that their Lordships' Resolution was at direct variance with the Letters Patent, and thereby incidentally, and, no doubt, unconsciously, assigned to the barony of Windsor quite a new date. That date, moreover, was taken from the Garter manuscript, which, as was shown above, was actually not in evidence.

To the lay mind it is difficult to distinguish any consistent principle in the rules of evidence which prevail at present in peerage cases. Documentary proof which would satisfy a critical historian may be rejected as inadmissible by the Committee for Privileges; on the other hand, even though a peerage claim may depend on proof of pedigree, not merely hearsay evidence, but even 'hearsay upon hearsay,' may be held to constitute that proof. The rigour with which documents are examined, not merely as to their genuineness, but also, and even more, as to their proper custody, contrasts strangely with the lax acceptance of statements by the members of a family, or statements derived from them, as to its pedigree. Yet an eminent critical antiquary, the Rev. Joseph Hunter, has made the following just observations on the subject:

'It is curious to observe how little accuracy there sometimes is in families respecting their own descent, and how liable the genealogist is to be misled when he has to trust to oral information, unsupported by documentary evidence.'

Compare with this the statement for which Sir Francis Palmer cites a text-book on evidence :

‘Evidence that the deceased father of the claimant told him or someone else some fact in relation to the pedigree which had been related to him by his father or grandfather, or some other member of the family, is admissible in evidence in a pedigree case.’ (*Op. cit.*, p. 237.)

The immediate point, however, on which I propose to comment is the growing tendency, in recent cases, to rely, for proof of pedigree, on documents from Heralds’ College.

I have elsewhere shown that, less than three centuries ago, peerage claims were still within the jurisdiction of the Earl Marshal, and were heard before the Commissioners by whom his office was exercised. It was doubtless due to this that the heralds, as his officers, came to play so large a part in the proceedings on these claims, and that the proof of claimants’ pedigrees was practically supplied by them and from their own records. When, in the 17th century, the hearing of these claims was transferred to the House of Lords, the tradition of leaving pedigrees to the heralds continued for some time, even though the questions of peerage law and practice fell more and more into the lawyers’ hands. Gradually, however, the House of Lords became more exacting as to documentary proof; and increasing use was made of first-hand evidence, especially the public records. For a long time past the pedigrees of peerage claimants have been prepared by record agents, and have rested on those rigid proofs which modern genealogy requires. In support of these statements I may appeal to Cruise, who wrote (1823) that :

‘The pedigrees of persons claiming dignities were formerly made out by the heralds, and admitted, upon their authority, by the House of Lords . . . the pedigree of a person, claiming a peerage . . . will not now be admitted, upon the bare authority of the heralds; but must be proved by evidence strictly legal, and such only as would be admitted, as evidence of pedigree, upon a trial before a jury, in a court of common law.’ (*Op. cit.*, pp. 268-9.)

By the side, however, of these proofs there lingers on, according to the books, the admissibility of certain

evidence preserved in the College of Arms which would have, for a critical genealogist, by no means the same authority. It might have been anticipated that in this critical age less and less use would be made of this old-fashioned evidence. The case, it seems, is the reverse. Only three or four years ago, on the Burgh, Strabolgi, and Cobham claims, it afforded several of the 'proofs.' Three of these had to be withdrawn, but I can only deal here with what would probably be considered the most important proofs of pedigree preserved at the College of Arms. These are the famous 'Heralds' Visitations,' which are undoubtedly admissible, and two of which were, on that occasion, 'put in' successfully. The Committee showed, however, considerable reluctance to accept them; and, as the discussion on the subject was important, it may be of use to give the exact reference to the Minutes (pp. 51-6, 195-8). Legally, all that is required to make their evidence admissible is to prove the Royal Commission under which they were taken; but this, of course, affords no criterion of their value. Their obvious weakness is that they are unsupported by proofs, and that, when they carried back a pedigree for several generations, its earlier stages could not have been within living memory. With his usual acuteness, Lord Sheffield, a member of the Committee, put this point to counsel: 'Do you think,' he asked, 'you could take a visitation of 1880 to prove the fact of a pedigree in 1700?' 'I do not think,' Mr Wollaston replied, 'there are many cases in which there are such pedigrees as that proved; certainly in the majority of the visitation cases the details very seldom go beyond what was within the personal knowledge of those who entered the pedigree.' Yet, in the very latest case heard before the Committee, that of the barony of St John, the Hampshire visitation of 1623 was one of the documents adduced 'to prove that Thomas, Lord St John died 7 March 7 Henry VI (1429), having had issue an eldest son and heir Hugh, who had died in his father's lifetime, having had issue three daughters, Joan wife of Thomas Bonville, Constance wife of John Paulet,' etc., etc. This marriage of Paulet and St John was actually that through which the claimant traced; and yet a visitation taken nearly two centuries later is vouched as proof of the fact.

But there is far more than this. The visitation is actually at variance with the proposition it was adduced to prove. It makes the two serious errors of styling Hugh 'Lord St John,' though he never became so, and of making Constance his heir, instead of his co-heir. Here, then, we find that the doubt suggested by the long interval of time is amply confirmed by the serious errors which the document actually contains. However anxious the heralds may be to assert the authority of these visitations, the time has come, I think, for the Crown to insist at least upon their scrutiny by an independent expert before they are accepted in evidence. Their Lordships, to judge from their observations, would probably approve this precaution. In the Burgh case Lord Robert Cecil claimed, as counsel, 'that it does appear that an extract from these visitation books was received in the Fauconberg case.' On the Attorney-General rightly observing that 'it was objected to,' he replied, 'Anyhow it was accepted, and it is now printed in the evidence.' Lord Robert was misinformed. The pedigree in question (that of Strangways) was not accepted and is not printed in the evidence. Mr Asquith claimed that it was admissible as a visitation pedigree, but the Committee were not favourable and he did not press it (*Fauconberg Minutes*, p. 129).

Lord Robert justly cited Cruise, 'a great authority on these points,' as stating that 'original visitation books, or, where the originals are lost, authentic copies of them,' are evidence. But Sir Francis Palmer is silent as to any but originals; and the phrase 'authentic copies' may have escaped attention. For the heralds' view on this point I will quote Mr Wollaston, who put it thus to the Committee:

'I should like to say, with regard to these visitations in general, I think they are considerably more accurate than Lord Sheffield has suggested. As one of his Majesty's Heralds myself, I must apologise to your Lordships if I say that some of the criticisms which have been directed against them have been directed against copies which are discovered in the British Museum, which have been altered and are not the same as the originals at the Heralds' College.'

One is familiar with this explanation, which, it will

be seen, does not explain the errors above in the Hampshire Visitation of 1623. But is it, one ventures to ask, certain that all 'the originals' are at Heralds' College and only 'copies' at the British Museum? Mr Wollaston, indeed, may not have intended to imply so much as this; but, in case his words should be so understood, one may say something on a point which might arise before the Committee for Privileges.

As the heralds may be sensitive on this point, I will here rely on the testimony of the late Dr Marshall, who became a member of their body. In the preface to his edition of the Wiltshire Visitation of 1623 this well-known genealogist wrote:

'The five western counties, Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Dorset, and Wiltshire, were visited by St George and Lennard, as deputies to Camden, the two first in 1620, and the others in 1623. The original Visitations, signed for the most part by the gentry whose pedigrees were entered, are now part of the Harleian Collection of MSS in the British Museum . . . being without question original documents, which, either from carelessness or dishonesty, have escaped from their proper custodians, the Officers of Arms.'

The Wiltshire Visitation, indeed, in the British Museum is alleged to have been admitted in evidence, as the original, at Guildford Assizes in 1718. It is also Dr Marshall who states, in his Notes on the Visitations, that the Kent Visitations of 1530 and 1592 in the College are but 'copies.' Again, the late Mr Joseph Foster, who, with the assistance of a member of the College, edited the important Yorkshire Visitation of 1584-5, observed in his preface, praised by Dr Marshall, that 'the original copy of Glover's Visitation was purloined from the College, and the volume now in use is a "copy" presented at a later date.' Now this is the very visitation that Mr Asquith wanted the Committee to accept in the Fauconberg case. Nay more, it is that which in the Conyers case (1798) 'Windsor Herald . . . having been sworn . . . described to be an original Visitation of the County of York made in 1584 and 1585 by Robert Glover.' Further, it was that which in the Shrewsbury case (1857) was duly received, York Herald, who produced it, being examined by the

Attorney-General 'to satisfy himself that the return came from the Heralds' College, where it had been kept like all other visitations, having been there received as a return made under the Commission' (of Queen Elizabeth)! There is, it will be seen, a strange discrepancy between the above statements.

So long as the heralds' volumes remain jealously guarded in what Dr Marshall termed 'the hidden recesses of the venerable Institution in Doctors' Commons,' it is impossible to say how many are original and how many are copies. This, surely, confirms the view that those who represent the Crown should be given full opportunity of examining these volumes before they are 'put in.' One may also fairly inquire how 'authentic copies' are legally proved to be so, and whether original visitations preserved in the British Museum are superseded 'as legal evidence' by mere copies from them preserved in the College of Arms.

Two of the cases lately dealt with raised the question of what are known as Baronies *jure uxoris*, although they would be more accurately described as Baronies 'by the curtesy.' The curtesy of England—'*la corteyse dengleterre*,' *curialitas Anglie*—gave to a husband the tenure of his wife's fief for his life after the birth of a child defined in Scottish law (which long retained the principle) as 'ane barne or heire herd cryand betuix foure walls,' and in an English document of the 14th century as born 'alive, with all its members right, who received baptism.' This tenancy by the curtesy of the wife's fief might give the husband a right to a summons in respect of that fief if, on the territorial principle, its tenure gave that right. But, as this principle is no longer recognised in Peerage Law, the right has to be found in the wife's 'ennobled blood.' It is, therefore, necessary to prove the existence of a barony vested in her own ancestors and created by writ and sitting. As against this it has been argued, on behalf of recent petitioners, that a writ and sitting in the person of the husband of the heiress should be accepted as proof *per se* that a barony was vested in his wife. If so, the barony claimed should, it was urged, be dated back to the earliest summons of her ancestors.

At first sight this might seem to be a mere question of precedence and, as such, of little consequence to the Crown. But, as representing its interests, an Attorney-General is bound to watch most jealously any attempt to establish the existence of a barony 'by writ' without producing any valid proof of sitting. I showed in 'Peerage and Pedigree' that the decision in the Fauconberg case had left the question in doubt, owing to the unexplained and unfortunate addition of the words 'in right of his wife' to the perfectly correct Resolution which was moved by the Lord Chancellor; and I observed that, if claims were made to the baronies of Furnival and Fitzwarine, 'we might learn if the heiress of a non-existent barony could transmit that barony to her husband,' and how a barony can be 'vested in' a man in right of his wife, when there was no recognised barony, as the law is now settled, to which she could have succeeded. Petitions for both the above dignities have been presented since then; and in the Fitzwarine case, the later of the two to be decided, this question was the subject of a long and important 'judgment' by Lord Dunedin, and the Committee unanimously upheld the Crown's contention. The barony, therefore, was definitely dated, not from 1295 (or 1283, as claimed), but from 'the summons to and sitting of Sir W. Bourchier, Lord Fitzwarin in 1455.' This date, however, though that of his first sitting, was not that of his first writ, 1449, which would doubtless have been allowed, in accordance with the usual practice, if it had been claimed. But the Attorney-General's report shows that the earliest writ produced to him was that of 1455, while that report and the printed case, signed by Mr Fox-Davies, show that the Parliament Roll of 39 Henry VI was actually cited for the sitting of Sir William's son Fulk, though it relates to his father, while in the printed case the Close Roll of 12 Edward IV was no less wildly cited as that of 12 Henry VI. Intolerable trouble has been caused to those who represent the Crown by such carelessness as this.

In the other case, that of Furnival, the question was no less fully argued; and it was at least established that a sitting by the husband of the heiress cannot prove *per se* the existence of a barony in her, but must be

supplemented by evidence, not merely of writs, but of a sitting in her own ancestry. So far, this was satisfactory; but the proof of sitting accepted was very much the reverse. The only proof vouchsafed in petitioner's printed case was the occurrence of Thomas de Furnival as a witness to a royal charter early in 1300. The Crown objected both to the proof and to the mode of proof. It was shown that the date of the charter was eight days after the prorogation of Parliament; and it was urged that such a charter could not be, in any case, a 'record of Parliament.' We may add that a previous and unsuccessful attempt had been made, in the Hastings case, to use this evidence as proof of sitting. A 'second string' was then unexpectedly produced to prove a sitting, namely Thomas de Furnival's attestation to a royal charter granted at Carlisle in 1307, when he had been summoned to a Parliament there held. The late Lord Ashbourne, who delivered the principal 'judgment,' held that this charter made it 'highly probable' that he sat in that Parliament; and indeed, to the lay mind even of a critical historian, it would certainly seem clear that he and his heirs were peers. Yet such a conclusion from the evidence is, if historically right, wrong in strictness of law. We had here, in fact, one instance the more that 'hard cases make bad law.' No one would allege that a royal charter is a 'record of Parliament,' or that those who witnessed it are thereby proved to have taken part in 'a parliamentary proceeding.' Wishing to do substantial justice, their Lordships were resolved that petitioner should not suffer for the want of that technical proof of sitting which the law, as long settled, undoubtedly requires. But in thus departing from 'the rigour of the game' and accepting such evidence as proof of sitting, they have opened the door to claims which, till then, were hopeless. Indeed the charter in question alone would supply the proof wanting for at least one barony.

Probably the most important question, alike for the constitutional historian and for the student of peerage law, which recent decisions have helped to determine, is that of the 'first valid Parliament' from the standpoint of the House of Lords. When Stubbs wrote his 'Constitutional History,' he cautiously observed (Ed. 1875, II,

183-4), of the writs of summons issued by Edward I, that:

'it may be not unreasonably held that the practice of the reign owes its legal importance to the fact that it was used by the later lawyers as a period of limitation, and not to any conscious finality in Edward's policy. It is convenient to adopt the year 1295 as the era from which the baron, whose ancestor has been once summoned and has once sat in parliament, can claim an hereditary right to be so summoned.'

Yet, here again, the peculiar principle that a Committee for Privileges 'is not bound by preceding decisions,' as are Courts of Law, affords a priceless safeguard. Of this the Earldom of Wiltes case (1869) has been the standing illustration; but it is now reinforced by the latest of recent cases, that of the barony of St John. The very existence of this barony, like that of the (original) barony of Hastings, depended on the validity, as proof of a sitting in Parliament, of an entry on the Parliament Roll of 1290. Guided by the Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, in 1841, the Committee admitted the proof as valid, with the result that the barony of Hastings now figures on the roll of peers; in 1914 the Committee rejected the validity of the proof, with the result that the claimant failed to establish the barony's existence. Strange and even inequitable as this principle may seem, it has at least the merit of enabling the House to avail itself of the latest learning in a sphere illumined in our own time by the indefatigable researches of those who, not only in this country, but in France and America as well, have devoted themselves to the study of English medieval history with the aid of those incomparable records which are the envy of foreign lands.

J. H. ROUND.

Art. 4.—PATRIOTISM.

1. *Letters on Patriotism.* By Lord Bolingbroke. London. 1749.
2. *An Introduction to Social Psychology.* By W. McDougall. London: Methuen, 1913.
3. *Thoughts on the War.* By A. Clutton-Brock. London: Methuen, 1914.

And other works.

THE sentiment of patriotism has seemed to many to mark an arrest of development in the psychical expansion of the individual, a half-way house between mere self-centredness and full human sympathy. Some moralists have condemned it as pure egoism, magnified and disguised. 'Patriotism,' says Ruskin, 'is an absurd prejudice founded on an extended selfishness.' Mr Grant Allen calls it 'a vulgar vice—the national or collective form of the monopolist instinct.' Mr Havelock Ellis allows it to be 'a virtue—among barbarians.' For Herbert Spencer it is 'reflex egoism—extended selfishness.' These critics have made the very common mistake of judging human emotions and sentiments by their roots instead of by their fruits. They have forgotten the Aristotelian canon that the 'nature' of anything is its completed development (*ἡ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν*). The human self, as we know it, is a transitional form. It had a humble origin, and is capable of indefinite enhancement. Ultimately, we are what we love and care for, and no limit has been set to what we may become without ceasing to be ourselves. The case is the same with our love of country. No limit has been set to what our country may come to mean for us, without ceasing to be our country. Marcus Aurelius exhorted himself—'The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; shall not I say, Dear city of God?' But the city of God in which he wished to be was a city in which he would still live as 'a Roman and an Antonine.' The citizen of heaven knew that it was his duty to 'hunt Sarmatians' on earth, though he was not obliged to imbrue his hands with 'Cæsarism.'

Patriotism has two roots, the love of clan, and the love of home. In migratory tribes the former alone

counts; in settled communities diversities of origin are often forgotten. But the love of home, as we know it, is a gentler and more spiritual bond than clanship. The word home is associated with all that makes life beautiful and sacred, with tender memories of joy and sorrow, and especially with the first eager outlook of the young mind upon a wonderful world. A man does not as a rule feel much sentiment about his London house, still less about his office or factory. It is for the home of his childhood, or of his ancestors, that a man will fight most readily, because he is bound to it by a spiritual and poetic tie. Expanding from this centre, the sentiment of patriotism embraces one's country as a whole.

Both forms of patriotism—the local and the racial, are frequently alloyed with absurd, unworthy or barbarous motives. The local patriot thinks that Peebles, and not Paris, is the place for pleasure, or asks whether any good thing can come out of Nazareth. To the Chinaman all aliens are 'outer barbarians' or 'foreign devils.' Admiration for ourselves and our institutions is too often measured by our contempt and dislike for foreigners. Our own nation has a peculiarly bad record in this respect. In the reign of James I the Spanish ambassador was frequently insulted by the London crowd, as was the Russian ambassador in 1662; not, apparently, because we had a burning grievance against either of those nations, but because Spaniards and Russians are very unlike Englishmen. That at least is the opinion of the sagacious Pepys on the later of these incidents. 'Lord! to see the absurd nature of Englishmen, that cannot forbear laughing and jeering at anything that looks strange.' Defoe says that the English are 'the most churlish people alive' to foreigners, with the result that 'all men think an Englishman the devil.' In the 17th and 18th centuries Scotland seems to have ranked as a foreign country, and the presence of Scots in London was much resented. Cleveland thought it witty to write:

'Had Cain been Scot, God would have changed his doom;
Not forced him wander, but confined him home.'

And we all remember Dr Johnson's gibes.

British patriotic arrogance culminated in the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century; in Lord Palmerston it found a champion at the head of the government. Goldsmith describes the bearing of the Englishman of his day:—

‘Pride in their port, defiance in their eye,
I see the lords of human kind pass by.’

Michelet found in England ‘human pride personified in a people,’ at a time when the characteristic of Germany was ‘a profound impersonality.’ It may be doubted whether even the arrogant brutality of the modern Prussian is more offensive to foreigners than was the calm and haughty assumption of superiority by our countrymen at this time. Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers were quite of Milton’s opinion, that, when the Almighty wishes something unusually great and difficult to be done, He entrusts it to His Englishmen. This unamiable characteristic was probably much more the result of insular ignorance than of a deep-seated pride. ‘A generation or two ago,’ said Mr Asquith lately, ‘patriotism was largely fed and fostered upon reciprocal ignorance and contempt.’ The Englishman seriously believed that the French subsisted mainly upon frogs, while the Frenchman was equally convinced that the sale of wives at Smithfield was one of our national institutions. This fruitful source of international misunderstanding has become less dangerous since the facilities of foreign travel have been increased. But in the relations of Europe with alien and independent civilisations, such as that of China, we still see brutal arrogance and vulgar ignorance producing their natural results.

Another cause of perverted patriotism is the inborn pugnacity of the *bête humaine*. Our species is the most cruel and destructive of all that inhabit this planet. If the lower animals, as we call them, were able to formulate a religion, they might differ greatly as to the shape of the beneficent Creator, but they would nearly all agree that the devil must be very like a big white man. Mr McDougall has lately raised the question whether civilised man is less pugnacious than the savage; and he answers it in the negative. The Europeans, he thinks, are

among the most combative of the human race. We are not allowed to knock each other on the head during peace; but our civilisation is based on cut-throat competition; our favourite games are mimic battles, which I suppose effect for us a 'purgation of the emotions' similar to that which Aristotle attributed to witnessing the performance of a tragedy; and, when the fit seizes us, we are ready to engage in wars which cannot fail to be disastrous to both combatants. Mr McDougall does not regret this disposition, irrational though it is. He thinks that it tends to the survival of the fittest, and that, if we substitute emulation for pugnacity, which on other grounds might seem an unmixed advantage, we shall have to call in the science of eugenics to save us from becoming as sheeplike as the Chinese. There is, however, another side to this question, as we shall see presently.

Another instinct which has supplied fuel to patriotism of the baser sort is that of acquisitiveness. This tendency, without which even the most rudimentary civilisation would be impossible, began when the female of the species, instead of carrying her baby on her back and following the male to his hunting-grounds, made some sort of a lair for herself and her family, where primitive implements and stores of food could be kept. There are still tribes in Brazil which have not reached this first step towards humanisation. But the instinct of hoarding, like all other instincts, tends to become hypertrophied and perverted; and with the institution of private property comes another institution—that of plunder and brigandage. In private life, no motive of action is at present so powerful and so persistent as acquisitiveness, which, unlike most other desires, knows no satiety. The average man is rich enough when he has a little more than he has got, and not till then. The acquisition and possession of land satisfies this desire in a high degree, since land is a visible and indestructible form of property. Consequently, as soon as the instincts of the individual are transferred to the group, territorial aggrandisement becomes a main preoccupation of the state. This desire was the chief cause of wars, while kings and nobles regarded the territories over which they ruled as their private estates. Wherever despotic or feudal conditions survive, such ideas are likely still to be found, and to

cause dangers to other states. The greatest ambition of a modern emperor is still to be commemorated as a 'Mehrer des Reichs.'

Capitalism, by separating the idea of property from any necessary connexion with landed estate, and democracy, by denying the whole theory on which dynastic wars of conquest are based, have both contributed powerfully to check this, perhaps the worst kind of war. It would, however, be a great error to suppose that the instinct of acquisitiveness, in its old and barbarous form, has lost its hold upon even the most civilised nations. When an old-fashioned brigand appears, and puts himself at the head of his nation, he becomes at once a popular hero. By any rational standard of morality, few greater scoundrels have lived than Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. But they are still names to conjure with. Both were men of singularly lucid intellect and entirely medieval ambitions. Their great achievement was to show how under modern conditions aggressive war may be carried on without much loss (except in human life) to the aggressor. They tore up all the conventions which regulated the conduct of warfare, and reduced it to sheer brigandage and terrorism. And now after a hundred years we see these methods deliberately revived by the greatest military power in the world, and applied with the same ruthlessness and with an added pedantry which makes them more inhuman. The perpetrators of the crime calculated quite correctly that they need fear no reluctance on the part of the nation, no qualms of conscience, no compassionate shrinking, no remorse. It must, indeed, be a bad cause that cannot count on the support of the large majority of the people at the *beginning* of a war. Pugnacity, greed, mere excitement, the contagion of a crowd, will fill the streets of almost any capital with a shouting and jubilant mob on the day after a war has been declared.

And yet the motives which we have enumerated are plainly atavistic and pathological. They belong to a mental condition which would conduct an individual to the prison or the gallows. We do not argue seriously whether the career of the highwayman or burglar is legitimate and desirable; and it is impossible to maintain that what is disgraceful for the individual is

creditable for the state. And apart from the consideration that predatory patriotism deforms its own idol and makes it hateful in the eyes of the world, subsequent history has fully confirmed the moral instinct of the ancient Greeks, that national insolence or injustice (*ὕβρις*) brings its own severe punishment. The imaginary dialogue which Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Athenian and Melian envoys, and the debate in the Athenian Assembly about the punishment of revolted Mitylene, are intended to prepare the reader for the tragic fate of the Sicilian expedition. The same writer describes the break-up of all social morality during the civil war in words which seem to herald the destruction not only of Athens but of Greek freedom. Machiavelli's 'Prince' shows how history can repeat itself, reiterating its lesson that a nation which gives itself to immoral intellectualism is far on the road to disintegration. Seneca's rebuke to his slave-holding countrymen, 'Can you complain that you have been robbed of the liberty which you have yourselves abolished in your own homes?' applies equally to nations which have enslaved or exploited the inhabitants of subject lands. If the Roman Empire had a long and glorious life, it was because its methods were liberal, by the standard of ancient times. In so far as Rome abused her power, she suffered the doom of all tyrants. There are no more Romans now; but the Jews, the victims of Vespasian and Titus, we have always with us.

The illusions of imperialism have been made clearer than ever by the course of modern history. Attempts to destroy a nationality by overthrowing its government, proscribing its language, and maltreating its citizens, are never successful. The experiment has been tried with great thoroughness in Poland; and the Poles are now more of a nation than they were under the oppressive feudal system which existed before the partitions. Our own empire would be a ludicrous failure if it were any part of our ambition to Anglicise other races. The only English parts of the empire were waste lands which we have peopled with our own emigrants. We hauled down the French flag in Canada, with the result that Eastern Canada is now the only flourishing French colony, and the only part of the world where the French race increases

rapidly. We have helped the Dutch to multiply with almost equal rapidity in South Africa. We have added several millions to the native population of Egypt, and over a hundred millions to the population of India. Similarly, the Americans have made Cuba for the first time a really Spanish island, by driving out its incompetent Spanish governors and so attracting immigrants from Spain. On the whole, in imperialism nothing fails like success. If the conqueror oppresses his subjects, they will become fanatical patriots, and sooner or later have their revenge; if he treats them well, and 'governs them for their good,' they will multiply faster than their rulers, till they claim their independence. The Englishman now says, 'I am quite content to have it so'; but that is not the old imperialism.

The notion that frequent war is a healthy tonic for a nation is scarcely tenable. Its dysgenic effect, by eliminating the strongest and healthiest of the population, while leaving the weaklings at home to be the fathers of the next generation, is no new discovery. It has been supported by a succession of men, such as Tenon, Dufau, Foissac, de Lapouge, and Richet in France; Tiedemann and Seeck in Germany; Guerrini in Italy; Kellogg and Starr Jordan in America. The case is indeed overwhelming. The lives destroyed in war are nearly all males, thus disturbing the sex equilibrium of the population; they are in the prime of life, at the age of greatest fecundity; and they are picked from a list out of which from 30 to 40 per cent. have been rejected for physical unfitness. It seems to be proved that the children born in France during the Napoleonic wars were poor and undersized—30 millimetres below the normal height. War combined with religious celibacy to ruin Spain. 'Castile makes men and wastes them,' said a Spanish writer. 'This sublime and terrible phrase sums up the whole of Spanish history.' Schiller was right: 'Immer der Krieg verschlingt die besten.' We in England have suffered from this drain in the past; we shall suffer much more in the next generation.

'We have fed our sea for a thousand years,
And she calls us, still unfed,
Though there's never a wave of all her waves
But marks our English dead.

We have strawed our best to the weed's unrest,
 To the shark and the sheering gull,
 If blood be the price of admiralty,
 Lord God, we ha' paid in full.'

Aggressive patriotism is thus condemned by common sense and the verdict of history no less than by morality. We are entitled to say to the militarists what Socrates said to Polus :

'This doctrine of yours has now been examined and found wanting. And this doctrine alone has stood the test—that we ought to be more afraid of doing than of suffering wrong ; and that the prime business of every man [and nation] is not to seem good, but to be good, in all private and public dealings.'

If the nations would render something more than lip-service to this principle, the abolition of war would be within sight ; for, as Ruskin says, echoing the judgment of the Epistle of St James, 'The first reason for all wars, and for the necessity of national defences, is that the majority of persons, high and low, in all European countries, are thieves.' But it must be remembered that, in spite of the proverb, it takes in reality only one to make a quarrel. It is useless for the sheep to pass resolutions in favour of vegetarianism, while the wolf remains of a different opinion.

Our own conversion to pacificism, though sincere, is somewhat recent. Our literature does not reflect it, and we must wince slightly at Mark Twain's good-natured gibe about us. 'The English are mentioned in the Bible. The meek-spirited shall possess the earth.' Bacon is frankly militarist :

'Above all, for empire and greatness, it importeth most, that a nation do profess arms, as their principal honour, study, and occupation. For the things which we formerly have spoken of are but habilitations towards arms ; and what is habilitation without intention and act? . . . It is so plain that a man profiteth in that he most intendeth, that it needeth not to be stood upon. It is enough to point at it ; that no nation, which doth not directly profess arms, may look to have greatness fall into their mouths.'

A state, therefore, 'ought to have those laws or customs, which may reach forth unto them just occasions of war.'

Shakespeare's 'Henry V' has been not unreasonably recommended by the Germans as 'good war-reading.' It would be easy to compile a *catena* of bellicose maxims from our literature, reaching down to the end of the 19th century. The change is perhaps due less to progress in morality than to that political good sense which has again and again steered our ship through dangerous rocks. But there has been some real advance, in all civilised countries. We do not find that men talked about the 'bankruptcy of Christianity' during the Napoleonic campaigns. Even the Germans think it necessary to tell each other that it was Belgium who began this war.

But, though pugnacity and acquisitiveness have been the real foundation of much miscalled patriotism, better motives are generally mingled with these primitive instincts. It is the subtle blend of noble and ignoble sentiment which makes patriotism such a difficult problem for the moralist. The patriot nearly always believes, or thinks he believes, that he desires the greatness of his country because his country stands for something intrinsically great and valuable. Where this conviction is absent, as in the case of the Huns, we cannot speak of patriotism, but only of the cohesion of a wolf-pack. The Greeks, who at last perished because they could not combine, the victims of a disintegrating intellectualism, had nevertheless a consciousness that they were the trustees of civilisation against barbarism; and in their day of triumph over the Persians they were filled, for a time, with an almost Jewish awe in presence of the righteous judgment of God. The 'Persæ' of Æschylus is one of the noblest of patriotic poems. The Romans, a harder and coarser race, had their ideal of *virtus* and *gravitas*, which included simplicity of life, dignity and self-restraint, honesty and industry, and devotion to the state. They rightly felt that these qualities constituted a vocation to empire. There was much harshness and injustice in Roman imperialism; but what nobler epitaph could even the British empire desire than the tribute of Claudian, when the weary Titan was at last stricken and dying:

'Hæc est, in gremium victos quæ sola recepit,
Humanumque genus communi nomine fovit
matris non dominæ ritu, civesque vocavit
quos domuit, nexuque pio longinqua revinxit'?

Jewish patriotism was of a different kind. A federation of fierce Bedouin tribes, encamped amid hostile populations, and set in the cockpit of rival empires against which it was impossible to stand, the Israelites were hammered by misfortune into the most indestructible of all organisms, a theocracy. Their religion was to them what, in a minor degree, Roman Catholicism has been to Ireland and Poland, a consecration of patriotic faith and hope. Westphal says the Jews failed because they hated foreigners more than they loved God. They have had good reason to hate foreigners. But undoubtedly the effect of their hatred has been that the great gifts which their nation had to give to humanity have come through other hands, and so have evoked no gratitude. In the first century of our era they were called to an almost superhuman abnegation of their inveterate nationalism, and they could not rise to it. As almost every other nation would have done, they chose the lower patriotism instead of the higher; and it was against their will that the religion of civilised humanity grew out of Hebrew soil. But they gained this by their choice, tragic though it was, that they have stood by the graves of all the empires that oppressed them, and have preserved their racial integrity and traditions in the most adverse circumstances. The history of the Jews also shows that oppression and persecution are far more efficacious in binding a nation together than community of interest and national prosperity. Increase of wealth divides rather than unites a people; but suffering shared in common binds it together with hoops of steel.

The Jews were the only race whose spiritual independence was not crushed by the Roman steam-roller. It would be unfair to say that Rome destroyed nations; for her subjects in the West were barbarous tribes, and in the East she displaced monarchies no less alien to their subjects than her own rule. But she prevented the growth of nationalities, as it is to be feared we have done in India; and the absence of sturdy independence in the countries round the Mediterranean, especially in the Greek-speaking provinces, made the final downfall inevitable. The lesson has its warning for modern theorists who wish to obliterate the sentiment of nationality, the revival of which, after a long eclipse,

has been one of the achievements of modern civilisation. For it was not till long after the destruction of the Western Roman Empire that nationality began to assume its present importance in Europe.

The transition from medieval to modern history is most strongly marked by the emergence of this principle, with all that it involves. At the end of the Middle Ages Europe was at last compelled to admit that the grand idea of an universal state and an universal church had definitely broken down. Hitherto it had been assumed that behind all national disputes lay a *ius gentium* by which all were bound, and that behind all religious questions lay the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, from which there was no appeal. The modern period, which certainly does not represent the last word of civilisation, has witnessed the abandonment of these ideas. The change took place gradually. France became a nation when the English raids ceased in the middle of the 15th century. Spain achieved unity a generation later by the union of Castile and Aragon and the expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula. Holland found herself in the heroic struggle against Spain in the 16th century. But the practice of conducting wars by hiring foreign mercenaries, a sure sign that the nationalist spirit is weak, continued till much later. And the dynastic principle, which is the very negation of nationalism, actually culminated in the 18th century; and this is the true explanation of the feeble resistance which Europe offered to the French revolutionary armies, until Napoleon stirred up the dormant spirit of patriotism in the peoples whom he plundered. 'In the old European system,' says Lord Acton, 'the rights of nationalities were neither recognised by governments nor asserted by the people. The interests of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regulated the frontiers; and the administration was conducted generally without any reference to popular desires.' Marriage or conquest might unite the most diverse nations under one sovereign, such as Charles V.

While such ideas prevailed, the suppression of a nation did not seem hateful; the partition of Poland evoked few protests at the time, though perhaps few acts of injustice have recoiled with greater force on the heads

of their perpetrators than this is likely to do. Poles have been and are among the bitterest enemies of autocracy, and the strongest advocates of republicanism and racialism, in all parts of the world. The French Revolution opened a new era for nationalism, both directly and indirectly. The deposition of the Bourbons was a national act which might be a precedent for other oppressed peoples. And when the Revolution itself began to trample on the rights of other nations, an uprising took place, first in Spain and then in Prussia, which proved too strong for the tyrant. The apostasy of France from her own ideals of liberty proved the futility of mere doctrines, like those of Rousseau, and compelled the peoples to arm themselves and win their freedom by the sword. The national militarism of Prussia was the direct consequence of her humiliation at Jena and Auerstädt, and of the harsh terms imposed upon her at Tilsit. It is true that the Congress of Vienna attempted to revive the old dynastic system. But for the steady opposition of England, the clique of despots might have reimposed the old yoke upon their subjects. The settlement of 1815 also left the entire centre of Europe in a state of chaos; and it was only by slow degrees that Italy and Germany attained national unity. Poland, the Austrian Empire, and the Balkan States still remain in a condition to trouble the peace of the world. In Austria-Hungary the clash of the dynastic and the nationalist ideas is strident; and every citizen of that empire has to choose between a wider and a narrower allegiance.

Europeans are, in fact, far from having made up their minds as to what is the organic whole towards which patriotic sentiment ought to be directed. Socialism agrees with despotism in saying, 'The political aggregate—the state,' however much they may differ as to how the state should be administered. For this reason militarism and state-socialism might at any time come to terms. They are at one in exaggerating the 'organic' unity of a political or geographical *enclave*; and they are at one in depreciating the value of individual liberty. Loyalty to 'the state' instead of to 'king and country' is not an easy or a natural emotion. The state is a bloodless abstraction, which as a rule only materialises as a

drill-sergeant or a tax-collector. Enthusiasm for it, and not only for what can be got out of it, does not extend much beyond the Fabian Society. Cæsarism has the great advantage of a visible head, as well as of its appeal to very old and strong thought-habits; and accordingly, in any national crisis, loyalty to the War-lord is likely to show unexpected strength, and doctrinaire socialism unexpected weakness.

But devotion to the head of the state in his representative capacity is a different thing from the old feudal loyalty. It is far more impersonal; the ruler, whether an individual or a council, is revered as a non-human and non-moral embodiment of the national power, a sort of Platonic idea of coercive authority. This kind of loyalty may very easily be carried too far. In reality, we are members of a great many 'social organisms,' each of which has indefeasible claims upon us. Our family, our circle of acquaintance, our business or profession, our church, our country, the comity of civilised nations, humanity at large, are all social organisms; and some of the chief problems of ethics are concerned with the adjustment of their conflicting claims. To make any one of these absolute is destructive of morality. But militarism and socialism deliberately make the state absolute. In internal affairs this may lead to the ruthless oppression of individuals or whole classes; in external relations it produces wars waged with 'methods of barbarism.' The whole idea of the state as an organism, which has been emphasised by social reformers as a theoretical refutation of selfish individualism, rests on the abuse of a metaphor. The bond between the dwellers in the same political area is far less close than that between the organs of a living body. Every man has a life of his own, and some purely personal rights; he has, moreover, moral links with other human associations, outside his own country, and important moral duties towards them. No one who reflects on the solidarity of interests among capitalists, among hand-workers, or, in a different way, among scholars and artists, all over the world, can fail to see that the apotheosis of the state, whether in the interest of war or of revolution, is an anachronism and an absurdity.

A very different basis for patriotic sentiment is

furnished by the scientific or pseudo-scientific theories about race, which have become very popular in our time. When the history of ideas in the 20th century comes to be written, it is certain that among the causes of this great war will be named the belief of the Germans in the superiority of their own race, based on certain historical and ethnological theories which have acted like a heady wine in stimulating the spirit of aggression among them. The theory, stated briefly, is that the shores of the Baltic are the home of the finest human type that has yet existed, a type distinguished by blonde hair, great physical strength, unequalled mental vigour and ability, superior morality, and an innate aptitude for governing and improving inferior races. Unfortunately for the world, this noble stock cannot flourish for very long in climates unlike its own; but from the earliest historical times it has 'swarmed' periodically, subjugating the feebler peoples of the south, and elevating them for a time above the level which they were naturally fitted to reach. Wherever we find marked energy and nobleness of character, we may suspect Aryan blood; and history will usually support our surmise. Among the great men who were certainly or probably Germans were Agamemnon, Julius Cæsar, the Founder of Christianity, Dante, and Shakespeare. The blonde Nordic giant is fulfilling his mission by conquering and imposing his culture upon other races. They ought to be grateful to him for the service, especially as it has a sacrificial aspect, the lower types having, at least in their own climates, greater power of survival.

This fantastic theory has been defended in a large number of German books, of which the 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century,' by the renegade Englishman Houston Chamberlain, is the most widely known. The objections to it are numerous. It is notorious that until the invention of gunpowder the settled and civilised peoples of Europe were in frequent danger from bands of harder mountaineers, forest-dwellers, or pastoral nomads, who generally came from the north. But the formidable fighting powers of these marauders were no proof of intrinsic superiority. In fact, the most successful of these conquerors, if success is measured by the

amount of territory overrun and subdued, were not the 'great blonde beasts' of Nietzsche, but little yellow monsters with black hair, the Huns and Tartars.* The causes of Tartar ascendancy had not the remotest connexion with any moral or intellectual qualities which we can be expected to admire. Nor can the Nordic race, well endowed by nature as it undoubtedly is, prove such a superiority as this theory claims for it. Some of the largest brains yet measured have been those of Japanese; and the Jews have probably a higher average of ability than the Teutons. Again, the Germans are not descended from a pure Nordic stock. The Northern type can be best studied in Scandinavia, where the people share with the Irish the distinction of being the handsomest race in the world. The German, like ourselves, is a mixture of various anatomical types, including, in some parts, distinct traces of Mongolian blood, which indicate that the raiding Huns meddled, according to their custom, with the German women, and bequeathed to a section of the nation the Turanian cheek-bones, as well as certain moral characteristics. Lastly, the German race has never shown much aptitude for governing and assimilating other peoples. The French, by virtue of their greater sympathy, are far more successful. The only part of this chauvinistic ethnology which demands careful and indeed anxious consideration is that which asserts the decay and ultimate disappearance of the Northern type of man when he wanders too far from his home. It is a very serious question for ourselves, because it threatens the future of that kind of imperialism on which Britons now pin their hopes—the prospect of greater Englands beyond the seas. It has not been proved that either Australia or South Africa, or even the greater part of North America, is climatically fit to be the permanent home of the Anglo-Saxon. It is said that the second generation of Australians is weedy and anæmic; and that the Anglo-American, who is no longer increasing except by immigration, ages quickly and is less healthy than his English cousins. The greater part of our

* The reasons of their irresistible strength have been explained in a most brilliant manner by Dr Peisker in the first volume of the 'Cambridge Medieval History.'

colonies is probably more suited to the Mediterranean race than to ourselves.

The French have their own form of this pseudo-science in their doctrine of the persistence of national characteristics. Each nation may be summed up in a formula: England, for example, is 'the country of will.' A few instances may, no doubt, be quoted in support of this theory. Julius Cæsar said: '*Duas res pleraque Gallia industriosissime prosequitur, rem militarem et argute loqui*'; and these are still the characteristics of our gallant allies. And Madame de Staël may be thought to have hit off the German character very cleverly about the time when Bismarck first saw the light. 'The Germans are vigorously submissive. They employ philosophical reasonings to explain what is the least philosophic thing in the world, respect for force and the fear which transforms that respect into admiration.' But the fact remains that the characters of nations frequently change, and that what we call national character is usually only the policy of the governing class, forced upon it by circumstances, or the manner of living which climate, geographical position, and other external causes have made necessary for the inhabitants of a country.

To found patriotism on homogeneity of race is no wiser than to bound it by frontier-lines. As the Abbé Noël has lately written about his own country, Belgium,

'the race is not the nation. The nation is not a physiological fact; it is a moral fact. What constitutes a nation is the community of sentiments and ideals which results from a common history and education. The variations of the cephalic index are here of no great importance. The essential factor of the national consciousness resides in a certain common mode of conceiving the conditions of the social life.'

Belgium, the Abbé maintains, has found this national consciousness amid her sufferings; there are no longer any distinctions between French-speaking Belgians and Walloons or Flemings. This is in truth the real basis of patriotism. It is the basis of our own love for our country. What Britain stands for is what Britain is. We have long known in our hearts what Britain stands for; but we have now been driven to search our thoughts

and make our ideals explicit to ourselves and others. The Englishman has become a philosopher *malgré lui*. 'Whatever the world thinks,' writes Bishop Berkeley, 'he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human soul, and the *summum bonum*, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman.' These words, which were quoted by Mr Arthur Balfour a few years ago, may seem to make a large demand on the average citizen; but in our quiet way we have all been meditating on these things since last August, and we know pretty well what our *summum bonum* is for our country. We believe in chivalry and fair play and kindliness—these things first and foremost; and we believe, if not exactly in democracy, yet in a government under which a man may think and speak the thing he wills. We do not believe in war, and we do not believe in bullying. We do not flatter ourselves that we are the supermen; but we are convinced that the ideas which we stand for, and which we have on the whole tried to carry out, are essential to the peaceful progress and happiness of humanity; and for these ideas we have drawn the sword. The great words of Abraham Lincoln have been on the lips of many and in the hearts of all since the beginning of the great contest: 'With malice towards none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right—let us strive on to finish the work we are in.'

Patriotism thus spiritualised and moralised is the true patriotism. When the emotion is once set in its right relations to the whole of human life and to all that makes human life worth living, it cannot become an immoral obsession. It is certain to become an immoral obsession if it is isolated and made absolute. We have seen the appalling perversion—the methodical diabolism—which this obsession has produced in Germany. It has startled us because we thought that the civilised world had got beyond such insanity; but it is of course no new thing. Machiavelli said, 'I prefer my country to the salvation of my soul'—a sentiment which sounds noble but is not; it has only a superficial resemblance to St Paul's willingness to be 'accursed' for the sake of his countrymen. Devil-worship remains what it was, even

when the idol is draped in the national flag. This obsession may be in part a survival from savage conditions, when all was at stake in every feud; but chiefly it is an example of the idealising and universalising power of the imagination, which turns every unchecked passion into a monomania. The only remedy is, as Lowell's Hosea Biglow reminds us, to bear in mind that

'our true country is that ideal realm which we represent to ourselves under the names of religion, duty, and the like. Our terrestrial organisations are but far-off approaches to so fair a model; and all they are verily traitors who resist not any attempt to divert them from this their original intendment. Our true country is bounded on the north and the south, on the east and west, by Justice, and when she oversteps that invisible boundary-line by so much as a hair's breadth, she ceases to be our mother, and chooses rather to be looked upon *quasi noverca*.'

So Socrates said that the wise man will be a citizen of his true city, of which the type is laid up in heaven, and only conditionally of his earthly country.

The obsession of patriotism is not the only evil which we have to consider. We may err by defect as well as by excess. Herbert Spencer speaks of an 'anti-patriotic bias'; and it can hardly be disputed that many Englishmen who pride themselves on their lofty morality are suffering from this mental twist. The malady seems to belong to the Anglo-Saxon constitution, for it is rarely encountered in other countries, while we had a noisy pro-Napoleonic faction a hundred years ago, and the Americans had their 'Copperheads' in the Northern States during the civil war. In our own day, every enemy of England, from the mad Mullah to the mad Kaiser, has had his advocates at home; and the champions of Boer and Boxer, of Afridi and Afrikander, of the Mahdi and the Matabele, have been usually the same persons. The English, it would appear, differ from other misguided rascals in never being right even by accident. But the idiosyncrasy of a few persons is far less important than the comparative insensibility of whole classes to the patriotic appeal, except when war is actually raging. This is not specially characteristic of our own country. The German Emperor has complained

of his Social Democrats as 'people without a fatherland'; and the cry 'À bas la patrie' has been heard in France.

It is usual to explain this attitude by the fact that the manual workers 'have no stake in the country,' and might not find their condition altered for the worse by subjection to a foreign power. A few of our working-men have given colour to this charge by exclaiming petulantly that they could not be worse off under the Germans; but in this they have done themselves and their class less than justice. The anti-militarism and cosmopolitanism of the masses in every country is a profoundly interesting fact, a problem which demands no superficial investigation. It is one result of that emancipation from traditional ideas, which makes the most important difference between the upper and middle classes on the one side and the lower on the other. We lament that the working-man takes but little interest in Christianity, and rack our brains to discover what we have done to discredit our religion in his eyes. The truth is that Christianity, as a dogmatic and ecclesiastical system, is unintelligible without a very considerable knowledge of the conditions under which it took shape. But what are the ancient Hebrews, and the Greeks and Romans, to the working-man? He is simply cut off from the means of reading intelligently any book of the Bible, or of understanding how the institution called the Catholic Church, and its offshoots, came to exist. As our staple education becomes more 'modern' and less literary, the custodians of organised religion will find their difficulties increasing. But the same is true about patriotism. Love of country means pride in the past and ambition for the future. Those who live only in the present are incapable of it. But our working-man knows next to nothing about the past history of England; he has scarcely heard of our great men, and has read few of our great books. It is not surprising that the appeal to patriotism leaves him cold. This is an evil that has its proper remedy. There is no reason why a sane and elevated love of country should not be stimulated by appropriate teaching in our schools. In America this is done—rather hysterically; and in Germany—rather brutally. The Jews have always made their national history a large part of their education, and even of their religion. Nothing has helped

them more to retain their self-consciousness as a nation. Ignorance of the past and indifference to the future usually go together. Those who most value our historical heritage will be most desirous to transmit it unimpaired.

But the absence of traditional ideas is by no means an unmixed evil. The working-man sees more clearly than the majority of educated persons the absurdity of international hatred and jealousy. He is conscious of greater solidarity with his own class in other European countries than with the privileged class in his own; and as he approaches the whole question without prejudice, he cannot fail to realise how large a part of the product of labour is diverted from useful purposes by modern militarism. International rivalry is in his eyes one of the most serious obstacles to the abolition of want and misery. Tolstoy hardly exaggerates when he says: 'Patriotism to the peoples represents only a frightful future; the fraternity of nations seems an ideal more and more accessible to humanity, and one which humanity desires.' Military glory has very little attraction for the working-man. His humanitarian instincts appear to be actually stronger than those of the sheltered classes. To take life in any circumstances seems to him a shocking thing; and the harsh procedure of martial law and military custom is abhorrent to him. He sees no advantage and no credit in territorial aggrandisement, which he suspects to be prompted mainly by the desire to make money unjustly. He is therefore a convinced pacifist; though his doctrine of human brotherhood breaks down ignominiously when he finds his economic position threatened by the competition of cheap foreign labour. If an armed struggle ever takes place between the nations of Europe (or their colonists) and the yellow races, it will be a working-man's war. But on the whole, the best hope of getting rid of militarism lies in the growing power of the working class. The poor, being intensely gregarious and very susceptible to all collective emotions, are still liable to fits of warlike excitement. But their real minds are set against an aggressive foreign policy, without being shut against the appeals of a higher patriotism.

And yet the irritation which is felt against preachers of the brotherhood of man is not without justification.

Some persons who condemn patriotism are simply lacking in public spirit, or their loyalty is monopolised by some fad or 'cause,' which is a poor substitute for love of country. The man who has no prejudices in favour of his own family and his own country is generally an unamiable creature. So we need not condemn Molière for saying, 'L'ami du genre humain n'est pas du tout mon fait,' nor Brunetière for declaring that 'Ni la nature ni l'histoire n'ont en effet voulu que les hommes fussent tous frères.' But French Neo-catholicism, a bourgeois movement directed against all the 'ideas of 1789,' seems to have adopted the most ferocious kind of chauvinism. M. Paul Bourget wrote the other day in the 'Echo de Paris,' 'This war must be the first of many, since we cannot exterminate sixty-five million Germans in a single campaign!' The women and children too! This is not the way to revive the religion of Christ in France.

The practical question for the future is whether there is any prospect of returning, under more favourable auspices, to the unrealised ideal of the Middle Ages—an agreement among the nations of Europe to live amicably under one system of international law and right, binding upon all, and with the consciousness of an intellectual and spiritual unity deeper than political divisions. 'The nations are the citizens of humanity,' said Mazzini; and so they ought to be. Some of the omens are favourable. Militarism has dug its own grave. The great powers increased their armaments till the burden became insupportable, and have now rushed into bankruptcy in the hope of shaking it off. In prehistoric times the lords of creation were certain gigantic lizards, protected by massive armour-plates which could only be carried by a creature thirty to sixty feet long. Then they died, when neither earth, air, nor water could support them any longer. Such must be the end of the European nations, unless they learn wisdom. The lesson will be brought home to them by Transatlantic competition. The United States of America had already, before this war, an initial advantage over the disunited states of Europe, amounting to at least 10 per cent. on every contract; after the war this advantage will be doubled. It remains to be seen whether the next generation will honour the debts which

we are piling up. Disraeli used to complain of what he called 'Dutch finance,' which consists in 'mortgaging the industry of the future to protect property in the present.' Pitt paid for the great war of a hundred years ago in this manner; after a century we are still groaning under the burden of his loans. We may hear more of the iniquity of 'Dutch finance' when the democracies of the next generation have a chance of repudiating obligations which, as they will say, they did not contract. However that may be, international rivalry is plainly very bad business; and there are great possibilities in the Hague Tribunal, if, and only if, the signatories to the conference bind themselves to use force against a recalcitrant member. The conduct of Germany in this war has shown that public opinion is powerless to restrain a nation which feels strong enough to defy it.

Another cause which may give patriots leisure to turn their thoughts away from war's alarms is that the 'swarming' period of the European races is coming to an end. The unparalleled increase of population in the first three quarters of the 19th century has been followed by a progressive decrease in the birth-rate, which will begin to tell upon social conditions when the reduction in the death-rate, which has hitherto kept pace with it, shall have reached its natural limit. Europe with a stationary population will be in a much happier condition; and problems of social reform can then be tackled with some hope of success. Honourable emulation in the arts of life may then take the place of desperate competition and antagonism. Human lives will begin to have a positive value, and we may even think it fair to honour our saviours more than our destroyers. The effects of past follies will then soon be effaced; for nations recover much more quickly from wars than from internal disorders. External injuries are rapidly cured; but 'those wounds heal ill that men do give themselves.' The greatest obstacle to progress is not man's inherited pugnacity, but his incorrigible tendency to parasitism. The true patriot will keep his eye fixed on this, and will dread as the state's worst enemies those citizens who at the top and bottom of the social scale have no other ambition than to hang on and suck the life-blood of the nation. Great things may be hoped from the new science

of eugenics, when it has passed out of its tentative and experimental stage.

In the distant future we may reasonably hope that patriotism will be a sentiment like the loyalty which binds a man to his public school and university, an affection purged of all rancour and jealousy, a stimulus to all honourable conduct and noble effort, a part of the poetry of life. It is so already to many of us, and has been so to the noblest Englishmen since we have had a literature. If Henry V's speech at Agincourt is the splendid gasconade of a royal freebooter, there is no false ring in the scene where John of Gaunt takes leave of his banished son; nor in Sir Walter Scott's 'Breathes there a man with soul so dead,' etc. 'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.' We cannot quite manage to substitute London for Zion in singing psalms, though there are some places in England—Eton, Winchester, Oxford, Cambridge—which do evoke these feelings. These emotions of loyalty and devotion are by no means to be checked or despised. They have an infinite potency for good. In spiritual things there is no conflict between intensity and expansion. The deepest sympathy is, potentially, also the widest. He who loves not his home and country which he has seen, how shall he love humanity in general which he has not seen? There are, after all, few emotions of which one has less reason to be ashamed than the little lump in the throat which the Englishman feels when he first catches sight of the white cliffs of Dover.

W. R. INGE.

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Art. 5.—THE WAR AND INDIAN WHEAT.

FOR a long time to come economists will probably look back to the years beginning with 1914 as an era of bold experiments. Already we see, either in actual operation or at least the subject of practical discussion, State organisation of production, State regulation of wages and of profits, provision of public capital for private enterprise, manipulation of the excise revenue-system as a sumptuary law—all of them measures which historians may associate with the distant past, which enthusiasts have dreamed of as short cuts to their own particular millennium, but which economists of the orthodox type have usually been content to regard as exploded heresies, valuable only as affording practice in dialectic to the junior students of their classes. Among the economic experiments already in progress few are bolder and few are of greater interest than the undertaking of the Indian Government to regulate the price of food throughout the vast area of the Dependency. No final judgment can yet be pronounced on this enterprise, but, while awaiting the verdict of results, it is worth while to examine the conditions in which action has been considered to be necessary, and the methods by which it is hoped to attain success.

The regulation of the price of food is no novel conception to Indian statesmen. At recurring periods throughout the centuries cheap food has been an ideal of government; and the stern adherence of recent British rulers to the policy of free trade in the necessities of life has been almost incomprehensible to those classes of Indians who are accustomed to express an opinion on public affairs. These classes have given a cordial welcome to the emergency-measures that have now been adopted; and it is possible that when the emergency is over their attitude may prove an inconvenient obstacle to the complete resumption of the traditional British policy. Some idea of the way in which the Indian mind regards such questions can be obtained by glancing at a precedent which has been described in detail by a contemporary chronicler.

Rather more than six hundred years ago Alá-ud-din, the powerful Emperor of Northern India, found that the

prices of food and other necessities were inconveniently high, so much so that he could not maintain an army adequate to resist the hostile forces pressing on his north-western frontier. To the western mind the position might have called for an increase in taxation or for economies in internal expenditure; Alá-ud-din and his advisers, after careful deliberation, chose what was to them the natural course, a reduction in the price of necessities, so that a larger army could be maintained with the funds available. The administrative measures adopted with this object were exhaustive. The area sown with food-crops was regulated in accordance with requirements; a large proportion of the revenue was collected in grain; and an extensive system of storage and control over transport enabled the supply of grain to be regulated from season to season. The supply being thus adapted to the demand, temporary and local fluctuations in the markets could be prevented by an adequate intelligence-system and by punishment for any evasion of the regulations. The Emperor insisted on the avoidance of 'severe and tyrannical' punishments, and apparently attempts to raise prices were repressed only by minor penalties such as fines and flogging; but for more insidious practices, such as giving short weight, the delinquent dealer was mulcted in an equal weight of flesh, 'cut from his haunches and thrown down before his eyes' in market overt. The chronicler adds that the certainty of this punishment prevented what he calls knavish tricks, and even secured extra weight for purchasers. These measures were successful during the remainder of the Emperor's life; but, as has so often been the case in Indian history, measures died with the man, the next Emperor failed to maintain the regulations, and prices were once more left to the unrestricted action of the market.

The Government of Lord Hardinge has now decided to revive in part the policy of Alá-ud-din; and it is fortunate for the administration that the present economic situation in India admits of a simpler procedure than was found necessary in the earlier case. The difference is due to the modern development of the export trade in wheat, the existence of which ensures that in ordinary years the country produces

more food than it requires for its own consumption. Through the widespread operations of this trade the price of wheat all over India has gradually been brought into relations with the rates prevailing in the European markets; and, since wheat is interchangeable in consumption with most of the other food-grains*—maize, barley, and the various millets and pulses—produced and consumed in India, the export price of wheat is a governing factor in the prices of food-grains throughout the country, so long as there is a surplus at all. Happily this condition is fulfilled at the present time; the crops of wheat and other grains that ripened this spring over Northern and Central India have been abundant; and, after allowing for local consumption, there is a surplus of wheat available for export which the Government statisticians put at about two million tons, and which may prove to be substantially larger than this estimate. Existing conditions, then, place the Government in a position to regulate the price of food throughout India by regulating the export price of wheat, and render unnecessary any interference with the free course of internal trade. Under the regulations that have been made, anyone in India is left absolutely free to buy or sell wheat and other grains at any price he pleases; and supervision over the internal markets is thus rendered unnecessary, except in so far as temporary interference may be required to counteract the operations of groups of speculators in particular localities. The only general restriction enforced is that no one may export wheat; and this restriction does not directly affect anyone but the relatively few shipping firms whose business has been organised with that object in view.

If the action of the State stopped with the prohibition of exports, the situation would be clear. Within the country there would be a large surplus of food, and there would be no means of getting rid of it. Prices would therefore fall substantially; and cheap, perhaps

* The case is somewhat different as regards rice, the staple food of the East and the South. Rice-eaters find it difficult to take to wheat and other hard grains; on the other hand, the eaters of wheat and millet are ready to turn to rice if necessary; and, when food is scarce in Northern India, the imports of rice from Burma become of great importance.

very cheap, food would be assured to the people. On the other hand, food would be retained and consumed which would not be absolutely necessary to the country, and which, if exported, would be of the highest present value to the Empire. Indian producers would be impoverished, while the curtailment of exports might so far affect the balance of trade as to threaten the security of the gold standard of currency, now the corner-stone of India's financial policy. Further measures, therefore, became essential, as soon as the prohibition of exports had been decided; and it is in these further measures that the interest of the experiment mainly lies. To put it shortly, the Indian Government has decided that exports are to continue, though no private exports are allowed. The Government will buy wheat in quantities and at prices to be determined by itself, will ship this wheat to the London market, and will retain for the benefit of the country as a whole any profits that may be derived from these gigantic operations. These measures are obviously calculated to meet the objections that have just been stated. The surplus wheat of India will be carried to the place where it can be of most service to the Empire; internal prices will be lowered, but not to the same extent as if export were entirely stopped; while the sale of Indian wheat in Europe will support the gold standard to exactly the same extent, whether it is conducted on behalf of Government or of private exporters. A minor advantage is that, as the Government purchases will be made through the agency of the exporting firms, that great business-organisation will be maintained in working order.

Superficially, then, the scheme is simple; practically, it requires the administrative machine (consisting in this case of the Commerce and Industry Department, that is, of a Member of the Viceroy's Council and his Secretary, supported by a Wheat Commissioner and one or more Assistant Commissioners), to determine within fairly wide limits the kind and the quantity of food that shall be eaten during the current year by a large proportion of the inhabitants of India. To justify this statement, it is necessary to consider in a little detail the conditions in which wheat is produced and consumed by those inhabitants.

Under present conditions India hopes to produce in favourable years about ten million tons of wheat. The production is not evenly distributed over the country; two-thirds or more of the whole is yielded by the alluvial plains of the Ganges and the Indus, and the balance mainly by the black soils of the central table-lands, which stretch, broadly speaking, southward from the line of the river Jumna as far as the latitude of Bombay. Diverse as are the agricultural characteristics of these extensive areas, a few general statements can be made regarding the conditions of production. In the first place, the producers are peasants; the capitalist farmer, familiar in England and in America, is in these regions too rare to be taken into account. The peasants are practically illiterate, and have no knowledge of the wider markets for their products; such knowledge as they obtain is limited to the conditions prevailing in their immediate neighbourhood. Nor are they as yet in touch with scientific developments, or able to obtain the capital they may need on reasonable terms. Some of them (the proportion varies greatly in different regions) possess sufficient capital to carry on their business on the traditional lines, and, when the harvest is over, can offer their produce in the market, and stand out for the best price obtainable; others are financed by money-lenders who advance capital as required, and at harvest time take over a part or all of the produce at prices determined mainly by themselves, and usually lower than could be obtained in the open market. But the number of individuals who could embark unaided on fresh capital expenditure is a very small proportion of the whole; and it is not inaccurate to say that in India wheat is produced to-day by the methods that have been followed for an indefinite number of centuries. Oxen, as of old, draw the same primitive implements through or over the soil, and later on tread the grain out of the ears collected on the threshing-floor of bare earth; the labourers still gather the crop in handfuls that can be cut by the bit of curved iron dignified with the name of sickle; and, if we leave out of account the irrigation-canals that British rule has led over the country from almost every available river, we may say that there is nothing in the staple farming of

to-day that would surprise an observer of the time of Akbar.

In all material aids to production, the Indian peasant must be accounted poor and backward; in other respects his equipment is much more satisfactory. He has knowledge—knowledge of the climate, the soil and the crop—based on the experience of his ancestors and embodied in the traditional custom of the country. He has skill, acquired by practice under his father's eye from childhood onward; he has fortitude and endurance; and, except when he is hopelessly in the money-lender's hands, he has the incentive to hard work which is given by the knowledge that its reward is secured to him. Thus the production of wheat rests on the surest foundation, the foundation, that is, of the personal qualities of the producers; the problems of the industry are concerned with the ways in which the resources of agricultural science and the accumulated wealth of the country can be placed at the producer's disposal, so that his personal qualities may be utilised more effectively than is the case at present. These problems have not been neglected. During the last decade the organisation of co-operative credit and of the Government agricultural departments has made progress that can only be described as astonishing; but most of the work accomplished has been preliminary, and there has not yet been time for it to modify materially the conditions in which production is carried on. Here and there, a more remunerative grade of wheat may already be seen on the land; ploughs from Ipswich and reapers from Glasgow are beginning to be known; there are places where during the irrigating season the throb of an oil-engine mingles with the creaking of the pulleys at the well-heads; while in not a few villages the co-operative societies handle substantial sums borrowed from the wealthier classes to provide the capital required by their members. Progress in these and other directions may be expected to become more rapid; and possibly the next two decades may witness more change than the last two centuries. But at the present day the production of wheat is, as we have said, carried on very much on traditional lines—by intense human effort supported by inadequate material equipment.

So much may be said regarding the conditions under which the crop is grown: the consumption of the product brings us into a somewhat different atmosphere. India is fundamentally vegetarian; and, if we leave out of account those parts of the country (mainly the East and the South) which consume chiefly rice, it may be safely asserted that almost everyone wants to eat wheat, and that the number who do so and the amount which they eat is determined largely by the price. There are naturally no direct statistics of internal consumption. The figures have to be arrived at by deducting the exports from the estimated produce; the balance, that is the quantity of wheat retained in the country, has during the last decade varied between 6,000,000 and 8,500,000 tons. This balance includes the seed for the next year's crop, an uncertain amount which, however, must exceed 1,000,000 tons in ordinary seasons. Thus we arrive at actual consumption varying according to prices between 5,000,000 and 7,500,000 tons. It is fairly well known that the amount consumed by people who eat chiefly cereals is such that, when allowance is made for children and the aged, for under-feeding, loss in grinding and other incidentals, a ton of wheat harvested will on the average feed five persons for a year; thus the wheat consumed in recent years would feed a population varying between, let us say, 25,000,000 and 40,000,000 souls. Now the potential wheat-eating population, that is the number of people who would eat wheat if they could afford it, is considerably in excess of 100,000,000; in any case, only a minority can realise their wishes, and the number of that minority depends mainly on the prices that prevail.

The price is the direct governing factor in the case of those classes who do not produce wheat or share directly in the produce, that is to say, the upper and middle classes, the lower classes in towns and cities, and those artisans and labourers in the country who are paid in cash and not (as was formerly the usual practice) in kind. Some members of these classes will buy wheat, whatever the price may be, that is to say, the amount of their consumption is not dependent on the price; others cannot hope to buy wheat—except for a rare treat—however low the price may fall; and between these

two limits stand the large numbers who will buy wheat when it is cheap, but who turn to coarser grains when wheat is dear. So far, then, as regards consumers who are not producers, the position in India is in no way exceptional; their consumption fluctuates in accordance with recognised laws, and the surplus of wheat is not an absolutely fixed quantity, but varies in accordance with changes in price.

But more than half the potential wheat-eating population are concerned in the production of the crop; and their position requires separate consideration. The Indian peasant does not, like the English farmer, buy his bread from a baker; the first principle of his economy is that at each harvest he shall put aside enough grain to feed his family until the next crop is ready. Peasants who are in the hands of the money-lender cannot, of course, completely realise this ideal; but in their case the money-lender (who is also usually a dealer in grain) carries the necessary stock on their behalf and doles it out as required. The well-to-do peasant naturally stocks wheat for his family's use; the smaller man, who cannot afford wheat, stocks the coarser grains which he has grown for that purpose. Having thus provided for the first necessary of life, the peasant has next to find the money that he needs for rent, for clothes, for wages and for miscellaneous expenditure of various kinds. To get this, he sells part of his produce, and it is here that he comes into touch with the market. Often he will sell all that is left after providing a minimum of food, and still have less money than he wants; but, when he has had good crops and prices are high, he will find himself with a margin in hand. He may either sell this margin and hoard the money; or he may sell less grain and add the balance to his household stock, partly to be expended in charity and hospitality, partly to be retained to meet a prospective deficit, and partly (in the case of the poorer peasants) to provide something more than the bare minimum of food required for subsistence.

Now a rise in the price of wheat does not mean the same thing to an entire consuming population constituted in the manner that has been described. Those who are also producers, and in India this means more than half the population under consideration, are either pleased or

indifferent. They are pleased if they have a surplus on hand; they can then either get more money than they expected, or get the money they need by the sale of less wheat. They are indifferent if they have no surplus to sell, as is very commonly the case when the rise in prices takes place some time after harvest. The minority of the population, who do not produce wheat but buy what they want from day to day, of course feel the rise. Some of them have to give up wheat; and their increased demand for the coarser and less nutritious grains lifts the prices of these in turn, so that ordinarily coarse grains move in the same direction as wheat. In any case the vocal classes are loud in their complaints. The middle classes write to the papers; employees come to their masters for a supplement to their wages or salaries; and in the less law-abiding parts of the country more or less organised attacks on grain-dealers' stores are a normal feature of the situation. Thus, when the Government undertakes to control prices, its efforts, in so far as they succeed, do in fact determine the kind and quantity of food of large numbers of people to whom food is at all times the most important and most interesting question in the world.

During last winter the Indian price of wheat rose in harmony with prices all over the world, and very few people in India were benefited. The non-producing consumers naturally suffered, and they did not everywhere submit quietly; producers generally were indifferent because those of them who had secured a surplus out of the inferior harvest of 1914 had already disposed of all they could spare; and the only persons to profit were the comparatively small number of dealers who still had stocks on hand, and the few exceptional peasants who were in the same position. If the export trade had been left free, the approach of the harvest of 1915 would, as usual, have been marked by the appearance of export-buyers in all the principal centres of production, and by the offer of prices more or less in accord with those prevailing in Europe. These prices would have seemed to the cultivator very high; and it is probable that immediate sales would have been very large, and that the entire surplus of the year, and perhaps quantities in excess of the real surplus, would have been rushed to

the seaports. This would have stereotyped (within limits) the existing range of prices for a year ahead. Non-producing consumers would have continued to suffer, and some of them would probably have continued to break the law; solvent producers would have benefited enormously by selling the surplus of their excellent crop at unprecedented prices; and similar benefit would have accrued to those money-lenders who retain the profits earned by producers who are not solvent. The most serious danger of the position lay in the possibility of over-exporting; the country might have seen its stocks reduced to a dangerous extent; and then even a slight deficiency in the autumn crops might have meant famine in the ensuing winter.

The nature of the measures taken by the Government to avoid this danger is not apparent to the ordinary producer. As harvest has come on, he has seen the appearance of the usual export-buyers; and probably everything has gone on much as usual in the markets, except that the prices offered have been less than he had hoped, his hopes having been raised by the exceptional prices that prevailed during the winter. Probably some producers at first held back, but the progressive lowering of the prices offered by the buyers on behalf of Government was calculated to produce the desired conviction that higher prices were not to be hoped for; and at the time of writing it appears to be probable that the object aimed at will be secured—that a compromise will be established in the matter of price, and that the surplus of wheat which the country can spare will be exported for the benefit of the Empire with the minimum of disturbance of internal conditions.

These emergency-measures are therefore likely to prove immediately successful. But the fact must not be overlooked that they affect a very large number of human beings in their daily affairs; and consequently the ulterior effects which they will produce cannot be entirely neglected. The lowering of wheat-prices must inevitably react on the prices of other food-grains; more people will be able to eat wheat, and fewer will want to buy barley or millets; consequently every cultivator who has any grain to sell is worse off than he would have been if Government had not interfered. Government

has in fact transferred arbitrarily a portion of wealth from one class of the population to the others; and the amount so transferred depends on the judgment of the two or three men concerned in fixing the prices offered for export. Their aim, it may be assumed, is to confiscate just so much of the peasants' wealth as will suffice to avoid the danger of distress (and lawlessness) among the rest of the population. The equation is not an easy one to solve; and at best the solution can be only approximate. If the price fixed for wheat is too high (higher, that is, than the theoretically accurate solution), large numbers of poor people will go hungry, and others will be deprived of the nourishing food that should be within their reach; if the price is too low, producers will suffer in pocket though not in stomach. The latter alternative is the more probable; for signs of distress will be carefully watched for, while no intelligence-system can gauge the state of the producer's pocket. To what reactions is this likely to give rise in the immediate future?

There can be little doubt that the prices now being realised, though much higher than would have prevailed in ordinary times, will be a disappointment to the Indian cultivator who has wheat to sell. Expectations had been raised by the high prices prevailing in the winter, and by the flood of rumour and gossip which has supplemented the thin stream of information regarding the war and its effects. The peasants may admit grudgingly that things might have been worse, but they will be disappointed that things are not better. And it is practically certain that the blame for this disappointment will fall mainly on the Government. The fact that Government has not appeared in the up-country markets will afford little protection; to the unlettered peasant its non-appearance makes the case worse. He would understand, and probably he would submit to, direct interference with the markets such as was practised by the Emperor Alá-ud-din and by many rulers of India before and after him. But in his eyes there is something sinister in actions of Government which take place behind the scenes. Probably every buyer of wheat throughout the country invokes the name of the Government when he is beating down the price—'he would pay more if he

dared, but the Government order is that wheat is to be cheap'—and the plain statement of fact will be supported and amplified by the lurid details which the imagination of an oriental market may be trusted to produce. The Indian peasant is at all times credulous; just now he is ready to believe even more than he is told. The incursions of hostile airships were last winter the common talk of Central India, and the country thrilled to the news that the German fleet had anchored in the Jumna off Agra; while the recent disturbances in the Panjab were in part based on the reported arrival of the German army within two days' march of Karachi. In this atmosphere inherent improbability either counts for nothing or is a guarantee of truth; and it is to be feared that both the actions and the motives of Government will be misrepresented in a way that Englishmen can scarcely realise.

The practical result may be twofold. In the first place holders of wheat may decide not to sell; in the second place cultivators may be discouraged from sowing wheat next season. So far as can be judged the withholding of stocks will not take place on such a scale as to produce a very serious effect on the market. The peasants in any case need a certain amount of money; they had not on the whole a successful year in 1914; and, owing to low prices, the cotton-crop, which is important in a large part of the wheat area, brought much less money than usual. The need for money is therefore probably greater than is commonly the case at this season; and, if distrust of the Government increases the strength of the ever-present impulse to hoard, the hoarding is most likely to be done in silver and gold, the commodities recommended by the tradition of the country as the safest resource in times of difficulty and uncertainty. The question of the next crop is more doubtful. The present need for wheat was foreseen in India last September; and, as seed-time approached, cultivators were urged by the authorities in some British provinces and by the rulers of some Native States to sow wheat in preference to other crops, such as oil-seeds, the need for which was less likely to be urgent. That these recommendations did not fall on deaf ears may be inferred from the figures recently made public of the

area sown with wheat for 1915, which was considerably larger than in any previous year. It may be questioned whether similar recommendations for the next sowings would be equally effective if made by a Government which is known to have interfered to reduce the price at which the crop could be sold, and the nature of whose interference has been magnified and distorted by the currents of popular rumour.

Now it is very possible that the Empire's need for wheat may be more urgent next summer than this. No wise civilian would prophesy regarding the course of a war where so many surprises have already been manifest; but it is obvious that this result may follow in various circumstances. The main sources of the world's wheat supply are: (a) Central and Eastern Europe, (b) North America, where the crop ripens in the autumn, (c) South America, (d) India, and (e) Australia, where the harvest takes place in the season which we know as the spring. If, as is probable, the 1915 crop in Europe should prove to be below the normal, the demand for wheat in the summer of 1916 may be very great; and, if Central Europe is then in a position to import—whether as conquerors or as conquered is immaterial to the argument—the call on Australia, India and South America to keep the world going till the autumn may be more urgent than any similar call since the establishment of oversea commerce on modern lines. On the other hand, it is not easy to imagine any combination of circumstances in which the demand next summer would be much less than usual; and the conclusion may be drawn that it is important for the Empire, perhaps for civilisation, that the Indian crop of 1916 should be as large as possible.

To secure this result, organisation will be necessary, no less than to secure an adequate output of munitions of war. But the organisation will take longer, because the yield at harvest depends primarily on the area sown. In India the wheat area is governed, first of all, by the weather in August and September. If the weather-conditions in those months are favourable, a large variety of crops is sown during October and November; and organisation is wanted to secure not only that the cultivable land is fully occupied, but that it is

occupied by the most important crops. The Indian peasant cannot watch and forecast the market like an English or American farmer; and in existing circumstances this can be done for him only by the Governments, which can advise him, or in some Indian States even order him, what crops to sow, and can lend him the capital that he needs in order to follow the advice or obey the order.

It is at next seed-time, then, that the consequences of the action already taken by the Indian Government may become apparent. If that action, or the distorted popular idea of that action, has rendered the peasants distrustful, they will curtail their sowings of wheat and will not respond readily to any measures that the Government may take to increase the area under the crop. If this turn out to be the case, India in 1916 will have less to contribute to the world's needs, and her peasants will have lost what may be an unequalled opportunity of improving their own position. If, on the other hand, the authorities succeed in their immediate aim without seriously shaking the confidence of the peasants in their ulterior motives and in the future of the crop, then the undoubted advantages which have been secured in 1915 will be pure gain, and not merely a temporary profit to be set off against the greater losses and difficulties of the ensuing year; and they will have fully earned the credit which they will doubtless enjoy for the successful conduct of one of the most delicate economic enterprises that could be undertaken.

W. H. MORELAND.

Art. 6.—THE DARDANELLES. ✓

SOME three thousand years ago there lay at the mouth of the Hellespont a great army, convoyed by a great navy, fighting for the possession of the land. They met with a stubborn resistance. Near the shore stood a strong castle, fortified by all the arts of the 12th century B.C.; the remains of the walls still surprise the most thoughtless visitor to Troy by their size and construction. But the castle was taken in the end; its parapets were overthrown, though the stone sub-structures were by their very massiveness spared for us to see; its houses were razed, and little has been left of them but the rare fragments of broken pottery which enable the archæologist to say with confidence that the fall of the castle took place about 1200 B.C.

This at least is authentic history, so far as it can be gathered by scientific deduction from material relics which can be seen and handled. A further conclusion lies close at hand; and all recent enquiry tends to strengthen it—that this castle was the famous Troy, and that the war in which it finally fell was that known by its poetic fame as the Trojan War. The details of the story, as told in the 'Iliad' and worked out by the fancy and imagination of later generations of poets, are the embroidery; but the broad fact is that soon after the year 1200 B.C. the fortress of Troy was taken and sacked by Greek invaders from the west.

It is no mere coincidence that after the lapse of more than thirty centuries the War of Troy should have come round again, and that a new 'Agamemnon' should be sailing the same waters where the king of Mycenæ landed his confederate army; that blood should be flowing among the hills and valleys in full sight of Troy, and even on the banks of the Scamander itself. It is only too likely that batteries have been erected on the very hill of Hissarlik, and that the precious remains which the Achæians spared for us have now been destroyed for ever by the orders of German engineers. Turks and Germans are fighting for the same object as Trojans and Lycians; the aim of both alike is to keep the ships of the west from commerce with the Black Sea. The Black

Sea or Euxine trade is one of the essential economic needs of the world at large; and those who can stop it are always in a commanding position, which must needs be disputed if they choose to exercise their power. It is very rarely that it has been worth their while to do so; the tolls which in one form or another can be derived from it are so abundant that an actual stopping of the passage is economically suicidal.

The king of Troy was able to close the Straits to ships if he chose—by what means we shall discuss later. But the remains of his castle show that he was rich; therefore he did not permanently block the way. His plan was, by preventing the ships of the west from sailing up, to force other ships to bring their wares from the east, and to barter them with the west under the walls of his fortress. That was the source of his wealth and power. But it was a power intolerable to the enterprising Greeks, just as it is intolerable for us that all the world should be cut off from the rich granaries of Russia and the Danube plains. The Achaians fought, and we are fighting, to insist that this all-important waterway shall not be closed against the needs of the human race.

The Black Sea trade has been important to the well-being of mankind from the very earliest ages. The shores of the great inland sea are to us, as they were already in pre-historic days, the birthplace of raw materials of the highest importance. Though the oil of Baku must not be forgotten, it is as one of the great cereal areas of the world that we think of the plains that surround the northern and north-western shores. From Sulima, Galatz, Braila, and the other ports of the Danube, from Odessa and Nikolaieff, from Varna, Burgas and Kustendje, come vast quantities of wheat, maize, barley and oats. It is by cutting off these supplies that Turkey struck her worst blow at the west before she had fired a single shot. The only outlet for these immense supplies is through the Dardanelles; and the power which is able to close the Straits can throttle at once an important part of the food of the world.

But, whatever the Black Sea and the Dardanelles mean to us, all that and more the Euxine and the Hellespont meant to the ancient world. To them the Euxine

trade brought not only grains of all sorts, but many others of the most essential of the raw materials of commerce and industry. The southern shore, now lying almost fallow under the paralysing effects of Turkish rule, was then peopled by a long line of busy Greek colonies, engaged in active trade with the interior. All the coast is fringed by vegetation almost subtropical in its luxuriance; * it supplied an inexhaustible treasure of timber, easily shipped from hill-sides running down to the water's edge. Mineral resources were abundant and largely exploited; the country is to Homer 'the birth-place of silver'; and the Chalybes among the eastern valleys were the most famous iron-workers of antiquity. At the extreme eastern end is Colchis, with the gold-bearing Phasis, where the earliest explorers sought the Golden Fleece. In the north-east is the Sea of Azoff, the great breeding place of the tunny, whose pickled flesh, exported from Sinope and Byzantium, formed the staple food of a large part of the Mediterranean peoples. Moreover the Euxine was one of the chief sources of an indispensable implement of ancient industry, slaves. And finally we have to remember that from immemorial ages a caravan route has run from Central Asia through northern Persia to Trebizond; † and many a Persian rug in our drawing-rooms has come on camels' backs and across the Black Sea just as eastern carpets came three thousand years ago, no doubt, to Troy and Mycenæ. And all this trade has one outlet only to the west; it must pass through the narrow portal of the Hellespont. Geographical conditions preclude any alternative.

Into this country of vast potential wealth the progressive nations of the west have been pressing since the earliest dawn of history. The nations of the Black Sea area have never been enterprising sailors or merchants. They have always hitherto been content to allow the mercantile countries to come to them, and traffic with them at their own gates. Thus there has never, till quite recent days, been any pressure to force the Straits

* The July isotherm is only a degree or two less than that of Alexandria, and is combined with a summer rainfall (June–August), varying from two to over four inches, while the Egyptian summer is rainless.

† Within the last few years the construction of a harbour at Batum has diverted the final stage to the north-east.

from within. We are apt to forget how short a time has elapsed since Russia made good her footing on the shores of the Black Sea. It was only in 1794 that she conquered the site where Odessa now stands; the town itself was founded in the early years of the last century. It is the appearance of a nation seeking exit instead of entrance which forms the only material alteration of the Black Sea problem in modern days.

It is only in the direction of their length, that is as a water-way, that the Straits have played any important part in history, economic, political, or strategic. In a transverse direction they have been only secondary. No great route of trade has ever crossed them. The produce of the plains and valleys on either side comes to the ports on their shores only to be shipped up or down their length to more distant regions. All the neighbouring countries are accessible to cheap carriage by sea; and with this method expensive transport over hills and uplands can never compete. Nor have the Straits ever been taken as a military line of defence or served as a political frontier. The command of one of the main arteries of the world has at all times been too valuable for division; and when, at rare intervals, two powers have, in the course of war, found themselves face to face across the narrow water, the position has always been one of unstable equilibrium, and the weaker on either shore has had to give way to the stronger on the other. No settlement which ignores this cardinal fact can have any chance of permanence.

Armies have crossed, of course, sometimes on a large scale, and with notable pomp and circumstance, but not against military opposition. Even the crossing of the Turks in 1356 was, as we shall see, virtually unopposed. The two most famous military passages, those of Xerxes in 480 and of Alexander in 334 B.C., were indeed only possible because both sides of the Straits were in friendly hands. The former was rather a spectacle than a military operation. We read in the immortal narrative of Herodotus of the bridging of the Straits from Abydos to Sestos; how the first bridge was destroyed by a storm, how Xerxes' wrath was aroused, how the disobedient Hellespont was scourged with three hundred strokes of the lash, and a pair of fetters let down into the water,

while all the time the 'salt river' was insulted for revolting against its master, who 'will pass over thee whether thou wilt or not.' Then, when the Egyptian and Phœnician engineers had at last completed the bridge and the passage was prepared, Xerxes reviewed his army from a throne set on the hills of Abydos, and called for a sham fight between the ships.

'And seeing all the Hellespont covered with the ships, and all the shores and the plains of Abydos full of men, Xerxes pronounced himself a happy man, and after that he fell to weeping, saying in answer to Artabanos' question, "Yea, for after I had reckoned up, it came into my mind to feel pity at the thought how brief was the whole life of man, seeing that of these multitudes not one will be alive when a hundred years have gone by." . . . 'Next day they waited for the sun, desiring to see him rise, and in the meantime they offered all kinds of incense upon the bridges and strewed the way with branches of myrtle. Then, as the sun was rising, Xerxes made libation from a golden cup into the sea, and prayed to the sun, that no accident might befall him such as should cause him to cease from subduing Europe, until he had come to its furthest limits. . . . And his army crossed over in seven days and seven nights, going on continuously without any pause.'*

This is not to be taken as mere childish vanity or oriental ostentation. It was evidently a carefully prepared and well executed piece of acting on the most conspicuous stage of the ancient world; and it had its definite purpose. It was intended to impress upon the Greeks the belief that the force which was marching to attack them was something superhuman. It was in fact an early instance of 'frightfulness' on an imposing scale; it doubtless had its effect in inducing the ready submission of many Greek states, and lost nothing in its psychological results because the display had none of the savagery which, till a few months ago, was associated only with the barbarians of the Orient.

Another dramatic crossing was that of Alexander on his way to the battle of the Granicus and the overthrow of Persia. The passage was in itself so unimportant as a military operation that Alexander left the transport of

* Macaulay's translation, abridged.

the troops to his chief of the staff, Parmenion, and went on pilgrimage to Troy. Passing down the peninsula to the town of Elæus, where now stands what we know as 'de Tott's battery,' he paid his devotions at the tumulus which stands near by, and which was known to antiquity as the tomb of Protesilaus, the first hero to fall in the landing of the Achaian army. Thence he crossed to the European side, to the sand-spit of Kum-kale. Here stood the great tumulus of unknown age, still a landmark to all who enter the Straits, and sacred to the Greeks as the tomb of Achilles. From Achilles Alexander claimed, through his mother, direct descent, and to his tomb he paid especial honour, anointing it with oil and running round it naked, 'as the manner is.' After due devotion at the temple of Athena in Ilium itself he turned northwards to rejoin his army, now safely brought across from Sestos, and encamped in the rolling plain of Arisbe, a few miles to the east of Abydos. The whole episode was again a carefully planned display, only it was intended to emphasise the piety and self-restraint of the Greek in contrast with the blasphemous ostentation of the Persian.

When Xerxes insulted the Hellespont by telling it that it was only a 'salt river,' he was in fact very near the scientific fact. The Hellespont is the course of a submerged river valley, and still preserves the main characteristic of its origin in the superficial * current which runs down it with an average speed of $1\frac{1}{2}$ knots, sometimes attaining in the Narrows a maximum of five to about six statute miles an hour. To the effect of the current must be added the equally important though less regular influence of the wind, which for nine months out of the twelve blows with the current from the N.-E., often with great violence.

When current and wind are both at their height, no sailing ship, even of the best modern type, can beat up against them; for the vessels of the ancients, which probably could not sail on a wind, the passage upwards was even at the best of times a difficult matter. It

* Hydrostatic conditions, due to the lower salinity of the Black Sea, produce an under current from the *Ægean* inwards; but this heavier water never comes to the surface.

would have been impossible, but for two mitigating circumstances; firstly, that the N.-E. winds do not usually blow throughout the 24 hours, but rise in the morning, attain their greatest power at midday, and drop again in the evening; and secondly, that the various promontories along the shore of the Straits set up eddies of the current which run faintly upwards along the shores of the principal bays. By taking advantage of these, sailing ships can creep slowly up from point to point, and await a favourable breeze strong enough to carry them past the chief headlands; but the passage eastwards is for them at best a slow and tedious business, and may mean a delay of days or even weeks before the more critical points can be rounded.

These then were the conditions under which the command of the Straits had to be exercised. It will be seen at once that they are all against those who come from the west, while they greatly facilitate the return passage from the east; they are all in favour of the defence so long as there is no pressure from the east, and such pressure has never yet effectually come. It is possible to distinguish very clearly three stages in the development of the defence, corresponding to the growth of man's control of material power. We may conveniently distinguish them as the Trojan, the Athenian, and the Turkish stages. Each had a different method, and therefore a different site. The Trojan system was one of passive control by possession of the shores; it was exercised at the very mouth of the Straits. The second or Athenian method was control by navies; for this purpose harbours were needed, and the point of command moved to the two opposite harbours of Sestos and Abydos, at the northern end of the Narrows. The third or Turkish method was control by artillery; and for this purpose the narrowest point in the whole strait was naturally chosen for the two castles of Chanak and Kilid-ul-bahr. Let us deal in order with the history of the three stages.

Of the first, the Trojan, we have already spoken. The object of the fortress of Troy can only have been negative; it prevented the merchant ships of the west from sailing upwards, and so brought the Euxine trade

down to meet the *Ægean*. For this purpose a passive control was effective, for the possession of the land implied command of the water-supply; and without the power of obtaining fresh water the small vessels of primitive navigation were helpless. It was impossible for them to sail up the Straits under the prevailing conditions of wind and currents without reckoning on the probability of many days or weeks of detention at one or another anchorage; and, so long as they were anchored, they were at the mercy of the owners of the land. This is a sufficient and necessary explanation of the presence in early days of a stronghold on the Trojan plain. The situation was one which the eager and enterprising people of Greece could not tolerate. The fortress was ultimately taken and razed, as we know.

When the curtain of history rises again, several centuries having elapsed since this first act, we find that the Greeks have had their way, and are now established in numerous colonies, not only along both shores of the Hellespont, but all round the two inner seas, the Propontis and the Euxine. All are flourishing greatly on the Euxine trade. The problem of the Straits is now entirely altered. There is no question of closing them to the traffic on which all Greece is thriving; but the control of it is, as always, of the utmost value. This Athens saw; and on the control of the Hellespont she founded her empire.

Athens, hitherto a third-rate town, incapable of comparison with the great Greek cities of Asia Minor, was still engaged in the struggle for her own shores and the possession of Salamis, when, under the guidance of her great statesmen Solon and Pisistratus, she made her first bid for an empire over the seas by fighting for a hold on the Hellespont. She set her foot on the Asiatic side, already claimed by the Mitylenæans of Lesbos; and the battles for the Attic foundation of Sigeum seem to have covered nearly half a century. But soon after 550 B.C., under Pisistratus, the colony was founded on the western ridge about half a mile south of the village of Yeni Shehr.

Sigeum itself does not seem to have been a successful colony; it was on the wrong side of the Straits; and the effective base of Athenian empire was laid on the

European shore by an unauthorised private adventurer, the elder Miltiades. He was invited by a native tribe of the Peninsula to help them against some powerful neighbours, and with a company of free lances succeeded in establishing an independent principality, including the whole of the Thracian Chersonese, the Peninsula of Gallipoli; and this after his death passed to his nephew, the younger and more famous Miltiades.

But Cræsus, the personal friend of the elder Miltiades, had by this time fallen before the new Persian power; in the days of the nephew the eastern flood swept over the whole of Asia Minor. Darius invaded Scythia by way of the Bosphorus, returning by Sestos, and carried with him, together with all the other small Greek princes, the 'tyrant' of the Chersonese as a mere satellite in his train. Miltiades was no friend to Darius, and finding his position unbearable retired to Athens, where in 490 he took at Marathon a brilliant revenge on his former master.

It was not, however, till ten years later, after the final defeat of Xerxes, that Athens could think of regaining her lost hold on the Chersonese. She lost not a moment when the occasion came. No sooner had the Persian fleet been finally defeated at Mycale than Spartans and Athenians sailed off to Sestos to destroy the bridge which formed the Persian communication with Europe. They arrived there to find that storms had done the work for them. The Spartans were satisfied and sailed home; but the Athenians determined to stay till they had captured Sestos itself. With the fall of the town Herodotus appropriately closes his history; for the recovery of the place marks the end of the struggle against Persia, and the opening of a new era, that of the Athenian Empire.

Athens, essentially a commercial and industrial state, was wholly dependent upon imports for the food of her people; and by holding the Hellespont she could secure the passage of the Euxine corn-ships upon which her very existence depended. As her empire began by the capture of Sestos, so it was destroyed close to Sestos in the battle of *Ægospotami*. The Hellespont was always the central point on which the operations of her fleet turned, at the first and at the last. The peninsula she

held by planting a large body of her own colonists there; for her grasp on the Asiatic shore she was dependent on a number of Greek cities, nominally independent allies, but practically subjects so long as she was able to hold them down. The key to the position was Sestos, her own colony. Next in importance was Abydos on the opposite Asiatic shore. The two were always closely bound together by nature; even in Homer they appear under the same ruler.

Abydos had by far the most important harbour—the best natural harbour, indeed, in the whole Troad. The low spit which we know as Nagara Point juts out at right angles to a range of low hills running along the eastern side of the Narrows, and forms a bay sheltered alike from the force of the current and of the winds; while the hills above the bay form a defence for the town which lay at their feet. The harbour is one at which every ship passing up the channel was bound to touch; for Nagara Point is the hardest of all in the Hellespont for a ship to weather.

But, as Abydos commanded the traffic of the Straits, so Sestos commanded Abydos itself. Abydos lay low, on the shore and the sloping hillsides; Sestos was raised on a plateau lying some 300 feet above the sea. The plateau commands a view down the whole length of the Narrows from north to south; and it is high enough to look right over the low point of Nagara into the harbour of Abydos, at a distance of three miles, so that all movements of shipping could be easily observed. Sestos lay, moreover, up stream, and the current and prevailing winds gave its ships the permanent weather-gage of those at Abydos. A ship of war could descend on Abydos in an easy half-hour; but from Abydos ships could only reach the harbour of Sestos by a toilsome and devious course against the current, passing of necessity for a great part of the way right under the walls of the fortress. The harbour of Sestos was not in itself as good as that of Abydos; for the bay now called Ak-bashi liman, though offering good anchorage, has not equal shelter against the north-east winds. This was, no doubt, remedied by moles; in all other respects Sestos had the advantage. The harbour lay on the north side of the town, completely invisible

from Abydos itself; and the cliffs and ravines which surround the plateau with a steep and high scarp on every side rendered it one of the strongest fortresses of the ancient world. So long as it served for the base of a powerful fleet, Abydos was at its mercy, and Athens had absolute command of the passage, protecting the whole course of her merchant ships as they passed up with merchandise for the rich Euxine colonies and returned with the indispensable wheat for the granaries of the Piræus.

No wonder Abydos always hated Athens, as Demosthenes says she did. The turn of Abydos came after the great Athenian disaster before Syracuse. Abydos was one of the first towns to throw off her allegiance to the Attic confederacy; and from that moment the last act of the Peloponnesian War consists of the desperate struggle of Athens to hold the Hellespont from Sestos alone against the hostility of Abydos. The fortunes of war varied for some years; Athens gained naval victories in the Straits themselves, one of them in 411 off the promontory of Cynossema, which we now call Kilid-ul-bahr. In 406 the victory of Arginusæ seemed to give Athens the definite naval predominance. But Sparta produced, as usual, the commander of genius who reversed the position. Lysander, with the aid of Persian gold, built a new fleet, and in 405, after various manœuvres to throw the Athenians off their guard, entered the Hellespont unattacked. Here he showed the strategic insight which his predecessors had lacked. The Spartans had hitherto confined themselves to defending Abydos, so accepting all the disadvantages of the position. Lysander boldly sailed up the Straits to the northern end, and, with the aid of a land force, stormed and held the important town of Lampsacus.

The Athenian fleet, sailing in pursuit, found on its arrival at Sestos that it was for the first time in a strategically inferior position. Lysander, with stream and wind to back him, had the weather-gage, with all the advantage of the initiative, and could attack at his pleasure. An Athenian admiral might, one would think, have two alternatives. He might either attempt to seize Callipolis (Gallipoli), where he would at once have recovered the initiative, with a good harbour and the

weather-gage for his ships; or he might decide to remain on the defensive at Sestos, with at least a strongly fortified base. But the Athenians had no admiral; they had a committee of admirals, and the committee made the usual compromise; they neither went to Callipolis nor stayed at Sestos, but went half way to the little stream of *Ægospotami*. They thus ingeniously put themselves at every possible disadvantage. They had no harbour; their ships were moored off a muddy delta, with no sort of protection. They were still down wind and stream, and at a distance which made observation and sudden attack easier than ever; and, worst of all, they were cut off from their base at Sestos, with no organised means of supplies. There was neither market nor town near them; and they could provision themselves only by the primitive method of sending the crews to forage in the country.

Day by day they made in the morning ineffective attempts to lure Lysander to fight; they could not attack the Spartan fleet as it lay close to land protected by a strong army, and Lysander was too wise to be drawn. The afternoons had to be spent in foraging expeditions. On the fifth day Lysander ordered his swift scouts to heliograph to him, by the simple device of hoisting a bright shield on the mast, as soon as the Athenian crews were well on shore. Then he made his pounce. He was on the empty ships long before the crews could be re-embarked; and, while the Athenians looked on in helpless rage from the shore, the fleet was annihilated. Sestos fell at once; and Athens, with her food supply cut off, had no choice but to surrender at discretion. So it was that the winds and currents of the Hellespont destroyed an empire at the very spot where it had been founded.

The subsequent history of the defence of the Straits based on Sestos and Abydos, the stage which, because in the days of Athens it had the greatest significance for the world, we have called the Athenian period, must be briefly dismissed. Two generations after *Ægospotami* Athens recovered sufficiently to found a second empire; and this again was based on the Hellespont. Students of Demosthenes will remember the weary maze of fighting and

intrigue which led to the culmination of this brief and unstable renaissance in the recapture of Sestos. But the new confederation went to pieces almost at once. The Hellespont fell into the hands of Alexander without a blow after his conquest of mainland Greece; the Persians waited for him to cross, and struck too late. It was not till 200 B.C., when Rome was stretching her hands eastwards, that the Straits assumed a momentary importance. Philip V of Macedon, anticipating an attack by the combined forces of Rome and Attalus of Pergamon, decided to seize the Straits as a measure of defence; his campaign ended with the capture of Abydos after a siege memorable among the sieges of the world for the desperate resistance of the inhabitants, and their universal suicide when the walls at last fell. But this serves only to illustrate the fact that the Straits are unimportant as a line of defence; the Romans had no thought of attacking on this side, and it was not on the Hellespont but in Thessaly that they crushed Philip. Thereafter their power over Asia grew steadily by the land routes. Abydos settled down, when Asia Minor had become Roman, into the comfortable position of a commercial town and chief toll-station; the taxes on shipping formed an important part of the revenue of the empire for many centuries. The purely military position of Sestos became useless, and we hear little or nothing of it till the days of Justinian. He, finding so naturally strong a site neglected and deserted, built there an 'impregnable castle.' But it was, like much of Justinian's work, a piece of mere ostentation. The enemies he had to resist were pressing from the north and the east, not from the west. It may have been a recognition of the uselessness of the fortress that brought it the not very complimentary name of Choiridokastron, 'Pig's Castle.'

The pressure from the west began again in the 11th century; and nothing can better mark the imbecility of Byzantine government than the fact that the Eastern empire never seems to have made any attempt to defend itself in the really vital point. Pretenders to the throne, Franks, Genoese, Crusaders, seem to have passed up and down the Straits with hardly even a show of resistance. The Fourth 'Crusade' established itself in 1204 at Abydos, a town 'moult bele et moult bien

assise,' as Villehardouin describes it, for the attack on Constantinople. A century later, in 1306, Gallipoli was captured by the roving body of free lances called the 'Grand Company of the Catalans.' They held on to the place as long as they cared; they stood a siege or two, defeated every army sent against them, and, after bleeding the country white, retired at their leisure to seek new fields for plunder.

And then came the Turks. They had already secured, with small exceptions, the whole of Asia Minor; their capital was at Brussa, and they had a wide choice of directions from which to make their final attack on Constantinople. They were led by their military instinct to fix on the Straits, and on Sestos as the vital point. When Suleiman Pasha, the son of Orkhan, decided on the great adventure in 1356, he did not even take an army. With a picked body of a few hundred heroes, he crossed the Straits on rafts by night, and surprised Justinian's impregnable castle of Choiridokastron. The fall of the place was worthy of its name; it is said that most of the garrison were absent, employed on agricultural work, and the walls were easily scaled over a great heap of manure stacked against them. Next year the Turks, working northwards from Sestos, had seized Gallipoli, and made it their bridge-head for a further advance. By 1361 Adrianople was in their hands, and the capital was cut off from the west. The final fall of Constantinople was delayed for nearly a century by the astounding and wholly unforeseen attack of Timur and his Mongols on the Turkish rear, and the defeat and capture of Bayezid; but none the less the fatal blow to Constantinople, as to Athens, was delivered at Sestos. It is characteristic of Byzantine fatuity that the Emperor John Palæologos should have received the news of the capture of Choiridokastron with the inane jest, 'After all, they have only taken a pigsty.'

Constantinople fell at last in 1453. Mohammed the Conqueror was not the man to neglect a vital point in the defence of his new capital as his predecessors had done; and his victory was hardly won when he set about securing the Straits. But the year 1453 marked in many ways the beginning of a new era, the end of the Middle Ages; among others, it had established the

power of heavy artillery. Mohammed had no need to waste a fleet in holding the Straits now that they could be commanded by guns. But new conditions involved a new point of defence. It was the harbours which fixed the naval point at Sestos and Abydos. But for guns the question depended upon range, and the Straits were not narrowest here. The general width at the upper end of the Narrows is about 2500 yards, and is nowhere less than 2200. Four miles lower down, the Straits contract to 1400 yards; and it was here that Mohammed the Conqueror placed his two forts, the 'Old Castles' of Chanak and Kilid-ul-bahr. Till February last both stood intact; Chanak, with a massive square central keep, faced by Kilid, a picturesque tower planned in the shape of a trefoil or heart. Both were armed with guns throwing huge stone shot up to 1000 lb. weight, incapable of being trained, and discharged only as a ship came into the line of fire.

The toll-station and seat of administration moved down to the forts; and the population followed. The town of Chanak or Dardanelles sprang up; and Sestos and Abydos were finally deserted. The site of Abydos now holds only forts and their garrisons. No foreigner is allowed to land there; but a century ago almost all remains of antiquity had disappeared. The stones had been carried off to build the houses of Chanak; and it is doubtful if the most diligent archæologist would now find anything to reward a search. The site of Sestos is a ploughed field; the only visible remains are the walls of 'Pig's Castle'; and the only inhabitants are the family of the farmer who is employed not only in tilling the soil, but in tending the 'tekkeh' which stands before the gate of the castle—the tomb of one of the Turkish heroes who fell in the assault.

The two forts stopped the passage, but they could not prevent approach. Venetian fleets more than once sailed up to and threatened the Narrows; and in the 17th century the range of guns had improved sufficiently to make it worth while to defend the outer entrance. The two 'New Castles' of Kum Kale and Sedd-ul-bahr were built by the Vizier Köprülü just after the middle of the century, and strengthened in the 18th by Baron de Tott, who added also the battery on the site of the

ancient Elæus, at the eastern end of Morto Bay. Since then the Straits have only once been forced, by Sir John Duckworth in 1807. The Turkish Government had at that time almost relapsed into the imbecility of their Byzantine predecessors; and little resistance was offered to the upward passage; but, while Sir John was kept in play by the diplomatists at Constantinople, the forts in his rear were hastily strengthened by French engineers. The admiral had to retreat lest he might be cut off, and in descending the channel he suffered not inconsiderable loss from the huge stone cannon-balls of the guns.

So it is that the centuries from the days of Troy onwards have contributed their memories of war to the shores of the fifteen miles of water between Sestos and Troy. Even Priam's Troy was not the first. Below the feet of Priam and Hector there lay yet older Troys of which they knew nothing; many centuries must have passed since the days of the 'Second City' where Schliemann found the great treasure of gold and silver, jade and amber, proving that even at that remote date the holding of the Straits was the source of wealth and power. And below the 'Second City' again lie the rude and humble walls of the first—how many centuries older still who can say? Of those ancient cities no other record has come down to us; but in their remains forty centuries look down on the present battlefields as surely as they did from the Pyramids on the armies of Napoleon. Troy has once more arisen to block the west, and at last we may look for the fulfilment of the prophecy of Juno in Horace:

*'Trois renascens alite lugubri
Fortuna tristi clade iterabitur.'*

WALTER LEAF.

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✓ Art. 7.—NIETZSCHE AND GERMAN EDUCATION.

1. *The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Eighteen vols. Edinburgh and London: Foulis, 1909-13.
2. *Nietzsche: Tendances et Problèmes*. Par Virgile J. Barbat. Zürich und Leipzig: Rascher, 1911.
3. *Nietzsche und die Kulturprobleme unserer Zeit*. Von A. Kalthoff. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1900.
4. *German Higher Schools*. By James E. Russell. New York and London: Longmans, 1905.
5. *Die Reform der höheren Schulen in Preussen*. Von M. Caspar. Berlin: Emil Felber, 1913.
6. *Rembrandt als Erzieher*. Von einem Deutschen. Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1890.

SOMEBODY once remarked that when the French conquered a country they founded a parliament, the Germans a university. It is very difficult to characterise, as it is to arraign, a nation in such brief terms, but the author of that epigram has done it with remarkable success and unusual insight into national psychology. For it is a fact that the rulers of Germany for the last two hundred years have seized upon education as the best instrument with which to further their designs. And that is a novel and unexpected policy for kings to adopt.

Education, it has generally been assumed, means enlightenment, and, as such, it is to be denied to the populace. Autocrats and democrats, in countries other than Prussia, seem to have agreed upon one point, namely, that education and political or social progress go hand in hand. Thus the policy of all other reactionary rulers in this regard has been negative; the despots have always refused to impart what the demagogues persistently demanded. But the Kings of Prussia, from Frederick the Great to the present German Emperor, have followed a positive course of greater intellectual danger to their subjects and of infinitely more sinister import for the rest of the world. I mean that what we may call, in most of its bearings, the peculiarly Prussian ideal of the State as the be-all and end-all of existence, has been helped forward by the Prussian educational system to an undreamt-of degree.

Another tendency in German education, one which is, of course, considerably subordinated to the requirements

of King and Fatherland but is noteworthy nevertheless, is towards utilitarianism. Frequently the demands of patriotism and those of material progress are identical. For example, it was the present Emperor who, by a celebrated speech in the year 1890, virtually set in motion the gradual abandonment of the classics which has progressed continuously, if in some instances slowly, up to the present. Despite the protests of a large number of humanists, amongst whom Professors Wilamowitz-Moellerndorff, Uhlig and Jaeger were the most conspicuous, the dropping of humaner studies has proceeded apace, especially in Prussia. For the discarded subjects natural science was substituted at the wish of those desirous of seeing Germany industrially and commercially great, and patriotic geography and history at the wish of the Emperor, who, to quote his own words, wanted to see the schools turn out 'young Germans and not young Romans or Greeks.' The struggle was not merely between 'classical' and 'modern' education; most modern languages, French perhaps more than any other, may be held to possess, if taught properly, a cultural value comparable even with Latin or Greek. But the issue was really far wider. It was, in effect, between education directed towards culture in the French or Anglo-Saxon sense, and education directed towards the production of subservient State officials or successful men of commerce and industry. The various protesters were quick to see the point. Prof. Paulsen, in a plaintive article written at the time of the change, did not expatiate on the value of Greek or Latin civilisation to the modern world. He confined himself to the question of whether the same liberality was being shown by the Government to the modest needs of philology and philosophy as towards applied chemistry, engineering and the like. His answer was a regretful negative. A well-known pseudonymous *laudator temporis acti*, one among many, signing himself 'Schwarzseher' (Pessimist), made the now trite assertion that in modern Germany 'an active interest for natural science and technical improvements is not balanced by a deeper concern for the mental sciences and the arts.' Even Heinrich von Treitschke felt and expressed the same despondency. A sentence he wrote in 1895 seems to echo, curiously enough, Nietzsche's

main thesis on the subject of German education. He said: 'The more culture extends, the more insipid it becomes; men despise the profundity of the ancient world and consider only that which subserves their immediate ends.' In this connexion it is a commonplace, and also a thoroughly typical fact, that the great advance in the teaching of English which Germany has made during the past few years is no compliment to us. Where its incentive has not been purely philological interest, it has been commercial ambition, eagerness to capture new markets.

The word 'philological' suggests the third and last reactionary tendency with which we are immediately concerned here, namely, in the direction of confining learning to comparatively unimportant details and of turning criticism into what Swinburne used sneeringly to call 'finger-counting.' Anyone with the slightest experience of German universities knows that the word most bandied about from professor to professor and from earnest student to earnest student is the word 'wissenschaftlich.' This precious word connotes hard work divorced from insight, and industry entirely separated from anything resembling artistic sympathy. Imagination or style is a very real disadvantage in a German university; it will be contemptuously dismissed as 'ästhetisch' and will be accompanied in the case of a professor by a falling-off in attendance at his lectures and in the case of a student by failure to obtain an adequate place in his final examination for the doctorate. And that is a far more serious thing in Germany than in this country or indeed anywhere else. Few people have analysed this state of affairs with greater care than the author of 'Rembrandt als Erzieher'—a well-known, sometimes admirable, sometimes extravagant and absurd representative of that large class of pessimistic books on modern Germany—who remarks:

'Cataloguing, inventory-making and indexing are indeed necessary at times; but as these preponderate in education culture dies; . . . a literature of handbooks is, in fact, still-born.'

No one who has paid even a cursory attention to modern German life can fail to have had the existence

of the three tendencies I have briefly described brought home to him by numberless complaints and pessimistic reviews, from the book I have just cited, which was published in 1890 and reached a second edition next year, down to the noteworthy articles written by the journalist and novelist Kurt Martens in 1910. What is not recognised so much as it ought to be at this time is the fact that Friedrich Nietzsche, near the beginning of his career, as well as upon several occasions subsequently, put his finger on these three weak spots in German education. His first and most detailed account of the whole question is contained in a series of five lectures entitled 'The Future of our Educational Institutions,' delivered at the University of Basel in January 1872, just a year after the birth of the German Empire. In these lectures Nietzsche divined with remarkable clear-sightedness the inherent weaknesses of German academic life and organisation, and uttered warnings which to-day read like the prophecies of another Cassandra.

Nietzsche's main argument may be stated as follows. He sees in united Germany two opposing tendencies—to extend education and to weaken and minimise it. Both repel him. At this early stage in his development—he was only twenty-seven at the time of these lectures—he had already begun to form his 'aristocratic' conception of art, culture and education. Hence, in opposition to the two antagonistic forces he saw at work, Nietzsche set up as his ideal, on the one hand, the limitation and concentration of instruction, and, on the other, the effort to strengthen it and make it independent:

'The education of the masses (he says) cannot be our aim; but rather the education of a few picked men for great and lasting works.'

The idea expressed in these words was constantly reiterated in later writings. The sentence in 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' 'The end of culture is the production of genius,' was repeated again and again, until, at length, what in its inception appeared to be an unorthodox pedagogic theory became part of a philosophic dogma, the 'Superman' dogma, in fact. Another sentence from 'Schopenhauer as Educator' will illustrate the point still further:

'The man who only regards his life as a moment in the evolution of a race or a science . . . has not understood the lesson of existence and must learn it over again.'

That is plainly the halfway house between the lectures on education and the poetic philosophy of 'Thus spake Zarathustra.' The complete man as the sole aim of education—this is implicit in all that Nietzsche had to say upon the subject. It often occupied his thoughts, as his letters to his friend Deussen prove; and the high seriousness he showed in his professorial duties, to which Frau Foerster-Nietzsche brings ample witness in 'The Lonely Nietzsche,' was no doubt the result of earnest meditation upon his theories and aims. And yet, in spite of this lifelong consistency, Nietzsche, at all events in 'The Future of our Educational Institutions,' was too little of a Utopian not to see the impracticability of this suggestion of 'schools for geniuses.' So that what he does in the remarks that follow is to take the German University system as it then stood or as he conceived it might stand before long, and to analyse its chief defects in the light of his ideal.

At the outset Nietzsche delivers a vigorous protest against

'the all-too-frequent exploitation of youth by the State for its own purposes; that is to say, its endeavour to rear useful officials as quickly as possible and guarantee their unconditional obedience to it by means of excessively severe examinations.'

These words describe with exactitude the process which has been increasingly put into operation from 1890 to the present day. The Moloch of *étatisme*, to put it rhetorically in the best French polemical style, has been consuming its victims with an ever-growing voracity from the day when its high-priest, the Emperor, declared the chief function of teachers to be the reconciling of the proletariat to the conception of an absolute monarchy as it had been handed down from Frederick the Great. In a later lecture Nietzsche says that in Prussia the principal aim, as it is the principal achievement, of the educational system is to turn out two types—State officials or men desirous of embracing a military career.

Those words have been justified more and more every year since they were uttered. Philosophically, as Nietzsche clearly shows, this *Staatsvergötterung* on the part of the German educational authorities is directly traceable to Hegel, who, in a celebrated passage, called the State 'an absolutely complete ethical organism.' The numerous critics or opponents of Nietzsche on this particular point, Dr Kalthoff for example, urged that the problem of the State must be solved, not philosophically, but historically. Whereupon, adopting their line of argument, he made an attack upon all current historical and political conceptions, so far as these had any bearing upon education. In 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' where this onslaught is principally made, Nietzsche gibes at 'the simple people who believe that the world was put right two years ago' (i.e. in 1871), and continues, in a series of important passages :

'Every philosophy that believes the problem of existence to be shelved, or even solved, by a political event, is a sham philosophy. . . . We are feeling the consequences of the doctrine, preached lately from all the housetops, that the State is the highest end of man and that there is no higher duty than to serve it. I regard this as a relapse not into paganism, but into stupidity. . . . Compare, for example, what the self-interest of the State has done for Christianity. Christianity is one of the purest manifestations of the impulse towards culture and the production of the saint; but, being used in countless ways to turn the mills of the State authorities, it gradually became sick at heart, hypocritical and degenerate, and antagonistic to its original aim.'

Someone suggested that Germany had really gained far more from Jena than from Sedan. Nietzsche anticipated that statement by a generalisation in 'Human, All-too-Human,' 'Culture is indebted most of all to politically weakened periods.'

It is quite beside the point to attack Nietzsche, as many apologists for Prussian education have done, on the ground that he is a mere aristocratic anarchist whose political formula runs, 'As little State as possible !' The value of his indictment has nothing whatever to do with the strength or weakness of his philosophy. When he protested that Germany was 'sacrificing a number of its

most conspicuous talents upon the "Altar of the Fatherland," he did so as a practical human being and not as a political theorist. 'Goals are wanting,' he had said in 'The Birth of Tragedy'; 'and these must be individuals.' And yet the production of individuals was, and is, precisely not the aim of Prussian education; it was officials and soldiers, and yet more officials and soldiers, until Moltke's words might be made a universal fact: 'The real victor in our wars is the schoolmaster.' Anyone who has observed Germany during the past ten years can bear witness to the pathetic spectacle of boy after boy being forced into the service of the most uninspired bureaucracy in the world. Nietzsche only saw the beginning of the process, but his detestation of it was expressed emphatically enough. To him it represented nothing less than a ceaseless squandering of intellect. In 'The Dawn of Day' he wrote:

'All political and economic matters are not of such great value that they ought to be dealt with by the most talented minds; such a waste of intellect is at bottom worse than any state of distress. . . . Our epoch, however much it may babble about economy, is a spendthrift; it wastes intellect, the most precious thing of all.'

There has been no lack of protests along the same lines from Nietzsche's day down to the present. A book by Herr M. Caspar, published in 1913, 'Die Reform der höheren Schulen in Preussen,' in many places does little more than echo 'The Future of our Educational Institutions.' Even so favourable an observer as Prof. James Russell, of Columbia University, finds himself compelled to say:

'For upward of a century the management of the schools has steadily been becoming more bureaucratic. The demands of militarism have begotten the privilege of one-year volunteer army service. . . . Indeed the whole system of privileges, which I have characterised as the bane of German secondary schools, is an evidence of bureaucratic control. Year by year new regulations are made which tighten the grip of the central authority, and leave correspondingly less freedom for local option. The trend is toward officialism and formalism. It weighs on the teachers in their classrooms, in so far as they are required to observe ends which are foreign to true

pedagogical ideals; it detracts the pupil's attention from study for its own sake, and centres it on rewards to be attained out of school; it lowers the standard of scholarship, by forcing schools to carry too heavy a load of superannuated teachers and unambitious scholars. In a word, the tendency is to place altogether too little reliance on individual liberty and personal ambition.'

All this is a convincing testimony to Nietzsche's farsightedness and to the completeness with which he treated the question.

In a few incidental passages of his lectures on education, Nietzsche expresses views which should satisfy even the present Emperor. I mean passages like his plea, strangely resembling the Emperor's words at the famous conference of December 1890, that 'German composition' ('*der deutsche Aufsatz*') should be made the centre of instruction. The facile journalism of those days seemed to be the only result that German literary education had to show, and it disgusted him. He wished—and the aspiration was an exceedingly common one at that time—to see a genuinely German culture. In 'Human All-too-Human,' or even earlier, Nietzsche acknowledges the complete vanity of his demand. Similarly, towards the end of the last lecture, there is a good deal of vapouring about Tacitus, the 'Burschenschaften' and the 'Freiheitskriege,' which the later Nietzsche, the 'good European,' must certainly have regarded with supreme contempt. Nietzsche's last word on German culture, it should be remembered, is given in 'Ecce Homo':

'When I try to think of the kind of man who is opposed to me in all my instincts, my mental image takes the form of a German.'

These inconsistencies are therefore of no importance beyond marking a stage in Nietzsche's evolution, just as do his earlier relations with Wagner.

The Benthamite tendency in German education—or, for the matter of that, in English education; we have all been bitten by Prussianism—is such a wearisomely trite subject that it demands little attention from us at this point:

'As much knowledge and education as possible; therefore

the greatest possible supply and demand; hence as much happiness as possible—that is the formula.'

Nietzsche saw that, so long as classical education, formal education (*formelle Bildung*), and scientific education were all only 'subterfuges for use in the fight and struggle for existence,' so long could there be no real 'education for culture.' We may assume that a certain reasonable amount of material comfort is essential to all culture, and that Nietzsche held this view. Somewhere he said:

'Here lies the whole secret of culture—namely, that an innumerable host of men struggle to achieve it and work hard to that end, ostensibly in their own interests, whereas at bottom it is only in order that it may be possible for the few to attain to it.'

In other words, this means that the toilers of a nation ensure a minimum of leisure to the remainder, and this is the first essential of culture. But there is the widest possible gulf between this 'minimum of comfort' and the feverish race for wealth and superfluities which is the most marked symptom of modern Germany's decadence. Nietzsche foretold it, writing in 1873:

'The educated classes are being swept away in the contemptible struggle for wealth. . . . Everything bows before the coming barbarism, art and science included.'

Yet his remarks under this head are comparatively few. If we may judge from the small space he gave it, he apparently held materialism to be far less dangerous to culture than the third tendency—the tendency to reduce all learning to one of two things, fact-collecting or historical criticism. He very effectively pours scorn on the so-called 'philologists' who 'count the number of verses written by Greek or Roman poets' and are delighted with the proportion $7 : 13 = 14 : 26$, or who 'consider the Homeric poems from the standpoint of prepositions, and think they have drawn truth from the bottom of the well with *áva* and *καρά*.'

Prof. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, who certainly ought to know, proved at great length, in a pamphlet entitled 'Zukunftsphilologie,' that Nietzsche was not a philologist

and was most certainly not 'wissenschaftlich.' But Nietzsche's conception of philology was very different from the average academic conception. In 'Homer and Classical Philology' he said he wished to reverse Seneca's saying, 'Philosophia facta est quia philologia fuit,' and declared that 'all philological activities should be enclosed and surrounded by a philosophical view of things.' On no occasion did he grudge praise to the professors engaged on so-called 'philology'—textual criticism and the like. A generous tribute to them will be found in 'Human, All-too-Human.' But he did deny them the title 'philologists,' and he was frequently irritated by their ridiculous self-importance. He was convinced that they overstrained their memory at the expense of their judgment, and that, above all, they lacked 'a great artistic faculty, a creative vision from a height,' without which all teaching of history must have a harmful effect on the nation's culture. Lacking this essential development of the imagination, they took refuge in facts, in 'drawing truth from the bottom of the well with *áva* and *kará*.' Philosophy made 'that most dangerous concession to the State, when it was compelled to appear in the form of erudition.' And that, as Nietzsche said, would never bring home to students or to mankind their need for philosophy or their interest for art, not to speak of Greek and Roman antiquity, 'the incarnate categorical imperative of all culture.' So he passes to the practical considerations, to the question of the influence such 'philologists' will have on the nation's intellectual life.

In the first place they will impose still more upon Germany that contradiction between life and knowledge the acceptance of which Nietzsche thought to be his countrymen's chief characteristic. And, when once the connexion between life and knowledge has been broken, all other evils will follow. There will be no individuals; for 'there are three forms of existence in which a man remains an individual—as a philosopher, as a saviour, and as an artist'; and the misnamed 'philologists' are blind to all three. The State has deprived them of sight. Where learning and scholarship have been reduced to a mechanical industry, there can be no consciousness of nobler aims. Classical education, under such conditions, will become 'something that is useless beyond

rendering a period of military service unnecessary and securing a degree.' That is an assertion that was never more justified than in twentieth-century Prussia. Such perfunctoriness on the part of the students, no less than the 'ant-like work' on the part of the professors, will not give to Germany the virtues which the study of Greek culture ought to give—practical asceticism combined with new vital activities.

Nietzsche therefore looks for the ideal teacher who shall impart, to himself first and then to his scholars, a finer culture than State 'philology' has been able to produce. It should be remembered that Nietzsche himself, during his professorship at Basel, had hopes of being such an ideal teacher. He wrote to Deussen that he was meditating upon the needs of modern philology and upon the right methods of teaching and of learning. 'The Birth of Tragedy,' which Prof. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf somewhat sarcastically labels 'artistic, not scientific,' was partly the fruit of such reflection. Not long after writing it, Nietzsche changed the direction of his activities; and for the most part his writings on education remain expressive of an ideal which he was never able to realise. In fact, his last word on the matter is one of despair. There is no 'ladder to ascend to culture.' He had looked for the poet-scholar like Goethe or Leopardi, whom he once, in 'We Philologists,' called 'the modern ideal of a philologist.' He longed for the teacher who should respect 'the highest principle of all culture . . . that we should not give food except to those who hunger for it,' and yet should be able 'to discover the central force' in the souls of his students, and 'weld the whole man into a solar system, with life and movement.' Learning, he declared in effect, must become creative and teaching something intuitive. Goethe said, and Nietzsche repeated, that he hated everything that merely instructed him without directly quickening his activity. Anyone of ordinary ability could teach or learn the uninspired drudgery which in Germany passes under the name of 'philology.' Tasks would be more difficult under an ideal teacher, and there would in consequence be fewer pupils. But the few chosen would be given a real culture, and, in possessing that, would be the salt of the nation. Under

such professors as Nietzsche longed to see there would at last grow up a genuine 'aristocracy of intellect.'

And here, of course, Nietzsche tended to become remote and utopian. But there is at least nothing remote about his analysis of the causes which led to the decline of Prussian education. His opinion, which he expressed again and again, was that there were three obstacles in the way of true culture, namely, 'the self-interest of business, of the State, and . . . of savants.' Commerce and the State, by working on the professors, had managed to turn a very great number of them into machines for the production of erudition and for the instruction of docile officials. It would be too much to ask one man, even as great a man as Friedrich Nietzsche, for practical suggestions as to the destruction of such a pernicious system. At one time he had hopes that it would destroy itself. In 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,' for instance, he stated his belief that the educational institutions of Germany were decaying, and that it only needed a rebellion on the part of the brighter spirits of the nation for the whole fabric to collapse. Naturally such expectations were disappointed; all that Nietzsche could do in the last resort was to wish fervently to see German educational institutions 'remoulded and born again.'

That is really the need of all systems of education, not the least the English system. In this country the demand made on schools and universities to provide the State with officials or commerce with its well-trained slaves has not been quite so insistent as in Prussia; the devitalising of learning has not been carried so far. But there can be no academic circle in Europe or America in regard to which Nietzsche's words would be held superfluous: 'Culture begins in understanding how to treat the quick as something vital.' In this sentence lies the gist of all his warnings and all his aims.

A. W. G. RANDALL.

Art. 8.—GERMAN METHODS IN ITALY.

1. *L'Invasione tedesca in Italia.* By Ezio M. Gray. Florence : 'I Libri d'Oggi.' R. Bemporad e figlio, 1915.
2. *La Germania alla Conquista dell' Italia.* By G. Preziosi. Florence : Libreria della voce, 1915.
3. *La Banca Commerciale.* By G. Preziosi. Florence : Libreria della voce, April 1915.
4. *Banca Commerciale Italiana : Cenni Statistici sul Movimento Economico dell' Italia.* Milan : March 1915.
5. *La Ricchezza e la Guerra.* By Filippo Carli. Milan : Fratelli Treves, 1915.
6. *Senatori e Deputati nelle Società Anonime.* Milan : F. Bisleri, 1914.
7. *Spionaggio Militare Civile e Commerciale.* By A. G. Bragaglia. Milan : Quintieri, 1915.

EDUCATED in a school of anthropological and philological generalisation conceived with an imperialist end in view, it is not surprising that the German should believe his race to be the one pure super-race, and regard neighbouring races, which have admittedly given evidence of progress, as having done so in virtue of a heavy infiltration of German blood. He is led by feelings of blood-relationship, which are usually not reciprocated, to take an interest in, and feel an affection for, these neighbours ; and he proceeds diligently to regermanise the names of these people and of their countries and towns now unhappily lost to Germany, but which he is taught must, for their own good and happiness, ultimately be reunited to the parent stock. The fact that they may not desire re-union does not trouble him. He is conscious only of high motives and of the sanctity of his mission, and is determined not to spare himself in his efforts to secure their salvation.

The Englishman is to a slight extent under a delusion of the same type when he hopes to please a foreigner by half shyly suggesting that he might be taken for an Englishman ; but he instinctively knows when to give way, and, if the compliment fails, he at once politely desists, silently ascribing the failure to 'ignorantia crassa,' the term invented by charitable theologians to

save good heathens from eternal damnation. The German, without a shred of shyness in his composition, acts quite differently. He regards the failure of his neighbours to recognise their German blood-affinity and their apathy to cultural regeneration as disclosing intellectual and moral sloth, and, confident of his superior mental equipment and of the strength of his will-power, he never doubts that with German industry, thoroughness and pertinacity their ignorance is, to return to theological terms, quite 'vincible.' Campaigns of 'cultural' penetration with this end in view have been a long time in progress in the Baltic provinces of Russia, in German-speaking Austria and Switzerland, in Holland, in Flemish-speaking Belgium, and even in certain districts in Eastern France. About a generation ago a similar campaign was started in Italian-speaking Austria and Switzerland, and in Italy. In Italian-speaking Switzerland and Austria the work of germanisation and denationalisation was done quite openly; and the Schulverein, the Südmark, the Volksbund and the Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande give the results achieved in their annual reports.

In Italy the campaign had of course to be conducted more cautiously. Even the most self-confident German realised that suddenly to announce to Italians that they were Germans would lead not merely to disaster but to derision; and, not unlike what has taken place in Belgium, the plan of cultural penetration had in view ends more practical and more possible of achievement. The first object aimed at was to undermine the sense of nationality and to shake the idea of unity, and so to weaken the national fibre as to render it less capable of resistance to plausible ethnical theories.

When the campaign began, the reputation of German erudition and German education was at its highest; and Germans were freely consulted in the remodelling of Italian universities and schools on German types which took place at that time. The influence of the Germans went beyond advising on the framework of the educational system; and it was gradually found that Italian students were being taught to regard themselves as descended not from effete Latin ancestors but from the virile German tribes which overthrew the Roman Empire. They

were taught to admire the Gothic and Lombard civilisations, the study of which had undoubtedly been much neglected; they were even taught that the 'Comune,' the glory and most characteristic feature of all Italian civic life, was of German origin; and the obvious superiority of Northern Italy in progress and civilisation was explained to them as being due to the heavier infiltration of German blood. When they left school they found, whatever their political views might be, special appeals made to them to look to Germany for support. If anti-clericals, they learned that the Hohenstaufen were the defenders of civil liberty against clerical aggression; and a cult of the Hohenstaufen was industriously encouraged. To mark his solidarity with the movement, the Kaiser came in 1905 to visit their castles, and commissioned Herr Eckhardt to write the usual monumental work on their history and architecture. If clericals, Italians were told that Germany was the only bulwark against those pernicious liberal and democratic doctrines which must inevitably lead to irreligion. In this propaganda Germany found support in many German houses of monastic orders; and it was perhaps more than a mere coincidence that, in his pilgrimage to the castles of the Hohenstaufen, the Kaiser did not forget Father Krüger of the Abbey of Montecassino, which the Kaiser has enriched with a series of frescoes exhibiting German taste. The German campaign was carried on with extraordinary diligence in the Press; and Italians read everywhere of the great strength, wealth, prosperity and erudition of the German race.

The trouble of the German is that his thoroughness, the quality of which he is most proud, has the inherent defect of taking him too far, and usually ends in making him ridiculous. Three years ago the Italian public was startled by the publication in Leipzig of L. Woltmann's '*Die Germanen und die Renaissance in Italien.*' Woltmann professed to have discovered from investigations into the ancestry of the great Italians of the Renaissance that 130 out of 150 of the most famous were of pure German descent. He found, from evidence which appeared to him reliable, that they were dolichocephalous, fair in complexion, high in stature, of north-German cast of countenance, with light-coloured eyes and blond hair.

The remaining twenty he stated to be of mixed German and other descent. Philology is always a useful weapon in the hands of a German professor, and Herr Woltmann tells us that Ghiberti was certainly Wilbert, Buonarroti Bonroth; that the castle of Vinci from which Leonardo took his name *must* have belonged to a German knight of the name of Winke; that Cacciaguida is a corruption of Katzwitt; and he produces a great deal more evidence of equal weight.

The industry and energy of the German in the accumulation of material is prodigious, but his use of it is sometimes futile. Woltmann may not be of great importance, but his views were supported by other German writers, notably by the irrepressible Houston Chamberlain, whom the Kaiser has recommended to his subjects as a serious writer. About the same time the attention of Italians was drawn to the publication of the Pan-German map for 1950 ('Der Grossdeutsche Bund und Mittel-Europa um das Jahr 1950'), which showed that the new Great German Confederation would at that date include not only Trieste and the Trentino, but a great part of Venetia and a considerable portion of Lombardy. To strengthen the desire of German schoolboys for this rectification of frontier, the names of the towns in the districts to be annexed were germanised in the 'Handbuch des Deutschtums im Auslande' (edition for the Schulverein); e.g. Brescia becomes Welschbrixen, Verona Bärn, Udine Hasfeld, Treviso Tarvis, and Castelfranco Freikastell. It came as a shock to Italy to find its correct and loyal ally permitting its youth to be brought up under the influence of such publications.

Germans always underrate the intelligence and knowledge of the people with whom they have to deal. Italians were quite well aware that, according to the recognised anthropological criteria of cranial index, coloration and stature, Italy is, of all countries in Europe, the one most free from any admixture of German race; and that the very few invaders who may have been of genuine Teutonic origin must have been easily absorbed. They also knew that the pretence of modern Germany to be of pure Germanic race is an imposture, and that it is not even preponderatingly Germanic. This is well known to the rulers, who do not permit the Army authorities

to make those investigations into the cranial form and stature of the recruits which would soon settle the point. They also knew that, if Woltmann was right in claiming, as Germans, Dante, Giotto, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, and many others on very dubious evidence of their having been dolichocephalous, Italians could on far better evidence claim as Italians Leibniz, Bismarck, Schiller, Kant and Schopenhauer, who happen all to have been brachycephalous. They also smiled at the association of the Hohenstaufen with civil liberty, and regarded the Kaiser's attempt to claim succession to the Hohenstaufen as historically hardly less ludicrous than his attempt to claim succession to the Prophet. As for the German travesties of Roman history which had been popularised, their absurdity was pointed out some years ago by Prof. Giulio Bonacci,* a man who cannot be suspected of Nationalist tendencies.

This prostitution of history and the sciences for the purposes of political propaganda has done irreparable harm to the reputation of German learning, and has led to a strong reaction against the German system of education. As Ugo Ojetti, one of the most cultured of modern Italians, pathetically laments,† the old Italian classical school, which inculcated a love for the humanities and produced men of judgment and taste, has, under German influences, been replaced by a store-room where pupils are taught laboriously to accumulate facts and more facts, without any real interest or enthusiasm in their work. Judgment and taste can only be developed in a mind trained to think for itself; and such a training is discouraged where aptitude for organisation is the real aim of education.

There is no doubt that the campaign of cultural penetration has completely failed; but German professors are now at a discount even in their own country. As has recently been proclaimed in a leading German paper, the strength of Germany is not in her professors but in her men of business, and more especially in her financiers. The latter, adopting methods which professors

* G. Bonacci, 'Genii Italici e Teutomani d'oltremonte.' *Italia Moderna* (1906), 1, 18.

† 'L'Italia e la Civiltà Tedesca,' Milano: ed. Ravà, 1915.

would disdain, have in the economic penetration of foreign countries produced far more solid results for the Fatherland. While the professors, in a pedantic and irritating manner, are continually misstating and overstating the case for Germany and are under the delusion that it is strengthened by their reputations, the reticence and discretion of German financiers in hiding the true nature of their operations are quite uncanny.

These German financiers who work in foreign countries do not conform to any type we know. They are utterly unlike the adventurous spirits of fiction, who, with a craving for independence and a blameless desire to get rich, go abroad to seek the opportunity which, after years of wasted endeavour, at last comes and enables them to show their grit and superiority and forge to the front. Our Germans are quite different. Having been carefully trained in the language, history, physiography and industries of the country they are destined to occupy, and having learned the most approved methods of finance and of organisation, they are then sent out by one of the powerful Industrial Banks to a district which has been carefully studied and prepared for their arrival. They go there with all the proper introductions and the financial backing of those who sent them, and they proceed to found a financial institution, probably an Industrial Bank, to which they at once give a name which suggests a local origin or at any rate avoids all suspicion of German influence. Thus we have a Banca Romena at Bukarest, a Creditna Bank at Sofia, a Banca Commerciale Italiana at Milan, and, what is even more mystifying, a Banca Russa at Genoa. All these Banks are of German origin, but do not betray it in their names; and the same procedure is followed in Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Russia, or any other country to which German capital is attracted.

Having founded the Bank, our German financiers see to it that the control and management remain in their hands, and that Germans are appointed to the responsible posts on the staff; but otherwise, to the best of their abilities, they will endeavour to secure local notabilities as shareholders or even directors. This is useful in obtaining further capital and desirable business

connexions; and, above all, it goes a long way to give the enterprise the local or national appearance which the name usually implies. In the course of time the preponderating German influence will no doubt be suspected. If it creates difficulties, it is quite easy for the parent Bank to transfer the German interest in the undertaking, which we will suppose to be in Russia, to a Bank, Belgian in name, but equally under German control; and the preponderating influence will then appear to be Belgian. The procedure is sometimes varied by creating a pseudo-international Trust, subscribed to by financial institutions apparently foreign but really under the control of the parent Bank. In extreme cases German financiers have been known to go so far as to part with the whole of their shareholding, except the amount necessary for the qualification of the directors, retaining, however, the control and management for which they had made themselves indispensable. As we shall see, they can even then be of considerable use to the Fatherland. The investigator is so bewildered by these financial complications that, despairing of getting to the end of German influence, he probably overstates it; but for this overstatement the devious methods of German finance are alone responsible.

In Italy the main agency for German economic penetration has been the Banca Commerciale Italiana. There has been in the last twelve months a very serious agitation against this Bank; and Dr Preziosi's pamphlet, '*La Germania alla conquista dell' Italia*,' gives in detail the evidence of its German origin and management and its extraordinary domination of the economic situation. The Bank, while not denying its past and admitting the extensive ramifications of its influence, has in a half-hearted way made several attempts to prove that, even prior to August last, the management had been transferred to Italians. Its most reasoned defence was published in March last in a London daily paper which had reviewed Dr Preziosi's pamphlet. It is certainly curious that the Bank should have chosen London for the publication of its defence, as in August last, at the date of the opening of the war, the bulk of the employees and all the managers of the two London branches of the

Bank were enemy aliens. Dr Preziosi dealt trenchantly with the defence in his second pamphlet, published in April last. Though he possibly overstates the case, in essentials he appears to be right; but this is not an opportune moment for continuing the controversy. Since April Italy has gone to war; and, as a result, the Bank must have lost the services of many of its most competent managers and of most of its highly trained staff, whom it will be difficult to replace. Moreover, its past pro-German reputation must now add to its difficulties; and, as directly and indirectly a vast amount of Italian savings is dependent on the continuance of the Bank's prosperity, one would not wish to say anything which might be regarded as hostile. On the contrary, one hopes that, with new management and new methods, it will secure not only its own prosperity but that of the industries dependent on it.

It is not, however, with the present or the future of the Bank that we are now concerned, but with the past which is already part of the industrial history of Italy. In the early days of the Triple Alliance Crispi endeavoured, with the approval of Bismarck, to induce German bankers to support the market for Italian bonds, which were at the time attacked on the Paris Bourse. The support was given grudgingly; and it was intimated to Crispi that, if German bankers were to interest themselves in Italian securities, there should be some institution founded which would enable them to keep in touch with the financial condition and development of the country. This led in 1894 to the formation of the Banca Commerciale Italiana with the very modest capital of 200,000*l.*, subscribed to the extent of 74 per cent. by German and Austrian and the balance by Swiss and Italian bankers. Certainly, when Crispi encouraged the formation of the Bank, he did not foresee that in twenty years it would have a capital of 6,240,000*l.*; and that, working with other institutions under German management, such as, e.g., the Credito Italiano, it would dominate the economic situation. It is, however, to be noted that, very shortly after the formation of the Bank, Sonnino, who was Crispi's Minister of the Treasury, had his suspicions aroused and refused to countenance some of the Bank's claims to exceptional recognition.

The Bank has recently informed the public that, of the present capital of 6,240,000*L.*, 63 per cent. is owned by Italians, and that the German-Austrian holding has been reduced to 2½ per cent., the balance being in the hands of investors described as Swiss and French. There is a Board of 33 directors, which, before the agitation made itself felt, consisted of 15 Italians and 18 foreigners. Dr Preziosi makes a great point of the fact that, whereas the foreign directors were trained financiers representing important banks, such as the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank and the Diskontogesellschaft—and in this connexion we may note that the Berlin Bank für Handel und Industrie was at the time represented by no less a personage than Herr Kaempf, the President of the Reichstag—the Italian directors represented merely well-known aristocratic families and political interests. This point does not appear to be very important, because only very general lines of policy could be settled by a Board of directors living at very considerable distances from the company's office. The real work had to be done by the resident Managing Directors; and, until the last few months, Italians have as far as possible been excluded from these posts. It is no secret that the real work has been done by three extremely competent men, Herr Joel, who has been on the management from the start, Herr Weil and Herr Toepliz; and their names appear and reappear in the annals of the Bank and of the subsidiary companies which it has founded. These men deserve well of the Bank, for to them it owes the extraordinary power which it has attained. The fact that Italian Industry is glad to be rid of them is no discredit to them, for they have acted according to what they considered to be their duty. The new management will find it a very difficult task to obtain efficient substitutes for them and for the staff they have trained. In the writer's opinion the initial mistake, from the Italian point of view, in the formation of the company was the admission of Italians to the subscribing syndicate and to the Board of Directors. No one could have objected to foreign bankers starting in Italy a 'maison de vente,' to which their clients wishing to invest in Italian securities could be referred. The association of Italian directors, as the character of the individuals selected throughout has

shown, was for the purpose of attracting the Italian investing public and obtaining political influence. In the course of time and with the extension of the company's operations, that influence has become so great as to be dangerous not only in the world of industry but in that of politics, of the Press and of administration. Readers interested in this point may be referred to the '*Rivelazioni postume alle memorie di un questore*,' published in Milan in 1913 before the agitation against the Bank had commenced.

The Bank's campaign of economic penetration was greatly facilitated by the fact that Italian industry was mainly carried on by a large number of limited liability companies with relatively small capitalisation. Shareholders all over the world are notoriously inattentive to their interests; but this, for reasons we shall mention, is far more the case in Italy than elsewhere. There is not in Italy any one pre-eminent financial and residential centre like London and Paris, where all companies have their offices and hold their meetings, and where a substantial body of shareholders can, if necessity arises, attend without difficulty. Italy has a number of centres; and the offices of the companies and the shareholders are spread over the whole peninsula. In the absence of an active financial press and of a serious treatment of finance in the daily press, Italian shareholders are singularly uninformed as to the management of the companies in which they invest. A common practice is for shareholders to deposit their certificates at the nearest branch of their Bank, with a document empowering the Bank to represent them at the meetings of the company, thus abdicating their power of control in favour of the Bank. Moreover, the law which is devised for the protection of minorities puts quite unnecessary difficulties in a majority getting its way. In these conditions it was easy for the Banca Commerciale, by purchasing a substantial block, though often only a minority, of the shares, to obtain control of a company. The Banca Commerciale is itself a case in point, as the German management has had no difficulty in retaining control, though it is doubtful whether in recent years it could ever count on the support of more than a third of the shares.

The first object of the Banca Commerciale was to acquire the control of the Shipping Companies which represent the all-important factor in the organisation of foreign trade. By obtaining 45,000 shares as security for a loan, which could not be repaid, to the Navigazione Generale Italiana, the Bank acquired practical control of that Company; and, by a stratagem explained at length by Dr Preziosi, the chief rival, the Lloyd Italiano, was also brought within the net of its influence. Gradually all the important shipping companies came under the Bank's management. It is not necessary to believe Dr Preziosi's contention that the Bank has purposely mismanaged these companies and stunted their growth with a view to helping their Austrian and German rivals; it is sufficient for us to know that, if the Bank desired, such action was within its power. The Bank then turned its attention to the steel and iron, naval construction, and armaments companies, the bulk of which it formed into a trust under its control. As an instance of the power of the Bank and as showing its close relations with German and Italian industry, we may mention that in 1913, when Germany was dumping iron on the Italian market, the Bank acted as an intermediary between the German and the Italian Iron Trusts, and brought about an agreement under which the Germans were guaranteed a fixed but limited annual import of 40,000 tons, the result of which was to add 33 per cent. to the price of German iron.

The Bank, in its recent statement of defence, also claims to have identified itself with the vigorous development of chemical, mining, textile and electricity companies. By electricity companies the Bank means companies for producing electrical power. In the matter of electrical machinery and appliances the Bank has always seen that its clients and the companies under its control should get such goods from Germany; and the A. E. G., the Brown Boveri and the Siemens, the three well-known German producers of these goods, who are always strongly recommended by the Bank, between them export annually to Italy goods of an average value of 8,000,000*l.* sterling. In this connexion we may note that Dr Helferich, who has since become Finance Minister of Germany, but who at the time was Manager of the

Deutsche Bank, which has been always represented on the Board of the Banca Commerciale, in discussing the advantages of the investment of German capital abroad, stated the first object to be the encouragement of the German export trade. He added as a further advantage that of financial mobilisation in time of war. The meaning of this phrase has been variously construed, but perhaps it explains the statement that only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the capital of the Bank is now German-Austrian. If the statement is true, it shows that, with an infinitesimal expenditure of capital, German management could still control the fate of a large number of Italian companies whose total capitalisation amounts to about 40,000,000*l.* sterling. The Bank, following German models, has established, or has combined with other financiers to establish, financial institutions in foreign countries. It has created the Società Commerciale d'Oriente, of which Herr Joel was the first president. It combined with Austrian financiers to found the Banca d'Albania, and with other financiers it founded the Banque Française et Italienne pour l'Amérique du Sud, of whose character Dr Preziosi has the gravest suspicions.

Next to the Banca Commerciale Italiana, the Credito Italiano, which until quite recently has also been under German control, has been the most important organ for German economic penetration. Ezio M. Gray notes as a fact, which we trust is only a fortuitous coincidence, that in March last, just before the coming into force of the Legge Salandra against 'espionage,' several of the managers of the Credito Italiano left the country, among them being the manager of the Roman branch, who was director of no less than twenty-seven industrial companies. Whatever doubts there may be as to these gentlemen, there are none as to the Manager of the Civitavecchia branch, who was also the local German consul. We have an official announcement dated April 16, 1915, that he was divested of his consular functions and escorted to the frontier.

Another form of peaceful penetration is the control of the press. Early in August last the 'Frankfurter Zeitung' published an article which explained that, apart from the publications of commercial agencies, there were

168 newspapers printed in the German interest outside the Fatherland. The object of the article was to reassure the German public as to the attitude of neutral powers; but the results are more reassuring to those who in the past have attached too much weight to the press. What is meant by the reference to the publications of commercial agencies is well known to any one who has visited Italy since August last. We do not know how many of the 168 newspapers referred to were Italian, but the attempt to influence the press went far beyond the utilisation of controlled newspapers. There was hardly any paper so insignificant that it did not receive the attention of German agents. Nor were papers notoriously hostile left alone. Every kind of pressure was exercised. We know from reports of proceedings in the Courts that there has been abundant evidence of bribery and of treating on an elaborate scale; but this method was applied of course only to the more disreputable organs. The threat of withholding advertisements, when emanating from a body controlling large commercial interests, was, in the case of a struggling paper, not unlikely to be effective. News was syndicated to the smaller papers with local circulation, while to the more important organs original material was supplied gratuitously in great abundance. Most of it was, however, so exuberant in tone and so pedantic in manner as at once to betray its origin, thus becoming useless for purposes of propaganda.

The most pertinacious workers in this field of operations were the German consuls; but their influence was only occasionally successful. German consuls have multifarious functions; besides acting as press agents, they also assisted the passage of contraband goods to Germany. Ezio M. Gray gives many details of their work. Since his book was written, in fact ten days before the declaration of war against Austria, the German consul pleaded the urgency of consigning at once to Germany 200 cases declared to contain salted fish lying in the port of Genoa. In transit to the station one of the cases burst open and revolvers fell out. This led to the examination of the other cases, which were found to contain only revolvers. Though no consul is involved, an incident which occurred at the port of

Venice should be told, as it opened the eyes of Italy to the ingenuity and the intentions of the Germans. Through an accidental discovery by one of the dock-labourers, 92 barrels declared to contain beer and consigned by the Patzenliefer Brewery in Berlin to Tripoli were found to contain 545 French (no doubt captured) rifles and 27,300 cartridges. Had these rifles been found in the hands of natives, it would have led to complication with France; and that no doubt was what was hoped for.


Spying should, I suppose, strictly be regarded as coming within the term 'peaceful penetration,' but the Italian literature on the subject is already too vast to be dealt with in this paper. One would have supposed that, as in Italy the naval construction and the factories for armaments, munitions and cement factories are mostly managed by Germans, and as the electrical machinery and appliances are supplied from Germany and frequently put in by German workmen, there would be very little left to spy; but the evidence contained in Ezio M. Gray's book is sufficient to show that this supposition is erroneous.

In conclusion, we may say that Italians are by character, history and traditions a very tolerant people. While they have never had feelings of affinity for Germans, they have not in the past actively disliked them; what has now angered them is the German claim to dominate them in their national life. The two nations have complementary qualities and should in time learn to respect each other, but Italy does not need or desire interference in her development. 'L'Italia farà da se.'

ALBERT BALL.

Art. 9.—WAR, WOUNDS, AND DISEASE.

To the truth of the saying that disease, not battle, digs the soldier's grave the campaigns of the 19th century bear ample witness. How great may be the losses from this cause was never shown more terribly than in the ill-fated Walcheren Expedition (1809), when 23,000 men out of 39,000 died in four months; only 217 were killed! In 1828 a Russian army, 100,000 strong, marched on Turkey; victorious in the field, it was completely vanquished in the hospitals, which in July 1829 contained 40,000 men, more than half of the available strength. Of the whole force, only 15,000 returned to Russia. Since the Crimean War there has been a gratifying reduction in the deaths from disease. The accompanying diagram from an article by M. N. Kozlovski* shows the proportion of killed in battle and deaths from wounds and disease, in certain wars of the last and present centuries.



* Translated by Major G. S. McLoughlin, D.S.O., in the 'Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps,' vol. xviii, 1912, p. 345.

The Russo-Japanese War saw the lowest proportion, but the figures in the diagram of the Russian Army may be for only one section of the Army. Captain Culmann, analysing the losses in the Franco-German and Russo-Japanese wars ('Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps,' vol. XIII), gives the following figures:

Killed	Russians	28,800	or	4.9	per cent. of effective strength.			
	Japanese	47,400		8.8	"	"	"	"
	Germans	17,300		2.7	"	"	"	"
Wounded	Russians	141,800		24.0	"	"	"	"
	Japanese	173,400		32.1	"	"	"	"
	Germans	99,800		15.3	"	"	"	"

The Germans in the Franco-Prussian War had one killed for every six wounded, the Russians one for every five, and the Japanese one for every four. The percentage of the men who subsequently died from wounds was 3.7 in the Russians, 6.6 in the Japanese, and 11.0 in the Germans. As regards the sick, the following numbers are given:

Russians	358,400	or	51.3	per cent. of strength.
Japanese	334,100		51.4	"
Germans	480,000		59.4	"

For the first ten months of the present war to May 31, 1915, the casualties in the Army have been 258,069. A complete analysis is not yet possible. The killed number 50,342, the equivalent of the annual toll taken in England alone by one bacillus, that of tubercle. Of the wounded, 153,980, I am informed that up to date 60 per cent. have returned to duty. A gap in our knowledge relates to the 53,747 men missing, of whom a considerable proportion are no doubt killed or wounded. It is interesting to study the character of the cases and the results of treatment of an unselected group of men sent home from France. A report by Dr Beal of the first 1000 treated at the American Women's War Hospital, Paignton, states that 783 were surgical and 215 medical. Three patients died, and only 3.3 per cent. have been invalided, so that a great majority of the 1000 cases discharged have been marked as fit for duty of some kind. Of the 783 surgical cases 265 were non-traumatic, 144 of them frostbites in various degrees. Of the medical cases there were 17 of dysentery, 11 of rheumatic fever, and only one of typhoid. The public should read these heavy

and calamitous casualty lists with a knowledge that a very large proportion of the wounded get perfectly well, and that up to date some 60 per cent. have returned to duty. The returns for disease are not yet available, but, when the analysis is completed, we shall find that coughs and colds, pneumonia, rheumatic fever, bronchitis, and muscular rheumatism, particularly what is called trench rheumatism, have been responsible for a large proportion of the sickness.

It may be of interest to review briefly the more serious camp diseases to which wounded and healthy are liable, among which the infections due to micro-organisms come first in order of importance.

Wound Infection.—At the close of the American Civil War, fifty years ago, we did not know the cause of any one of the great war pestilences. To-day, with the germs of all discovered, we have in our hands the effective weapon suggested by the axiom of Celsus—‘*Eum vero recte curaturum, quem prima origo causæ non fefellerit.*’ Our position in 1865 was not much better than in the days of Hippocrates and Galen. That fevers are catching, that epidemics spread, that infection remains attached to clothing, all suggested a living ‘something’ of the nature of a ferment; and among the many shrewd guesses the best parallel was that drawn between the processes of contagion and of fermentation. In the hands of Pasteur the experimental method completely revolutionised our knowledge of disease and the methods of prevention. Certain facts of primary importance have been determined by the studies of the past half-century: (1) the specific nature of the seeds of disease, which breed as true as do the seeds of wheat, and show varieties as easily distinguished by the expert as is Manitoba red from Forfar wheat; (2) the germs, artificially grown, show special chemical and biological characters, and, when introduced into the bodies of susceptible animals, produce the specific disease; (3) the changes in the body fluids caused by the growth of the germ have been thoroughly studied—we know how immunity is produced after recovery from a fever, and against many diseases this immunity can be artificially induced by the inoculation with the germs or the products of their growth; and (4) the part played by insects in the transmission of disease

has been determined—Texan cattle fever by the tick, Malaria and Yellow fever by the mosquito, Sleeping Sickness by a fly, Plague by the flea, Typhus fever by the louse, and a host of minor maladies by other insects.

Some of these discoveries have proved the most life-saving instruments ever placed in the hands of man. Malaria, the greatest scourge of the tropics, can be absolutely controlled, while Yellow fever, the most dreaded pestilence of the western hemisphere, has been dislodged from its strongholds. It is not too much to say that the Panama Canal could not have been built without the researches of Laversan and Ross and of Walter Reed and his colleagues. The first practical fruit of the new studies was the application by Lister of Pasteur's principles to the treatment of wounds. It had long been recognised that a wound occasionally healed without suppuration or the formation of pus, but both spontaneous and operative wounds were almost invariably associated with that change; and, moreover, they frequently became 'putrid,' or, as we should now say, 'infected.' The general system became involved; and death from blood poisoning was so common, particularly in old and ill-equipped hospitals, that many surgeons feared to operate, and the mortality in all surgical cases was very high.

Believing that from the outside the germs came which caused the decomposition of wounds, just as from the atmosphere the sugar-solution got the germs causing the fermentation, Lister applied the principles of Pasteur's experiments to their treatment. We may quote from his original paper in the 'Lancet,' March 16, 1867:

'Turning now to the question how the atmosphere produces decomposition of organic substances, we find that a flood of light has been thrown upon this most important subject by the philosophic researches of M. Pasteur, who has demonstrated by thoroughly convincing evidence that it is not to its oxygen or to any of its gaseous constituents that the air owes this property, but to minute particles suspended in it, which are the germs of various low forms of life, long since revealed by the microscope, and regarded as merely accidental concomitants of putrescence, but now shown by Pasteur to be its essential cause, resolving the complex organic compounds into substances of simpler chemical constitution, just

as the yeast-plant converts sugar into alcohol and carbonic acid' (p. 327).

From these beginnings modern surgery took its rise; and the whole subject of wound-infection, not only in relation to surgical diseases, but to child-bed fever, forms one of the most brilliant chapters in the history of preventive medicine. Pus germs are ubiquitous. In civil life surgeons strive to work, so far as possible, in a germ-free (aseptic) environment, with the result that in hundreds of successive operations the wounds heal without suppuration, and with a single dressing. Infection is an inseparable incident of the wounds inflicted in war. In civil life we had almost forgotten what suppurating wounds were like, but the pus organisms have again become aggressive, and more suppurating wounds have been seen by British surgeons in ten months than in the forty years since Lister's methods became general. The nature of the commoner wounds due to shell and shrapnel favours infection; and in spite of early first-aid dressing, the germs are carried far into the tissues, and suppuration is inevitable. Trench warfare can never be aseptic. The uniforms of the men are caked with mud, which in highly cultivated districts always contains dangerous micro-organisms. The usual pus germs, streptococci and staphylococci, are ubiquitous; and everyone harbours less important forms, so that any wound, however slight, unless treated immediately, may become infected. The one bright feature has been the frequency with which the high velocity bullet sterilises its course, so that many perforating wounds of the chest, abdomen and limbs recover without suppuration. The torn and bruised shrapnel wounds invariably become infected. The surgeons have found it hard to adapt themselves to pre-Listerian conditions quite foreign to their usual work; and methods used in civil life have proved quite unavailing in dealing with wounds infected by these highly virulent organisms in trench warfare.

Tetanus.—From time immemorial tetanus, or lockjaw, has been one of the most dreaded of human maladies. Following often slight injuries, curiously limited to localities, even to special farms, and in horses to special stables, the discovery of its ætiology is one of the most

interesting chapters in the history of biology. The germ is widely diffused, particularly in highly cultivated districts, occurring in garden mould, in stables and farm-yards; in some places it is a frequent inhabitant of the intestines of horses and cattle and of ostlers and dairymen. It is the most virulent of all animal poisons; compared with strychnine, of which the fatal dose for a man weighing 10 stone is from 30 to 100 milligrams, that of tetanus toxin is 0.23 milligram. The mode of infection is peculiar. At the site of inoculation the bacilli produce a toxin which travels slowly up the nerves to the spinal cord. It may be as long as twenty days before the poison reaches the central nervous system and causes the characteristic symptom of painful spasm of the muscles. The disease is easily produced in animals, either by inoculation with the bacilli or with the toxin produced in their growth. By repeated injections of small non-fatal doses into the horse, protective substances are formed in the blood serum; and this serum may be used to neutralise the poison in an animal artificially inoculated or in a man accidentally infected. The animal may be completely protected by inoculation against doses of the poison many times above the limit ordinarily fatal; and a fatal dose may be counteracted by a dose of the protective serum if injected within a certain space of time. In the early days of the war no feature was more distressing than the number of cases of tetanus. In a very highly cultivated area, the soil of which was infected with the tetanus bacillus, the risk of contamination was great, and many wounded men were infected. But medical science provided a remedy. Orders were issued that at the first-aid stations all wounded were to receive a protective anti-tetanic vaccination. No single feature in the campaign has been more gratifying in its results. Since every wounded man has received at the first dressing station a protective inoculation, the disease has been checked. Such a triumph of preventive medicine appeals strongly to the imagination, when one thinks that at last the victory has been gained over one of the most terrible of all human maladies.

Gas gangrene.—Another soil-germ has been responsible for a serious and fatal complication, viz. gangrene of

wounds associated with the formation of gas. The organism (in which I happen to have a personal interest, as it was first isolated from one of my patients in the Johns Hopkins Hospital by my colleague Professor Welch) is widely prevalent in the soil of highly cultivated districts, so that the mud-stained clothing of the soldier is almost invariably infected. It is gratifying to know that with early and proper treatment of the wound the cases have become less frequent and less fatal.

Typhus Fever.—Typhus, perhaps the most fatal of all camp diseases, has been a great world-epidemic, whose story is written in the dark pages which tell of the grievous visitations of war, famine and misery. During the last half of the 19th century, decade by decade, the prevalence lessened, until in England last year not a single case was reported. It has lingered sporadically in Ireland, in the Balkan States, in Russia, in New York among the foreign population, in Manchuria, and in Mexico. Its association with crowded, ill-ventilated, filthy apartments has always been recognised; as Bartlett remarks, it is the 'pestilence which dogs the footsteps of retreating and discomfited armies and takes up its dwelling in their tents; which hides itself within the dark and noisome walls of ancient prisons; and which lurks amid destitution and vice in the narrow lanes and unlighted cellars of great cities.' Its contagious character and high rate of mortality have justly made typhus the most dreaded of all infections. From no disease have nurses and doctors suffered so severely. During twenty-five years of special prevalence in Ireland in the 19th century, out of 1230 physicians attached to institutions dealing with it, 550 died.

The demonstration of the method of its transmission has been made within the past few years, and illustrates the modern methods of procedure in research and the value of the practical knowledge that may result. In 1909 Nicolle infected a chimpanzee with the blood of a patient ill of typhus fever, and demonstrated the transmission of the disease from one monkey to another by the bite of the body-louse. These results, confirmed by Anderson and Goldberger in the United States, have practically solved the problem of the prevention of typhus fever, and have led to the adoption of preventive

measures, viz. warfare against lice-infection in the public at large; the destruction of lice and their eggs on the clothing and body in all cases of typhus, suspects and contacts; and the use of precautions against lice-infection by persons necessarily coming into contact with the sick. The nature of the germ in typhus is still doubtful, though recent studies by Plotz have possibly determined the specific bacillus; and attempts are being made in Serbia to carry out a protective inoculation. Fortunately, the range of activity of the louse is very restricted in comparison with that of the mosquito and the fly; and the transference from one person to another requires that close and constant contact met with in overcrowding. In the present war, orders have been issued and systematic efforts are being made which are rapidly reducing the number of infected men. Bathing accommodation, thorough disinfection of the clothing, and the free use of insecticides may clean up the camps completely. Experience is teaching the men the necessity of taking every opportunity to keep themselves free from vermin.

Cerebro-Spinal Fever.—One of the most remarkable epidemics of the present war has been the so-called 'spotted fever,' which has prevailed in the home camps, and to a less extent in the expeditionary forces. Isolated cases occur constantly in the community, and it blazes into epidemics when large bodies of young men are concentrated together in camps and barracks. A larger number of small epidemics of from forty to eighty cases have occurred than was ever before known in England. It broke out first in the Canadian regiments, which had had a few cases at Quebec and on the voyage, but they are not responsible for the wide prevalence of the disease in all parts of the kingdom. Though a soldier's malady, it has never played an important rôle in campaigns. The case incidence is always small, but the mortality is high; and the disease shares with cholera and plague a malignancy that may cause death within a few hours. With fresh air, isolation of cases and carrier, and scrupulous personal cleanliness, the epidemics, as a rule, quickly subside; and with early and thorough serum treatment the mortality is greatly diminished.

Typhoid Fever.—In modern wars no infection has been more disabling than typhoid or enteric fever. With

a lower mortality than typhus, it is a more costly disease, running a longer course and having more serious sequels and complications. In the Civil War of the United States there were, at a low estimate, 29,336 deaths; in the Franco-Prussian war the Germans had 8000 deaths. In the Spanish-American war, out of 107,973 men in camps 20,738 had the disease and 1580 died. It killed more in South Africa than the bullets of the Boers—8022 to 8000—and the case incidence reached the high figure of 57,684. The concentration in camps of young men at a susceptible age, and a campaign in a country in which typhoid was prevalent, aroused the greatest apprehension lest the disaster of South Africa should be repeated in the present war.

In dealing with typhoid, there are two favouring circumstances. Sanitation has caused a steady reduction of the disease in England; and foci of infection are carefully guarded. Still, in 1912 there were 1600 deaths from typhoid, which means a case incidence of from 16,000 to 20,000, an enormous number of positive germ-centres. The infection is conveyed by water, by milk, by food; and we have learned to recognise the importance of carriers, individuals who harbour the germ for years and distribute it with the urine or fæces. The authorities, civil and military, are thoroughly alive to every detail in the preventive measures necessary to limit the dissemination of the germ; but with troops in the field such measures are not always possible.

The second favouring circumstance is the possibility of protecting the soldier artificially against the germ. Certain acute infections so alter the body that it is afterwards resistant to the germ of the disease. Experimentally, animals may be rendered resistant or immune to many diseases by repeated injections of small doses of the germ; and the protective forces thus called out remain mobilised and active for a variable time. Very few persons ever have a second attack of typhoid fever; but it is not possible to say how long the protection lasts. There are persons with a natural immunity, in whom indeed the germs may live for years without causing disease; on the other hand, there are families with a special susceptibility. Of a series of 2000 patients with typhoid fever at Hamburg only fourteen had had

the disease before, and one had had two previous attacks. Of 500 cases in which I had special enquiries made, eleven had had the disease before at intervals ranging from nine months to thirty years. It had long been known that an infection artificially induced by inoculation of material from a case of the disease, or of an allied one, is milder and protects against the natural disease. Small-pox if inoculated took on usually a mild form; and it was Jenner's merit to discover that vaccination with material from the cow-pox protected from small-pox equally well.

On this principle Sir Almroth Wright, in 1896, introduced inoculation with dead cultures of the typhoid germ, which produce changes in the body by which the individual is protected or rendered immune. The practice has been carried out on an extensive scale, with results convincing to all save those who deny the elementary facts relating to immunity. Figures may prove anything—even (as Sir Berkeley Moynihan said the other day) the truth. In America, India, France and Italy inoculation against typhoid fever has been shown to reduce the incidence of the disease, even to the vanishing point, as in the case of many of the stations of the American Army. The technique of the procedure has been greatly improved; and the percentage of cases in which serious discomfort follows has been reduced. Though not compulsory in the British Army, more than 90 per cent. of the men have been inoculated. Ten months of war have passed; at home and abroad more than two millions of men have been in camp and at the front; and, so far, typhoid fever has not prevailed to any serious extent. The figures to May 22, 1915, are:—1006 cases, 61·5 per cent. of which occurred amongst the 10 per cent. of uninoculated men. The analysis of the cases is not yet complete; but amongst 508 uninoculated cases there were 106 deaths, a case mortality of 20·86; amongst 155 inoculated twice there were 11 deaths, a case mortality of 7·09; and amongst 164 cases inoculated once there were 11 deaths, a case mortality of 6·70. Many of the cases have been caused by the paratyphoid germ, an allied organism, against which inoculation with the cultures of the ordinary germ does not protect; but measures are being taken to combine and standardise the procedure.

Widespread experience in different countries shows that properly performed vaccination against typhoid fever protects for periods varying from a year to two or three years. There is little or no danger; nor is there any probability of transference of other disease or of rendering the subject more liable. Its use is indicated in soldiers and sailors, who are specially liable to be exposed to the germs of typhoid fever, to nurses and doctors, and to persons travelling in hot countries.

Cholera.—Though it prevailed in the Russo-Polish war of 1831, the Crimean War, and (much more seriously) in the recent Balkan wars, cholera has never played a very important rôle in European campaigns. The mode of transmission of the germ is largely through water, through carriers and flies. Protective sanitation is effective; and successful inoculation is now possible. In the western area of the present war there is very little danger that the disease will prevail to any extent. In Hungary, between Sept. 15 and Nov. 30, there were only 3024 cases; and in Galicia, between Sept. 23 and Dec. 5, 2047 cases and 793 deaths. A few cases have occurred in Germany; between Nov. 8 and Jan. 16, sixty-four cases. The Marine Hospital reports of the United States of America down to May 7 do not refer to its prevalence in Constantinople, Asia Minor, or Egypt; and so far the armies of the eastern area have been spared.

Venereal Disease.—From 1 to 4 and even 5 per cent. of the men in home camps are invalided for venereal disease. Though we know the germs both of gonorrhœa and of syphilis, no satisfactory measures of prevention have been devised, either in civil or military life. The incidence is lessening through frank and free education; and the disability is much less protracted owing to better measures of treatment. The terrible nature of this scourge comes home when one sees it, so to speak, whole-sale. Passing through lines of tents in an outlying portion of a camp, impressed by the silence and loneliness, I asked, 'Where are the soldiers?' At command a bugle sounded, and out of the tents came between 500 and 600 victims of the disease, stricken in one of our pest-haunted sea-ports. It was a tragic sight, the sorrow of which was heightened by the knowledge that the offender's cross is not borne by the sinner alone. The gonococcus

is a germ of terrible social malignancy, while the spirochete of syphilis, transcending the imagination of Ezekiel, visits upon the innocent mother and children the iniquity of the father, perhaps after long years of bitter repentance for 'his trespass that he hath trespassed and for the sin that he hath sinned.' But there is a silver lining to the luetic cloud, in the steady fall in the incidence of the disease in the Army and Navy, and in the greater efficacy of treatment since the discovery of the germs.

'Nerves.'—While infection with germs of various kinds is the most serious factor in war, always more fatal than the enemy, inefficiency may come from many other causes, among which mental strain stands first. I asked an old veteran, thin, brown and worn from twenty-one days' continuous fighting in the trenches, what would be the deciding factor in the war. He answered, 'Strain. The side with the strongest nerves will win.' Neurasthenia, mental breakdown and forms of insanity are common results of the nerve-shattering experiences of the war. Hysteria has shown possibilities of protean manifestations unrecognised by this generation in British constitutions. Strange functional types of nervous diseases occur which will demand most careful treatment. In many, psychic shock has so disturbed the working of the higher brain-centres that all sorts of weird delusions and hallucinations have been experienced, even to the strong level flight of a group of angels during the retreat from Mons!

On the whole, the country may be congratulated on the comparatively small part disease has so far played in the Great War. There has been no epidemic on a large scale; and with effective measures it may be hoped that we shall escape the terrible experiences of South Africa and the Crimea.

WILLIAM OSLER.

Art. 10.—THE CALIPHATE.

WHEN the Fatimid Caliph El-Mo'izz entered Cairo in triumph in 973, he was required to show proof of his preposterous claim to represent the sacred lineage of the Prophet. So he called a general assembly, including many Sherifs or 'Honourables' of the true stock, who were fully prepared to scrutinise his genealogy; then, half drawing his sword from the scabbard, he said, 'Behold my pedigree,' and, scattering gold among the crowd, 'Behold my proofs!' The assembly could only profess itself completely satisfied. Moslems are quick to recognise the inevitable; and, apart from certain sects, the caliphate has usually belonged to him who could seize it, on 'the good old rule,

... the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can.'

The probability in the near future of the demise of the Turkish empire, which now represents the orthodox caliphate, has naturally excited speculation as to the future of the formal headship of Islam. Into such it is not proposed to enter here. As the Secretary of State for India said, the future of the caliphate is a matter for the decision of Moslems alone; and in a letter to 'The Times,' April 24, 1915, Lord Cromer joined his experienced judgment to Lord Crewe's.

No one doubts that they are right. But they wisely left the question open, how such a decision of the Moslem world was to be arrived at. As a matter of history, there has hardly ever been unanimity on this critical point. It is perhaps a popular opinion that there is only one caliph; but there are, in fact, at the present time, six. So erroneous is the impression that Islam acknowledges but one caliph, that it would be less untrue to say that there have usually been two or more. In the tenth century the Mediterranean washed the territories of three rival caliphs. Not only have Moslems frequently disagreed as to who was the true caliph, but a large minority have been, and still are, firmly persuaded that there is no caliph in the flesh, but that one will be

manifested in the fulness of time and will usher in a millennium. Of such are most of the Persians, many Indians, including the Isma'ilis headed by the Aga Khan, and some powerful orders of dervishes.

All this complexity arose from the Prophet Mohamad's neglect to appoint a rule of succession. The caliphate is no divine institution; it was founded neither on revelation in the Koran nor on prescription by the Prophet. It rose out of an urgent public necessity, which was met by a hurried, unpremeditated, informal expedient. Mohammad's unexpected death found his disciples wholly unprepared for the emergency. He had neither nominated a successor nor prescribed any rule for choosing one. The tradition that he limited the succession, or caliphate, to his own tribe of the Kureysh must be rejected.* Yet someone had to be chosen, and chosen at once, to fill, as far as might be, his supreme place. The occasion was momentous. Mohammad had been not only the religious leader, the 'Imam,' of Islam, but also the legislator, administrator—in short, the autocrat of the Moslem State. Only his tremendous personality kept the jarring factions and half-converted tribes together. It was of the first importance to find a 'successor,' a 'Khalifa,' who could carry on his gigantic work. A mistake might mean the ruin of the young State, not yet bound indissolubly by the ties of unswerving faith and rooted tradition. Already there

* Modern criticism of Moslem traditions by Goldziher, Wellhausen, and Guidi, ably represented in the great 'Annali dell' Islam' of Leone Caetani, Principedi Teano, though sometimes hypercritical, has exposed the frequently *tendentious* character of traditions, invented to bolster up some dynasty or politico-theological view. The postulate that a caliph must belong to the Kureysh was the product of the historical fact that a long series of caliphs did belong to it. A tradition representing popular opinion based on experience was easily 'found'; and a speech, corroborating it, was put into the mouth of Abu-Bekr, to the effect that only the Kureysh could secure the allegiance of all the other Arab tribes. There is no evidence of any such tribal pre-eminence, outside Mecca, in pre-Islamic times; and the idea seems to be purely Moslem and *post facto*. The Prophet's reiterated insistence on the perfect equality of all true believers makes his alleged limitation of the headship to one tribe or family exceedingly improbable; and the fact that the leading citizens of Medina, where he had ruled for ten years and where he died, assembled on the day of his death, were within an ace of choosing a caliph out of their own number, and not one of the Kureysh, shows that any such limitation was unknown in the city; otherwise it would certainly have been respected.

were signs of cleavage. Before the Prophet's body was cold, the 'Defenders' of Medina, following the usual Arab custom on the death of a tribal chief, had met together to elect a new leader. They were on the point of nominating one of themselves, when Abu-Bekr and 'Omar, and others of the Meccan 'Emigrants,' rushed in, and a stormy debate was soothed only by the tact of Abu-Bekr. Fortunately for the hopes of the Meccans, the men of Medina were of divided opinions, and other parties confused the issue. It was even proposed that there should be two caliphs, one for Mecca, the other for Medina. In the result, the choice of Abu-Bekr was carried chiefly by impulse, without formal voting; but, once accepted by this casual group of notables, his position was secure, and the great congregation in the Prophet's mosque next morning duly acclaimed the First Caliph, 'Khalifa^u-Rasūl-ilāh,' 'Successor of the Messenger of God'; or, to use the title assumed by 'Omar, the second caliph, and ever afterwards the official style of all caliphs, 'Emīr-el-mu'minīn,' 'Commander of the Faithful.'*

Abu-Bekr became caliph solely in right of his personal pre-eminence. He was one of the earliest converts to the faith, the Prophet's close friend and counsellor in his adversity as in his triumph. He had (but so had others) given him his daughter in marriage; and, when his Master fell ill, it was to Abu-Bekr that he deputed

* In a previous article on the Sultanate of Egypt ('Quarterly Review,' No. 443), stress was laid on the authoritative evidence of coins for official titles. The Omayyad caliphs put no names or titles on their official (gold and silver) issues, but are styled Emīr-el-mu'minīn on local copper coins. The 'Abbasids, from the third caliph onwards, called themselves, or were styled on subordinate currencies, Emīr-el-mu'minīn, and only five of them (El-Mahdi to El-Ma'mun) also used the title Khalifa. El-Ma'mun, who was strongly under the influence of Persians, who laid special stress on the Imamate, used Khalifa alternatively with Imam; and the last title was adopted by all later caliphs of this line, if they used any title at all on their coins. Imam and Emīr-el-mu'minīn are the titles on the coins of the Idrisid caliphs of Morocco, the Omayyad caliphs of Cordova, the Fatimid caliphs of Africa and Egypt, the Sherifs of Morocco and other Moorish caliphs, some of whom also called themselves 'sons of the caliphs.' Only the Almohades consistently used the title Khalifa; but it also appears sporadically on the coins of a Shi'a vezir in Egypt in 1130, on those of Mohammad Sheybani at Herat, etc., in the 16th and of Haidar at Bukhara in the 18th century. The Turkish Sultans employed none of these three titles on their coins, nor any other word to indicate caliphship.

the exalted duty of leading the public prayers—an appointment which acquired a perhaps unintended significance. But all this would not have assured his succession if his personal character had not won general respect and affection. His simple piety, single-hearted loyalty, calm and moderating temper, sound good sense and transparent honesty marked him out for the great office. 'Vir pietate gravis,' he appealed to every true Moslem heart. Yet even he could not escape stifled murmurs. 'Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, the Achilles of Islam, sulked in his tent; and a few others, who thought they had a claim to the headship, held aloof. There was some feeling that the electing conclave had been irregular, and that Abu-Bekr had got in by a 'fluke.' 'Certainly,' says Prof. Macdonald, in his brilliant survey of Moslem Constitutional Theory,*

'the people of Islam had little conception of what was involved in the great precedent that they were about to establish; but nevertheless there lies here, in the first elective council which they called, the beginning of all the confusions, rivalries, and uncertainties that were to limit and finally to destroy the succession of the Commanders of the Faithful.'

We should say, rather, that it was the lack of authority for the precedent, and the informality of the impromptu conclave, that worked the mischief. In the early days of Islam the elective principle was far from settled, and the first precedent was disregarded. Abu-Bekr himself set it aside when he personally nominated 'Omar as his successor; and 'Omar, after failing to obtain the consent of his own nominee, appointed six chief men, who were to choose the next caliph from amongst themselves. Soon afterwards we find the Omayyad caliphs nominating sons as their successors, and even ordering the succession of one son after another. Thus nomination superseded election; and, though it was doubtless confirmed by the acclamation of the people, such recognition, rarely denied to the man in power, can hardly be regarded as a technical election. Afterwards the succession to the caliphate became practically hereditary, as with

* D. B. Macdonald, 'Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory' (1903), p. 8.

other sovereigns, though the fiction of popular sanction, through the 'shura' of elders, and later the 'ulama or jurists, however compulsory and otiose, was, perhaps, usually preserved.

The choice of 'Othman as third caliph, as the result of the deliberations of the six nominees, introduced undesignedly a new element into the caliphate. Abu-Bekr and 'Omar became caliphs on their merits; the same cannot be said of 'Othman. He was the representative of the most powerful family in Mecca. The two chief branches of the Kureysh were the Hashimids, to whom the Prophet himself and 'Ali belonged, and the Omayyads, represented in the caliphate by 'Othman. This family had been conspicuous by its hostility to the Prophet in his days of adversity, but, when his luck turned, they had submitted to Islam from necessity. Though half-hearted Moslems, a kind of seventh-century Erastians, they were men of marked energy and ability; and the Prophet and the first caliphs had not been averse to making use of their administrative talents. The succession of 'Othman made them supreme; they were appointed to the chief governments and commands; and one of them, Mo'awiya, was nominated to the government of Syria, then the most important military centre, although his mother was known opprobriously as 'the eater of liver' because she had behaved disgustingly to the corpse of 'the Lion of God' after the defeat of the Moslems at Ohud. Such a family could not be popular with the faithful. Since Mecca was to be the lodestar of Islam, it was probably inevitable that the Meccan mercantile aristocracy should dominate the new State; and it was well for practical efficiency that power should be in the hands of those who were eminently fitted to wield it. But it was not well for the integrity of the faith. It substituted a secular for a theocratic basis, and it led to schisms which have never been healed.

The first great split in Islam occurred after the brutal murder of the aged caliph in 656 by an organised band of conspirators. The murder of 'Othman was a witness to the widespread dislike which the family of Omayya inspired, but dislike was not enough to unseat them. The election of 'Ali as fourth caliph, under the menace

of the regicides, was as much dragooned as certain early Councils of the Church; and it was not in fact maintained. It is true that 'Ali had very strong claims. He was the Prophet's first cousin and first male convert; the husband of his daughter Fatima, and by her the parent of the only descendants of the apostolic blood. At personal risk he had contrived the escape of the Prophet from Mecca in the epochal Hijra or Flight, and had always been his most attached follower, proving his valour and devotion in many fights for the faith. But he was indolent and irresolute, and had no gift of managing men; and this probably accounts for his having been hitherto passed over for the caliphate. The Shi'a sect has made a saint of him, 'the Near to God,' and has woven a tissue of legend round his person and deeds; for the manufacture of useful traditions was as rife among Moslem theologians as the forging of pedigrees among Tudor heralds. But he must have possessed a rare charm to have impressed as he has the imagination of the spiritually minded, little as it attracted virile natures. The sterner Moslems rejected him. Two famous warriors, Talha and Zubeyr, abetted by 'A'isha, a widow of the Prophet, who had an old grudge against him, refused their allegiance, and were killed in battle. Much more serious was the hostility of Mo'awiya, at the head of the Syrian army, who came forward to avenge, as he said (perhaps honestly), the murder of his cousin, the late caliph, in which 'Ali was falsely supposed to be implicated. The rival forces met in battle; 'Ali was induced or forced to consent to arbitration. Whatever view is taken of the conflicting versions of the ensuing negotiations, the result is clear; Mo'awiya assumed the caliphate, 'Ali refused to abide by the award.

Thus, within thirty years of the Prophet's death, there were already two caliphs in Islam; and the seeds were sown of the great Schism. Not only this, but a third party was born out of the ill-fated arbitration. The primitive Moslems, rigid puritans of Islam, held that by allowing his caliphship to be questioned 'Ali had degraded the sacred office, and they seceded in thousands. These Seceders or Kharijis were long a menace to all caliphates, which they denounced. From them descend the Ibadi Imams of 'Oman (Maskat) and their offshoot the Seyyids

or Sultans of Zanzibar to the present day, neither of whom have acknowledged any other caliphate. The Seceders' political heirs are the Wahhabis of Arabia in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the present powerful sect of the Senusis. 'Ali himself was assassinated by one of these Seceders in 661, but his death only widened the schism. It had all the stimulating efficacy of martyrdom; and the subsequent deaths of his son Hoseyn and many of the family in the dismal massacre at Kerbela heightened the tragedy and gave rise to one of the most poignant expressions of religious emotion in the Moharram celebration of the Persian Passion Play.

The caliphate now became a question not of election or nomination, but of Divine Right. A theory of the divine appointment of 'Ali, as Imam of the faith, and something more than the mere Successor of the Prophet,—as the 'Weliyu-llāh' or 'Near to God'—had been set up even in his lifetime. After his 'martyrdom' it grew apace. Mystical doctrines came to be associated with the Divine Imamate, especially among the Persians whom the Avesta and Mithraism had made familiar with such ideas, and the transcendent virtues and indefeasible rights of the family of 'Ali found numerous champions. That family itself, however, after the tragic lesson of Kerbela, kept studiously in the background. 'Just for a handful of silver,' Hasan, 'Ali's heir, had resigned his assumed caliphate to Mo'awiya, his father's rival; and the increasing shyness of the heirs placed the Shi'a or 'Schismatics,' as 'Ali's adherents were called, constantly in a difficulty about a 'lost leader.' Their mysterious disappearances suggested the mystical idea of the Hidden Imams. It was taught that these vanishings were part of the Divine scheme for the sacred lineage; that the Imam was concealed by God only for a while, and would reappear when the time was ripe. Then came another difficulty. Several Imams had vanished; which was the one expected to reappear? Some pinned their faith to the Twelfth Imam, others to the Seventh, or rather to his son, and most Persians and many Indians are looking for the reappearance of the invisible Twelfth, and own no caliph till he come; whilst the Carmathian anarchists and the 'Assassins'—that hashish-eating

secret society which nearly made an end of Saladin * and frightened him more than all the Crusaders put together—looked, like the modern Isma'ilis of Bombay, for the advent of the vanished Seventh Imam. The Fatimid caliphs of Kayrawan and Egypt were a branch of the Carmathians, but found it convenient to resuscitate the hidden Imam in the person of their own founder, and, setting out to preach the promised Mahdi, personated the expected Imam himself.

One must, however, distinguish between these thoroughgoing Shi'a, who hold the mystical doctrine of the Hidden Imam and are Moslems only in a very loose sense, and those 'Alids or lineal descendants of Mohammad who claim the caliphate merely in right of their blood and do not trouble themselves much about mysticism or differ essentially in dogma from the orthodox Sunnis. There have nearly always been princes of this kind in Arabia and also in North Africa, the nursery of Moslem nonconformity. Such in Arabia are the two lines of Sherifs or 'Honourables' who have been Emirs of Mecca from the date of our Norman conquest to the present day. Such the Zeydi Imams of the Yemen, whose caliphate does not deter the present holder from accepting the alliance and financial aid of his rival the Sultan of Turkey.† Various other distinguished Arabian families trace their descent from Fatima and 'Ali. In Morocco there have been 'Alid caliphs from the eighth century to the present day; Idrisids, whose most venerated descendants are the Sherifs of Wazzan; Almohades; Beni Ziyen; and the Sherifs (or Sultans) of Morocco, who have been caliphs there for the best part of four centuries, and whose caliphate, scrupulously respected by the French Protectorate, is as vital as their Sultanate is vain.‡ There has never been a time in Islam when there were no adherents of the Divine Right of 'Ali's house, nor could any conscientious believer in its claims ever do homage to the *de facto* Sunni caliphate, whether Omayyad, 'Abbasid, or Ottoman. They may have been actively hostile or biding their time; persecuted when possible, or treated

* Abu-Firas; Lane-Poole, 'Life of Saladin' (1898), pp. 148-151.

† G. Wyman Bury, 'Arabia Infelix' (1915), pp. 38, 158.

‡ Dugage, 'Lettres du Maroc' (1915), p. 42.

with the amiable toleration which Queen Victoria extended to the league of the White Rose; but they have always been there. And so long as they are there, all discussion of an undivided universal caliphate is nugatory.

To return to the 'orthodox' caliphate at the time of the great Schism. 'Ali, though the source of the split, is always counted by the Sunnis as the last of the four 'righteous' caliphs of the original theocratic organisation. The great mass of the Moslems, after his murder, accepted Mo'awiya, the first of the Omayyad caliphs of Damascus, as caliph in fact, whatever the rights might be. There is always, as we have said, a disposition amongst Moslems to make the best of the established order of things. Mo'awiya's claim to the caliphate rested neither on the nomination of a preceding caliph, nor upon election by a conclave, but upon a totally new (and never repeated) title, that of arbitration.* The homage of his faithful army served as a pretence of election, and that was all. But he held the sword, and that was enough. If power were the criterion of a caliph, few better deserved the title. Mo'awiya was a born ruler, like several of his kindred. But how little the constitutional question of the succession was really settled appeared upon his death, when, on his nomination, his son Yezid became caliph. The Elders of the Church (if the term may pass) at Medina were at once up in arms at this cool supersession of their elective prerogative, as they conceived it. They proceeded to vindicate their powers by electing an anti-caliph, 'Abdallah Ibn-Zubeyr, who was able not only to hold his own at Medina against four successive Omayyad caliphs for thirteen years, but was accepted as rightful Successor of the Prophet throughout Arabia, Babylonia, and Egypt. Before he fell, Medina had been put to the sack with the utmost savagery by the troops of the orthodox Caliph, and Mecca was twice besieged—a curious illustration of the 'guardianship of the Holy Cities' which is supposed to be one of the necessary qualifications of a caliph.

* 'Ali's son, Hasan, afterwards sold the caliphate to him; but Hasan's own right was dubious, and his 'nomination' of Mo'awiya was as invalid as it was superfluous.

With the death of Ibn-Zubeyr, the old theocratic system and the authority of the Elders of Medina came to an end. Damascus was now the metropolis of Islam. Under Mo'awiya's fourth successor, 'Abd-el-Melik,—after he had killed another anti-caliph, his own cousin, with his own hand,—the Omayyad caliphate was recognised throughout the wide empire that had fallen to the swords of the Moslem armies. His reign and that of his son El-Welid mark the zenith of Arab power, when the name of the caliph of Damascus was recited in the Moslem bidding-prayer from the banks of the Indus to the Atlantic. This great dynasty has never received its due at the hands of oriental historians, because the Arab annalists wrote under the patronage of its destroyer, the 'Abbasid caliphate, and took little pains to conceal their bias; whilst the Persians and all the Shi'a, mindful of the massacre of the holy family at the hands of Yezid, religiously curse the whole 'scum' of the Omayyads to this day. Yet several were men of conspicuous ability and lofty character; and, if most of them were mainly statesmen, one was a saint of the primitive Moslem type. 'Abd-el-Melik was a brilliant administrator. To him was due the imperial policy which made Arabic the official language of the State, and purely Arabic coins with religious inscriptions the legal currency, in the place of the Greek and Persian which had before served for the languages and coinage of the Moslems. Under its stern and gifted governor, El-Hejjaj, Mesopotamia learned once more, as some day it will learn again, what skilful irrigation works can do for agriculture. Literature and music were held in honour at the court of Damascus, and some of the most famous poets of Islam there won their renown. Architecture was developed in the country palaces, of which we are only now beginning to understand the extent; and the famous mosque of Damascus was finished. Arabian civilisation was removed from the paralysing dogmatism of the Medina puritans, and, whilst broadened by Greek traditions in Syria, yet retained its essential independent character. The Omayyad State was still Arabian; and the caliph was like an Arab chief among his tribesmen, approachable, one of themselves, unshrouded by the mysterious seclusion of later times.

This great dynasty, however, enjoyed the splendour of its power for only thirty years after its triumph over rivals. If the later Omayyads had not been as a house divided against itself, till caliphs were murdered or driven to abdicate, and the heart of Syria, the spring of their strength, was broken by their disputes and exactions, the success of the 'Abbasids might have been long delayed. But, besides their own suicidal disunion, there were many external forces against them. The old Medina party was irreconcilable, like the Kharijis, who sometimes had a caliph of their own; a large section of the factious Arab tribes was hostile; and the Shi'a, with their theory of Divine Right, were naturally in perpetual opposition, in spite of magnanimous toleration at the hands of some of the 'usurpers.' To these adherents of the house of 'Ali, more than to any other cause, was due the 'Abbasid triumph. Persia, above all in the north, was full of them; and by a clever ruse the ingenious diplomatist who worked the revolution in Khorasan contrived to foist the 'Abbasid candidate upon them as their expected and hitherto hidden Imam. It was a disgraceful trick; and the unfortunate 'Alids were made a mere cat's paw for the accession of the 'Abbasid caliphs. These had about as much, or as little, right to the caliphate as the Omayyads whom they displaced, except in so far that their eponymous ancestor, 'Abbas, was the Prophet's paternal uncle, and the 'Abbasids therefore descended from the Hashimids. 'Abbas, like the family of Omayya, had been an enemy of Islam, and, like them, submitted only when he could not help it. The title to the caliphate was the sword in the one case as in the other.

There was a wide difference, however, between the two dynasties. Mo'awiya had usurped the caliphate by the strong hand, but the hand was still the hand of the Arab. Abu-l-'Abbas, the first caliph of the new line, usurped it by the help of the Persians. The capital was soon moved eastwards to Baghdad; Arab rule dwindled to nothing on the further side of the Tigris; and the administration, for good or ill, fell into the hands of the Iranians, a people of Aryan race, more intellectual than the Arabs, bureaucratic, better men of business, but grown effeminate, dreamy, and ill-fitted to check the

centrifugal forces of the immense and unmanageable empire. Under their influence the caliph became a Persian 'Great King,' more and more withdrawn from public view in a halo of reverence; and the 'Abbasid court became a byword among the hardy Arabs for luxury and self-indulgence. Most people, when they think of a caliph, form an 'Arabian Nights' image of 'the golden prime of the good' Harun-er-Rashid; but it was really an afternoon, drawing towards a lurid sunset. There was plenty of music and the song of the girl 'like an Oriental willow,' much wine and festivity, but little statesmanship. To Harun's son, El-Ma'mun, Arabic literature indeed owed much, especially in the study of some branches of Greek philosophy, but he was a ruler of exceptional mental breadth. It was a liberal policy, however mistaken, that led him to take the revolutionary step of conciliating the Shi'a, who abounded in Persia, by nominating their Imam as his successor in the caliphate and proclaiming the fact on his coinage. The indignation of the good people of Baghdad, who immediately set up a rival caliph of unblemished orthodoxy, caused a hasty reversal of this curious policy; but that it should have been entertained for a moment shows how far the caliph had departed from the creed of his forefathers, and how powerful was the pressure of Persian ideas.

After El-Ma'mun the caliphate of Baghdad rapidly degenerated. Turkish mercenaries were called in to protect the caliph from his own subjects; the very capital was temporarily vacated from fear of the mob; caliphs were set up and deposed at pleasure by their Turkish bodyguard; many were assassinated, starved, or poisoned; and at one time there were three dethroned blinded caliphs in captivity at Baghdad. The orthodox Successor of the Prophet had to submit to the control of the schismatic Buweyhid princes, and once, even in Baghdad, the 'Abode of Peace,' prayers were said for the heretical Fatimid caliph of Egypt. The religious sultans of the race of Seljuk released the caliphs from their duress, but could not restore their prestige, though now and again a caliph of some virility would widen the bounds of his small dominions round Baghdad and resume the immemorial war with the

Eastern Emperor. In spite of flashes of ability and a more sustained level of literary culture, such a caliphate was not of the stuff to last; and, when a misguided 'Abbasid summoned the aid of Chingiz Khan and his Mongols to chastise a Moslem prince, the end was not far off. It came with the sack of Baghdad by Hulagu Khan in 1258.

It is true that a flicker of the flame was rekindled when Beybars, the Mamluk Sultan, set up a refugee of the deposed family in Egypt; and seventeen of these later 'Abbasids posed there as caliphs until the Ottoman conquest in 1517, when Selim I compelled his captive, El-Mutawekkil, to assign to him his sacred office, and afterwards handed it on to successive Turkish sultans. But, as we have said before,* these *fainéant* caliphs of Cairo had little prestige even there, and were useful merely in preserving the established formality, otiose as it was, of legitimising the appointment of a prince by the caliph's diploma. In the days when the Baghdad caliphate was at its weakest, the princes who set up dynasties in Persia and India liked to hold a formal patent from their spiritual chief, just as Napoleon wished to be crowned by the Pope, or as people who set no value on the sacrament of matrimony would not consider themselves properly married unless in church. But, wherever such a superstition prevailed among rulers, we may be sure that it reflected a popular sentiment which could not safely be ignored.

Yet even the spiritual repute of the caliphate had early lost much of its force by the waning of the temporal power of the 'Abbasids. Spain was lost to them from the beginning; and, though the Omayyad prince who escaped from the massacre of his kindred and was welcomed by the Arabs at Cordova as their Emir did not assume the sacred title, and the Spanish Moslems managed quite happily with no caliph for a hundred and seventy years, the greatest of his descendants, 'Abd-er-Rahman, at length took the style of caliph in 929. Long before this, Morocco had established a legitimate caliphate; from the 8th century the 'Abbasid influence there was gone. In the 9th, the rest of North

* 'Quarterly Review,' No. 443, April 1915, p. 530.

Africa and Egypt became independent, and in the 10th the Fatimid caliphs made it officially Shi'a. The prestige of the caliphs of Baghdad sank to zero. With the fleets of the great caliph of Cordova sweeping the Mediterranean, the armies of the Fatimids flowing on through Egypt to Syria, the Carmathians spreading anarchy in Arabia and even thieving the sacred Black Stone from the Kaaba of Mecca, and a schismatic prince holding Baghdad itself, what had become of 'the independence of the caliphate from foreign control'? where was 'the guardianship of the Holy Cities'?

The orthodox caliphate had, in fact, become a phantom, a subject for theologians and canon lawyers to debate, but no longer a matter of supreme moment. The spiritual head of Islam, if he were also the head of the most powerful Moslem State and army, was doubtless a formidable power; but a caliph who had no army, who was recognised by only a portion of the divided Moslem world and was unable to enforce his spiritual authority anywhere, was but half a caliph even in the regions which acknowledged him, and no caliph at all elsewhere.

We have briefly examined the manner in which the caliphate devolved, as seen in the light of history. We have seen that the various principles of election, nomination, and arbitration all gave way to the simple law of the strong arm, except where the schismatic, but effective, doctrine of Divine Right prevailed, as it does to this day, in various interpretations, in a notable part of the Moslem world. It remains to consider the views of orthodox (Sunni) jurists, which are, however, valid only for those who agree with them. The chief qualifications which they put forward as necessary in a rightful caliph are five in number. (1) Descent from the Kureysh. This, as we have seen, is probably an *ex post facto* condition; because a long series of caliphs were in fact Kurashis, therefore all must belong to that tribe. It is repudiated by many sects, but may still have value in the eyes of the Arabs. (2) Election by a conclave of Elders or Notables—a form still kept up by the 'Ulama of Constantinople, but merely as a form. Election has usually been a mere acceptance of an already settled succession. 'Omar was not elected, nor were most of

the caliphs of Damascus and Baghdad, nor, least of all, the caliphs of the Shi'a, of whom Sunni theologians take no count. (3) Nomination by a previous caliph. This condition was not fulfilled by Abu-Bekr or 'Ali or Mo'awiya or Abu-l-'Abbas, the four founders of the Righteous, the Schismatic, the Omayyad, and the 'Abbasid caliphates. When there was nomination, it was often set aside, and its necessity is not obvious. There is no conferring of Holy Orders in orthodox Islam. (4) The Guardianship of the Haramayn, or Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The cities have often been in other hands than the caliphs', and have even been held by Fatimid and Suleyhid schismatics. From the 10th to the 16th century they were not under the temporal authority of any caliphs. (5) Custody of certain alleged relics of the Prophet. This is a mere *argumentum ad vulgus*, which no serious jurist would press.

None of these conditions stands the test of history. There remains one more rule. When Moslem lawyers cannot deduce a rule from the Koran or Traditions, literally or by analogy, they rely upon *ijmā'*, the general consensus of believers, corresponding to the Catholic canon 'quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus.'* It is not the same as the dictum 'vox populi vox Dei,' for it presumes qualified theologians, as in the councils of the Church, and excludes the mere opinion of the masses. Undoubtedly it is an important principle, and as such is recognised as one of the four roots of Moslem faith; but *ijmā'* is difficult of attainment and subject to error, just as General Councils, according to the Articles of Religion, 'may err, and sometimes have erred,' so that 'things ordained by them . . . have neither strength nor authority.' Accordingly, the rule of the general consensus of Moslems has been variously interpreted by jurists. It really represents the gradual growth of the best public opinion, and holds hopes for the future of Islam; but it is exceedingly difficult in application. Supposing a caliph to be *de facto* caliph by consent of the whole Moslem world, his position, apart from any other qualifications, would be unassailable. History, however, shows that, since the seventh century, no such

* See Prof. D. B. Macdonald, *op. cit.*, 57, 101, 105, 292.

general consensus has ever obtained, and no one caliph has ever been universally acknowledged. Therefore, the last rule proves as little valid as the rest; and we come back either to the view that 'might is right,' or else to the rival theory that the right is divine, conferred by God upon a privileged apostolical succession.

POSTSCRIPT.—Since this was written an article on 'The Caliphate' by the Right Hon. Ameer Ali has been published in the 'Contemporary Review' for June, which should be carefully studied by those who wish to understand the views of Indian Moslems, the great majority of whom—perhaps 80 millions—are orthodox Sunnis and pray for 'the caliph of the time' every Friday in the mosques. It is difficult, as the learned author says, for those unfamiliar with the history of the caliphate to form an even approximately just estimate of the real bearing of such an institution upon the sentiment of a people; but it is of the utmost importance that their feeling on the subject should be studiously respected. Time alone can show how deep it may be. Meanwhile the slightest interference is most earnestly to be deprecated. 'Solvitur ambulando' applies to this as to other problems.

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

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 Art. 11.—THE MOTOR INDUSTRY AND THE WAR.

EXCEPTING a few unsuccessful experiments in the employment of steam traction engines for the slow haulage of heavy loads, and a few attempts to produce substitutes for the old stage-coaches, the records of the use of self-propelled vehicles on common roads are comprised within the last quarter of a century. If we restrict ourselves to a consideration of the industrial uses of the motor car, excluding those types that have been directly developed from the traction engine, our field is still further narrowed, and we need go back little more than ten years. In this brief period there has sprung up an enormous industry of world-wide importance, the chief manufacturing centres of which lie within the British Isles. This industry was developed purely for peaceful purposes, and its progress has been affected comparatively little by military considerations. Whereas the home of early progress in the design and manufacture of the private motor car was France, the conditions of trade, of the distribution of population, and of facilities for transport by road, acted together to encourage in Great Britain the production of motors specially intended for the haulage or carriage of goods, and for the conveyance of passengers in considerable numbers.

The genius of the British engineer expresses itself best in machinery of a substantial and durable character; and in this particular instance he has had the advantage of having the biggest and readiest market near to his door. The French motor car factories have not been similarly encouraged, by a natural demand, to develop the industrial motor. Consequently, in France and also in other European countries, progress has been more nearly related to military requirements. All the great military Powers have endeavoured in some measure to encourage the construction of vehicles suitable for transport and supply under active service conditions. The method adopted, wherever possible, has been to offer a subsidy or subvention to the purchaser and user of any machine of a type passed as suitable by the Government's experts.

In France, annual trials have been held for some time past under the auspices of the War Department. As

a result of these trials, certain types and makes of vehicle have been certificated for subsidy. The general effect has been to create a more or less artificial demand, not based on sound economic principles, for machines so designed as to be at least fairly suitable for military service. The expenditure involved by putting this scheme into force in France has been considerable. It was found necessary to offer a subsidy amounting to an aggregate of about 300%, paid in instalments over a period of four years, in respect of each vehicle earmarked for Government use. In Germany, natural and trade conditions were even more unfavourable; and the subsidy offered consequently amounted to no less than about 450% for each vehicle, paid in instalments spread over five years. German manufacturers have depended upon these particular models, and upon their export trade, rather than on any natural increasing demand for purely commercial machines for use within their own country. Austria, with a smaller manufacturing trade, has paid a subsidy amounting to about 360%.

All these figures have of course been strongly influenced by the fact that the aggregate supply of vehicles in industrial service has invariably been less than the military demand taken alone. In Great Britain, this state of affairs has been reversed. Consequently, a subsidy scheme was not required actually to create a demand, but merely to direct it gradually into the desired channels. This was done, with moderate success, by the offer of a subsidy of about 120% spread over three years, which sufficed to encourage a limited number of manufacturers to build the types outlined in the War Office specifications. It did not, however, suffice to induce any very large number of commercial users to employ the types selected. Consequently, at the outbreak of war, the British Government had at its immediate disposal vehicles more than ample numerically, but not calculated to form fleets by any means perfect as regards uniformity and standardisation. All the other countries concerned in the war were situated even more unfavourably, the total supply in no case being adequate. Russia in particular, possessing no manufacturing industry and an extremely bad and incomplete road system, could not count within her boundaries anything approaching the

number of vehicles which she required for such an emergency as the present. No subvention scheme had been possible, but a certain number of lorries had been purchased directly or indirectly by the Government from Germany, England, and other countries during the two or three years preceding the war.

Italy manufactures a limited number of admirable industrial vehicles, but the conditions have not favoured their extensive purchase by the home market. The Italian Government was consequently obliged, during the Tripoli campaign, to purchase outright some hundreds of lightly constructed lorries suitable for working over loose sand. The United States possesses very great facilities for the manufacture of industrial motors. Up to the outbreak of war, however, she had not definitely attacked the European markets, as she had done in the sphere of the cheaper type of touring car. The best American industrial models indicate very clearly the influence of British designers. The American manufacturer is able to rely upon a very considerable home demand, but this is limited by the inadequacy of the roads at any considerable distance from the principal towns. His future consequently is probably dependent still more largely on a big export trade.

The state of affairs briefly indicated above leads naturally to consequences of the highest importance in connexion with the subject under consideration. In the first place, it followed that, at the outbreak of war, the Governments concerned could not limit themselves to the requisitioning of vehicles of definite types, but were compelled to commandeer any presumably sound machine of fairly suitable carrying capacity. This meant a definite interference with ordinary trade; but, while some users were deprived of their vehicles against their will, the trade of others was so far affected as to make their existing delivery system more than adequate. The result was that in the early stages matters were fairly evenly balanced; and, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the action of the War Department did not cause any great inconvenience in commercial circles. A point which is perhaps of more consequence is that, when a fleet is made up of vehicles of all makes and

types, the difficulties of maintaining it in service are immeasurably increased. Each separate type of vehicle must be supported by a supply of spare parts suitable for employment in the event of breakdown. If these spare parts are not already available, it becomes necessary to place orders with the vehicle manufacturers for their supply. It is of course impossible to devote machines or shops to the production of parts of obsolete models without seriously affecting the output of new and complete cars. Moreover, the use of mixed fleets necessitates the employment of a staff much larger than would be necessary if the cars were of uniform type.

The second important consequence of the conditions obtaining at the outbreak of war was that the Governments of all the belligerent countries were compelled to make prompt endeavours to arrange for a continuous and large supply of new vehicles either from works within their own country, or else by import. Manufacturers experienced in the production of motor lorries designed to carry loads of about 30 cwt. to 3 tons were in most instances required to reserve their whole output for delivery to Government. They were therefore unable to execute orders placed by their agents or by customers whose original vehicles had been requisitioned.

In France, all the suitable motor factories were completely mobilised, and the duties for which they were best fitted promptly assigned to them. The action taken in Great Britain was to some extent similar, but naturally, under our system of voluntary service, did not involve the enlistment of the men continuing to be employed in the factories. Meanwhile, the Russian Government, not having at its disposal suitable facilities for the manufacture of vehicles at home, began to place large orders with British manufacturers whose products had not been earmarked by our own War Department. For a time, Great Britain was in the position of supplying its own immediate needs, and assisting to make good those of all its allies. It soon became evident, however, that our unaided resources would not prove equal to the strain. First the Russian and Belgian Governments, then the French, and lastly the British supplemented the fleets immediately obtainable by placing large orders with manufacturers in the United States. In the aggregate,

tremendous encouragement has been given to American builders of industrial motor vehicles; and there is little doubt that at the conclusion of the war the permanent output of these firms will be enormously greater in proportion to the British output than it was in the summer of 1914.

While these statements apply mainly to the heavier class of motor vehicle designed originally for the carriage of goods or for public service work, it must not be imagined that the touring car and the motor cycle industries remained unaffected. In order to convey some impression of a general character, it would be advisable at this point to consider briefly the principal uses to which motor vehicles are put in time of war.

The introduction of mechanical transport has led to a revolution in the methods of the Army Service Corps. The transport and supply columns which link up the railhead with the distributing points in the immediate neighbourhood of the front are now formed entirely of motor vehicles. Generally speaking, the type selected is a self-contained lorry capable of handling a useful load of about 3 tons, and on level roads of attaining a maximum speed somewhat over 20 miles per hour. If we assume that the average speed in convoy does not exceed 10 miles per hour, it follows that a fleet of 100 motor lorries can in the course of four hours bring up 300 tons of supplies to the front from a railhead 40 miles distant. The length of such a convoy would be not more than half that of a horsed convoy dealing with an equal aggregate load. This in itself is an assistance towards keeping clear the main traffic arteries behind the army in the field, but the speed capacity of the motor is a still more important factor towards the same end.

The occupation of a road by a vehicle may be measured by the product of the space actually filled by the vehicle into the time taken in carrying its load from point to point. A horsed convoy could not of course operate daily over a distance of 40 miles, carrying its load and returning empty over the same distance. To perform the work by means of animal traction would mean perhaps three convoys linking up the railhead with refilling points. At intervals along the road representing

a normal day's journey for a horse, points of junction would have to be established. At the first of these, the convoy or *échelon* operating from the railhead would hand over its load to the second *échelon*. On the following day, the second *échelon* would again transfer its load at some point nearer the front to the third; and, if the distances were great, an even larger number would be required. For purposes of rough computation we may therefore assume that one motor convoy will do the work of at least three horsed *échelons*, each of double its length. The congestion on the road is thus reduced to one-sixth of what it would be if the old method still obtained.

During a period of stationary trench warfare, the difficulties of operating by means of horsed *échelons* linking up with distant railheads might conceivably be overcome. Directly the troops to be supplied begin to move rapidly either in advance or in retreat, the whole problem of supply and transport is enormously complicated. In the event of a retreat, the presence of congestion upon the roads may very well convert a temporary set-back into a decisive defeat. In the event of a rapid advance, the slow-moving horsed vehicles are incapable of gaining sufficiently quickly upon the troops in movement, with the inevitable consequence that ammunition and food supplies cannot be brought up punctually and regularly, and the army may well be robbed of the fruits of its first success. The whole matter may really be simplified down to a consideration of relative speeds. The time taken by a motor convoy in gaining upon infantry a distance equal to a full day's march is only a matter of a couple of hours or so. A slightly earlier start from the railhead makes it possible for the arrival at the appointed refilling points to take place at the usual time. Horsed *échelons* have practically no power of gaining upon troops marching rapidly. Consequently, during a continued advance, the supplies that have reached the lighter carts for distributing purposes are very likely to run short before further supplies can be brought up.

Even under the most easy and normal conditions, unless convenient railheads are in the immediate vicinity of the troops along the whole length of the line, the

presence of motor convoys alone makes it possible to supply fresh meat and bread in place of tinned and preserved provisions. Under the present system only about two days elapse between the time when cattle are slaughtered in the neighbourhood of the base, and the time when the meat from these same beasts becomes available as a hot meal for the men at the front. Assuming that the animals have been killed in the course of the afternoon, the carcasses may be presumed to have been loaded on to railway trucks and forwarded to railhead the same night. Early on the following morning, the supplies are taken over by the motor convoys, which deliver them at the refilling points on the evening of that day. Next day they are cooked by the regimental travelling kitchens while on the march. In general principle, the method of bringing up ammunition is similar. Here, the advantages of the motor show themselves firstly in the reduction of congestion, and secondly in the ability to make good in the shortest possible time any temporary tendency towards a failure of supplies at any point along the front.

It will be observed that one of the principal consequences of the employment of transport and supply motors is to make it possible for an army to continue to operate at long distances from railheads. Assuming that full advantage is taken of such increased latitude of movement, problems immediately arise in connexion with the transportation of wounded men from the front to the hospitals. Without going into details as to the various stages through which it is necessary to pass before the wounded man is actually handed over to the care of a fully-equipped hospital, it is sufficiently evident that a new difficulty arises whenever the troops are operating at a long distance from their railhead. The only satisfactory method of overcoming this difficulty lies in the use of motor ambulances.

The type of vehicle usually employed for this purpose is constructed upon a touring-car chassis of moderate power and rather unusually long wheelbase. It is, in general, advisable that the rear springs of the chassis should be strengthened; but, with these two exceptions, standard models are suitable for ambulance work. The body is lightly constructed, and usually takes the form

of a wooden framework covered with waterproof canvas. The interior provides accommodation for four stretchers. In some instances, there is also room for a central gangway and a seat for an attendant, but generally it is found more convenient to arrange the fastenings of the canvas sides so that any one portion can be opened up without exposing the remainder. This makes it possible to give attention to any one of the wounded men from outside, and without disturbing the others. The stretchers are usually loaded in from the rear, the upper resting upon shelves and the lower upon the floor boards. When in place they are rigidly strapped in position. This method is usually found more suitable than any attempts to introduce special forms of spring suspension. It is clear, however, that it involves placing full dependence upon the springs of the chassis to provide sufficient immunity from vibration and road shock. For the comfort of the patients it is very desirable that the stretchers should not be carried above the back axle, where the full amplitude of any spring movement is communicated to their occupants, but rather should rest between the front and rear axles. This is one of the principal reasons why a car with long wheelbase should be selected. A certain number of ambulances have been constructed on industrial vehicle chassis; and in some instances motor omnibuses have been converted for this service. In general, however, the supply of ambulance chassis is a matter for the touring-car manufacturer.

The employment of motor vehicles in the interests of the wounded does not stop at the provision of ambulances. Auxiliary to the main fleet—which, in the case of the British Red Cross Society alone, and excluding the numerous vehicles owned by the military authorities and by various private organisations, amounts to well over one thousand—are a number of cars equipped as soup kitchens. These must not be confused with the motor field-kitchens employed in one form or another by all the armies engaged. The field-kitchen is generally constructed upon a very substantial industrial vehicle chassis, and is designed for the purpose of preparing food in exceedingly large quantities. The Red Cross kitchens are as a rule lighter and speedier vehicles fitted with boilers but not with ovens. They are intended to operate

along the routes over which the ambulances travel from the front to the hospitals, and to provide liquid nourishment, which in many cases must be urgently needed by the wounded during the long and trying journey over broken roads. Then, again, there are cars fitted up as travelling bathrooms, equipped with a stock of folding baths, and with fumigating cupboards in which clothes can be thoroughly disinfected while the men are bathing.

In connexion with the medical services, there are numerous other applications of the motor. A number of cars have been fitted up very completely as bacteriological laboratories. Others again are equipped with X-ray apparatus, and others as small operating theatres. This last idea has been extended by the French, who employ small convoys of motor cars capable of carrying rapidly, from point to point, the whole equipment which goes to form an operating theatre of considerable capacity. Perhaps one may put in the same category other vehicles designed in the interests of health. These include travelling dispensaries, cars carrying installations for the sterilisation of water, and convoys of motors forming field laundries for the thorough cleansing and disinfecting of clothes.

Among the heavier types of vehicles must be classed the motor omnibuses and chars-à-banc that are so extensively employed for the rapid movement of troops, where direct railway facilities are not available. Several thousands of these machines have gone out from Great Britain; and the whole fleet of Paris motor omnibuses, numbering about 1100, was put directly into service on the day of the outbreak of war. Somewhat similar work has on occasions been done by lighter motors of the taxicab and touring-car types. Prior to the battle of the Marne, a very large and important movement of French troops was rendered possible almost entirely by the availability of an enormous number of machines of this type; and there is reason to believe that the concentration effected by their means had a decisive influence upon the results of the critical operations which then took place.

Ordinary touring cars of the better class are of course extensively used for staff purposes, and are of enormous

value in enabling officers to keep in touch with troops distributed over lengthy lines. For despatch work cars can be employed, but motor cycles are generally favoured, partly on account of the extreme rapidity with which they can be manœuvred and turned in case of emergency. Both cars and cycles are used by the Intelligence Department; and substantial cars with their vulnerable parts protected by armour, and usually equipped with one or two machine guns, have been employed in very large numbers to take the place of cavalry scouts. In the early stages of the war armoured cars were rapidly improvised. Many of these hurriedly-constructed machines were provided only with a sort of open box of armour, which left their occupants exposed to rifle or machine gun fire directed from any elevated points, such as the upper windows of houses. While armoured cars have proved very valuable, their utility has been somewhat diminished by the difficulty that is experienced in turning them quickly in a narrow road when they come suddenly upon an impassable obstruction or are subjected to artillery fire. One way out of this difficulty is the employment of special vehicles designed to run at equal speed in either direction and to steer from either end; and another partial solution of the problem is the employment of motor bicycles to which are attached lightly armoured side-cars equipped with machine guns.

A few motor vehicles are used for observation purposes. In some cases these carry ladders similar to those employed on fire escapes. These ladders can be extended vertically, and an observer thus hoisted into an effective position. A method favoured by the French involves the use of man-lifting kites, manipulated by the power of motor-car engines. Among other uses of motors, brief mention may be made of cars equipped with wireless telegraphy apparatus, and of others carrying powerful searchlights. In each case, it is possible to depend primarily for power upon the car engine, and in the latter that system of construction which involves electric transmission appears to be particularly suitable.

When all the needs of these various services have been met, there still remains much to do. All the vehicles are required to work under exceptionally arduous conditions. The surfaces of the roads to be

traversed are in almost every case seriously injured by heavy traffic; in many instances they are broken up by shell fire. A complete system of road maintenance is perpetually in operation, but even at the best the circumstances do not conduce to the long life and reliability of any complex mechanism. Thus it becomes necessary to evolve a system of maintenance as complete and satisfactory as is possible in the circumstances. This means, in the first instance, the equipment of a large number of substantial motor vans to form travelling workshops, in which are carried the tools and apparatus necessary to effect ordinary roadside repairs. In theory, these workshop cars accompany the convoys to which they are attached, but in practice they are more generally kept at the temporary base of operations. Certain workshop cars built for the Red Cross Society are fitted with cranes which enable them to hoist a broken-down car, and to tow it home on one pair of wheels.

The system of maintenance by travelling workshop has on the whole worked out very well, but the limitations of the method are obvious, and consequently it has been necessary to establish also large stationary workshops at certain convenient bases. Here, ample stocks of spares are kept in reserve, and vehicles are thoroughly overhauled and big repairs executed. Smooth working of the complete system is a matter of considerable difficulty. There must be a tendency on the part of those responsible for running the permanent base workshops towards justifying themselves by dealing adequately with the largest possible percentage of the cars that are sent in. In the event of a very bad breakdown, it may sometimes be advisable not to attempt to repair, but to use the remaining portions of the car as spare parts for other vehicles. In dealing with vehicles of obsolete type, the question must always arise whether it is not better to discard the machine altogether than to hinder the output of new vehicles by demanding from the manufacturers replacements for whose manufacture facilities no longer exist. The inherent character of the organisation renders it certain that in some instances unnecessary wastage will be permitted to take place, while in others too much valuable time will be spent on work which is not really worth doing. Nevertheless,

the scheme is the only possible one, and on the whole it has been found to work extremely well.

From this brief review of the uses of motor vehicles in war time, it will have been possible to gather some impressions as to the extent to which the manufacturing industry concerned is at present devoted to Government work to the exclusion of other business. It is when we come to consider the consequences of this state of affairs, the possibilities of which were never contemplated by those connected with an industry developed for purely peaceful purposes, that we find a rather startling outlook. Assuming that at a time when many normal trades are stagnant, those firms that are fully engaged on Government work are usually regarded as being extremely fortunate, one might be led to the conclusion that the motor manufacturing industry has little cause for anxiety in the present or in the early future. When one comes to examine the position, a very different state of affairs is revealed; and we are forced to the conclusion that, if this example is in any way typical, there is an urgent need of some effective connecting link between the departments of the Government responsible for the conduct of the war, and those responsible for the subsequent maintenance and improvement of British trade.

In view of this possibility, it may be interesting to consider briefly the position as it affects one industry. This industry must be subdivided into two groups, one of which, namely, the manufacturers of industrial motor vehicles, is fully occupied on Government work, while the other, including manufacturers of touring cars and of motor bicycles, is only partially occupied, and consequently is affected to a less degree by the fact, that motors are used for warlike purposes. This being so, it will be well to confine our considerations for the moment to the first group.

In respect, then, of industrial motor vehicles, we have an industry which has grown very steadily and with some rapidity during the past decade. It is also an industry in which Great Britain has from the first occupied a prominent position, and at the outbreak of war was certainly ahead of all competitors. The employment of motor vehicles by the trading community

at present represents only a small percentage of the potential development. While in certain specific instances, as, for example, in the use of motor omnibuses in London and in Paris, the change to motor traction is practically complete, the revolution in respect of the haulage of goods is only in its initial stages. At this juncture, every vehicle which goes out to some fresh point overseas represents a nucleus around which trade is likely to accrue, first, to its manufacturers and next to its country of origin, if the service given by it is satisfactory. Enormous importance attaches to getting the first grip of these new markets, insignificant at the moment but capable of immense development. If British manufacturers are—as they unfortunately must be—temporarily prevented from supplying the demands of foreign and colonial agents and purchasers, the consequences must be far-reaching, especially if competitors are able to utilise this opportunity of establishing themselves firmly. Even in the British Isles themselves, there is a strong likelihood at the moment of British manufacturers losing a material amount of goodwill. A trader building up a large fleet of motor vans prefers to limit himself to one make, if that make proves satisfactory. If at this juncture he is obliged to place his order for foreign vehicles, it is more than likely that, unless these prove total failures, all his subsequent orders will go in the same direction. It must be remembered, too, that at the outbreak of war, the Government requisitioned many thousands of cars built by British makers of high repute. The manufacturers in question have been unable to replace the vehicles thus commandeered; and traders, under the necessity of continuing the work of their delivery departments, have taken their orders elsewhere.

These facts serve to show that the profits accruing from the Government contracts, even if substantial in the first instance, must not necessarily be viewed with jealousy by those who do not participate in them. These profits represent payment not merely for the vehicles themselves, but for an enormous quantity of valuable goodwill built up during years of steady work. It remains to be seen how much of this goodwill is recoverable in face of adverse conditions. As already stated, in many quarters manufacturers will have not only to

make a fresh start, but to counteract influences that have superseded their own. They will have to fight for their old markets and for a share of new ones in circumstances that are bound to tell heavily against them. The necessity for maintaining a substantial output in the interests of the Government involves the purchase of stores of raw material a long time in advance and at much inflated prices. On the other hand, the Government contracts can be terminated at extremely short notice. There is, then, a strong probability that a large number of British manufacturers, including the bulk of the most prominent firms, will find themselves compelled to utilise materials in stock by continuing for some time to concentrate on the manufacture of vehicles of the very limited number of types that chance to be suitable for military work. The costs of manufacture will be great in view of the cost of the raw materials. Sales, on the other hand, will have to be effected in competition with a large number of other British manufacturers, all overloaded with vehicles of similar carrying capacity, and all equally anxious to reach that stage at which it will be possible to return to normal conditions of production.

Here, then, we have two effects; one, the flooding of the market with vehicles of certain specified types, which means a very small profit—if there is any profit at all—as a result of their sale; the other, an inability to supply the public demand for vehicles of other types, and a consequent continuance of a condition under which British trade loses ground every day. It is reasonable to anticipate that the whole difficulty will be still further increased by the presence upon the market of thousands of second-hand lorries and cars which, if the War Office and Admiralty adhere to customary methods, will presumably be sold by auction. Some of these vehicles will doubtless be obtainable at a wonderfully low price, so that purchasers will be strongly induced not to deal direct with manufacturers at a time when the latter are urgently in need of their custom. Others of these second-hand cars, when they go into commercial service, will show the results of rough handling, and will very unjustly earn for their makers an unenviable reputation.

It is quite conceivable that, so far as this prospective

flood of second-hand vehicles is concerned, steps could be taken which would protect manufacturers from overwhelming competition, and would also safeguard the reputation of the British industry. It is also within the bounds of possibility that the terms of contract might be so modified as to relieve manufacturers to some extent from the onus of continuing to manufacture and sell a type of vehicle which is likely to be a drug on the market. These measures and others which might be devised to save a young and promising industry from the grave consequences of its active participation in the war, are matters for the consideration of those Departments of the Government that are charged with the duty of watching the interests of British trade. Whether it is possible, with its existing machinery, for the Board of Trade so far to make its influence felt upon the Departments directly concerned with the conduct of the war as to make these latter realise the necessity for incurring heavy expenditure which appears to be avoidable, is a question, the answer to which is hardly likely to be wholly satisfactory. It is conceivable that the establishment of the new Ministry of Munitions may form the basis of some link between interests which, viewed individually, are of a conflicting character. When the great problems before this new Department have been successfully solved, and its work gradually becomes lighter, it is possible that its energies might be diverted for a season, before it ceases to exist altogether, towards the work of securing that those industries which it has organised for warfare shall finally be set free to pursue the arts of peace under conditions which give them at the least a reasonable prospect of success.

HORACE WYATT.

Art. 12.—THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE ALLIED POWERS.

As the great war of attrition progresses, it becomes more and more evident that an unparalleled strain will be imposed upon the financial resources of each belligerent, and that economic exhaustion will exercise an important if not a decisive influence in bringing it to a conclusion. It is, therefore, a matter of profound importance to arrive at a clear understanding of the economic position and resources of the Allies.

The Allied Powers differ widely from each other in respect of economic conditions. The British Empire is the richest confederation in the world; and, of all the belligerents, its wealth and national income have been least affected by the war. France is very wealthy, but the mobilisation of practically all her male workers between the ages of 19 and 50 and the occupation by the German army of some of her most important manufacturing departments have for the time being rendered the financing of her external war expenditure a matter of considerable difficulty. Russia is potentially one of the richest Empires in the world, but, owing to the suspension of her foreign trade by the closing of her ports in the Baltic and the Black Sea, the process of converting her great natural resources into a liquid form has been rendered extremely difficult.

It was inevitable that the shock of war should fall upon France with the utmost violence both in a military and an economic sense. Some of the richest portions of her territory were almost immediately ravaged, and the flower of her manhood was rapidly mobilised. The French Official Review of the War stated that there were 2,500,000 men at the front at the beginning of March last and that at the same time there were 1,250,000 men in the dépôts and in reserve. The cost of maintaining these men appears to be averaging now about 8s. per man per day. On June 3 the French Minister of Finance, M. Ribot, laid before Parliament estimates for the public expenditure during the three months July, August and September, 1915, amounting in all to 237,600,000*l.*, say at the rate of 79,200,000*l.* per month. This, of course, includes the civil as well as the

military expenditure of the French Government. At the same time the Minister said that the total estimated expenditure for the first fourteen months of the war, that is to say up to Sept. 30, 1915, amounted to 960,000,000*l.* Under normal conditions the expenditure of the French Government runs at the rate of about 170,000,000*l.* per annum; so that it may be said that the first fourteen months of war will cost the French Government 762,000,000*l.*, or at the rate of 653,000,000*l.* per annum. Should the war be prolonged it would appear probable that the rate of expenditure will increase beyond this level. The military outlay for the first five months was at the rate of 34,000,000*l.* per month, for the succeeding six months at the rate of 44,000,000*l.* per month; and it is estimated that for the three months ending Sept. 30 it will average 52,000,000*l.* per month. The operations in the Dardanelles account for a large proportion of this increase. The expenditure on allowances to the families of mobilised men, on the support of refugees and on the repatriation of those who have been expelled from the army zone is continually increasing. During the last five months of 1914 the sum paid to dependents of mobilised men averaged 2,720,000*l.* a month. In the first half of 1915 it reached 5,080,000*l.* a month, and for the following three months it is estimated at 6,160,000*l.* monthly. The total expenditure on allowances to dependents of mobilised men for the first fourteen months of the war was put by M. Ribot at 62,500,000*l.* The estimated expenditure on the support of refugees and repatriated persons for the same period was put at 7,380,000*l.*

Before the outbreak of war the public debt of France amounted to 1,071,848,000*l.*, or 27*l.* per head of the population; and her public revenue for 1911 was 195,267,000*l.*, or 4*l.* 18*s.* 7*d.* per head, of which 3*l.* 8*s.* 7*d.* per head was derived from taxation. The public debt of France before the war was larger than that of any other Power; and her revenue from taxation was nearly as great per head as that of the United Kingdom. France is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Her national wealth has been estimated by M. Edmund Théry at 11,675,000,000*l.*, and her national income at 1,460,000,000*l.* The gold reserve of the Bank of France is larger than that of any other European power with

the exception of Russia; and on the eve of war the Bank held 165,854,000*l.* in gold against notes in circulation to the value of 267,327,000*l.* On June 10, 1915, the gold reserve was 156,785,000*l.*, and the note circulation 480,629,190*l.* The increase of the note circulations appears to be due to the fact that a large proportion of the war expenditure has been provided by advances by the Bank.

From Aug. 1 to Dec. 31, 1914, the war expenditure was provided, as to 77,600,000*l.*, by the proceeds of the 3½ per cent. Loan and the issue of National Defence Bonds; and 157,000,000*l.* was obtained from the Bank of France and the Bank of Algeria. That is to say, about one-third of the war funds were obtained from the French public and two-thirds from the Banks, while 20,000,000*l.* Treasury Bonds were issued in London. From January to May 15 this year, Treasury Bonds and the 3½ per cent. Loan brought in 194,240,000*l.*; and the Bank advances only totalled 64,000,000*l.* Thus in the second period the French people subscribed nearly four-fifths of the outlay and the Banks little more than one-fifth. These figures show not only the growing confidence of the French people but the improvement which has taken place in their general economic position.

The national savings are ample to meet the further calls which will be made upon the French people for internal expenditure upon the war, but the financing of war material and foodstuffs purchased abroad is a matter of some difficulty. The capital value of the foreign investments of France may be estimated at 1,600,000,000*l.*; and, under normal conditions, her income from this source should amount to about 80,000,000*l.* per annum. Unfortunately, a very large proportion of this total has been invested in Russia; and, until the commerce of that country has been released by the opening of the Dardanelles, France cannot derive full benefit from her Russian investments. France has also invested large sums in Turkey and the Balkan States, which are unrealisable for the time being. In these circumstances it is natural that she should look to Great Britain to help her to meet her temporary financial difficulties. Purchases abroad have to be paid for; exports have declined; import duties have to a large extent been cancelled. A recent estimate puts the probable amount

of payments to be made in the next six months to the United States, Canada and Great Britain at 60,000,000*l.* An arrangement has been made with the British Treasury by which credits are to be opened for the French Government in return for the export by France of gold to one-third of their amount; and, in return for 20,000,000*l.* in gold, the French Government will be granted credits for 62,000,000*l.*

The indirect losses of France cannot fail to be very great. At the census of 1911 the total population was 39,601,000, and the 'active' population included 12,910,000 males. The war has withdrawn the bulk of the male population between the ages of 19 and 50 from the production of wealth. So far as possible, women have taken the place of male workers; but, owing to the high specialisation and interdependence of modern industry, it has proved impossible to make good more than a comparatively small proportion of the loss of production occasioned by the withdrawal of so many skilled workmen. An investigation was carried out by the Labour Department of the French Government at the beginning of the current year as to the conditions of some 32,000 establishments, nominally employing some 1,070,000 persons—an investigation limited in scope but capable of giving some idea of the general position. In August, 1914, nearly half the firms were compelled to shut down owing to mobilisation, which carried off more than two-thirds of their workers. By October the position had begun to improve, 28 per cent. more firms being open and 35 per cent. more persons employed. In January, 1915, the number of firms working was 43 per cent. better than in the previous August, and the number of hands was 83 per cent. better.

We must also take into consideration the damage caused in the territory occupied by the Germans, and the loss of production which has resulted from such occupation of French territory. The route chosen for the advance of the German armies on Paris embraced some of the most important manufacturing districts in France. The area of the twelve ravaged departments is 28,181 square miles, or 13·5 per cent. of the total area of France; and the population numbered 6,906,000, or 17·4 per cent. of the total population. The departments of the Nord

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and the Pas-de-Calais contain many important manufacturing towns and coal-mines; and the whole region round about Lille is dotted with manufacturing towns, while Rheims is another important manufacturing centre. In these districts the German army appears to have followed a deliberate policy of destruction and spoliation. At the end of December the German troops occupied about 7000 square miles of French territory, but this has since been somewhat reduced. It has been computed that the Germans seized raw materials and manufactured goods in Northern France (especially wool, cotton, leather, metals, grease and oils) to the value of 50,000,000*l.*; and the total losses through destruction of property, etc., for the twelve departments, have been estimated in the Chamber of Deputies at 160,000,000*l.*

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the war should have exercised an extremely unfavourable influence upon the foreign trade of France. The exports and imports for the first five months of the war were as follows:

Month.	Imports. Special trade.		Exports. Special trade.	
	1913. £	1914. £	1913. £	1914. £
August . . .	23,397,000	10,872,000	21,028,000	10,690,000
September . . .	25,077,000	10,150,000	23,311,000	5,752,000
October . . .	28,385,000	8,127,000	24,794,000	7,230,000
November . . .	30,486,000	10,649,000	23,708,000	7,148,000
December . . .	33,072,000	15,612,000	25,936,000	8,966,000
Totals .	140,417,000	55,410,000	118,777,000	39,736,000

For the first five months following the outbreak of war the imports decreased by 85,007,000*l.*, or 60·7 per cent.; and the exports decreased by 78,991,000*l.*, or 67 per cent. For the first four months of the current year there was a marked improvement in the import trade and a small improvement in the export trade, the totals being as under:

	Imports.		Exports.	
	1914. £	1915. £	1914. £	1915. £
First four months .	120,904,440	87,184,480	88,399,360	36,617,900
Decrease, £33,719,960 = 27·9 %			Decrease, £51,781,460 = 58·6%	

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It is instructive to note that, while there was an increase in the value of the imports of manufactures of over 50 per cent. (presumably, in the main, war munitions), there was a very heavy decline in the imports of raw materials. Food imports were maintained at about the same level as 1914. On the whole the increase in the value of the imports indicates that the inherent economic strength of France has asserted itself. The falling-off of exports, though somewhat less than in the first five months, is serious, and is mainly due to the loss of production which has resulted from the mobilisation of all the male workers between the ages of 19 and 50.

It may be assumed that the total forces mobilised by Russia will amount to at least 6,000,000 men, of whom about 4,000,000 are at present actively employed in the various theatres of war. In the Japanese war Russia managed to keep her expenditure per head down to a remarkably low level, having regard to the fact that she was operating at such a great distance from her base; and there is good reason to believe that she will be able to maintain her troops in the present war at a lower average expenditure per head than any other Great Power. The explanatory memorandum attached to the Russian State Budget for 1915, prepared by the Minister of Finance, Mr P. L. Barck, stated that Russia's extra expenditure down to Oct. 13 was 178,500,000*l.*, say at the rate of 2,400,000*l.* per day. This period, however, covered the extraordinary expenditure in connexion with mobilisation; and the daily expenditure appears to have fallen to a lower level after that date. On Feb. 9, State-Controller Kharitinoff informed the Duma that, from the commencement of the military operations until Jan. 1, the total sum spent by the Russian Government on the war was 3,020,000,000 roubles (302,000,000*l.*)—say at the average rate of 2,000,000*l.* per day. The same Minister added that the war was then costing approximately 1,400,000*l.* per day. For an average war establishment of 5,000,000 men this would give a daily expenditure per head of only 5*s.* 6*d.*, which is a considerably lower average than any other Power can hope to attain, but it is difficult to believe that Russia will be able to work at this low level. Assuming that the direct expenditure of

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the Russian Government averages only 1,400,000*l.* per day from Jan. 1 until July 31 next, the total cost for the first twelve months of war will be as under:

July 31 to December 31, 1914	302,000,000
January 1 to July 31 (212 days at 1,400,000 <i>l.</i> per day)	296,800,000
Total	<u>598,800,000</u>

The war has, naturally, exercised a profound influence upon the foreign trade of Russia. In 1912, 40 per cent. of Russia's imports came from Germany, and 30 per cent. of her exports went to that country. With the closing of the Dardanelles, Russia's exports from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov came to a stop, while the remainder of her imports and exports ceased with the suspension of navigation in the Baltic, with the exception of the inconsiderable quantities shipped by way of Archangel and Vladivostock. The following table shows the foreign trade of Russia during the first five months of the war:

Month.	Imports. Special trade.		Exports. Special trade.	
	1913. £	1914. £	1913. £	1914. £
August	11,238,000	3,273,000	16,762,000	2,488,000
September	10,979,000	3,163,000	16,841,000	1,520,000
October	13,210,000	2,889,000	15,232,000	1,695,000
November	12,187,000	2,927,000	14,287,000	2,014,000
December	9,883,000	3,027,000	14,252,000	343,000
Totals	57,497,000	15,279,000	77,374,000	8,060,000

During the first five months after the declaration of war Russia's exports were reduced by 69,314,000*l.*, or 89·6 per cent.; and her imports were reduced by 42,218,000*l.*, or 73·5 per cent. Russia is a debtor country; that is to say in normal years it is essential, in order to adjust her trade balance, that her exports should greatly exceed her imports. Russia has borrowed immense sums from foreign countries, principally from France, for the purpose of developing her great natural resources; and it is estimated that 30,000,000*l.* are paid annually to foreign holders of Russian Government securities by way of interest. The almost complete suspension of the foreign trade of Russia

has, therefore, rendered the financing of her war expenditure a matter of great difficulty; and her two great allies have recognised in a practical manner her special claim to their financial support. The Bank of France placed 20,000,000*l.* at the disposal of the Russian State Bank, so as to enable Russian institutions to pay their obligations in France. The British Government advanced 32,000,000*l.* to the Russian Government for purchases in Great Britain and elsewhere, and the Russian Government deposited 8,000,000*l.* with the Bank of England; so that at the beginning of this year credits were established in this country for Russia to the extent of 40,000,000*l.* In order to provide the further credits required to enable the Russian Government to make additional purchases of war materials, etc., until the end of the present year, the French and British Governments decided to raise a two-power loan, the first 50,000,000*l.* being raised in equal sums on the French and British markets respectively.

At the commencement of the war the Russian Government took an heroic step in dissociating itself from the fiscal system of the past twenty years by sacrificing the liquor revenue and prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors. In the 1914 Budget the receipts from the liquor monopoly produced 93,600,000*l.*, or 26·2 per cent. of the entire revenue of the Russian Government. This fundamental reform at once brought about a sharp decline of revenue receipts, but other sources of direct and indirect taxation have been opened up.

On the eve of the outbreak of war the national debt of Russia amounted to 935,018,000*l.*, say 5*l.* 9*s.* 7*d.* per head of the population, as compared with 15*l.* 5*s.* 0*d.* per head for the United Kingdom and 27*l.* 1*s.* 3*d.* per head for France. A large proportion of the public debt of Russia is represented by valuable assets in the shape of State Railways, which in normal years bring in a net revenue of about 25,000,000*l.* Since the outbreak of war the following sums have been added to this debt:

	£
5% Interior Loan	50,000,000
4% and 5% Treasury Bills and Bonds	110,000,000
Credits granted by France and Great Britain	45,000,000
Credit by J. P. Morgan & Co.	3,100,000
New 5% Loan	50,000,000
	<hr/>
	258,100,000

It is fortunate for Russia that she had accumulated an enormous gold reserve long before the outbreak of the war. The amount of gold held by the Russian State Bank on July 21, 1914, was 174,509,000*l.*, the largest stock of gold held by any Bank of issue. On May 6, 1915, notwithstanding the vast war expenditure incurred since July 31, 1914, the stock of gold amounted to 171,185,000*l.* It is true that the amount of the notes in circulation increased from 163,411,000*l.* to 334,899,000*l.* within the same period; but the ratio of gold to notes on May 6 was 51.1 per cent., which is a considerably higher percentage than that of the Imperial Reichsbank of Germany.

The natural resources of Russia are perhaps greater than those of any other country in the world. Hitherto only the fringe of the mineral resources of the Russian Empire has been touched; and altogether there is good reason to believe that the recovery of Russia from the economic consequences of the war will be more rapid than that of any other belligerent.

Fortunately for Italy, she did not become involved in the war until ten months after its outbreak; and she was able to reconstitute her finances on a war basis with the minimum of disturbance. In the past twenty years there has been a remarkable improvement in the economic position of Italy; and this has been reflected in the condition of the national finances. The public debt at the end of 1912 amounted to 537,174,000*l.*, a large proportion of this total being represented by capital expenditure in the shape of State Railways. Italian currency rose to a par with that of France; and large gold reserves were accumulated by the three Banks of issue. A considerable proportion of the public debt, which was held in France, Great Britain and Germany, was bought back by Italian investors; and the national credit was thus materially strengthened.

The economic progress of the country was checked to some extent by the war in Tripoli; and the operations in Libya were not fully completed when the great war commenced. Italian industries were hard hit by the world-wide economic disturbance of August last. The mobilisation of her army, which quickly followed, caused a serious interruption of the industrial life of the Kingdom;

and this resulted in a substantial fall in the Italian exchange. The war preparations of the Italian Government involved an expenditure estimated to amount at the beginning of May to not less than 40,000,000*l.*; and early in the year a national loan of 60,000,000*l.* was subscribed by the Italian people. As the war directly involved most of the principal customers of Italy, her foreign trade suffered materially. In normal years the imports exceed the exports by about 40,000,000*l.*; this amount represents mainly the earnings of Italians resident in the United States and Argentina. The foreign tourist expenditure also contributes largely to the excess of imports over exports.

Italy, as the ally of Great Britain, will receive financial assistance just as France and Russia have received it; and in the early part of June it was announced that the Minister to the Italian Treasury had conferred with the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Nice, when proposals for the financial co-operation of the two Powers were discussed and arrangements concluded on behalf of their respective Governments.

Twelve months ago Belgium was one of the most prosperous countries in the world. She had a population of 7,571,000; and her foreign trade in 1912 amounted to 356,379,000*l.* Her national income was approximately 300,000,000*l.*, and her national wealth 2,400,000,000*l.* To-day Belgium is a blackened ruin. All administrative, industrial, commercial and financial life has come to a stop. There is no money, and business is at a standstill. Entire industries have been transported to Germany by simply expropriating machinery and the necessary materials. An interesting table has been compiled by M. Henri Masson of the losses inflicted upon Belgium during the first eighty-two days of the war, the total being 212,057,600*l.* This loss has of course been materially increased since the end of last October. The population of Belgium has been seriously reduced. The refugees in this country are estimated to number 180,000, and earlier in the year a German wireless report placed the total number of refugees at 750,000. The French and British Governments have each advanced 10,000,000*l.* to the Belgian Government, and it is obvious that a further loan must soon be made to that Government.

Advances have been made by both the French and the British Governments to the Serbian Government; but there are no data available which will admit of a useful discussion of the economic position of that country. It is, however, obvious that here also we must anticipate further claims upon our financial support.

The extent to which the national finances of the Allies have become intimately bound up with those of Great Britain cannot fail to have far-reaching consequences upon our future economic relations with them. One of the most delicate and important tasks which will fall upon the National Government is the readjustment of our economic system to meet the extraordinary conditions and demands which have been created by the war. On the whole our principal Allies should be able to finance their internal outlay upon the war without great difficulty; but it is obvious that they must look to Britain to help them to finance a large part of their external war expenditure. As the war progresses, the foreign exchanges of the belligerents grow more and more unfavourable. Russia is paying 29 per cent. over the normal for all her imports, France 3, Italy 10, Germany 14, and Austria 31 per cent. We have not only to provide our own war expenditure but at the same time to finance our Allies. The mobilisation of our own economic resources and the organisation of the national finances are therefore matters of the greatest moment.

From the point of view of accumulated wealth and national income Great Britain was in an extremely favourable position when the war broke out. As the result of one hundred years of peace (the wars in which we have been engaged since 1815 having been so far removed from our shores that they cannot be said to have exercised a permanently destructive influence upon our national economic life), our industrial and economic development had reached a point which rendered us the richest people in the world. In a paper which was read before the Royal Statistical Society on June 16, 1914, I gave data for estimating the national wealth of the United Kingdom at 16,500,000,000*l.*, or 366*l.* per head, and the national income at 2,140,000,000*l.*, or 47*l.* per head. But we have

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behind us at this great crisis not only the wealth and resources of the United Kingdom; we have in addition the almost illimitable resources of the Overseas Dominions and Possessions. The population, area, national wealth and income of the different portions of the Empire may be estimated as set out hereunder: *

	Population.	Area.	National Wealth.	National Income.
		Square miles.	£	£
United Kingdom	45,878,000	121,000	16,500,000,000	2,140,000,000
Canada . . .	7,206,000	3,739,000	2,072,000,000	259,000,000
Australia . .	4,872,000	3,063,000	1,312,000,000	164,000,000
South Africa .	5,973,000	473,000	600,000,000	75,000,000
New Zealand .	1,083,000	104,000	320,000,000	40,000,000
India and Ceylon	298,500,000	1,827,000	3,600,000,000	608,000,000
Crown Colonies, Possessions and Protectorates, including Egypt	84,488,000	5,174,000	1,600,000,000	200,000,000
Total . . .	448,000,000	14,501,000	26,004,000,000	3,486,000,000

The economic interests of the Motherland and the Overseas Dominions and Possessions are reciprocal to a remarkable degree. The United Kingdom is one of the greatest manufacturing countries in the world; and the Empire affords one of the best markets for the products of the Motherland. The Overseas Dominions and Possessions are already amongst the greatest producers of foodstuffs and raw materials; and the United Kingdom offers a practically unlimited market for most of their products. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that the exchange of commodities between Great Britain and the other parts of the Empire will continue to expand indefinitely. The production of staple articles within the Empire in 1911 was as follows:

	Value.
	£
Coal 314,000,000 tons	125,800,000
Iron ore 17,425,000 tons	
Pig iron 10,382,000 tons	
Diamonds	8,299,000
Gold 13,243,000 ozs.	55,900,000
Silver	4,368,000
Copper	4,616,000
Tin	11,100,000
Wheat 788,800,000 bushels	
Barley 117,500,000 bushels	

* Cf. 'Imperial Defence and Finance,' 'Nineteenth Century,' August 1913.

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Oats	559,500,000 bushels
Tea	455,600,000 lbs.
Cocoa	181,589,000 lbs.
Coffee	36,788,000 lbs.
Raw Sugar	61,100,000 cwts.
Rubber	37,789,000 lbs.
Cotton	1,279,616 lbs.
Jute	29,410,000 cwts.

Our ability to bear the financial strain of the war is greatly increased by the resources placed at our disposal by our investments abroad. The aggregate capital value of these investments on the eve of the outbreak of war was approximately 3,900,000,000L;* and the average annual income derived therefrom was about 200,000,000L.* The geographical distribution of the bulk of these investments is shown hereunder:

British Dominions, Colonies and Possessions :—		£
India (including Ceylon)		447,000,000
Australia and New Zealand		408,000,000
Africa		401,000,000
Canada		423,000,000
Egypt		75,000,000
Other British Possessions		91,000,000
Total		1,845,000,000

Foreign Countries :—		£
United States		632,000,000
Argentina		329,000,000
Brazil		135,000,000
Mexico		81,000,000
Japan		74,000,000
Chile		57,000,000
Uruguay		40,000,000
China		38,000,000
Peru		32,000,000
Cuba		29,000,000
European Countries		170,000,000
Other foreign countries		92,000,000
Total		1,709,000,000
Grand total		£3,554,000,000

The above figures represent capital invested abroad in public undertakings and foreign or colonial loans. They do not comprise the very considerable amounts of British capital invested abroad privately which may be estimated to amount to about 350,000,000L., making the total of our investments abroad 3,904,000,000L.

It is instructive and reassuring to note the geographical distribution of this vast sum. In the first

* Cf. articles on British Investments Abroad, 'Quarterly Review,' July 1907 and April 1911.

place the bulk of it has been placed in countries which are remote from the European war areas. Only 170,000,000*l.*, or 4·4 per cent. of the total, are represented by European investments; and these are mainly in Russia, Turkey and the Scandinavian countries. It is extremely significant that our greatest credits exist in those countries, such as the United States, Argentina, Canada, Australasia and India, which are in a position to send us foodstuffs and raw materials. Our Colonial and foreign debtors send us commodities to the value of 200,000,000*l.* per annum by way of payment of interest, for which we need not export one pound's worth of British manufactures. This vast reserve of wealth is naturally the first source upon which we shall rely for the adjustment of our trade balance. The United States Secretary to the Treasury stated earlier in the year that the war found United States business men and bankers indebted to London in the sum of approximately 90,000,000*l.*, maturing by Jan. 1, 1915; and it was owing largely to this circumstance that we were able to strengthen our gold reserve in the first three months of the war by drawing large sums in gold from New York. The trade balance has in the meantime swung right over; and there is now some danger that New York will be able to recall a portion of the gold she paid us last September and October. The income from our foreign and Colonial investments will doubtless decline to some extent in consequence of the war; but for the current year it does not seem probable that the decrease will exceed 10 per cent. This would leave a net income of 180,000,000*l.* from this source.

So far as British Banking is concerned, there is good reason to feel satisfied with the manner in which it has come through the first eleven months of the war. At the beginning there was a period of uncertainty and bewilderment, due principally to the fact that the problem of financial preparation for war had been utterly neglected by the Banks and the Government. But the immensity of our resources and the stability of our credit institutions rapidly became manifest; and ever since the middle of August the position of the Joint Stock Banks has steadily improved. On July 29, 1914, the stock of gold held by the Bank of England amounted to 38,131,544*l.*,

and the notes in circulation to 29,706,350*l.*; that is to say, for every pound of notes in circulation the Bank held about 1*l.* 6*s.* in gold. On June 9 the gold reserve of the Bank was 59,365,241*l.*, and the notes in circulation amounted to 33,152,700*l.* At the same date the currency notes in circulation amounted to 45,689,361*l.*, against which gold to the amount of 28,500,000*l.* was held. Adding banknotes and currency notes together, we had a total circulation of 78,841,561*l.* against gold to the value of 87,865,241*l.*

In other words, every pound of notes in circulation was covered by 1*l.* 2*s.* in gold. In order to appreciate the relative strength of our position, it is necessary to remember that on June 7 the German Reichsbank only held 9*s.* in gold against each pound of its note circulation, irrespective of the note issues of the War Loan Societies and War Credit Banks. It may be that the greatest test of the strength of our banking and credit system has yet to come; but the manner in which the difficulties created on the outbreak of war were overcome inspires a feeling of profound confidence as to the future. Mistakes were doubtless made, but on the whole the emergency measures were in keeping with the high traditions of British Banking, and no step has yet been taken which has seriously imperilled British credit.

On Nov. 17, 1914, Mr Lloyd George presented his first war budget. He estimated that the loss of revenue occasioned by the war would amount to 11,350,000*l.* for the financial year 1914-15, and to 50,000,000*l.* for the present financial year. The new estimate of revenue was therefore 195,796,000*l.* The expenditure provided for in the Budget of April 1914 was 207,000,000*l.* To this Mr Lloyd George added the war expenditure up to March 31, 1915, which he estimated at 328,443,000*l.*, making the total sum to be provided 535,443,000*l.* He pointed out that it had always been a feature of our war finance to provide a considerable proportion of the war expenditure out of taxation. In the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (which lasted over twenty years) the expenditure was 831,000,000*l.* Nearly one half of this total was provided from taxes; the other half was obtained from loans. The Crimean war cost us 67,000,000*l.*,

the outlay being spread over three years; taxes provided 35,000,000*l.* and loans 32,000,000*l.* In the South African war, which lasted thirty-one months, our total expenditure, which was spread over four years, was 211,000,000*l.*; 28 per cent. of the cost was charged to revenue and 72 per cent. to capital. Mr Lloyd George laid it down as a fundamental principle of our war finance that the loss of revenue and the interest on the money borrowed for war expenditure should be provided out of taxation and not by loans. The loss of revenue down to March 31, 1915, was estimated at 11,350,000*l.*, and the interest on the war expenditure at 4,650,000*l.*, making a total of 16,000,000*l.* to be provided from additional taxation. In order to provide this sum, the Income Tax and Supertax were doubled and charged on one-third of the year's income; 17*s.* 3*d.* per barrel was added to the Beer Tax; and 3*d.* per lb. was added to the Tea Duty.

The yield of new taxation from these sources was estimated at 15,500,000*l.*; and a further sum of 2,750,000*l.* was provided by the suspension of the Sinking Fund. On the whole the Treasury realised more than their anticipations of November. One of the most remarkable features of the revenue returns for the year to March 31, 1915, was the wonderful buoyancy of the Income Tax and Supertax. The yield of the Income Tax attributable to the first Budget of 1914-15 was put by Mr Lloyd George at 46,000,000*l.* The forecast made in November of the yield as increased by the rate levied in that Budget was 53,000,000*l.*; the actual yield was 59,279,000*l.* The yield of the Supertax attributable to the first Budget was 8,135,000*l.*; and, though the rates were increased in November, Mr Lloyd George did not expect to receive more than 8,460,000*l.* The actual yield proved to be 10,120,000*l.* The total excess of the yield of Income Tax and Supertax over the estimate of November 1914 was nearly 8,000,000*l.* This was almost entirely due to the ease with which these two taxes were collected. With regard to Customs and Excise, the November estimate was 73,900,000*l.*; the revenue actually received came to 80,975,000*l.*, an increase of 7,075,000*l.* on the estimate. Of that increase 3,000,000*l.* came from forestalments, notably on spirits, tea and tobacco; and 2,182,000*l.* was due to an increase in the consumption of spirits.

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The revenue returns for the year to March 31, 1915, reveal the magnitude and solidity of the wealth of the United Kingdom; they also afford striking evidence of the elasticity and adaptability of our fiscal system. While the revenue of every other belligerent must have declined to an enormous extent, that of the United Kingdom expanded by no less a sum than 28,451,000*l.* No other Power has dreamt of meeting a proportion of its war expenditure out of additional taxation; but we have doubled the Income Tax and materially increased several excise duties; and the additional revenue thus obtained will not only make good the falling-off of income from other sources but will enable us to pay the whole of the new debt charge arising out of the war expenditure. The two following tables have been prepared in order to show the effect which the war has already exercised upon the national finances:

REVENUE.

	Budget Estimate, April 1914.	Actual Revenue Year to March 31, 1915.	Budget Estimate for Year to March 31, 1916.
	<i>£</i>	<i>£</i>	<i>£</i>
Customs	35,350,000	38,662,000	38,950,000
Excise	39,650,000	42,313,000	56,250,000
Estate, etc., Duties	28,800,000	28,382,000	28,000,000
Stamps	9,900,000	7,577,000	6,500,000
Land Tax	700,000	630,000	660,000
House Duty	2,000,000	1,930,000	1,990,000
Income Tax, including Supertax	56,550,000	69,399,000	103,000,000
Land Value Duties	725,000	412,000	350,000
Total receipts from Taxes	173,675,000	189,305,000	235,700,000
Postal Service	21,125,000	20,400,000	20,600,000
Telegraph Service	3,150,000	3,000,000	3,100,000
Telephone Service	6,350,000	6,250,000	6,700,000
Crown Lands	530,000	545,000	530,000
Receipts from Suez Canal and Sundry Loans	1,370,000	1,277,000	2,002,000
Miscellaneous	2,300,000	5,917,000	1,700,000
Total Non-Tax Revenue . .	34,825,000	37,389,000	34,632,000
Total Revenue	208,500,000	226,694,000	270,332,000
Deficiency		333,780,000	862,322,000*
Grand total		560,474,000	1,132,654,000

* On the assumption that the war lasts until Sept. 30, 1915, there would be a deficiency of 516,346,000*l.* instead of 862,322,000*l.*

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One of the most notable features of the Budget of 1915-16 is the disproportionate growth of direct taxation. Out of a total tax revenue of 235,700,000*l.*, no less than 140,500,000*l.*, or 59·6 per cent., is to be obtained by means of direct taxes (Income Tax, Death Duties, etc.), while indirect taxes (Customs and Excise) will provide 95,200,000*l.*, or only 40·4 per cent. During the past twenty-five years there has been a great development of the direct taxation falling upon the smaller and wealthier section of the community. In 1888, when the national revenue was 87,424,000*l.*, direct taxes only provided 45·3 per cent. of the total tax revenue and indirect taxes 54·7 per cent. Moreover, in order to appreciate the full measure of the tax burden falling upon the direct taxpayer, it is necessary to include the proportion of Local Rates paid by this group, which has been estimated by Mr Bernard Mallet at seven-tenths of a total sum of 75,000,000*l.*, which latter sum was the total amount of rates raised in the United Kingdom in 1910-11. It is instructive to note

EXPENDITURE.

	Budget Estimate April 1914.	Actual Expen- diture for year to March 31, 1915.	Budget Estimates for year to March 31, 1916.	
			" A "	" B "
	£	£	£	£
National Debt Services	16,741,000	17,341,000	20,720,000	20,720,000
Repayment of Capital .	7,759,000	3,156,000		
Interest on War Debt, &c.		2,172,000	24,750,000	30,726,000
Road Improvement Fund	1,545,000	1,528,000	1,431,000	1,431,000
Payments to Local Taxa- tion Account . . .	9,885,000	9,529,000	9,406,000	9,406,000
Other Consolidated Fund Services	1,706,000	1,694,000	1,697,000	1,697,000
Total Consolidated Fund Services	37,636,000	35,420,000	58,004,000	63,980,000
Army	28,885,000	28,886,000	15,000*	15,000 *
Navy	51,550,000	51,550,000	17,000*	17,000*
Civil Services	57,066,000	56,956,000	59,018,000	59,018,000
Customs and Excise . .	4,696,000	4,602,000	4,788,000	4,788,000
Post Office Services . .	26,152,000	26,060,000	26,836,000	26,836,000
Total Supply Services .	168,349,000	168,054,000	90,674,000	90,674,000
Votes of Credit . . .		357,000,000	638,000,000	978,000,000
Total Expenditure . .	205,985,000	560,474,000	786,678,000	1,132,654,000

* The substantial provision for these Services is being made under Votes of Credit.

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that this transference of the burden of taxation from the shoulders of the indirect taxpayer to those of the direct taxpayer coincided with the policy of extravagance which characterised the administration of the national finances during the period referred to.

The Budget estimates of the expenditure for the current financial year afford some indication of the extent of the permanent addition to taxation which must result from our vast war expenditure. On May 5, Mr Lloyd George gave the following particulars as to the cost of the war down to March 31, 1915:

	£
First four months	102,000,000
Second four months	177,000,000
Advances to Dominions and Allies	52,370,000
Purchases of wheat, meat, etc.	28,416,000
Total for eight months	<u>359,786,000</u>

At the same time Mr Lloyd George furnished two estimates of the cost of the war during the current financial year. The first estimate "A" was based upon the assumption that the war would last for six months, i.e. to Sept. 30, 1915; the second estimate "B" was based upon the assumption that the war would last for a further twelve months, i.e. until March 31, 1916. Mr Lloyd George pointed out that a war which lasted six months did not mean that the expenditure would come to an end at the expiration of the six months. There would be months of expenditure almost as heavy as the expenditure of the war whilst affairs were being wound up. There would be armies in occupation and other expenditure. Bills would come in in respect of contracts executed during the war. The three or four months after the war might very well be more expensive to the Exchequer than the three or four months before the end of the war.

	Estimate A. (6 months.)	Estimate B. (12 months.)
	£	£
Army	400,000,000	600,000,000
Navy	120,000,000	146,000,000
Railways, compensation for bombardments and raids	11,000,000	22,000,000
Advances to Allies and Dominions	100,000,000	200,000,000
Compensation provision of Canteens under the Defence of the Realm Act	7,000,000	10,000,000
Total	<u>638,000,000</u>	<u>978,000,000</u>

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In time of peace our army and navy would cost, on the basis of the first Budget for 1914, about 80,000,000*l.* per annum; and, in order to arrive at our true war expenditure on the basis of the above estimates, it is necessary to deduct that amount. The estimates of Mr Lloyd George, taken in conjunction with the actual expenditure up to March 31, 1915, would warrant the assumption that the first twelve months of war will involve us in an outlay of about 785,000,000*l.*, less such amounts as may be repaid by our Allies and the Overseas Dominions, and less the proceeds of the sale of wheat, etc., say a net expenditure of 700,000,000*l.* But, in order to arrive at the true cost of the war, we must add the capitalised value of the pensions and allowances to the wounded and to the dependents of the killed. In November last the Treasury issued a White Paper (Cd. 7662) which contained an actuarial estimate worked out on various bases. Series II, which provided for 2,000,000 men, a duration of war of one year, 10 per cent. of deaths and 12 per cent. of disablements, total and partial, showed a total amount to be disbursed during the currency of the Pensions and Allowances of 178,000,000*l.* At the beginning of February it was announced that an amended scheme, on a much more generous scale, had been adopted and would come into operation on March 1; and it is not improbable that the amount to be disbursed under the later scheme will exceed 300,000,000*l.* Adding this sum to the 700,000,000*l.* referred to above we arrive at a total direct cost of 1,000,000,000*l.* for a war of twelve months' duration only.

Our army expenditure, which in time of peace averaged about 8*s.* per man per day, is working out at a very much higher average; as a matter of fact it appears to be more than double the average cost per man per day of the German Army. There has unquestionably been a great waste of public money; but a large part of this was inevitable. The great Powers of Europe had already, in time of peace, placed their army establishments on a war footing; but in our case we have had to provide equipment, clothes, boots, rifles, guns, ammunition, housing, transport, medical hospitals and service for armies aggregating ten times our normal establishment. In other words, we have had to pay for our

neglect to maintain an adequate army establishment in past years. Our naval expenditure appears to be running at the rate of about three times our normal peace expenditure, as shown in the first Budget for 1914. Our naval establishment has been raised from 140,000 men to over 300,000 men. The expenditure on new construction has been greatly increased by the acceleration and expansion of our naval shipbuilding. Again, large sums have been expended on the purchase of the war-ships which were building for foreign navies at the time of the outbreak of war. Very extensive orders have been placed for the construction of naval guns and for the provision of naval stores, etc.

The national expenditure for the current year may be estimated to average about 21,000,000*l.* per week; and the national income from taxation, etc., may be estimated to average about 5,000,000*l.* per week, leaving a balance of about 16,000,000*l.* per week to be provided by means of borrowed money. There are three well-recognised methods by which the British Government has financed past wars, namely: (1) by a fixed war loan; (2) by the issue of Exchequer Bonds; and (3) by the issue of Treasury Bills. In November last a war loan for 350,000,000*l.* was issued at 95, bearing interest at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and redeemable at par in 1928. Allowing for redemption, the yield works out at 4 per cent. The proceeds of this loan financed the bulk of the war expenditure down to March 31, 1915. The Government then adopted a new policy of issuing Treasury Bills daily at published rates of interest; and this policy was successful beyond all expectation. Between the beginning of April and June 5 no less than 148,162,000*l.* was obtained in this manner at an abnormally low rate of interest, namely, about $3\frac{5}{8}$ per cent. But this method of raising war funds could not be continued indefinitely. The bulk of the Bills are short-dated; and, although most of them will doubtless be renewed at maturity, it is not altogether satisfactory to have such a mass of indebtedness constantly requiring renewal; moreover, there is a limitation to the ability of the money market to absorb Treasury Bills.

On June 21 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in introducing the Loan Bill, stated that down to the end of

March—the close of the financial year—the excess of expenditure over revenue was 334,000,000*l.* Between March 31 and June 19 there was a further realised deficit of 184,000,000*l.* The two deficits together gave a total of 518,000,000*l.*, which amount had to be made good by receipts other than revenue. The Government had made provision so far to meet this deficit by various borrowings. The proceeds of the first War Loan issued in November 1914 amounted to 331,000,000*l.* Exchequer Bonds to the amount of 48,000,000*l.* had been issued; and the Government had further sold Treasury Bills to a total of 235,000,000*l.* These three items together gave a total of borrowings amounting to 614,000,000*l.* From this total must be deducted an amount of 16,500,000*l.* which had been paid off for Exchequer Bills redeemed; leaving a balance of receipts from borrowings amounting to 597,488,000*l.* to meet a deficit of 518,000,000*l.* There was, therefore, an apparent surplus of 80,000,000*l.* in hand.

There were certain facts which the Government had to take into account before they could properly regard this surplus as money which they could freely spend for the purposes of the war. In the first place, the State had now very considerable liabilities to the Bank of England. Supported by a Government guarantee, the Bank had made advances to accepting houses and others, to enable them to meet bills and other liabilities. The original amount of these liabilities was 120,000,000*l.*, but they had been reduced to well under 50,000,000*l.* The Government proposed to take over these outstanding liabilities by repaying the Bank the amount lent against the bills. The policy of the Government was to reduce its debt to the Bank, so as to leave the Bank as free as possible to carry out its time-honoured duty of watching over the exchanges and protecting the country's gold reserve. The second factor which the Government had in mind was the daily excess of expenditure over income. If they assumed that the revenue came in at an equal rate day by day throughout the year, the daily revenue would be 732,000*l.* The expenditure at the middle of June was nearly 3,000,000*l.* a day, and it was rising. The Government had, therefore, to make provision for a deficiency which was already upwards of 2,250,000*l.*, and

must as months go by approach, if not surpass, 2,500,000*l.* per day.

After discussing the alternative methods of raising money, the Chancellor stated that the Government had determined to issue a new War Loan carrying interest at 4½ per cent. The amount of the loan was practically unlimited. It could not exceed 1,000,000,000*l.*; and he indicated that the Government would be satisfied if the public subscribed 800,000,000*l.* The State has the right to repay the loan in 1925; and the lender is entitled to his money back in 1945. Important rights of conversion into the new loan have been given to holders of the previous War Loan, or of Consols and Annuities, provided they are also holders of the new War Loan. Ample provision has been made to enable the small investor to subscribe; and even the weekly wage-earner is enabled to participate in the loan. Strong criticism has been directed against the high rate of interest offered by the Government and the expensive conversion privileges offered to holders of existing Government securities; but the bulk of this criticism may be attributed to the fact that the public are only beginning to appreciate the immense wastage of capital and the cost of the war, and the process of readjustment to the new economic conditions which have been created by the war has begun in earnest.

Mr Lloyd George estimated that, if the war lasted to March 31, 1916, there would be a deficiency of 862,322,000*l.* In recent years our savings have averaged between 300,000,000*l.* and 400,000,000*l.* per annum. In order to meet the cost of the war it is necessary that our savings should be doubled; and this will mean the exercise of economy to an extent which is not yet fully appreciated by the bulk of the people. The alternative to drastic economy is drastic taxation; and economy is, from all points of view, by far the most satisfactory policy. *The people of Great Britain must strain every nerve to save money in view of the further taxation or possibly loans that may still be necessary.*

Our principal indirect loss through the war is that occasioned by the withdrawal of over 2,000,000 men from production. The census returns for 1911 showed that in

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that year there were 11,453,665 males and 4,830,734 females in England and Wales, aged ten years and upwards, engaged in occupations, making the total number of occupied persons 16,284,399. For the United Kingdom the number of occupied persons at the date of the last census might be estimated at 20,000,000, of whom 6,000,000 were females. The withdrawal of over one-seventh of the male population from production must, of necessity, reduce our national income; but by the introduction of female labour, and so long as we are not compelled to resort to compulsory service, the loss of income from this source is likely to be kept at its minimum. Moreover, there has been a 'speeding up' of production by the workers who have remained. In 1913 Mr Flux estimated the national income at 2,000,000,000*l.*, say 100*l.* per worker; and, applying this average to, say, 2,000,000 men withdrawn from production, we arrive at a loss of national income from this source of 200,000,000*l.*

As the war directly involved five of our principal customers, it was inevitable that it should exercise a profound influence upon the course of our foreign trade; but the actual disturbance is very much less than might have been anticipated. The Board of Trade Returns give the following figures:

EXPORTS OF BRITISH MANUFACTURES.

	£	Decrease compared with corresponding periods of 1913 and 1914.	
		Amount. £	per cent.
1914.			
August	24,211,000	19,899,000	45·1
September	26,674,000	15,750,000	37·1
October	28,602,000	18,020,000	38·6
November	24,601,000	20,154,000	45·0
December	26,278,000	17,048,000	39·3
1915.			
January	28,247,000	19,558,000	40·9
February	26,176,000	15,085,000	36·5
March	30,176,000	14,342,000	32·2
April	32,169,000	7,777,000	19·4
May	33,618,992	8,432,198	20·0

It is very important to bear in mind the fact that, while the Board of Trade Returns include goods bought in

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the United Kingdom by or on behalf of the Governments of the Allies, they do not include goods taken from British Government stores and depôts, or goods bought by His Majesty's Government and shipped on Government vessels. It is extremely likely that the purchases of war-stores and war-material by the Allied Governments from our stores and depôts are on a considerable scale. Our own expenditure is now running at the rate of over 60,000,000*l.* per month; and the proportion of this outlay which is being shipped to the Continent or to the Dardanelles would, in all probability, if included in our returns, bring the value of our exports quite up to the level of twelve months ago.

The above figures show the remarkable improvement that has taken place in the exports. In August, 1914, the decrease was 45·1 per cent.; in May, 1915, it had fallen to 20 per cent. This result is particularly gratifying when we remember that not only have over two millions of men enlisted, but another two millions have been transferred from commercial production to the production of munitions of war. The so-called 'Submarine Blockade' does not appear to have had any effect upon our foreign trade; indeed, the greatest improvement took place after the 'blockade' began. The figures relating to the imports are shown below :

IMPORTS.

	Increase + or Decrease — compared with corresponding periods in 1913 and 1914.		
	£	£	per cent.
1914.			
August	42,362,000	13,613,000	-24·3
September	45,425,000	16,303,000	-26·5
October	51,559,000	20,172,000	-28·1
November	55,987,000	12,480,000	-18·2
December	67,555,000	3,560,000	-5·1
1915.			
January	67,401,000	604,000	-0·8
February	65,209,000	3,215,000	+5·1
March	75,591,000	8,643,000	+12·9
April	73,678,000	12,051,000	+19·5
May	71,644,966	12,545,676	+21·2

The position of our import trade is even more satisfactory than that of the export trade. In August, 1914, the decrease was 24·3 per cent., and in October it amounted

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to 28·1 per cent. Our economic strength then manifested its power. We began to call in our credits all over the world; and in the two following months there was a marked improvement. By the beginning of the year 1915 there was a small increase, which rapidly developed until May, when we imported commodities to the value of 21·2 per cent. in excess of those imported in May, 1914. Naturally there was a heavy falling-off in the imports of manufactures, but this was more than balanced by the increased value of imports of foodstuffs and raw materials. A large proportion of the increase this year is due to the advance which has taken place in the price of foodstuffs; but, on the whole, the figures are a wonderful testimony to the strength of British credit and the command of the sea attained by the Navy. The following table shows the value of the re-exports:

	£	Decrease compared with corresponding periods in 1913 and 1914.	
		Amount. £	per cent.
1914.			
August . . .	4,420,000	3,730,000	45·7
September . . .	5,274,000	1,578,000	23·1
October . . .	7,179,000	2,376,000	24·8
November . . .	5,643,000	2,357,000	29·5
December . . .	5,870,000	3,858,000	36·9
1915.			
January . . .	6,895,000	2,701,000	28·1
February . . .	6,809,000	3,419,000	33·4
March . . .	8,067,000	1,469,000	15·4
April . . .	9,957,000	832,000	7·7
May . . .	10,243,319	128,200	1·2

The re-export trade has also made a remarkable recovery, the decrease of 45·7 per cent. in August having been reduced to only 1·2 per cent. in May.

The least satisfactory feature of our foreign trade is the enormous excess of imports over exports. In the five years 1909-13 the excess of imports over exports averaged 140,000,000*l.* per annum. The figures for the first five months of this year show imports of commodities at the rate of 848,000,000*l.*, and exports at the rate of 460,000,000*l.* per annum—an excess of imports of about 388,000,000*l.*, exclusive of bullion. The question of the adjustment of our trade-balance is, therefore, one of the first importance. In ordinary years the

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excess of imports over exports is met by the interest earned by our foreign investment, the earnings of our shipping, and the earnings of our banking and insurance houses. The credits from these sources are not only sufficient for this purpose, but they have in recent years provided a fund of about 200,000,000*l.* per annum for investment abroad. The ordinary investment of capital abroad will be largely suspended during the war; but its place will be taken by the loans which we shall be called upon to make to the Overseas Dominions and to our Allies. The following is an approximate statement of the position of our foreign trade, etc., for the current year:

Debit items.		£
Imports of commodities and bullion, say	.	860,000,000
Loans to Overseas Dominions and Allies	.	200,000,000
Capital invested abroad, say	.	80,000,000
Total	.	<u>1,140,000,000</u>

Credit items.		£
Exports (including re-exports)	.	460,000,000
Interest on investments abroad	.	180,000,000
Earnings of shipping industry	.	100,000,000
Earnings of banking, insurance and mercantile houses engaged in foreign trade, etc.	.	20,000,000
Total	.	<u>760,000,000</u>
Leaving a deficit of	.	<u>380,000,000</u>

How is this deficiency to be provided? It can be met to some extent by reducing our imports and increasing our exports. It is difficult to see how the latter course can be adopted if we enlist many more workers or transfer a much larger portion of the workers from commercial production to the production of war munitions. Another possible course is the export of gold; but our stock of the precious metal is not sufficiently great to admit of our adopting this course without grave disadvantages. A third method is to sell British securities abroad. As already stated, our investments in the Overseas Dominions and in foreign countries have an approximate capital value of 3,904,000,000*l.*; and, if we could realise only 10 per cent. of these holdings, we should be able to obtain the amount required. Unfortunately there is only one country where sales can be effected, namely,

the United States; and it is not yet clear that the New York money market is in a position to absorb securities on a sufficiently large scale. The final method is the raising of a loan in New York. The great objection to this is its extreme costliness. Money is still as cheap in London as it is in New York; and it is difficult to see how we can raise a great loan there upon terms which will not react unfavourably upon British credit at home. *It should be recognised as a patriotic duty by all classes to limit consumption, and particularly the consumption of foreign manufactures and produce, to the utmost extent possible.*

The war has already exercised a profound influence upon Local Government. The growth of local expenditure was one of the most alarming features of national finance. In 1897-8 the amount raised by rates was 44,534,000*l.*; in 1911-12 it was 76,655,000*l.* The total indebtedness of Local Authorities of the United Kingdom in 1887 was 227,405,000*l.*, or 6·21*l.* per head of the population; in 1911-12 it was 629,635,160*l.*, or 14·02*l.* per head of the population. When Mr Lloyd George introduced his first Budget of 1914, he told the House of Commons that the Government had come to the conclusion that further aid from the Exchequer was inevitable if the municipalities were to be saved from bankruptcy; and the Finance Bill of 1914 contained in legislative form the proposals of the Government for giving this aid. The effect of these proposals would have been to secure each year from the Exchequer a total sum of about 38,000,000*l.* in aid of the local expenditure of the United Kingdom, as compared with grants at the rate of about 28,000,000*l.* per annum. The war broke out, however, before legislative effect had been given to these proposals; and the matter has been deferred for an indefinite period.

The war has not only deprived the Local Authorities of the promised relief from Imperial taxation, but it has rendered the financing of local loans and the administration of local finance generally very difficult. It is not yet clear that Local Authorities, particularly the Poor Law and the Educational Authorities, have realised the fundamental change that has taken place in their financial position and the pressing necessity that exists for retrenchment and economy. It is essential that public

opinion should undergo complete transformation before this can be effected. The causes of the growth of local expenditure have been (1) the continuous enlargement by Parliament of the area of local administrative activity, (2) the higher ideals which have arisen in regard to local government, (3) the increase of population, and (4) the demand of the people for a greater share of what have come to be regarded as the necessities of life. The public must realise that the era of extravagance has passed away, and that *for many years to come a policy of the strictest economy must characterise the administration of the local as well as the national government of this country.*

The Napoleonic wars added over 600,000,000*l.* to our national debt, which in 1816 amounted to 900,436,000*l.* This vast burden of debt, together with the great losses incurred during the war, exercised a profound influence upon the national policy; and for nearly seventy years after the conclusion of peace the national finances were administered in a spirit of strict economy. In the late eighties, however, Parliament appears to have taken the view that the losses incurred at the beginning of the century had been made good, and that there was no necessity to continue to exercise the strict economy which had hitherto characterised the administration of the national finances. Between 1889 and 1911, that is to say in twenty-two years, the national expenditure was nearly doubled. (The expenditure for the year ending March 31, 1889, was 87,073,872*l.*; that for the year ending March 31, 1911, amounted to 171,996,000.) Mr Lloyd George then became Chancellor of the Exchequer; and a further wave of extravagance swept over the House of Commons, with the result that the Budget for 1914-15 provided for a total outlay of 205,985,000*l.*

Before the war, the National Debt amounted to 706,000,000*l.* On March 31, 1915, it reached 1,165,802,000*l.*; and, if the war continues until March 31, 1916, it will probably exceed 2,100,000,000*l.* The service of the Debt will then call for a further 55,000,000*l.* per annum. Pensions and allowances and further expenditure on armaments will probably require another 50,000,000*l.* It would therefore be prudent to anticipate that the war will result in a permanent addition to the national expenditure of at least 100,000,000*l.* per annum. That

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is to say, the total national expenditure will be running at the rate of 300,000,000*l.* as compared with 200,000,000*l.* per annum before the war. We are quite rich enough to overcome the financial disturbance created by the war without crippling our economic development if we organise our finances and conserve our resources, but *it is imperative that public opinion should become alive to the necessity for economy.* It will, in all probability, be found necessary to broaden the basis of taxation, to adopt a tariff for revenue purposes, and to lower the limit of liability to Income Tax, say, to incomes of 100*l.*, of course on a graduated scale. If some such measures are taken, public opinion, operating through Parliament, will be able to bring the required pressure to bear upon the spending departments of the Government; we shall be in a position to discharge our great financial obligations to our Allies; and the great fabric of British credit built up by the sacrifice and self-denial of our forefathers during the past century will be preserved for the benefit of future generations.

EDGAR CRAMMOND.

Art. 13.—WAR-ZONES, BLOCKADE, CONTRABAND, AND
RIGHT OF SEARCH.*

WHEN a war is carried on by sea, neutral states must be affected by it. Their ships suffer, without any claim to redress, a curtailment of the activities and immunities which are within their right in time of peace. Experience, further, shows that belligerents tend to widen the range of these encroachments on neutral interests. In considering some of the manifestations of this tendency in the present war, we open one of the most astounding pages in the history of public law.

Mines and Mine-areas.—The simplest case in which war diminishes the freedom or safety of a neutral ship is where this is due to a naval battle. Thus it is said that a Norwegian ship was hit during the action off Heligoland on Aug. 28, 1914. Equal rights are here in collision—the right of an innocent neutral to pass without hindrance over the high seas, and the right of the belligerents to fight each other there. In the compromise which ensues upon this collision, the right which may be described as abnormal must not be allowed to impinge more than is necessary upon the right which may be described as normal; that is, the neutral ship may be required to choose another route, but it may not be subjected to a hurt which it has no chance of avoiding. If the Norwegian ship above-mentioned had no reasonable opportunity of escaping the risk of hurt, it is surely entitled to obtain redress from the combatant which did the hurt; otherwise the right of the belligerent would be exalted above that of the neutral.

This principle, thus derived from the simplest case, will be of use to us when we advance a stage and think not of a single battle but of naval operations spread over a large tract both of space and of time. The modern use of mines and wireless telegraphy makes it possible to form on the high sea a war-zone which is ampler in extent than the scene of a battle as fought in the days of the sailing ship, and in which the claim to neutral forbearance is of correspondingly longer continuance.

* This article is in continuation of that on Neutrality, etc., in the April number of this Review.

Into this area, if mined, the neutral ship will enter at its peril; and, even if it be not mined, the neutral ship which enters it must abstain from acts such as the despatch of wireless messages which might be injurious to the belligerent. This interference with the neutral is, however, only permissible subject to two conditions: (1) the neutral must not be exposed to risks which he has no reasonable opportunity of avoiding—this means that the position of anchored mines must be notified to the neutral, and that unanchored mines may not be used; (2) the area mined must not be such as wholly to prevent the neutral's access to any port to which he may lawfully go; otherwise it would be a cancellation of his right rather than a compromise.

The Hague Conference of 1907 discussed the subject of submarine mines, but could not arrive at any agreement of importance. The only restraints agreed to were the following. Mines must be so constructed as to become harmless, if unanchored, one hour after those who laid them have lost control, and, if anchored, as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings; and when anchored mines are laid, 'every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful navigation,' the danger-zone being notified 'as soon as military exigencies permit.' The present war has confirmed all that was said at the Conference by Sir E. Satow on the perilous latitude allowed to belligerents under the Convention. It had hardly begun before the German mine-layer was at work in the North Sea,* no notice being given by Germany of the areas thus turned into death-traps for friend and foe alike. Contrast the notification given by the British Admiralty on Oct. 2, when announcing that it was about to follow the German policy of mine-laying in the open sea; the Proclamation indicated the danger-zone (it was off the N. Foreland) by latitude and longitude.

War-Zones in the High Seas.—Germany gave no notification as to the position of the mine-field created by

* We have the word of Sir E. Grey that no mines had been laid by the British in the high seas at this time, and that none were laid by them for a long time afterwards. See, e.g., Memorandum to the U.S. Government in 'Times,' Feb. 20, 1915.

her in the North Sea. This wrong both to non-combatant subjects of her enemies (with whom we are not concerned here) and to neutrals was soon followed by another. Towards the end of October, 1914, British trading vessels were sunk, with loss of life, by mines laid off the north-west coast of Ireland, on the northerly trade-route from America to Liverpool; and neutral vessels, in all probability, only escaped the same fate because of the warnings given by British cruisers. The waters in which the mines were reported were too deep for the mines to have been anchored; they must have been simply flung into the sea to deal death indiscriminately to neutral and to enemy, to combatant and to non-combatant. Later acts of savagery on the part of the same Power have perhaps dulled our perception of the grossness of this outrage; but it needs to be realised if we are to judge fairly the drastic measure adopted in reply by the British Government. This was to announce, on Nov. 3, that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area, in which, after Nov. 5, vessels of all countries would be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines and warships unless they followed the route prescribed by the Admiralty; all ships wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland, were advised to take the route by the Straits of Dover; all ships which crossed a line drawn from the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland would do so at their peril. It will be observed that the limits of danger were assigned, and also that an alternative route was indicated whereby neutral vessels might reach their desired ports.

Before the present war it was tending to be admitted that a belligerent might interfere with neutral vessels even in a zone lying outside his own or his enemy's territorial waters. No protest, for instance, was raised against the treatment which the 'Haimun' received during the Russo-Japanese war. This was a neutral vessel, fitted with wireless, which was chartered by a correspondent of the 'Times' and cruised in the Gulf of Pechili, in the neighbourhood of the Russian and the Japanese fleets; the Russians threatened to treat it as a spy, and the Japanese ordered it out of the zone of military operations. Again, in the same war, the Japanese

declared and notified a number of 'Defence sea-areas,' to which special restrictions were to apply. Some of these areas extended outside Japanese territorial waters. And in 1912 the French Admiralty included in 'Instructions' which it was issuing to the officers of the French fleet an article empowering them, in case of necessity, to notify to merchant-vessels, fitted with wireless, which should be in or passing through the zone of naval operations, a prohibition against transmitting news about the position or movements of the French fleet, or registering messages issuing from a ship of the fleet.

On all this the British proclamation of Nov. 3 was undoubtedly a startling advance. Germany's next move was more startling still. On Feb. 4 she declared all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, an area of war, and announced that on and after Feb. 18 she would endeavour to destroy every enemy merchant ship found in that area, 'without its always being possible to avert the peril that this threatens to persons and cargoes.' At the same time neutral ships were warned to avoid entering the area, because 'their becoming victims of an attack directed against enemy ships cannot always be avoided.' One feature differentiating this Proclamation from the British Proclamation which made the North Sea an area of operations was that it left no alternative sea-route open to neutrals desiring to go to a British port; all access was imperilled. The revolutionary character of this declaration, seeing that no blockade was established, will now be shown.

Blockade.—The general object of maritime hostilities is to weaken an enemy by preventing him, so far as possible, from making use of the sea for either military or commercial purposes. Hence naval battles; hence the attempt to capture enemy merchantmen; hence also the attempt to isolate enemy ports or coasts, and to cut them off from communication by sea with the outside world. This last variety of maritime hostilities is blockade, 'commercial blockade.' In it the outside world is, of course, at the same time cut off from communication by sea with the coast which is blockaded. Now the concession thus required of neutrals is a concession to the actualities of an accomplished military

situation, the essence of which is the fact that along our enemy's coast or part of it we have formed a line of our fighting ships, so disposed that for all practical purposes of international life the boundary of the enemy's country is, to that extent, no longer the sea but our navy. What then justifies our interference with the traffic of neutrals is the actual impediment which we have succeeded, as against the enemy, in erecting round his shores;* no respect is owed by neutrals to the mere threat of an impediment. This, which accords with the reason of the thing, has been affirmed by the Declaration of Paris and by the Declaration of London: 'blockades to be recognised must be actual (*effectifs*).'

It will now be seen that, in the situation set up under the German Decree of Feb. 4, there is nothing approaching the conditions of blockade. No hostile barrier interposes its 'you cannot pass' between our coasts and the outside world; and, therefore, no belligerent has a right to say to neutrals 'you may not pass.' The thinly veiled prohibition of neutral traffic with Britain, being unrelated to any adequate military operation successfully effected against ourselves, derives no support from the law of blockade. It is merely an independent challenge to neutrals. As such, and simply as the creation of a war-zone, we have seen that it offends in not leaving to the neutral ship an alternative route to our ports, safe from the dangers of the mine and submarine.

The British Order in Council of March 15, 1915.—This Order consists of a preamble and eight articles. In the preamble the draftsman has followed word for word, as far as he could, the preamble of the Order in Council issued in 1807 as an answer to Napoleon's Berlin Decree. Reciting that the illegality of the German Decree of Feb. 4 gives Great Britain a right of retaliation, it reads like an appeal to neutrals not

* No attempt to find a sound juridical basis for blockade has succeeded. Nothing higher than 'compromise by tacit international agreement' (Westlake, 'International Law,' vol. ii, ch. ix) can probably be found. The weak point in the above analysis, from the side of the neutral, is that the line of investment must be drawn in the open sea, and not in the territorial waters of the enemy. The force of this objection is, however, lessened by the modern tendency to admit a belligerent's right to create a war-zone in the open sea.

to stand on their extreme rights, an appeal for which, as we shall see, there is some need as well as much justification. Of the eight articles the first four are, for our purpose, the most important; we will try to give their effect in summary form.

Articles I and II are the articles which set up the blockade. They say that no merchantman which sailed either to or from any German port after March 1 shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage. Such vessels are to be brought in, but they may subsequently receive a pass to a friendly port. The owners of the cargo are not, however, to be subjected to the confiscation which is the recognised penalty for an attempted breach of blockade; but, unless the goods are requisitioned by the Crown, such as are not contraband are to be restored if they were going *to* a German port, and *may* be restored if coming *from* a German port. Thus Articles I and II close the door on German trade when using German ports; Articles III and IV attempt to prevent it from using neutral ports. Article III relates to ships going *to* a non-German port, carrying goods which have an enemy destination or are enemy property; Article IV relates to ships sailing *from* a non-German port and having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property. In both cases the ship *may* be brought in; if it is, the goods, unless requisitioned by the Crown, or the proceeds of their sale, are to be dealt with as may seem just to the Prize Court. It may be assumed that there will never be confiscation, except in case of contraband.

The Order does not employ the word 'blockade.' From this and other indications it seems that the Government not only was reluctant to call, but also hesitated at first to consider, the new operation a blockade. One reason for this is suggested by a Memorandum issued by Mr Balfour ('Times,' March 29). The line of investment was, of necessity, so drawn that the sea-borne trade between Germany and Scandinavia would be unaffected, and it was felt that this might lead other neutral countries to protest that, in effect, a discrimination was being made against their trade with Germany in favour of that of Scandinavia; they might even cite, though perversely, the Article of the

Declaration of London which says, 'A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations.'

The initial refusal of the British Government to treat the new operation as blockade was deliberate; when, on March 1, Mr Asquith was forecasting it in the House of Commons, he said that he had advisedly abstained from using the words 'blockade' and 'contraband,' so that our efforts might not 'be strangled in a network of juridical niceties.' The event showed that it would have been better to keep to the old names for familiar ideas. An observer in America, Mr Maurice Low, has chronicled* the suspicions and alarm which the Order caused there. And the Reply sent by the United States Government on April 2 showed that, while neutrals were willing to allow to a harassed and possibly aggrieved belligerent a liberal interpretation of the law, they demurred to ill-defined measures outside law.

'The Government of the United States' (it said) 'is, of course, not oblivious of the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the form of "close" blockade, with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports, is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defence by the use of submarines, mines, and aircraft; but it can hardly be maintained that, whatever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is impossible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war.' ('Times,' April 6.)

Before this reply was received, however, Sir E. Grey had, on March 15, handed a memorandum to the United States ambassador in which ('Times,' March 18) he announced that 'the British fleet has instituted a blockade, effectively controlling by cruiser "cordon" all passage to or from Germany by sea.' Neutrals then knew, up to a certain point, where they were. And Mr Low quotes from American journals such comments as 'The correct phrase is finally uttered by England—an effective blockade,' and 'The necessity for protests from Neutral Powers has disappeared.' At any rate, the ground for protest was

* 'National Review,' May 1915, p. 460.

thenceforward no longer in Articles I and II, which constituted the blockade, but in Articles III and IV. That protest was on two chief points. (1) Article III authorises, though it does not enjoin, the seizure of goods consigned to a neutral port if they have an ulterior destination for Germany; we shall see later that this is not permissible in the case of non-contraband goods, unless the transit from the neutral port to Germany involves the breach of a line of blockade. (2) Article IV authorises, though it does not enjoin, the seizure of innocent, neutral-owned goods in a neutral ship trading between two neutral ports, if the goods be of enemy origin. It is necessary to point out that this is an almost unheard-of claim. And in the Reply of the United States Government, from which an extract has already been made, it was foreshadowed that difficulties might arise in this connexion. The Reply claimed that 'free admission and exit should be accorded to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon.'* This is consistent with the Declaration of London, which lays it down (Art. 18) that 'the blockading force must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts.'

Enemy Goods on Neutral Ships.—Another objection to Articles III and IV of the British Order in Council is that they are contrary to existing convention. By the Declaration of Paris, 1856, enemy goods on neutral ships are exempt from capture unless they are contraband of war; yet each of the above-named Articles allows the seizure of German-owned goods on neutral ships, whether they be contraband or not. We are, accordingly, not surprised to read in the United States Note of April 2 the following passage:

* The dislocation of neutral trade is sometimes diminished by allowing goods which otherwise might be detained to go through on a guarantee by the consignee that they will not be re-exported. In order to avoid the suspicion that may attach to the genuineness of the guarantee, the consignee is sometimes official or quasi-official; thus nitrates from Chile are exported to Holland only for the Dutch Government ('Times,' Nov. 17), and goods which would otherwise be kept in this country by our embargo on export are allowed to go through to the Dutch Oversea Trust which has been formed under Government auspices. Another device is for the neutral Government to forbid re-export of certain articles which it desires to be freely imported; e.g. Denmark has forbidden the export of oil, Sweden the export of foodstuffs.

'The rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, among them that "free ships make free goods," will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn document. His Majesty's Government, like the Government of the United States, have often and explicitly held that these rights represent the best usage of warfare in the dealings of belligerents with neutrals at sea.'

Under Article IV of the Order in Council a cargo of German-made toys, shipped through Rotterdam to the United States, *may* be seized on a United States ship. The Note of April 2 makes it clear that, even if the toys remained German property, the United States could not acquiesce in this seizure without, in its opinion, assuming 'an attitude of un-neutrality towards the present enemies of Great Britain.' This is the intelligible principle consistently maintained throughout by the United States in its assertion of existing law. Now in some matters we profit by that attitude considerably, e.g. in the matter of the supply of munitions of war to us by United States citizens, and surely (in Sir E. Grey's phrase) we cannot 'have it both ways.' By the large additions which we have made to our list of things contraband we have very seriously curtailed the number of things which, as being non-contraband, may issue from neutral ports without risk of seizure; and, having regard to this and to the extent of the gain which the American principle brings to us elsewhere, we may ask, 'Is the policy of Articles III and IV really worth while?' In 1809, when Britain and France, each hitting at the other's trade, unlawfully wounded that of neutrals, the United States passed an Act of Non-Intercourse with both Belligerents!

The Order in Council is open also to a serious criticism from the national point of view. Each of the first four Articles provides that the fate of the cargo is to be such as the Prize Court may deem just. Now in cases coming under the first two Articles this is unobjectionable; there will, *ex hypothesi*, have been a breach of blockade, and the Court may well have a discretion in its administration of the law. But cases under Articles III and IV are different; these Articles deal with goods going to or coming from Germany through neutral ports, which goods, if they are not contraband, are, under existing law,

immune. To seize them might or might not be expedient, but it would certainly be a breach of the rights of neutrals. The question, then, would be one of high policy, and might involve vital national interests. We submit that this is not a matter which should be left to a tribunal.

Contraband of War.—In a case of contraband, the neutral's interference with the military operations of the belligerent consists in transporting materials of military use to the enemy by sea. And the belligerent thereupon says, 'If I can intercept these cargoes, I shall confiscate them, and possibly the ship also; if necessary, I shall destroy instead of confiscate.' Some such words as 'transport by sea' occur in the definition of contraband for the simple reason that, when a neutral trader sends military supplies to one belligerent across the land-frontier between his state and the belligerent state, the other belligerent has ordinarily no means of intercepting the goods while they are in transit. The modern development of aircraft makes it possible, of course, that in time the words 'by sea' may disappear from the definition.

The duty owed to the belligerent by the neutral state—alike in the case of contraband and of blockade—is to acquiesce in the interference of the belligerent with its citizen's commerce. The neutral state itself, subject to one possible exception, is under no duty to stop the commerce of its citizens either in contraband or innocent goods. This compromise between neutral and belligerent interests represents widely prevalent doctrine. It was declared at the Hague in 1907 that

'a neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export, or transit, on behalf of either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or in general of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.'

There are, however, dissenting voices. Thus the German 'War Book' says:

'The supply of contraband of war, in small quantities, by subjects of a neutral State to one of the belligerents is . . . not a violation of neutrality. . . . The supply of war resources on a large scale stands in a different position. Undoubtedly this presents a case of actual promotion of a

belligerent's cause. . . . If, therefore, a neutral State wishes to place its detachment from the war beyond doubt, and to exhibit it clearly, it must do its utmost to prevent such supplies being delivered.' (Prof. Morgan's translation, p. 147.)

This is the doctrine underlying Count Bernstorff's Memorandum of April 11 ('Times,' April 13):

'In contradiction with the real spirit of neutrality, an enormous new industry of war materials of every kind is being built up in the United States, inasmuch as not only are existing plants kept busy and enlarged, but also new ones are continually being founded. If the American people desire to observe true neutrality, they will find the means to stop the exclusive exportation of arms to one side. . . .'

What is, however, of supreme importance now is not theory but the fact that the compromise stated above represents the attitude firmly adopted by the United States. It is indeed traditional in that country. First enunciated by Jefferson in 1793 ('Works,' [ed. 1854] iii, 558), it was ruled by Mr Justice Story in 1822.

'There is,' said the latter, 'nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending . . . munitions of war to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation.' ('Santissima Trinidad,' 7 Wheaton, p. 283.)

Nearly a century later Mr Secretary Bryan re-affirmed the doctrine. In January last he wrote to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

'It has never been the policy of this Government to prevent the shipment of arms or ammunition into belligerent territory. . . . The belligerents in the present conflict, when they are neutrals, have never, so far as records disclose, limited the sale of munitions of war. It is only necessary to point to the enormous quantities of arms and ammunition furnished by manufacturers in Germany to belligerents in the Russo-Japanese war and in the recent Balkan wars, to establish the general recognition of the propriety of this trade by a neutral nation. . . . Those in this country who sympathise with Germany and Austria-Hungary appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this Government, in the performance

of its neutral duty, to prevent all trade in contraband and thus to equalise the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obligation exists. It would be an unneutral act of partiality on the part of this Government to adopt such a policy.' ('Times,' Jan. 26.)

This, it will be noted, is not an attitude of discrimination in favour of one side. The American market is open to both sides; the responsibility for the fact that transport is safer for one belligerent than for the other lies with Whitehall, not with Washington.

Supply of a war-vessel to a belligerent state by a neutral citizen.—The possible exception mentioned above (p. 232), to the rule that a neutral State is not bound to restrain the trade of its citizens in contraband goods is in connexion with the supply of ships of war. A neutral State may not allow its territory to be made a base of operations by a belligerent. Now a ship of war may be regarded as an expedition *in posse*; and the admission is generally, though not universally, made that, so regarded, it ought not to be allowed to start from neutral territory. This brings us back to the 'Alabama' dispute, the latest outcome of which is Article 8 in the Hague Convention XIII of 1907:

'A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction, which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which the Government is at peace.'

Logically, perhaps, there is not the same objection to the supply by a neutral shipbuilder of the various, uncombined parts of a vessel of war; for it is, surely, the place where, later on, the parts are combined into a whole, that is the place whence the ship, regarded as a potential expedition, issues. This was not, however, the view taken by the United States Administration last December. A scheme was on foot for shipping American-built submarines to Europe in sections which were to be assembled by the purchasing belligerent. The President was advised that 'the law forbade' this ('Times,' Dec. 14); and in consequence he used his influence, successfully, with the builder, Mr Schwab, to stop the

export. The 'law' in question may have been the American Neutrality Law of 1794 or the rule given above in the words of the Hague Convention. If it were the latter, a doubt is permissible, whether, in view of the principle of 'hostile expedition,' which underlies the rule, the case was really within it.

Contraband, Absolute and Conditional.—In order that sea-borne goods may, even though still neutral property, be seized by a belligerent, they must be destined for the military purposes of his enemy. If arms and ammunition are found going to enemy territory, the inference as to their intended use is irresistible; they are always contraband. But there are other goods which, if going to an enemy may as well be meant for his peaceful as for his military purposes. With regard to these a new practice sprang up a little over a century ago in the British Prize Court. When captured goods of this kind (e.g. cheeses) were brought before Sir William Scott, he would ask what kind of a port the ship was on her way to; if to a commercial port, he would release the goods; if to a port of military or naval equipment, he would condemn them. Hence came the division of Contraband into two kinds, Absolute and Conditional (or Relative or Occasional). Goods in the former class are liable to condemnation if found in a ship with any kind of enemy destination, but goods in the latter class only if the ship has a special kind of enemy destination, namely, a destination from which it may be presumed that they would be put by the enemy to a military and not a civil use. Much adverse criticism has been directed against the doctrine of Conditional Contraband; and the practical difficulties which it presents render its survival doubtful. It was, however, accepted by the Conference of London in 1909. The Declaration of London contains three lists: (1) Absolute Contraband; (2) Conditional Contraband; and (3) Goods which never may be Contraband, the last-named being spoken of as the free-list. The Declaration also provided that additions might be made to its 'Absolute' and 'Conditional' lists; but nothing was to be added to the former which was not exclusively used for war. The fate which this proviso and the free-list have met with in the proclamations of the belligerent Powers justifies the remark made at the Hague

in 1907 by Baron von Bieberstein: 'It would be well not to issue rules the strict observance of which might be rendered impossible by the force of things.'

It is customary for belligerents to issue their own lists of goods which they propose to treat as contraband. In the present war the Declaration of London, though unratified, has been proclaimed by both sides to be operative 'with additions and modifications' or 'so far as may be practicable.' On each side, therefore, the lists given in the Declaration have been adopted—as a starting-point. But the heads of the list of Absolute Contraband have become more than double the original eleven; no raw material was on it at first, but copper, tin, aluminium, tungsten, etc., are there now; it has received additions not only from the 'Conditional' list—e.g. barbed wire and motor spirit—but also from the free-list—e.g. wool and rubber. The 'Conditional' list has grown on the same scale. This expansion originated with Great Britain, followed by her allies, and later, 'in retaliation,' by Germany* ('London Gazette,' May 11).

So long as German ports continue to be blockaded by the Allies the question whether goods which are going to a German port are or are not on our list of contraband is only of importance as regards German trade with Scandinavia; but the question may be important in connexion with goods going to Germany through a neutral port. True, the Order in Council of March 15 provides that such goods *may* be captured; but, as we have seen, the legality of this part of the Order is denied, with good reason, by the United States. An enquiry how the matter stands apart from the Order in Council brings up the topic of 'continuous voyage or transport.'

'*Continuous Voyage.*' '*Continuous Transport.*'—The circumstances in which this doctrine, in its modern form, may operate are as follows. A neutral vessel, carrying

* Wood appears on the German list, but not on the lists of the Allies. Prof. Ramsay wrote to the 'Morning Post' of June 13, urging that we should include wood, because wood-pulp might be used by Germany as a substitute for cotton in the manufacture of explosives.

When Germany issued her revised lists, she also added a free-list ('London Gazette,' May 11). Now, a unilateral free-list is of no value, and so this might seem futile. But the explanation is obvious when we note that the first item among 'the things which can never be made contraband' is cotton.

contraband or intending to run a blockade, interposes a neutral port of call between its port of sailing and the ultimate enemy destination of ship or cargo. It then alleges, as against the belligerent, that during the first part of the voyage (sc. when between two neutral ports) neither ship nor cargo is liable to seizure. The belligerent refuses, however, to allow any effect to a merely colourable visit of the ship to, or a temporary deposit of the goods in, the second neutral port, and, treating the journey from its commencement in the first neutral port as one and continuous to the enemy destination, will seize the vessel or cargo even during the first part of this 'continuous voyage or transport.'

Contraband and 'Continuous Transport.'—During the Crimean war the French Prize Court condemned saltpetre which a neutral Hanoverian ship, the 'Vrow Houwina,' was carrying to the neutral port of Hamburg; the ground of the condemnation was that from Hamburg the saltpetre was to be forwarded (by sea) to Russia. This was novel doctrine, and its soundness has been impugned; it was, however, to receive almost at once a wider application, namely, to cases where the onward carriage of the cargo from the neutral port which was the destination of the ship was to be by land and not by sea. The extension was first made by the United States (in circumstances to be presently explained), but it has since been adopted by Italy and Great Britain, when these Powers were at war with Abyssinia and the Boer Republics respectively. The controversy concerning the legality of this extension was acute; and the Conference of London arrived at a compromise on the whole matter, whereby the doctrine of 'continuous transport' was to apply to Absolute Contraband but not to Conditional Contraband, except where the belligerent country of ultimate destination has no seaboard. We believe this compromise impracticable and ill-founded.

This is a topic of great moment to-day in view of the British Order in Council of March 15, for the Order threatens all neutral oversea trade (say that of the United States) which has a German destination, even though it be carried on through a neutral port (say Rotterdam). It is desirable, therefore, to refer to the position of the United States in the matter apart from the Declaration

of London. The western limit of the blockade of the southern coast during the American Civil War was the point off the mouth of the Rio Grande where the boundaries of Texas and Mexico met; forty miles up this boundary-river were two towns, Matamoras on the Mexican side and Brownsville on the American. Matamoras (which was, of course, unblockaded) did a brisk business in contraband with Brownsville. A British vessel, the 'Peterhoff,' carrying a cargo for Matamoras, part of which was contraband in quality, was seized by a Federal cruiser at sea. The question whether the cargo could be condemned came in time before the Supreme Court of the United States; the judgment was against the cargo and contains the following passage:

'It is true that these goods, if really intended for sale in the market of Matamoras, would be free of liability, for contraband may be transported by neutrals to a neutral port, if intended to make part of its general stock-in-trade. But there is nothing in the case which tends to convince us that such was their real destination, while all the circumstances indicate that these articles were destined for the use of the rebel forces then occupying Brownsville and other places in the vicinity. . . . The trade of neutrals with belligerents in articles not contraband is absolutely free unless interrupted by blockade; the conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband articles is always unlawful and such articles may always be seized during transit by sea. Hence, while articles not contraband might be sent to Matamoras and beyond to the rebel regions where the communications were not interrupted by blockade, articles of a contraband character destined in fact to a State in rebellion or for the use of the rebel military forces, were liable to capture though primarily destined to Matamoras.' (Chase, C.J., 5 Wallace's Rep. p. 59.)

The present-day importance of this judgment is obvious. We shall return to it later, when speaking of foodstuffs.

Blockade and 'Continuous Voyage.'—It was in the same courts and at the same time that the doctrine of 'continuous voyage' was first applied to a case of blockade. Vessels sailed from the neutral port of (say) Liverpool with a cargo for (say) Galveston, a blockaded port. They made, however, a slight detour to some neutral port adjacent to Galveston, (say) Cardenas in

Cuba or Nassau in the Bahamas; possibly the cargo was transhipped in this neutral port; anyhow the allegation was made that during the first part of the voyage the ship was not liable to capture. Nevertheless such vessels were captured by Federal cruisers while thus sailing between two neutral ports; and they were condemned by the United States Courts on the ground that there was in reality but one continuous voyage from Liverpool to Galveston. Against Great Britain there would be more basis for this contention than against France, for the British theory of blockade places the offence of the blockade-runner in the intent, and considers the vessel liable to capture from the time when it sails with that intent. But the more logical French theory is that, inasmuch as the essence of blockade is an actual investment, so the essence of breach of blockade is an actual attempt with knowledge to break through the investing line. On this latter view the extension of the doctrine of 'continuous voyage' to blockade was erroneous. Doubly erroneous was it when it was never planned that a neutral vessel should cross the line of investment and when the transport of the cargo to belligerent territory was to be by land from a neutral (and therefore unblockaded) port; the vessel never was a blockade-runner, the goods reached the belligerent without crossing a line of investment. On several occasions in the year 1801 Sir William Scott refused to condemn a neutral vessel for breach of a British blockade when it traded between neutral ports only and the communication with the enemy from one of these ports was by inland carriage only.* In one of these cases, the 'Stert,' he said:

'The blockade of Amsterdam was a mere maritime blockade, effected by a force operating only at sea. . . . As to interior navigation, how is it a blockade at all? where is the blockading power? . . . It is argued that, if this course of trade is allowed, the object of the blockade, which is to distress the trade of Holland, will be defeated. If that is the consequence, all that can be said is that it is an unavoidable consequence. It must be imputed to the nature of the thing,

* See the 'Ocean,' 3 C. Robinson, p. 297, and the 'Jonge Pieter,' 4 C. Rob. p. 79.

which will not admit of an effectual remedy of this species.' (4 C. Rob. p. 66.)

Sixty years later, in the afore-mentioned case of the 'Peterhoff,' Chief Justice Chase laid down the same rule. After asserting that the American courts were right in applying the doctrine of 'continuous voyage' to blockade when both parts of the journey were by sea,* he continued—and his words are of first-rate importance to-day, for the American despatch of April 2 refers Sir E. Grey to them as follows :

'The question now is whether the same consequences will attend an ulterior destination to a belligerent country by inland conveyance. The authorities . . . fully recognise the lawfulness of neutral trade to or from a blockaded country by inland navigation or transportation. . . . We know of but two exceptions to the rule of free trade by neutrals with belligerents,—the first is that there must be no violation of blockade or siege, and the second is that there must be no conveyance of contraband to either belligerent. . . . Trade with a neutral port in immediate proximity to the territory of one belligerent is certainly very inconvenient to the other. Such trade, with unrestricted inland commerce between such a port and the enemy's territory, impairs undoubtedly, and very seriously impairs, the value of blockade of the enemy's coast. But in cases such as that now in judgment we administer the public law of nations and are not at liberty to enquire what is for the particular advantage or disadvantage of our own or another country.'

What the American judge here held, though adversely to his country, the American Government will undoubtedly be justified in maintaining in their country's interests to-day. If, then, we imagine a case where, despite the Order in Council of March 15, goods are now being carried from the United States to a neutral port, such as Rotterdam, with an ultimate German destination, the United States will admit the right of the Allies to capture the goods if they are contraband, but only then. So long, then, as cotton is not contraband they will assert, and we think correctly, that it is lawful for a neutral to carry it to a neutral port even though it have

* The Declaration of London forbade the application of 'Continuous Voyage' to blockade in all circumstances.

an enemy destination; for we must bear in mind that the question is not what damage we should like to do to German trade, but what damage we are justified by reason of our belligerency in inflicting on neutral trade. This conclusion adds force to the demand that cotton, on the ground of its importance in the manufacture of explosives, should (if this would not be too dangerous to the Russian importation of it) be put into the list of contraband.* Under the doctrine of blockade we cannot prevent cotton from reaching Germany through a neutral port unless we violate what the United States rightly holds to be the law of nations; under the doctrine of contraband, however, we can effect this object without a clear breach of law. In the latter event a protest might, of course, be made against the inclusion of cotton in the contraband list; but if so, the reply made by Mr Bryan to American objections to our placing unwrought copper on the list of absolute contraband would be in point. In his letter to Mr Stone ('Times,' Jan. 26) he said:

'As the Government of the United States of America has in the past placed "all articles from which ammunition was manufactured" in its contraband list, . . . it necessarily finds some embarrassment in dealing with the subject.'

Foodstuffs.—Foodstuffs are in our list of Conditional Contraband; they are, therefore, confiscable—quite apart from the Order in Council of March 15—if going to the armed forces, or a government department, of the enemy (Declaration of London, Art. 33). And it is immaterial that they are going there *via* a neutral port. For, in the first place, we rightly threw over, in our Proclamation of Aug. 21, 1914, that part of the Declaration of London which exempts conditional contraband from the doctrine of Continuous Transport.† And, in the second place, the

* Returns published in June last show that less than 8000 tons of raw cotton were imported into Holland in April 1914, and nearly 11,000 tons in April 1915.

† In a case of contraband the offence is in the goods, not, as in blockade, in the ship which carries the goods. Once they are shown to have the guilty ultimate destination, it does not matter whether this is direct or through a neutral intermediary. The Declaration of London ignored this when it proposed to abolish the doctrine of Continuous Transport as regards Conditional Contraband.

decision in the 'Peterhoff' case, in which we acquiesced though it was adverse to our interests at the time, supports the confiscation of conditionally contraband goods which are going through a neutral port to the armed forces of the enemy; for part of the condemned cargo in that case was riding-boots, articles which are, obviously, not absolute contraband.

It may, indeed, be that certain foodstuffs going to Germany *via* a neutral port are, like absolute contraband, confiscable on proof of a *general* German destination. On Jan. 25 a decree of the German Federal Council declared that all grain and flour imported into Germany after Jan. 31 should be deliverable only to certain organisations under direct Government control or to municipal authorities. Thereupon it was claimed * that all grain and flour on the way to Germany by sea had become confiscable.† This was no mere quibble; for the goods on a belligerent's 'conditional' list are just as noxious to him, if they further the military purposes of his enemy, as the goods on his 'absolute' list; and it would be absurd for him to allow such goods to go through to the enemy merely because the enemy, by taking over the whole importation of these goods, has obscured the only available test for determining whether they are destined for civilian or for military use. He must, accordingly, either stop all such goods or consent to put into the hands of the enemy a simple means of nullifying the whole of his 'conditional' list. If, then, the German Government still takes over all imported grain and flour—Sir E. Grey's Memorandum above-mentioned said, however, that the Decree was repealed on Feb. 6—these goods are confiscable on proof of a general German destination.

For some purpose of its own the German Government wishes it to be believed that this country is trying to

* See Sir E. Grey's Memorandum, 'Times,' Feb. 20.

† In 1793 the same plea was used by a British diplomatist in order to justify the seizure of grain going to France in Danish vessels. A treaty between Britain and Denmark declared that food was not to be deemed contraband. The projected breach of the treaty was defended on the ground that the situation had been entirely changed by the fact that the foreign grain-trade of France had been placed 'presque entièrement entre les mains du prétendu conseil exécutif et les différentes municipalités' (Martens, 'Causes célèbres,' II, 337-360, edn. 1827).

starve out Germany. It will be well, therefore, to put on record the fact that, while no foodstuffs consigned to Germany have as yet (June 1915) been condemned in the British Prize Court, neutral ships carrying food to this country have been sunk by German cruisers, with little or nothing to prove that the food was destined for military or for governmental purposes. In September 1914 the Dutch vessel 'Maria,' with a cargo of grain from California to Dublin and Belfast, was sunk by the 'Karlsruhe' ('Times,' Feb. 20); on Jan. 27, 1915, the American vessel 'William P. Frye,' with a cargo of wheat from Seattle to Queenstown (for Liverpool), was sunk by the 'Eitel Friedrich' ('Times,' March 12).

Unneutral Service.—This is a comparatively new rubric of international law. Under it comes a number of miscellaneous cases in which a neutral, by aiding the military activities of one belligerent, entitles the other to interfere with the neutral's shipping or goods in a way which would be a wrong in time of peace. Instances of such unneutral service occur when the neutral advances the military aims of a belligerent by carrying men or news for him. The injured belligerent, by intercepting the men carried or otherwise, may frustrate the purpose in hand, and may in certain cases even seize and condemn the vessel thus engaged in rendering unneutral service to his enemy.

Visit and Search: (a) the Right.—We have now seen that a belligerent may, in certain cases, hold up neutral ships and cargoes on the high seas, acting as his own judge, and at times as his own executioner in regard to them. The neutral vessel in question is guilty towards him if engaged in running a blockade which he has established, or in carrying contraband to his enemy, or in rendering to his enemy unneutral service. Ancillary to this right of a belligerent to proceed against the *corpus delicti* in these cases, custom has firmly vested in him a right to require that every vessel flying a neutral flag shall submit to be visited by his men-of-war, so that scrutiny may be made, not only whether she is rightly entitled to fly a neutral flag, but also whether she is engaged in blockade-running, or in carrying contraband, or in rendering unneutral service, to his prejudice. In the days of the comparatively small sailing vessel, it

was an easy matter for a cruiser to detect the presence of contraband cargo ; but the search at sea of the floating warehouses of to-day for contraband goods which may combine high military utility with almost negligible bulk is often impracticable. In consequence neutral vessels are frequently brought into port for more thorough examination into the character and presumable destination of the cargo. This has raised questions which are far from settled.

Visit and Search ; (b) the Duty.—It must always be borne in mind that the right of Visit and Search is a right against neutrals only. If in connexion with the hostilities of a belligerent war-vessel towards an enemy merchantman any legal obligation exists, it is on the side of the belligerent and includes a duty to make certain investigations before proceeding to extremities. This duty may be loosely called, as the phrase is already familiar, the duty of Visit and Search. The investigation may, for instance, show that the enemy vessel belongs to a class which is immune from hostile attack, as being engaged on a scientific or religious mission ;* or it may appear that the vessel carries neutral-owned cargo or neutral passengers. In the latter cases the safety of the passengers, as of all the human freight, must be assured, and the character of the cargo must be ascertained so that indemnities may be paid for any loss that is caused to it. In the case of a vessel flying a neutral flag, this duty to scrutinise before extreme action is taken is at least equally imperative. The extreme action referred to is, of course, the sinking of the vessel.

Before the present war it would have seemed superfluous to insist upon the duty in question. When in the Russo-Japanese war a neutral vessel was for the first time in history sunk because it was carrying contraband, a preliminary scrutiny took place, and measures were taken to preserve ship's papers and the lives of the crew. But it has now become necessary to make a pointed assertion of this limitation upon belligerent licence. The indiscriminate attacks of German submarines are a wrong to the country to which the attacked vessel belongs, whether belligerent or neutral.

* See Hague Convention of 1907, XI, Art. 4.

As regards ourselves or other belligerents, the wrong is not in the destruction of our ships or property; if the ships cannot be sent in to a German port, they and all our property on them may be sunk, and, so far as these things are concerned, it is inept to speak of Piracy. But the officers and crews, if they do not resist, must not be hurt. The Hague Convention XI of 1907 provides that such of the crew as are of neutral nationality are to be released unconditionally, while officers and such of the crew as are of enemy nationality must be released if they give certain undertakings as to their conduct during the rest of the war; detention as prisoners of war is the worst fate that the Convention contemplates for them. We do not, however, need the evidence afforded by this Convention as to what, in the language of an American critic, is decent behaviour in the situation. If any one thing more than another differentiates modern war from war in the time of Wallenstein, it is the recognition of the difference between combatant and non-combatant; now, in the only too numerous cases where unresisting and indeed unsuspecting men of our merchant service have been killed by German submarine attack, this achievement of civilisation is obliterated. This is war on the non-combatant, deliberately waged by a Power which goes to the limits of calculated cruelty in order to repress war *by* a non-combatant.

As regards neutral ships, the German offence is insolence as well as savagery. Even though the decree of Feb. 4 says, 'the German forces have instructions to avoid violence to neutral ships *so far as they are recognisable*,' the words in italics are a wrong in themselves. It is the duty of a belligerent to make sure in these matters. So early as Feb. 5 the Dutch Government formally insisted on this ('Times,' Feb. 20); and President Wilson, in a more recent Note ('Times,' May 15), affirmed it.

'The United States Government,' he wrote, 'assumes that the Imperial (German) Government accept the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of unarmed merchantmen, and recognise also, as all other

nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether, etc.'

In the same Note the President, still taking a wider outlook than that of the injured neutral, tells the German Government that

'the objection to their present mode of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative.'

'Impossibility' is perhaps too strong a word; it is, e.g., quite possible that the submarine should signal to a ship to stop and send a boat with her papers for examination (see the case of the 'Davanger' in the 'Morning Post,' June 16). But, in any case, the observance of the rules referred to is not dispensed with by the fact that they are hampering to the belligerent. Belligerents in time past have submitted to be similarly hampered; thus, the effectiveness of the Northern blockade of Southern ports in the American Civil War would have been much greater, had the blockading squadron thought itself justified in sinking the blockade-runner instead of trying to capture him.* The belligerent may no more place himself outside the rules named, on the plea of convenience, than he may place himself outside the rules against the use of poisoned weapons or against the butchery of prisoners. This is the contention of the American President. How inconsistent with this the German attitude is, the case of the 'Falaba' shows. When this liner was sunk—merely on the ground of her nationality and not as engaged in rendering military service—non-combatants, including an American citizen, lost their lives. The German Government sought to free itself from responsibility for this by pleading (see Note, 'Times,' June 1) that the commander of the submarine 'fired a torpedo only when suspicious craft were hastening to the assistance of the "Falaba."' That is to say, the rules of humanity were violated in the name of belligerent convenience; the necessary limitations of the submarine

* See Soley's 'The Blockade and the Cruisers,' p. 165.

were turned to the detriment not of the submarine itself but of non-combatants, neutral and other. The American answer ('Times,' June 12) was :

'These are not new circumstances. They have been in the minds of statesmen and international jurists throughout the development of naval warfare. . . . Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight, when ordered to stop for the purpose of a visit, on the part of a merchantman has ever been held to forfeit the lives of her passengers and crew.'

It is hard to quit this topic without at least a mention of the word which lies across the brow of Germany like the brand of Cain, 'Lusitania.' Even if everything be conceded that is alleged against this liner—that it was constructed for conversion in case of need into an auxiliary cruiser; that it was carrying contraband; that it was armed for defence; and even if it be assumed that the passengers, neutral and other, had assented to run the risks of war by embarking on such a vessel, its destruction would remain a crime, in that the maximum military effect which the action could produce was utterly and obviously disproportionate to the suffering certain to be caused. We are invoking here a principle too often ignored by the Germans in this war. The outrage differed from others perpetrated by the Germans during the last ten months only in degree—in its staggering magnitude and in its dramatic setting—not, however, in kind. It is one of many incidents which show that the fabric of international law is threatened with the fate of Louvain. We trust that the arresting hand of a strong neutral will avail to save it; he is its rightful custodian, and his warrant is higher than mere self-interest.

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 Art. 14.—DRAMATIS PERSONÆ OF THE ITALIAN CRISIS.

THE present European upheaval supplies us with a striking confirmation of the contested proposition that occasion does not always bring to the top leaders fitted to preside over the destinies of nations at critical turning points of their development. For most of the well-meaning statesmen who swayed the vast forces—economic, political and military—of European peoples during the period which immediately preceded the outbreak of the great conflict, far from recognising the ultimate destination of their labours, were firmly convinced that these must efficaciously contribute to the elimination of violent interruptions to steady progress. And so entirely possessed were they by this hallucination that they construed the frequent warnings and sure foretokens of the coming storm, which were periodically reported from Germany, as part of their soothing dream, and fitted them into its harmonious scheme. Their pacifist philosophy construed the elaborate and feverish preparations for the great Teutonic war as so many fresh guarantees of stable peace. In London, Paris, and Petrograd the chiefs of the Governments, men whose sterling characters and humanitarian aims were untouched by the perturbing force of genius, displayed in their public acts and private conversations a strong sense of the all-pervading presence of moral law in the political world, and gave their future adversaries credit for the same wholesome intuition. Modest apostles of steady evolution whose slow rate is measured 'by the process of the suns,' they expected no sudden new birth of mankind and feared no lapse into the prehistoric fury of savage passion. One and all they were deaf to the temptation of unscrupulous ambition and loth to think their rivals less inaccessible than themselves to its promptings. Slow, steady, pacific, national development, through law and order and obedience to duty, exhausted their notions of political progress. National movements and racial ferment they could not prevent, but they would force them into the straight and narrow channels thoughtfully provided for their course. Among all these respectable leaders of peoples there was not any world-compeller endowed with

the clear, flashing vision which pierces the veil of the future, or charged with the irresistible electric force and consuming fire that radiates passionate words which thrill the heart and nerve the arm to deeds of epic heroism. However, as the contest is not between dynasties, or armies, or governments, but between nations and races, it is perhaps not inappropriate that in this democratic age no individual head should tower high above the dead level of the educated crowd.

Even the Germans, who finally let loose the blighting storm, failed, down to the last and fatal moment, to discern the magnitude of the deluge of misery for which they were opening the sluices. Carefully preparing for the worst, they based their main calculations on the coincidence of conditions most favourable to their own nefarious designs. The political theologian, Bethmann-Hollweg, plumed himself on his aversion from the use of military force, and the Kaiser was proud of his self-conferred epithet of peace-preserver; for both ruler and subject interpreted these terms in their German sense, as connoting a resolve not to wage war unconditionally, but only if its fruits could not be reaped at the cheap price of military bluff and a diplomatic campaign. And they had little doubt of their ability to win this bloodless victory. But behind them was a vast reservoir of elemental forces, created by themselves, which, bursting its bounds, scattered their scraps of paper and overwhelmed all Europe. Thereupon the Chancellor, it is said, wept bitterly, just as the German Ambassador at Petrograd, on hearing M. Sazonoff utter his quiet *non possumus*, dropped his head on his arm and sobbed out: 'How can I ever show my face in Berlin after this?' The various postulates and mainstays of Germany's military breakwater, which in its pristine shape rested on the battlefields of Serbia—namely, the neutrality of Russia, of Great Britain, of Italy—have since broken down one by one and bid fair to bury in their ruins the scourge of Europe for a time.

But in none other of the great European States was the advent or the tremendous force of the European upheaval less clearly foreseen or more dimly realised than in Italy. Even to the governing classes there, the bearings of the conflict upon the destinies of the Kingdom

seemed a mere matter of diplomacy, to be settled by a leisurely appeal to treaty clauses and an amicable shifting of frontiers. Inertness and listlessness accompanied and followed almost every fitful glance cast by public men at the rapidly succeeding phases of European politics, even when these bore directly upon the interests of the Peninsula. For all classes of the nation were lulled to comatose sleep by a vampire that sucked their life-blood while soothingly flapping its wings. Public sentiment was numbed, public opinion canalised and turned upon questions of parochial interest, while the warnings of the few press organs which, like the '*Corriere della Sera*' and the '*Idea Nazionale*,' courageously sounded the tocsin, seeking to arouse the nation to a sense of its danger and waken its instinct of self-preservation, rang out like voices in a wilderness, eliciting no audible response. The explanation of this phenomenon is not far to seek. From a constitutional country governed by a Cabinet responsible to parliament, Italy had fallen to the level of a community of henchmen bound to serve a liege-lord whose power was supreme and practically absolute in the legislature, the administration, the judiciary, and the army. This uncrowned monarch was Giovanni Giolitti.

This remarkable transformation sheds a lurid light on the conception of patriotic duty entertained by its authors, on the low ebb of political morality prevalent among the governing classes, and on the supine indifference of the bulk of the nation to the momentous matters that lay beyond the narrow purview of its various provinces and class interests. This work of demoralisation had been begun by Depretis, the Premier who concluded the first treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria; and it was continued and perfected by Signor Giolitti, who was Prime Minister when that diplomatic instrument was renewed for the last time in 1912. The theory of 'Giolittism' was to seize the reins of office by means of corruption, and to exercise the power thus obtained for the purpose of preserving it. It was power for power's sake, without regard for political principles and with a cynical contempt for public morality. 'First bread and then virtue.'

During his possession of power, which was much

longer than his tenure of office, Signor Giolitti incidentally made several dents on his country's history, of which the deepest was the state of utter unpreparedness in which he left the national defences. And by a curious perversity of spirit, which gives one the measure of his intellectual and moral fitness for leadership, he afterwards relied upon the inadequacy to which his own policy had reduced the army and the navy, but which his successors had fortunately remedied, as one of the arguments by which he endeavoured to convince the King of the unwisdom of breaking with Germany and Austria. But the chief result deliberately planned and fully attained by his unceasing exertions was the supersession of the Italian Constitution by the depraving system of personal Government which has long been known and execrated as 'Giolittism.' To this end every prefect and sub-prefect in the provinces, every mayor in the cities and towns, every member of the judicature, was dismissed in favour of friends and creatures of the Dictator. Now and again, by way of recruiting his health, evading a crisis or maintaining the shadow of parliamentary government, he would provoke an unfavourable vote or else resign on the plea of physical unfitness and retire to Cavour in Piedmont to play cards with the local clergyman and indulge in freedom from cares of State. During these intervals the Government was nominally carried on by a political friend or a neutral politician, who received the support of the Giolittian majority so long as the prefects and mayors were left at their posts and no reform bill of importance was laid before the Chamber.* But the moment new elections became necessary the Dictator invariably returned to office and 'presided' over them, with the invariable result that his majority was upheld.

There had been other parliamentary parties in existence before the advent of Giolitti, parties which laid greater stress on principles than on persons and would fain have combined morality with politics, but the corrosive action of 'Giolittism' caused them to crumble away. Of

* Nothing incensed the Giolittists against Salandra and his Cabinet more than the dismissal or transfer of a few prefects and sub-prefects, although the motives that prompted these measures were alien to politics.

these the most patriotic and respectable was that of which MM. Salandra, Bertolini, and Sonnino were the chiefs, followed by a dwindling contingent of supporters. When the last-named statesman, having acquired a brief tenure of office, omitted the name of Bertolini from his list of Ministers, that eminent politician forthwith seceded to the party of the Dictator, where he was rewarded first with the leadership of the House and afterwards with the portfolio of the Colonies. At last Salandra himself quitted his staunch but unsocial leader, who then found himself practically alone. The discipline in the Dictator's party, formed as it was of elements held together by the common thirst for power and for the things that power can buy, was military in its rigour.

Giolitti's parliamentary majority was less a body of lawgivers than a company of devoted soldiers, serving under a Condottiere like, say, Niccolò Piccinino or Carmagnola, who alone chose the causes for which he and his partisans were prepared to risk all that they cherished most. Hence, to defend one cause to-day and to attack it to-morrow was deemed to be included in the day's work. More than once the Dictator's servile following unanimously vetoed a measure on the pretended ground that it involved ruin to the country, and then, having cynically aggravated it, inscribed it on to the Statute Book.

'These law-mongers,' wrote the Nationalist organ, 'had and have their chief, their symbol, their self-lord, in whose name they load themselves with infamy and decadence and treason—Giolitti. They had and have a common denominator, a hall-mark by which they are recognised, a business house in which to conceal their cynical trading morality—the Parliament. The Parliament is Giolitti; Giolitti is the parliament; the binomial expression of our shame.' ('Idea Nazionale,' May 15, 1915.)

This rottenness of Italian public life was known to Prince von Bülow as thoroughly as to Sonnino or Salandra; and its bearings on the international problem were perhaps better appreciated by the Teuton, who possessed the will to employ it for his own purposes. His brother-in-law was a member of the conservative Senate, which, in its great majority, honestly favoured neutrality,

but was ever ready to ratify any bill passed by the Chamber. If, then, Giolitti could be enlisted on the side of Germany, the battle was won. And this aim seemed easy of attainment. For the Dictator was naturally anxious to steer clear of foreign complications because they might react disastrously on his domestic arrangements. A war declared by the Salandra Cabinet would, *ipso facto*, transform a stop-gap Ministry into a permanent national Government and utterly destroy Giolittism.

‘In truth,’ wrote the Nationalist journal, ‘Giolitti by means of his prefects serves the Giolittian deputies at the voting urn, and these in turn serve Giolitti faithfully in parliament. Each one, at the post he occupies in the hierarchy, is at once servant and master. When such a discipline no longer avails to insure power to the dominant oligarchy, the members of the oligarchy, as is the wont of all tyrannical oligarchies, turn for protection to the foreigner. And that is what the Giolittist oligarchy has done.’ (*Idea Nazionale*, May 18, 1915.)

If one had ransacked the country to find a political leader whose methods were more demoralising and whose influence was more dangerous, it is doubtful whether the search would have been successful. Even to the dispassionate onlooker it is matter for wonder that a bureaucrat of such mediocre intelligence and superficial attainments should have managed to usurp all the power of the State and all the prerogatives of the Crown by the irrelevant qualifications of a thorough knowledge of the technical machinery of government and consummate dexterity in working it. It should not be forgotten, however, that to this slender equipment he added a marvellous skill in dealing with the human factor of the problem, an intimate acquaintance with the seamy side of the professional politician's nature, and a cynical readiness to gratify its least noble cravings.

Giolitti's antecedents, however lightly they may be glossed over by his political friends, had thrown a blot on his 'scutcheon' ugly enough to render his return to public life undesirable. In the year 1895 his name was unpleasantly associated with those of the notorious Tanlongo, Lazzaroni, and Monzilli of the Banca Romana, who were duly condemned to prison for fraud. He himself

was formally accused of having seized and suppressed important documents, which would, it was supposed, have compromised him; and a warrant for his arrest was ordered by the Court of Appeal at Rome* on Feb. 25, 1895. On the parliamentary session being closed soon afterwards, Giolitti hastily quitted Italy, for the deeds laid to his charge were not political misdemeanours but offences at common law. His appeal against the proceedings on the technical ground that the accusation ought to have proceeded from parliament was rejected, but, being carried to the Court of Cassation, was finally upheld. Laid before the Chamber, however, the matter was referred to a Committee of nine, which concluded that Giolitti should be handed over to the ordinary criminal court, there to be dealt with in congruity with the common law; whereupon he announced that the documents were abstracted because of sensational disclosures they contained respecting a certain exalted personage. Further proceedings were then dropped.† But the moral effect remained for some time. Giolitti lay low; and, when he finally returned to public life, the episode of the Banca Romana was occasionally thrown in his face by men of such eminence as Bertolini, who subsequently became the Chief of his Staff.

It was after his reappearance on the parliamentary scene that he created the permanent governing junta which, when its internal mainstays threatened to give way last April, turned for support to Germany and Austria, although these empires were then known to be virtually the public enemies of their country. But his followers were concerned only with their own outlook. Even in matters of domestic legislation the Giolittists pursued no distant aims, displayed no far-reaching vision of consequences, cared for naught but their own necessities of the hour. Thus, although among the postulates of their continued existence were the intellectual backwardness and civil disabilities of the nation, they had no hesitation in voting universal suffrage immediately after having overthrown Luzzatti's Cabinet

* Cf. 'Uomini del mio Tempo: Giolitti.' By Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi; also 'Idea Nazionale,' May 18, 1915.

† Cf. 'Idea Nazionale,' May 15, 1915.

for attempting to enfranchise a few hundred thousand taxpayers!

Universal Suffrage having been inscribed on the Statute Book, Giolitti 'presided over' the last elections, and, content with his parliamentary majority, retired to Cavour, leaving Signor Salandra as a stop-gap whom he could displace at will. Soon afterwards the European war broke out. At first there appeared to be no urgent reason why the Dictator should return and accept responsibility for the fateful decisions rendered necessary by this catastrophic event. Of momentous decisions he had a paralysing dread. Moreover, having left the Marquis di San Giuliano at the Department of Foreign Affairs, he felt that that Minister, however energetically he might harry Austria, would keep to the alliance with Germany as the sheet-anchor of Italy's salvation. And when, on San Giuliano's death, Sonnino took over the reins of power, he felt equally certain that Italy's orientation in Europe would undergo no substantial change. Of this conviction, Salandra's presence at the head of the Cabinet, where he had worked harmoniously with San Giuliano, also offered a certain guarantee. Nor had Giolitti forgotten that behind the powerful manifestations of public opinion in Italy, which thirty-three years before had constrained the Depretis-Mancini Cabinet to ally itself with Germany and Austria, stood Sonnino and his few but energetic followers.* It was Sonnino too who, after the visit paid by the King of Italy to Franz Josef in Vienna in October 1881, triumphantly wrote:

'The King's visit has given us the assurance that the Ministry has at last resolved to strike out a new line of foreign policy and adopt a definite system of alliances. In order to reach Berlin it was found necessary to pass through Vienna. Well, through Vienna we have passed. But it is not necessary that we should remain there. And we are pushing on to Berlin, casting aside all thoughts of an alliance with France.'

Giolitti, with his naïve conceptions of foreign policy, may well have imagined that Sonnino in 1915 would

* The 'Rassegna Settimanale' was Sonnino's organ at the time. And in May 1881 and afterwards he carried on a resolute campaign against France and in favour of an alliance with the Central European Empires.

continue to act in congruity with the views he had thus vehemently put forward in 1881. And the Giolittian press reflected this conviction. For, when the nation grew impatient and restive during the wearisome conversations with Bülow and Macchio, and murmured against the Cabinet which refused to convey even a hint as to the course these were taking, Giolitti's journals exhorted the country to cultivate dignified self-control and ratify that implicit confidence in the Ministry which had been proclaimed by the legislature and approved by the King.

But that seemingly loyal attitude was brusquely reversed as soon as Bülow uttered his first cry of distress. This was the signal for an alliance between the German Ambassador, whose hopes of holding back Italy were slightly on the wane, and the Italian Dictator, whose bridge back to office was certain to be destroyed by a war. Such an event would give an indefinite lease of power to the Cabinet that he had meant to be only a stop-gap. The two men whose interests thus ran parallel at once joined forces and set to work to secure their aim. The first move came from Giolitti. He penned a brief note to a political partisan, recording his conviction that Italy could obtain 'something' (parecchio) by diplomacy which would spare her the horrors of war. Published in the papers, this insidious missive produced the desired effect. The nation assumed that a patriotic statesman could not have formed so decided a judgment on such a momentous issue without cogent grounds, nor given public utterance to it at that critical juncture without the approbation of the responsible Government. And this assumption was confirmed by Giolitti's colleagues. Signor Bertolini and others assured the uninitiated that the Dictator and the Cabinet were at one on the subject. The conclusion generally drawn was that peace with the world and friendship with the Central Empires would be the final outcome of the conversations with Berlin and Vienna. On the action of the Cabinet the letter had a hampering effect, and was meant to supply Bülow with a lever which he pressed vigorously enough. The country, he argued, is for neutrality. Its chosen representatives have affirmed this through the leader of the parliamentary majority;

and what the Cabinet demands appears exorbitant in the eyes of the real head of the Government. There was force in the plea. The Ministry, conscious of its dependence on the Dictator, felt sorely embarrassed, but nowise undaunted. Sonnino, whose temperament has more of the speculative reformer than of the man of action, and who is by nature inclined to compromise, held his ground and abated nothing of his demands.

When at last the Triple Alliance had been denounced, an agreement between Italy and the Powers of the Entente drawn up, and an understanding between the Austrian Government and the Salandra Cabinet thus rendered impossible, Bülow turned from the official spokesman to the virtual ruler of Italy, and called upon him to exercise his authority so long left in abeyance. At that moment Giolitti was still at Cavour, watching and waiting. The German Ambassador had meanwhile wrung from Vienna a series of concessions known as 'Bülow's portfolio,' which, although they still fell short of Sonnino's demands, might, had they been tendered at an earlier stage of the negotiations, have convinced the Consulta of the sincerity of the Austrian Government and perhaps even—some parliamentarians add—have led to an amicable settlement. But after the breakdown of the conversations, the denunciation of the Triple Alliance, and the stipulations between Italy and the Allied Powers, no Italian statesman with a spark of personal honour or a shred of public morality could entertain them. Hence the German charmer, relying on the power, which his alliance with the Dictator seemed to give him, of ousting the Cabinet from office, carried on negotiations exclusively with Giolitti, and withheld all knowledge of Austria's new concessions from the Italian Government. This was an act of glaring impropriety which only final success could 'justify.' But of success Prince Bülow was confident. He had a message despatched to Cavour urging Giolitti to repair to Rome. His friend General Brusati solicited an audience of the King on Giolitti's behalf. And in the meanwhile the Germanophile press, the Vatican agents, the commercial and industrial interests of the realm were mobilised and set to prepare for the great transformation scene.

Scarcely had Giolitti quitted the train that carried
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him to Rome (May 9) when his friends acquainted him with the exact state of affairs and with the contents of 'Bülow's portfolio.' Satisfied with the new concessions, he undertook that, if subsequently reinforced by 'a further little supplement,' he would have them ratified by the legislature. The condition was acquiesced in unhesitatingly, the 'little supplement' being designed to serve as the sugar-coating for the bitter pill which the Dictator was to administer to his country. That same morning Giolitti's Chief of the Staff and Sonnino's former friend, Bertolini, requested the Premier to receive the Dictator at his early convenience. Salandra assented and fixed the following day, Monday, at 4 p.m. for the interview. But he soon afterwards learned that Giolitti was to see the King on the morning of Monday, and would have it in his power, therefore, to tender to his Majesty advice unweighted by official cognisance of Italy's close relations with the Allies. In order to leave no loophole for subterfuge and place the Dictator's power for mischief under the guidance of honour and truth, Salandra sent him a Cabinet Minister, who was also a member of Giolitti's party, to explain minutely how Italy stood towards the Powers of the Entente; and, lest there should be any real or alleged omission in the oral message, Sonnino, with his wonted prevision, penned with his own hand a succinct and illuminating account of the matter.

Giolitti received the Minister, heard his statement, but kept his own opinion and persisted in his plan. Admitted to the King's presence, he argued that it would be the height of folly for Italy to declare war, because the great majority of the nation was desirous of peace, because Austria's new proposals would satisfy the national aspirations and would be welcomed with enthusiasm by the bulk of the people, and because neither the state of the army nor the spirit of its chiefs would warrant such a fateful enterprise. The delicate question of Italy's engagements towards the Allies Giolitti resolved to debate with the Premier, his contention being that they were not juridically binding, and might be repudiated without dishonour. By way of equipping himself for the defence of this thesis, he took counsel with the deputy Schanzer, who is described as a Viennese Jew settled in Italy and acquainted with international

law.* Thus primed, he sought out Salandra on May 10, and unfolded his legal pleas, which were treated by the Premier as quibbles. But, before he could proceed to high-handed acts, the bulk of the nation on which he was so complacently leaning rose up in wrath against him and his nefarious manoeuvres.

Like the buccaneers of bygone days who having no fixed destination could reverse their course at will, Giolitti, having encountered an insuperable barrier on his way to an accord with Austria and Germany, determined to 'bout ship and sail with the current. He had practised the expedient before. He might repeat it again. His line of defence, as set forth in his press organs, simple in itself but at variance with fact, consisted in the statement that he had not gone to Rome of his own accord but was summoned by the King, to whom he was bound as a loyal subject to propound his views; and that these views were uttered at a time when Italy's obligations towards the Allies were unknown to him. He accordingly wrote a letter to the 'Tribuna,' asserting that he had expressed his inmost convictions, and that not of his own initiative, but only when 'called upon' to do so in discharge of his duty. One of his journals actually termed his conduct 'an act of conscience.' But the facts leaked out; and the press comments were merciless.

'He spoke,' one journal wrote, 'because the foreign master whom he serves wanted him to speak. . . . The ignoble traitor went to threaten the King of Italy by order of the German Ambassador. Those are the facts in their formidable reality. The Italian people will do justice.' ('Idea Nazionale,' May 14, 1915.)

And it did. Painfully awakened to the treachery within its borders, and revolted by Teuton savagery from the opening of the campaign down to the destruction of the 'Lusitania,' the nation merged its cause in that of humanity and clamoured to be led against the ruthless foes of both.

Pitted against Giolitti and Bülow were Sonnino and Salandra, two men of lofty character. From them there emanated indeed none of those 'fiery radiations of human

* 'Idea Nazionale,' May 18, 1915.

spirits built to animate a leader in storms'; but they had an enormous advantage in the cause they represented and in the means by which they sought to further it. Sonnino's stock is not Italian any more than is his temperament. From his first masterly speech in parliament, when he struck the persistent note of his public career, down to the declaration of war against Austria, he has manfully persisted in the discharge of public duty, even when individual effort, however strained, seemed unavailing to sway the currents of opinion and sentiment in the only direction where they could become fruitful. From the first, his conception of politics rose high above party arrangements and personal ambition, and included the equitable adjustment of financial burdens, the equal distribution of political rights, the emancipation of the working classes whose lot was little better than that of serfs, and the duty of the Government to displace the obstacles which hindered the material and intellectual development of the nation. His parliamentary life is replete with splendid undertakings and noble schemes, often left inchoate, seldom completed, and sometimes defaced by men who were less his personal antagonists than foes to any kind of progress which might jeopardise their own tenure of power.

Sonnino's sympathy has been with the community as a whole rather than with any of its concrete types; but, despite a steady glow of social feeling, the constitutional shyness, impenetrable reserve, and sombre non-conducting atmosphere, which he carries about with him, may account for his failure to organise and keep together a parliamentary party of real influence. With a taste for great undertakings he has a passion for small ones. Temperament has made him firm in applying principles, but neither reflection nor experience has rendered him pliant in dealing with people nor indeed desirous of holding converse with them. His implicit confidence in the nation is coupled with invincible mistrust of individuals; and he seems unmindful of the fact that a leader is useless to his party if his suspicion is so deep-rooted as to make him unwilling to run the risk of being hoodwinked. He is a recluse rather than a statesman, and for months at a time he retires to his hermitage at Castello Romito by the sea, where he

shuts himself out from human society, even from that of his intimate friends. Indeed his high-pitched seriousness, modesty and morbid taciturnity have come to resemble some strange malady that benefits others while injuring himself, like that of the oyster—the symbol of silence—which produces the pearl. What he sadly lacks is that magic quality vouchsafed to all master-spirits born to lead men—the mysterious power of attracting, thrilling and stimulating others to combined action.

Sonnino took up the threads of the negotiations where they had dropped from the inanimate fingers of his predecessor. But there was this marked difference between their respective modes of conceiving the problem. San Giuliano made an important distinction between Germany and Austria, whereas Sonnino treated them as one. San Giuliano, looking upon the alliance with Germany as the cornerstone of Italy's foreign policy, had remonstrated with Austria, demanded territorial compensation, and even hinted at the dissolution of the partnership, in the grounded hope that Berlin would put the needful pressure upon Vienna. But he apparently dissociated Germany from Austria in their foreign schemes as well as in their claims to Italy's friendship. Germany was the powerful friend ready to deserve Italy's goodwill, whereas Austria was the sickly, crazy enemy whose morbid caprices called for stern repression. This theory, it is well to remember, obtained considerable vogue before the Triple Alliance was formed, and is not even yet exploded. Indeed it is certain to be resuscitated later on and constitutes one of the most curious characteristics of Italy's present anomalous situation. Germany favoured it in words and occasionally confirmed it by the seemingly impartial manner in which she composed the periodic squabbles between Vienna and Rome. Sonnino, one of the apostles of the Alliance, realised the nature and extent of the changes it had undergone since it was first concluded. In the veto uttered by Austria during the campaign against Turkey he discerned the accent of Berlin. Germany's eagerness to silence the voice of protest against the annexation of Bosnia told a tale whose significance had not escaped him. The 'defensive' war planned against Serbia in 1913 and hindered by San Giuliano's demurrer,

bespoke its real origin; and the ultimatum to the Belgrade Government, coupled with Germany's refusal to allow Austria to compromise, revealed the Habsburg Monarchy as the cat's-paw of the politicians of the Wilhelmstrasse, whose designs would entail the vassalage of Italy. These elements of the problem were ever present to Sonnino's mind during the conversations.

None the less, the Minister confined himself to the issue as formulated by his predecessor—territorial compensation for the blow dealt to Italy's status by the upsetting of the European equipoise. This limitation was of itself a great relief to Prince Bülow and his employers. For the new Italian Minister might have chosen to survey Italy's claims and aspirations from a broader angle of vision. Her position in the Adriatic, her future in the Eastern Mediterranean, her commercial markets and spheres of influence in Asia Minor, were all matters of undoubted moment which, so far as one could peer ahead, it would be out of the power of Austria and Germany to settle to Italy's satisfaction. She would be justified, therefore, in safeguarding those interests by an arrangement with the States which wielded that power, in obedience to motives which have not been revealed and were certainly patriotic and honourable. But Sonnino kept scrupulously within the bounds set him.

To the German Ambassador the opportunity was tempting. Having consented to renew her friendship with the two Central Empires on the basis of a readjustment of frontiers, Italy's destinies were seemingly in the hands of 'Germany's greatest living statesman.' Now was the time to strike before the iron cooled. The immediate cession of the districts demanded would have secured Italy's benevolent neutrality and diplomatic friendship, and perhaps even immobilised the Balkan States. And Bülow's business-like instincts prompted speed and liberality. But redoubtable obstacles barred the way. In Berlin there was the envy of rivals, in Vienna the denseness of diplomatic simplicists and still more Franz Josef's obstinate refusal to make over his Italian possessions, and in Rome the most insidious danger of all, the ambassador's overweening confidence in his own capacity to carry the day in spite of both. Down to March 10 his despatches to Berlin encouraged

hopes that differed little from certitude of final success. But just at the moment when everything he aimed at was within his reach, Bülow's confidence in his own skill and the power of his Italian allies hurried him into a series of errors which undid the work of months, ruined the cause he had come to promote, associated Germany with Austria in the mind of the Italian people, and shattered the Triple Alliance.

On his arrival in Italy the new German Ambassador found himself among a people of allies and friends. German influence—intellectual, commercial, scientific—permeated the nation to the core. Commercial and industrial methods were German. The flourishing Banks were branches of the great financial houses of Berlin. The Navigation Companies were largely German concerns. Industrial capital came from the fatherland. Even foreign policy was largely dependent on the Kaiser's Government. Berlin, through Austria, had forbidden Italy to wage war efficaciously against Turkey; and Berlin, through the Banca Commerciale, constrained her to cease hostilities and sent its own agents to negotiate peace.

Casting about for native agents, the German Envoy was embarrassed by their number and influence. Every profession, class, and institution yielded a formidable contingent. For the work of German interpenetration had gone so far that another ten or fifteen years would have sufficed to bring Italy into the state of tutelage to which Austria and Turkey had already been reduced. In the Vatican that process was already complete. German and Austrian ecclesiastics or their Italian creatures occupied posts of responsibility and trust there. High Church dignitaries openly avowed their sympathies for the two military Empires, and were at no pains to hide the contempt or resentment which they felt for France and Russia. And not only did the agents of the Central Powers transact the international business of the Vatican, but they boldly trespassed on the national domain and had a Saxon priest, named Doebling, appointed to the Italian see of Nepi and Sutri, which he continues to administer even during Italy's war. The neutral Pope himself is known to nurse feelings the reverse of friendly towards Russia, and to have set his heart on propping up Austria,

as the last great Catholic Empire. His Teutonic favourites, whom he has obstinately refused to dismiss, wheedled him into swerving from a rigid rule, giving an interview to an American-German journalist and advising the United States to refuse munitions to the Allies.

Prince Bülow, by his graces of manner, conversational charm and proficiency in the art of pleasing which is the art of deluding, drew a large contingent of the snobs of the Italian nobility to his camp. His numerous connexions by marriage and their friends—people of standing in the legislature, the camp, the administration, and at court—secured him valuable co-operation. Unhappily for himself, he employed his power for purposes of show as well as for substantial aims. Thus his brother-in-law, a Senator, without any tactical object in view, attempted to have the King's prerogative vetoed when his Majesty nominated to the Senate Italy's most eminent publicist, who had created a body of public opinion opposed to the Triple Alliance. Through his press agents Bülow unfairly raised the veil behind which he and Sonnino had solemnly promised to conceal the course of the conversations. He supplied Giolitti's journals with sensational half-truths which were more poisonous than the lies with which they were mingled. He even directed the movements of the Dictator, had him fetched from Cavour to Rome, and arranged an audience for him with the King, in order to enable Giolitti to prejudice the Sovereign against the Cabinet and move him to break his plighted word to the Allied Powers. He hatched two further plots, of which one aimed at depriving the King temporarily of his prerogatives, and the other at overthrowing his Ministers and constraining him to accept in their place the creatures of Germany.

If, instead of thus abusing the vast power he wielded, just in order to allow Austria to play her game of temporising and to score a passing triumph over his own envious rivals at home, Bülow had dealt with the diplomatic problem on its merits, the odds in favour of success would have increased a hundredfold. But he carried his brilliant performances too far. The nation was humiliated and incensed. The result of his masterful tactics was to drive the masses into the camp of the Nationalists. Of

all the elements of the problem he had ignored only one, but that one was the Italian nation. And the nation, rising up in anger, swept the ingeniously fashioned cage he had made for it to the winds of heaven.

To the suasive arts of the Entente-diplomatists Italy's decision has been ascribed by some, while others blame the inactivity which allowed it to be so long deferred. In truth, both praise and blame are groundless. Quiescence and dignity were all that the situation called for in Rome; and the representatives of the Allies were eminently qualified to display them to the best advantage. Italy's right to choose was religiously respected; and Sonnino, whose silence was absolute, his mistrust morbid, and his methods conspirative, would have brooked nothing that smacked of interference. Suspecting one day a colleague of frankness towards an Ambassador, he at once deprived him of the privilege of learning how the negotiations were proceeding.

The appositeness of the Ambassadors' bearing was shown in the contrast it offered to the well-meaning demonstrativeness of a Minister of one of the smaller States, whose enthusiasm for our cause and impatience of Sonnino's slowness hurried him into naïve assurances that *his* Government, at any rate, would lose no time in throwing in its lot with the Allies either before Italy or together with her. Now that King Victor is at war against Austria, this artless diplomatist is constrained, on meeting Sonnino, to assume an expression amorphous enough to cover the offer of a military convention or a declaration of war as his Government may hereafter determine.

No; Italy's decision is not the work of statesmen or diplomatists, foreign or domestic. It is the ready response of a people to the call of highest duty, a heartening instance of the law of eclectic affinity among civilised nations.

E. J. DILLON.

Art. 15.—THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

I.—BY LAND.

THE Austro-German offensive in Galicia, which resulted in the recovery of Przemyśl and Lemberg; the entry of Italy into the war on the side of the Allies; and the landing of a Franco-British force on the Peninsula of Gallipoli—these have been the chief military events during the past three months.

At the end of March the situation in Galicia was as follows. The opposing armies were facing each other on the line of the rivers Dunajetz and Biala, from the junction of the former with the Upper Vistula to the region of Gorlice. Thence the line ran roughly parallel to the main watershed of the Carpathian Mountains, for the most part on the northern slopes, as far as the neighbourhood of the Wyskow Pass, south of which it had been bent back, by the Austrian offensive in Eastern Galicia, to the Dniester in the vicinity of Halicz. The further advance of the Austrians having been stopped either by the thaw which set in about March 15, or by the arrival of Russian reinforcements, or, most probably, by both causes combined, the Russians had begun a general offensive movement between the road to Bartfeld and the Uzok Pass.

It is unnecessary to follow the ensuing operations in detail. They resulted, by the middle of April, in the advance of the Russian line to Stropko in the Ondava valley, to Wrava in the Laborcz valley, and to points a few miles south of the main watershed on the front between the Lupkow and Uzok Passes. A concentric attack on the region of the Uzok was also in progress. At this stage the enemy brought important forces into action on the Lupkow—Uzok front, accompanied by a proportion of heavy artillery. Our Allies were checked, and thrown on the defensive.

The effect of this sudden display of force was, probably, to induce the Russians, who were intent on the offensive, to set their available reserves in motion towards what seemed to be the scene of decisive action. The enemy, with their customary astuteness, had other designs in view; and the concentration on the Carpathian

front was partly a ruse, and partly an item in a more extensive plan of operations. They had meanwhile assembled, in great secrecy, an overwhelming force on the front in Western Galicia, composed in great part of German formations, the whole being under the command of General von Mackensen. The Russian positions on the Dunajetz and Biala were of great strength, but they were comparatively weakly held, and our Allies were taken by surprise. The Russian General Staff appear to have had the first intimation of what was impending about April 20; and a week later the great offensive in Western Galicia was heralded by an attack in the vicinity of Gorlice which threw the left flank of General Dimitrieff's Third Army back towards Jaslo. On May 1 the main attack began at Cieszkowice on the Biala, under an overwhelming fire of heavy artillery. The Russians, inadequately provided with guns, short of ammunition, and assailed by vastly superior numbers, fell back, fighting stubbornly, to the line of the Wisloka. Here they attempted to make a stand; but the enemy forced the passage at several points on May 5 and 6, compelling a further retirement to the Wislok, and ultimately to the San, behind which the Third Army was deployed on May 14. Meanwhile the retirement of the Third Army had exposed the right flank of the Eighth Army in the Carpathians, necessitating a general withdrawal on the entire front between the Bartfeld road and the Wyskow Pass. This retrograde movement was followed up by hostile forces advancing as follows: the Third Austrian Army, by the Lupkow group of passes, on Sanok; the Second Austrian Army by the Uzok group, on Sambor; and Von Linsingen's composite Austro-German Army by the Beskid group, on Stryj. On Von Linsingen's right the Archduke Eugen's Army continued to operate in the neighbourhood of Nadvorna and Delatyn, based on the Jablonitza Pass, while General Pflanzer occupied the line of the Pruth.

Before proceeding further it will be convenient to consider the enemy's plan of campaign. A glance at the map will show that Von Mackensen's advance, which constituted the main offensive on which the success of the whole plan depended, was a purely frontal attack on the strong defensive line of the Dunajetz and Biala rivers. It will also be observed that it was less effective

as a threat to the communications of the Russian forces in the Carpathians than the previous offensive in Eastern Galicia. The latter was directed in rear of the main Russian armies, and therefore had to be opposed by forces specially assembled for the purpose, whereas the advance in Western Galicia encountered an army established in an entrenched position which had withstood repeated attacks. It may be asked, Why did the enemy decide to abandon a line of advance on which they had already made some progress for one which was strategically less favourable, and which necessitated new dispositions and the concentration of fresh forces in a distant region? The answer is, that the conditions had changed to an extent which caused the new line of attack to offer possibilities outweighing the strategical advantages which the original line had presented in the first instance. The episode is an illustration of the fundamental truth that war is not subservient to rules. The art of strategy consists in adapting the operations of the forces available to the circumstances of the moment, and is not to be found merely in the geometrical system of lines and angles by which the Jomini school of strategists sought to solve the greater problems of war.

The pause in the operations in South-eastern Galicia, necessitated by the thaw which set in about March 15, deprived the enemy of the advantage of surprise which they had enjoyed at the outset, and enabled the Russians to concentrate troops and complete their arrangements for defence. The co-operation of forces by way of the Carpathian Passes, the purpose of which was explained in the last article, had been made impracticable by the successful defence of the Russian positions which barred the advance in the direction of Stryj and Stanislaw. On the other hand, while the Russian position in South-eastern Galicia had been strengthened, that on the Dunajetz line had probably been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to oppose the enemy's advance in the south-east, and to pursue the offensive on the Hungarian frontier in the Carpathians. The line of the Dunajetz might, therefore, be expected to be the most vulnerable part of the Russian front in Galicia. Another important consideration was the inadequacy of the available railway communications for the supply of the large force

which would be needed for the resumption of operations in South-eastern Galicia, with a reasonable prospect of success, after the spring floods should have subsided; while the railway facilities in Western Galicia were relatively good. This consideration by itself would suffice to decide the question; for the successful attack of entrenched positions can only be accomplished by the concentrated action of masses of men and heavy artillery, the supply of which with food and ammunition depends on a well-organised system of railway transport. It was pointed out in a previous article that the great German attacks invariably followed the lines of railway. In the present instance the main lines of attack were defined by the two railways which cross the San at Jaroslau and Sanok, the bulk of the artillery following the former route. Despite the facilities thus provided for the transport of ammunition, there are unmistakable indications that the advance was retarded by the difficulty of keeping the guns supplied. The delay, and the relaxation of the offensive, which succeeded the more violent engagements—as, for example, after the forcing of the Dunajetz near Tarnow, and the Wisloka at Debica—cannot otherwise be satisfactorily explained.

It was, apparently, intended that Von Mackensen should force the passage of the San north of Przemysl, and then turn in a south-easterly direction so as to envelop the fortress on the north-east and to join hands with Boehm Ermolli's Austrian army, which was to advance between Przemysl and the Dniester. The passage was effected in the neighbourhood of Jaroslau on May 15; but in the subsequent fighting the army appears to have become diverted from its proper course, and several days were occupied in effecting the necessary change of front. The converging attacks to the north-east and south-east of Przemysl were then pressed with great vigour for many days, but failed to reach the Lemberg railway, on which the garrison depended for its supplies. The fortress itself does not appear to have been attacked directly until the end of May, when German troops closed in on the northern front, and the left wing of the Third Austrian Army enveloped the southern and western defences. After the passage of the San had been forced, Przemysl, however, lost its value as a supporting point

in the Russian line, and even became a source of weakness on account of its advanced position and the large number of troops required to hold its extensive perimeter. Our Allies had, therefore, been engaged for some time in preparing for its evacuation, by removing to the rear the *matériel* it contained. This task had been completed before the enemy's close attack began to develop on June 1 and 2; and during the night of the 2nd—3rd the rearguards were withdrawn, and the empty and ruined fortress was occupied by the Austrians.

While these operations were proceeding in the region of Przemyśl, the Russians had begun, about May 27, an offensive movement in a southerly direction on the left bank of the Lower San, and along the line of the river Lubaczowka, which, flowing westwards from the direction of Rawaruska, falls into the San seven miles below Jaroslau. These operations were directed against the left flank and rear of Von Mackensen's forces north-east of Przemyśl, and against the Tarnow—Jaroslau railway, on which he relied for the supply of his entire army. The Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, who commanded Von Mackensen's left wing, said to comprise six Austrian army corps, opposed the movement; but the situation west of the San became so serious that a large German force was despatched to assist the Austrians. By June 5 the Russian advance was checked near Lezajsk, twenty miles below Jaroslau. The offensive east of the San made little progress south of the Lubaczowka.

A few days later the enemy had completed new dispositions for an eastward advance, which began about June 12. Von Mackensen's Germans moved between the Jaroslau—Rawaruska and the Przemyśl—Lemberg railways, with the Archduke covering their left flank, facing north; while Boehm Ermolli operated between the Lemberg railway and the Dniester. The Russians opposing the Archduke were obliged to retire across the frontier, and ultimately took up a position behind the River Tanev, which, flowing parallel to the frontier, joins the San at Ulanov, forty miles below Jaroslau. The main Russian army fell back to a position about fifteen miles west of Rawaruska and Lemberg, with the left flank resting on the Dniester at Kolodraby, covered by the Great Marshes which extend along the

river between Mikolajow and the Lemberg—Sambor railway. Our Allies were, however, unable to maintain this position owing to the irresistible advance of Von Mackensen's great army, which forced the right wing back, and, gaining Rawaruska, threatened to break the connexion with the army in Poland. The retirement was effected in good order, and Lemberg was evacuated on June 22.

While these important events were happening in Middle Galicia, Von Linsingen crossed the Carpathian Mountains by the Beskid group of passes, and, obtaining his supplies by the Munkacz—Stryj railway, operated against the line of the Dniester with the object of moving on Lemberg from the south. He appears to have been hampered throughout by the inadequacy of his lines of communication across the mountains, which at first retarded the deployment of his army, and afterwards seems to have impeded the supply of ammunition for his heavy artillery, with which, moreover, he may have been inadequately provided. Whatever the causes may have been, our Allies on the Dniester were able to meet the enemy on more even terms than on the San; and Von Linsingen's efforts to co-operate with the main offensive against Lemberg were unsuccessful. The withdrawal of the Russians from the Koziowa—Wyskow position, which they had held against continuous attacks since the beginning of February, was necessitated, as in the case of their positions in the Western Carpathians, by the enemy's progress between the Dunajetz and the San. On May 14, however, Von Linsingen's advanced troops encountered our Allies in position about Stryj; and an important battle began to develop on the following day on the line Drohobycz—Stryj—Bolachow. But the Austro-German troops, having few roads at their disposal, and being tied to the vicinity of the railway owing to considerations of supply, were marching in long columns on a narrow front, and came slowly into action. For four days the battle increased in intensity as successive reinforcements arrived; and on the 20th and 21st the enemy delivered desperate attacks, in the course of which they sustained heavy losses, the Russians remaining strictly on the defensive. It would appear that, during this period, either the heavy artillery

had not arrived, or the requisite supply of ammunition could not be provided. Von Linsingen suspended his offensive till the 25th, occupying the interval in reorganising his troops and bringing up his artillery. He then returned to the attack with renewed vigour, and after five days' desperate fighting carried the town of Stryj and part of the position on the north. At this crisis the Russian Commander-in-Chief had to decide whether he would send up reinforcements with a view to retrieving the situation, or order a retirement behind the Dniester. Various considerations prescribed the latter course. Count Bothmer's army, which had been drawn southwards in support of Von Linsingen, had succeeded in pressing back the right wing towards Slonsko, threatening to turn the position and to cut the Russians off from Mikolajow. The loss of the line of the San and the abandonment of Przemysl had made it unnecessary to maintain a position in front of the Dniester. The retirement was effected without difficulty, the right flank being covered during the movement by a successful counter-offensive against Bothmer's right wing.

The possession of Stryj enabled Von Linsingen to proceed with the deployment of his army. It gave him access to the railway leading to Kalusz and Stanislaw for the supply of his right wing, which forthwith began to spread out south-eastwards to take part in a general advance on the Dniester between Mikolajow and Halicz, and to gain connexion with the Austrian armies in the south, which had hitherto been kept at bay by a Russian counter-offensive towards Nadvorna, and on the line of the Pruth. The principal operations were carried out by his left wing, which, in the direct advance beyond Stryj, obtained its supplies by the lines radiating from that town to Mikolajow and Zydaczow. During these operations the Second Austrian Army appears to have been drawn south-eastwards in order to join in the main offensive by operating towards Mikolajow.

It must suffice to indicate briefly the main features of the subsequent operations. Von Linsingen succeeded in forcing the passage of the Dniester at Zuravno on June 6 and in throwing some troops across, which spread outwards and gained possession of a section of the Halicz—Lemberg railway south of Chodorow. The right bank

in this locality is heavily wooded, a circumstance which hampered the Russians in opposing the crossing, but subsequently reacted against the enemy, who, being broken up into isolated detachments, were thrown back over the river after hand-to-hand fighting, in which the Russian infantry has, on every occasion, shown its superiority. Our Allies subsequently occupied the country for some distance south of the river with advanced troops, which were not withdrawn till after the evacuation of Lemberg. Von Linsingen failed in his attempts to cross the river at other points. General Pflanzer was more successful. Following up the retirement of the Russians from the Pruth, which began early in June, he carried on June 11 the bridge at Zaleszczyki, where the Czernowitz—Tarnopol railway crosses the Dniester, and effected lodgments on the left bank at various points among the great loops of the river below Nizniow.

The retreat of the Third Russian Army in Western Galicia necessitated a corresponding retirement from the line of the Nida in Southern Poland. The Russians fell back slowly from the high ground about Kielce to Ostrovetz and Opatow, their left flank resting on the Upper Vistula about fifteen miles above Sandomir, the remainder of the front south of the Pilitza being readjusted in conformity with these dispositions. This line was maintained down to the evacuation of Lemberg.

The loss of the line of the San may be regarded as having practically decided the issue of the campaign in Galicia. This river forms the natural continuation of the position on the Dniester, and its abandonment was the prelude to the evacuation of the latter. It may be doubted whether, in their subsequent resistance, the Russians had any other object than to secure the orderly evacuation of Lemberg, which, having evidently been carefully arranged, appears to have been accomplished without loss. Once in possession of Lemberg, the enemy had control of the entire railway system of Middle Galicia, which conferred on them the power of moving in any direction without anxiety as to their supplies. The further retention of the Dniester line by the Russians became impracticable on account of the risk of becoming separated from the armies to the north.

The retirement, which is still in progress at the time of writing, shows a complete mastery of the local situation. Beginning with the withdrawal from Mikolajow, it is being effected with perfect regularity by the successive evacuation of the various river-crossings from right to left. On June 30, our Allies held the Dniester from Zaleszczyki to Halicz, and, north of the latter, the line of the Gnila Lipa, on the upper course of which connexion is maintained with the army east of Lemberg.

In following the course of the operations now in process of development, the object of the Germans, as outlined in previous articles, should be kept in view. That object has been to gain possession of the line of the Middle Vistula, which would practically give command of the whole of Poland, and that of the San, which would confer a similar advantage with respect to Galicia. The acquisition of this commanding position on the Eastern front would indefinitely postpone a Russian invasion of Germany or Austria, and make it possible to transfer troops to the Western or, perhaps, to the Italian front. A comparative lull in the operations about Lemberg succeeded the occupation of that place, during which, presumably, Von Mackensen was engaged in reforming his army and replenishing supplies. At the end of June the Russians had withdrawn behind the River Bug; and Von Mackensen was beginning a northward advance from the front Sokal—Ulanov which was obliging the Russian army in Southern Poland to fall back from its position west of the Vistula, which it had hitherto maintained against heavy attacks.

The German incursion into the Baltic Provinces has had no direct bearing on the general course of the war, and needs no more than a passing reference. Begun at a period when diplomatic relations with Italy were strained, and when the attitude of America was unsatisfactory and that of the Balkan States uncertain, the operations were probably intended, in conjunction with the simultaneous offensive in Galicia and previous activity in Belgium, to impress neutral opinion with a sense of the vigour and resources of Germany. But it seems likely that their principal object was to gain possession of the Province of Courland, and of the Gulf and port of Riga, the intention being to hold these conquests until

the end of the war, when a claim would be put in to retain them, together with Belgium, by the right of occupation. Such a scheme would be in accordance with Prussian methods during the war of 1866, when Hesse-Cassel and Hanover were occupied after the battle of Langensalza, fought far from the principal theatre of war, and were retained by Prussia under the Treaty of Prague. As a diversion, the operations could not affect more than the neutralisation of an approximately equal force of Russians.

The entry of Italy into the war, formally declared on May 23, introduced a new factor into the situation which was far from pleasing to the Germanic Powers. The various attempts made by Germany to purchase the continuance of Italian neutrality—chiefly at the expense of her Austrian ally—are evidence of the anxiety with which the event was anticipated. Although the position on the Western front was probably regarded as secure, she had only just saved her weaker partner, at considerable cost, from invasion in a quarter which, at least politically, was the most vulnerable. The Allies' attack on the Dardanelles threatened not only to deprive her of the support of her Turkish ally, but to result in the Balkan States ranging themselves on the side of her enemies. As though these complications were not enough, the incursion into the Baltic Provinces had been undertaken, which added another hundred miles to a fighting front already unduly extended. Austria, relieved from immediate peril in the East, must get together such forces as she could assemble to meet the new danger on her Southern frontier; and this could hardly be done without detriment to the operations against Russia, which were still in the initial stage. Germany would, in consequence, be obliged to exert greater efforts to accomplish her purpose against Russia, involving a further drain on her resources. Her project of turning to the Western front to seek a decision would be deferred, and the means she would have available for that purpose would be reduced.

For Italy the moment was opportune. Austria was too deeply committed to the operations on the Eastern front to attempt an offensive on her South-western

frontier. The initiative therefore lay with our new Ally, who might expect not only to complete the mobilisation of her army, but to acquire a dominant position on the frontier as a preliminary to an offensive campaign. The vital necessity of this preliminary step will appear from a brief consideration of the character of Italy's frontier against Austria.

After the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, in which Italy fought on the side of Prussia, the Treaty of Prague restored to Italy her ancient province of Venetia, but left Austria in possession of the mountainous district of the Trentino, which, jutting out in a great salient, dominates the plains of Venetia and Lombardy. Italy was thus placed strategically at a disadvantage, which was further accentuated by the alignment of the new frontier. For Austria retained possession of the heads of all the Venetian river valleys, and of the heights which give a tactical command over the passes and defiles in their vicinity. Hence, at the outset of a war with Italy, the Austrians would have free egress from their mountain strongholds in the basins of the Adige and the Drave; while the Italians, if they should be in a position to take the offensive, would find the passes barred by fortifications commanding the approaches, and the positions on which their artillery might be brought into action to support an attack. In their defensive arrangements, the Italians were placed at a similar disadvantage, inasmuch as fortifications constructed to stop an Austrian advance must be situated on the lower features, and would therefore be subject to observation from the Austrian heights, and be exposed to the attack of artillery placed in commanding positions.

These, however, are only matters of detail, for it must be borne in mind that fortifications built in time of peace are not intended to do more than retard the enemy's advance in order to gain time for the concentration of the field army on whose active operations the issue of the war must ultimately depend, and to enable that army to begin its operations under advantageous conditions. The point to be observed is that in both these respects the Italians were at a disadvantage.

When we turn to the more important question of the strategical aspect of the frontier, it will be found that

the potential military situation created by the Peace of Prague was equally unfavourable. It was, indeed, more inauspicious than that presented by the frontier of any of the other great European Powers with respect to any one adversary. A glance at the map will show that the plain of Venetia is enclosed on the east and north, and to a great extent on the west, by the Austrian frontier. The level country between the foot-hills and the sea has an average breadth of about forty miles, a cramped space in which to manœuvre a modern army. On the east, the River Isonzo, like the mountain passes already referred to, is in Austrian territory. Its course lies across the roads and railways which define the lines of operation of the main armies on either side. Beyond the mountain frontier on the north is the Pusterthal, or Valley of the Upper Drave, through which runs the railway leading, by Klagenfurt and Franzenfeste, from the interior of Austria to Trent. The mountains are of formidable height, and the passes few, the most important being that followed by the Tarvis railway, which is barred by the fortifications of Malborghetto. There are other passes, practicable for small forces, of which the chief is the Ploken, or Monte Croce, at an elevation of nearly 7000 feet. The eastern frontier of the Trentino, which is of less elevation, is traversed by several routes, which, in the northern half, attain an average height of about 5000 feet above sea-level. In the southern portion the principal route is by the valley of the Brenta, or Val Sugana, which leads direct to Trent, where it joins the main road and railway which follow the course of the Adige from Verona. To complete this brief survey it is necessary to mention the Val Giudicaria on the western side of Lake Garda, which is followed by the main road from Brescia to Trent; and, further north, the route by the Tonale Pass, practicable only for a small force, which reaches the valley of the Adige ten miles above Trent. Every route is guarded by one or more forts; and the town of Trent is strongly fortified.

It will be observed that an Italian army, whether operating defensively in Venetia, or offensively in Carinthia and Carniola, would be in a dangerous situation if a strong hostile force were in occupation of the Trentino and the Valley of the Drave. In the former case it

would be liable to attack in flank and rear. In the latter case its lines of communication through Padua and Verona would be in danger; and, in the event of defeat, it might find its retreat intercepted. Hence it would be necessary, before attempting an advance beyond the eastern frontier, to occupy the Trentino and to secure the junction of Franzenfeste, whence lines of railway lead eastwards to Klagenfurt and northwards by the Brenner Pass to Innsbruck. Conversely the eastern frontier must be strongly held during operations in the Trentino; for an invasion of Venetia, apart from other considerations, would speedily put a stop to the operations and compel a retirement.

A classical illustration of the strategical importance of the Trentino is provided by the history of Napoleon's invasion of Austria in 1797. Before advancing towards Vienna with his main army, Napoleon detached a quarter of his force under Joubert to occupy the Trentino. Having thus secured his communications, he proceeded by rapid marches, and, defeating the Archduke Charles on the way, occupied the Semmering Pass, overlooking the Viennese plain. Joubert, meanwhile, having defeated the Austrians opposed to him, proceeded to invade Tirol; but the enemy received reinforcements, the Tirolese peasantry rushed to arms, and Joubert, to avoid being overwhelmed, fell back and marched by the Drave valley to rejoin Napoleon. The way being thus opened, the Austrians moved down the Adige, threatening Verona; and Napoleon escaped from a dangerous predicament by proposing terms of peace which the Austrian Government, alarmed for the safety of the capital, were weak enough to accept.

If this example is kept in view, the slowness and apparent hesitation of the present operations excites no surprise. The Italians cannot proceed with their main armies to the invasion of Austria by the routes of Carinthia and Carniola until they have made themselves masters of the Trentino. To this end, and to securing the passages of the Isonzo river, their operations have hitherto been directed. The frontier, between Malborghetto and the Swiss border, is 250 miles in length, absorbing a large number of troops. The difficulties attending the attack of the fortified passes have already been described; and

to these must be added that of bringing up guns of sufficient calibre to demolish the defences. The operations need not be described in detail; but it may be observed that, in broad outline, they appear to comprise a concentric movement on Trent, together with an advance by the Cadoric and Carnic Passes against the railways on which the Austrian force in the Trentino depends for its supplies.

According to unofficial statements, the forces which Austria had available on the Italian frontier on the declaration of war amounted to about 700,000 or 800,000 men. There were rumours towards the end of last month of troops being transferred from the Eastern front, and of the presence of a German force in Carinthia. It has been officially stated at Rome that German prisoners have been taken in action, although war has not been declared between Italy and Germany. It would not be surprising if here, as in Galicia, the Austrians should be stiffened with a proportion of German troops, for it is of the first importance to Germany that her ally should be kept in the field. Hitherto the operations have been mainly defensive, the purpose of the Austrians being to maintain their commanding positions until the conclusion of the operations on the Eastern front shall enable them to take the offensive.

After the abandonment of the first attempt (in March) to force the passage of the Dardanelles, which failed for want of an adequate land force to follow up the successes achieved by the fire of the ships, the operations were suspended for more than a month, while a Franco-British Expeditionary force was being prepared and transported to the scene of action. During the enforced pauses in the naval attack the Turks had worked hard to make the passage impracticable by means of concealed batteries, movable guns, torpedo tubes on the shores, and floating mines carried down by the current which sets permanently towards the *Ægean* Sea. They employed the ensuing interval in making the coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula impregnable to landing-parties. The possible landing-places being few in number and well-defined, and the localities being adapted by nature for defence, the task was easy to execute in the ample time available;

and the result justified Von der Goltz' opinion that a successful disembarkation was inconceivable. The indomitable bravery of the officers and men of the naval and military forces employed in what was really a forlorn hope was, however, equal to the task.

It is unnecessary to touch on the details of the operations, of which excellent descriptions have been published in the Press. The general plan was formed on normal lines, but the conditions presented unusual difficulties. The essential factor of surprise could only be attained in a very limited degree. The Turks, having had ample warning, had elaborated a scheme of defence, assembled large forces, and completed their dispositions. The few points at which a landing was at all practicable were occupied by detachments provided with machine-guns and quick-firers which swept the approaches. Reserves were conveniently placed for the speedy reinforcement of any threatened points. Feints at other points than those chosen for the actual disembarkation were, therefore, of little efficacy. Owing to the character of the coast, of which the Turks took full advantage, the fire of the ships failed to give the landing-parties effective support. But in spite of appalling losses from hostile fire which could not be subdued, the survivors persevered, and the landings were ultimately successful at all points. Reinforcements were promptly put ashore, and positions were won and held, under cover of which the further landing of troops and supplies could proceed in comparative security.

The unprecedented task of landing troops on a difficult coast, under the close fire of concealed positions, having been accomplished, it might have been expected that the chief difficulties had been overcome. Everything, however, depended on the initial success being followed up before the enemy could organise an effective resistance. It soon became evident that the forces immediately available were inadequate for the purpose. It was impossible to act on the fundamental principle of the offensive, namely, to 'strike quickly, strike hard, and keep on striking.' The disembarkation of troops, with the necessary *matériel*, at the restricted landing-places, was a tedious operation, and was hampered by the absence of communications over the steep and rugged

slopes which intervene between the beaches and the more practicable country inland. The heavy losses sustained at the outset had reduced the effective strength; and the numbers which the enemy could bring forward to oppose the advance had, doubtless, been underestimated. The Turks were able, in consequence, to occupy their prepared positions in superior strength; and the attempts made to dislodge them proved abortive. The ships were unable to co-operate effectively, partly on account of the flat trajectory of their guns, and partly because of the risk of mines and torpedo attack. The want of heavy guns, apparent during the first few weeks, was doubtless due to the difficulty of putting them ashore. The fighting assumed the now familiar character of trench warfare; and, while the Allies' positions are secure, and the enemy's strength is being gradually worn down, progress is necessarily slow.

The attack of June 4, which was directed against the entire front of the Turkish positions, appears to have failed to attain the success anticipated owing to inadequate artillery preparation. This, however, was not due to any fault on the part of the artillery. The Turkish positions, and the wire entanglements covering them, were skilfully concealed; and the former, owing to the nature of the country, supplemented by well-designed entrenchments, were of exceptional strength. The artillery of the field force was, therefore, unable to demolish the defences, or even to shake the *moral* of the troops occupying them. On the greater part of the left or western wing, where the fleet could render effective support, the attack was immediately successful; but owing to the nature of the country it was impossible to direct the fire on the defences further inland. Similarly on the eastern flank, the French made some progress; but the fire of the ships was probably less effective owing to their being obliged to keep at a distance to avoid torpedo attack. Our Allies are also under the disadvantage of being exposed to the fire of batteries on the Asiatic shore.

Though the attack on June 4 failed, the operations of June 28 were completely successful. In consequence of the information and experience gained during the previous fighting, the attack was restricted to about a

mile of front on the left flank. It was arranged to take place by two stages, each being prepared by the fire of heavy artillery. This, and the effective co-operation of the guns of the fleet, enabled the infantry to attain the objectives assigned to it; and the operations resulted in the left flank being advanced one thousand yards.

Turkey's military resources have been developed, under German management, to an extent that may well have seemed impossible. Statements regarding numbers are naturally conflicting, but there is no doubt that the training of new troops had made considerable progress before she joined in the war, and that seven or eight new divisions have been added to the field army. The troops available for the defence of Constantinople, including fortress troops, have been estimated at 275,000, the greater part probably being engaged in the Peninsula. The organisation and efficiency of the army have been much improved under the direction of German officers. The problem of arming and equipping new troops seems to have been solved. The Turks appear to be well provided with machine-guns and artillery, and according to all accounts they are lavish in the expenditure of ammunition. Shell-factories, worked largely by German skilled labour, are said to run night and day, and to be capable of manufacturing shells for the largest guns and howitzers. In fact, the forecasts which anticipated an early shortage of munitions were as fallacious as those which foretold that Germany would starve before July.

During the past three months the situation on the western front has undergone no material change. The German attack in the neighbourhood of Ypres, beginning on April 22, seemed at first to be the commencement of the promised spring offensive. It was probably designed to convey that impression; and it doubtless formed part of the scheme for influencing neutral opinion. With the aid of poisonous gas the enemy drove back a portion of the French front between Ypres and Dixmude, and gained possession of the Yser Canal between Boesinghe and Steenstraate, necessitating a retraction of the British line north and east of Ypres. Our French Allies subsequently recovered part of the lost ground; and, since

that period, the enemy's attitude on the whole of the western front has been in the main defensive. Among the Allies' gains the most important are those north of Arras, between Neuville and Notre Dame de Lorette, and on the heights of the Meuse at Eparges.

The success of the Germans in maintaining their line with numbers inferior to those of the Allies has been partly due to their elaborate system of entrenchments, consisting of successive lines of deep, narrow trenches, protected by barbed wire, and connected by communications of similar design; but chiefly, perhaps, to the skilful use of a large number of machine-guns, and a preponderance of heavy artillery amply supplied with ammunition. By means of these scientific adjuncts it has been possible to hold positions with relatively small numbers of men, and also to minimise losses. In this respect the Allied Powers were found unprepared; but all, except Belgium, who has lost her factories, have been working hard to repair the deficiency. Great Britain has been embarrassed in the effort by the want of any existing system of national organisation which would enable industries to be controlled and labour to be utilised to the best advantage. She has also been hampered by her political system, which causes the party in power to be haunted by an inordinate dread of losing votes should it adopt any measures that might prove unpopular with its supporters. Hence the months were allowed to slip away before any adequate step was taken towards organising the manufacturing resources of the country. In Russia other causes have operated to prejudice the output of munitions. Thus it has happened that the Russian and British armies have been fighting under a serious handicap, from which Russia has suffered most, because, for the past nine months, she has been the special objective of the enemy.

Apart from the consideration of labour, the manufacture of guns and shells is not, however, a form of industry that can be speedily put into operation unless ample preparations have been made beforehand. The requisite plant takes long to construct; and, after this has been provided, the process of manufacture is slow. The War Office, with the limited powers it possessed after the incubus of financial restrictions had been

alleviated, was still dependent on the good-will and exertions of contractors and workmen, whom it was unable to influence or control. Despite this disadvantage, and some miscalculation of the time needed to remodel the existing factories, for which the War Office was not responsible, the arrangements initiated on the declaration of war have begun to take effect; and the output of munitions has lately increased to an extent which, in relation to the means of production that existed at the outbreak of war, may be considered satisfactory. Manufacture has been hampered by the operation of trade-union restrictions, and by the inability of certain classes of workmen in some districts to realise the gravity of the issues which depend on their efforts. The new Ministry of Munitions, by tact and firmness, and by the organisation of existing facilities, should be able to effect a further increase; but the establishment of new factories and the extension of those already existing, which is necessary to place production on a level with requirements, will take some months to accomplish.

There are, unfortunately, signs that with the formation of the Coalition Ministry, party politics may again become active, and cause embarrassment to the Government. Radical newspapers which were opposed to preparation for war in time of peace, and which, regardless alike of national honour and national interests, urged at the last moment that we should remain neutral spectators of the ruin of Belgium and the destruction of France, are now exerting such influence as they possess to retard the organisation of the national resources. It will be time enough, they urge, to prepare for such a novel departure when the necessity becomes clearly manifest. The Munitions Bill has been subjected to some hostile criticism; and the Registration Bill is freely denounced as a measure demanded by the Conservatives, and designed to promote their insidious aims. Politicians, released from the restraint of party discipline, have adopted a similar tone in Parliament.

It is easy to see that these obstructive tactics are dictated, in a great degree, by fear that the legislative measures referred to may be used hereafter as a basis for the organisation of a system of national service, industrial and military, opposition to which has become

a party matter. Whether or not such a system will ultimately prove to be necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, is at present a matter of conjecture. All that can be said is that the national resources, industrial or military, cannot be developed to the fullest extent by disconnected individual effort; and that the attainment of the present state of development has entailed much unfairness to individuals, some dislocation of vital industries—those on which the army and our export trade depend—and the adoption of methods for stimulating recruiting which are discreditable to a great nation. Another thing that is quite certain is that any measure which may be adopted, to prepare for a full expansion of our resources if required, will take an indefinite time to complete; and, if subsequently put in operation, will need many months to take effect.

So far as recruiting is concerned, the so-called 'voluntary' system has produced what is, for us, a great army of the highest possible quality as regards personnel. What is wanting at the moment is munitions—a broad term which includes guns, howitzers, machine-guns, rifles, ammunition, and every kind of equipment. Whether the necessary expansion of the means of manufacture can be attained by controlled voluntary efforts will soon be seen. If not, it will be necessary to adopt other means; and the lives of our soldiers and the national independence must not be jeopardised by slavish adherence to the dogmas of party politics. Again, a time may come when the production of *matériel* will outstrip the supply of recruits. This is a contingency which must be foreseen and provided for months in advance, for soldiers take months to train. It is not one that can be left to chance, or contemplated in an attitude of hope or pious aspiration.

Judging from the tone of a considerable portion of the daily Press, there seems to exist a widespread misapprehension of the gravity of the present situation. The foolish optimism which prevailed during the first eight months of war has been succeeded by a more reasonable attitude; but few people seem, as yet, to have contemplated the possibility of the Germanic Powers being ultimately victorious, or to have realised that to secure ourselves against such a fatal possibility it

is necessary to concentrate all our national resources on the prosecution of the war. It is time to cease recrimination, and, instead of harping on the failure of the late Government, to rise to the occasion, to face the situation with which we are confronted, and to apply our undivided energies to preparing for the future. There will be time enough to fix blame for the present state of things when the war is over.

Lord Curzon showed a just appreciation of the present outlook when, in the House of Lords on July 2, he spoke of the situation being one of 'grave anxiety,' and of the country being in 'grave peril.' As he put it plainly, we are 'held up.' In France and Belgium, the Allies have been held up for seven months. They are also held up in the Dardanelles; and the Italians have been able to make but little impression on the strong defences opposed to them. The great offensive which was promised in France has not matured. Our Russian Allies have been compelled to abandon the invasion of Hungary and to evacuate nearly the whole of Galicia, while Germany has added a considerable area to the territories previously occupied by her armies. When we seek the causes of the Russian failure we find that they lie not in any ineptitude of the commanders or inferiority of the troops, but in the want of artillery capable of coping with that of the enemy, and in the inability to provide sufficient ammunition.

When we turn from the causes of the enemy's success in Galicia, and consider its probable consequences, we find nothing to excuse over-confidence. The Russian positions on the Dunajetz and Biala were believed to be as impregnable as those of the Allies in France and Belgium; but Von Mackensen crashed through the defences in a few hours, and subsequently scored the greatest offensive success of the war. Galicia has been practically reconquered; and the enemy are within measurable distance of securing possession of Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, the acquisition of which would defer indefinitely the invasion of Germany and Austria, even if the Russians should be able to make good their deficiencies in munitions of war. There are indications that Germany is already withdrawing some of her forces—whither, is as yet uncertain—and that the

Austrian army on the Italian frontier is being reinforced. Whatever may be the enemy's plans for the immediate future, it is certain that the Germans will soon renew their attempt to obtain a decision on the western front, the necessity for which was discussed in the last article; and, having already tested the strength of the Allies' position, it is equally certain that she will concentrate all her available resources in men, and in mechanical and scientific accessories, on this object, in the hope of achieving a success similar to that which has attended her Galician campaign. If the result depended on the courage and resolution of the Allies' troops, there would be no room for uncertainty; but the recent experience of our Russian Allies has proved that these qualities are not in themselves decisive.

But in the appreciation of the paramount part played by artillery under present conditions, and of the need for an unlimited supply of ammunition, there lies the danger that other important factors may be neglected. It is a national characteristic to concentrate on one thing at a time, and to miss the inter-relation of the various factors which combine to form every problem of life. Public opinion, moreover, is liable to swift and unreasoning fluctuation. Not long ago the talk was all of a war of attrition, in which the Allies should stand on the defensive, and wear down the enemy's strength by obliging them to attack. Now, with strange inconsistency, people are impatient at the continuance of the attitude which they formerly commended. A few months back all our efforts were directed to stimulating recruiting. Now the cry is for munitions, and there is some danger that the need for men—who take as long to train as the heaviest guns to manufacture—may be overlooked. The fact is that our needs in each respect are inter-dependent; and hence the need for organisation to regularise and co-ordinate the supply. The Government, by introducing legislation on both subjects simultaneously, have shown that they grasp the situation. It is only to be hoped that they will not be deterred from taking any steps they may deem necessary, by the prospect of opposition on the part either of a knot of doctrinaires in the House of Commons or of any faction outside.

W. P. BLOOD.

II.—AT SEA.

DURING the past three months the British Navy has suffered losses, and a large number of merchant vessels have been sunk by German submarines. In addition to the battleships 'Irresistible' and 'Ocean,' the operations in the Dardanelles have cost us the battleships 'Goliath,' 'Triumph,' and 'Majestic'; and the destroyers 'Recruit' and 'Maori,' two modern torpedo boats (Nos. 10 and 12) and at least two submarines, E10 and E15, have been destroyed. On the other hand, Germany has during this period been deprived of no large ship,* though she has lost several submarines and two patrol vessels. On the balance, it may appear to the casual observer of the course of events that British sea-power has been definitely weakened, both actually and relatively, and that in consequence we hold in less secure control the maritime communications of the world. Such a conclusion would be incorrect.

There can be no victory without sacrifice; and, when our victory comes, we shall owe it, in no small measure, to the influence which sea-power has been patiently and successfully exercising against the two Central Powers of Europe. When hostilities opened, no disciple of the blue-water school would have dared to prophesy what has in fact occurred under our very eyes. We were accustomed to regard the military power of the British Empire as the extension of its naval power, and to insist that, if we were to exercise any influence on land, either in distant parts of the Empire or on the Continent, it was essential that we should maintain a fleet of unchallengeable strength. What has been the experience of war? The British Navy, reinforced by the naval power of the French Republic, has proved the keystone of our warlike operations. Without undisputed command of the sea, we could have rendered no military assistance to our Allies on the Continent; and the raising of new armies, except for purposes of home defence, would have been useless. Without command of the maritime

* The Russians claim to have sunk, by submarine attack, a battleship of the 'Deutschland' class, on July 2; the Germans deny the claim. It now appears that the action was due to a British submarine.

communications of the world, neither we nor our Allies could have drawn supplies of war-material and food from other countries, America in particular. Only by exercising sea-command has our credit been maintained, enabling us to act, in some measure, as paymasters in the promotion of the common cause. We can only estimate with any degree of accuracy the debt which is due to the British Fleet, and to the lesser Navy of France, if we endeavour to visualise the course which events would have taken if, either by our abstention from participation in the war or our failure to secure command of the sea, the German Fleet had been in a position to exercise that authority which for eleven months past we have been exercising on all the seas of the world.

Every development of the methods and instruments of warfare at sea, as well as on land, has contributed to the strength, efficiency, and cheapness of the passive defensive and increased the difficulties and risks associated with the virile exercise of sea-command. That is a conclusion which was frequently controverted before the opening of the present war, when it was stated as an argument against the probability of these islands being invaded. What has happened? With the aid of the mine, the torpedo, and powerful shore fortifications, Germany has been able to maintain an attitude of passive defence without material losses of such a character as seriously to cripple her battle fleet, whatever moral injury her Navy may have suffered; while at the same time she has pursued, by the aid of the mine and submarine, an active campaign against our men-of-war and our merchant ships.

In these circumstances losses were to be expected on our side, and losses have been sustained. Studied in isolation they may appear heavy, but, if they be reviewed in relation to the vast benefits—economic, financial and military—which have accrued to us and to our Allies, owing to our command of the sea, and if it be borne in mind that they have been spread over a period of many months during which industry has been active in fashioning new instruments of war, they are revealed as insignificant both in respect to the loss of material and of life, deeply regrettable though the latter has been.

On the one hand, the British Fleet has lost seven battleships since the war began, while the German battle fleet has remained unweakened by the loss of any unit (see note, p. 288); on the other, the unrivalled resources of the United Kingdom have been actively engaged in completing fresh ships. It may be claimed that during this period German industry has also been busy. That is true. But the armament establishments of Germany concerned with the creation of naval power are on a much more modest scale than those of the United Kingdom; moreover, the labour problem in Germany is complicated by the fact that the German Army, with an aggregate strength of about 8,000,000 men, has necessarily made the first call upon the national resources. In our case, in spite of the successful effort to raise and equip new armies, the Fleet has maintained its claim to first consideration in virtue of its primacy in the British scheme of defence.

Although details are lacking of the additions which have been made to the British and German Fleets since the opening of the war, confidence may be felt that, in spite of the losses which have been incurred, our relative power at sea is higher to-day in *matériel*, and particularly in *moral*, than it was a year ago. Machinery and labour which were then engaged upon foreign work have since been concentrated on British work. In Germany no corresponding reinforcement has been possible, because German firms have never added a single large armoured ship to an alien fleet, and, apart from one Greek battleship (the guns of which were ordered in the United States and cannot have been delivered), had in hand only small orders for torpedo craft when the war began.

It may be assumed that all ships of the armoured classes, down to the programmes of 1912-13, building in Great Britain and Germany on the outbreak of war have since been completed or are now on the eve of completion. On that assumption the British Fleet, including the three vessels purchased from Turkey and Chile, will comprise this summer 29 or 30 battleships and 10 battle-cruisers of the Dreadnought type; while Germany will possess 17 battleships and 5 or 6 battle-cruisers, an aggregate of 39 or 40 on the one hand, and 22 or 23 on the other. It is not necessary to examine in detail the basis

on which these figures rest; we may be satisfied with the general conclusion that in Dreadnought units the British Fleet this summer will have a margin of about seventy per cent. over that of Germany. In the light of this conclusion, the disappearance of such comparatively old battleships as the 'Majestic' (laid down in 1893), the 'Goliath' and 'Ocean' (1897), the 'Irresistible' and 'Formidable' (1898), the 'Bulwark' (1899) and the 'Triumph' (1902) involves indeed heavy losses, deeply regrettable owing to the destruction of so much life, but losses which still leave our battle fleet overwhelmingly strong; particularly as the squadrons of Dreadnoughts are supported by the 33 remaining battleships of the pre-Dreadnought era, representing a superiority over Germany of considerably over sixty per cent.; and bearing in mind, finally, that, owing in large measure to the influence of the British Fleet, the Navy of Italy is now co-operating with the Allies.

It would be difficult to over-estimate the direct and indirect influence which the participation of the Italian Navy in the war is bound to exercise on the course of events. For over nine months it maintained a neutral attitude while large supplies passed through Italian ports to Germany and Austria-Hungary, and was compelled to watch, without participation, the efforts of the British and French Navies to keep the Mediterranean open for the traffic of transports and merchant vessels. The Italian Fleet is no longer neutral. The balance of power in the Mediterranean against the two Central nations is now not less decisive than that which exists in northern waters. To the support of the Allied cause Italy has brought 6 battleships of the Dreadnought type, besides 6 battleships of pre-Dreadnought design, 9 large cruisers, 8 or 9 light cruisers, and over 100 effective torpedo craft. The Italian Navy is distinctly more powerful than that of Austria-Hungary. But for the intervention of Italy, the French Navy would have remained chained to the Adriatic. We shall do well not to under-estimate the value of Italian co-operation at sea.

What must be the verdict on the new phase of the German operations at sea with the submarine? Students

of naval affairs have been compelled to readjust their estimate of the importance of the submarine as an offensive weapon. All the losses at sea suffered by the Allied Navies, with the exception of the cruisers 'Good Hope,' 'Monmouth,' and 'Amphion,' have been due to the torpedo and not to the gun. Nets, as the experience of the 'Majestic' and 'Triumph' indicate, offer no defence; the cutter affixed to the modern torpedo finds its way through this form of crinoline. By no method of subdivision or the fitting of bulkhead doors can any vessel constructed hitherto, man-of-war or merchant vessel, be rendered unsinkable. The 'Formidable,' 'Goliath,' 'Majestic' and 'Triumph' were sunk by torpedo attack; the 'Lusitania,' although she was built under Admiralty supervision and completed in the belief that she could remain afloat for a considerable period after several compartments had been destroyed, sank in about eighteen minutes after she had been struck by two torpedoes. Yet it is a matter of surprise, not that the submarine has done so much, but that it has accomplished so little of military importance. In circumstances sometimes unnecessarily favourable, it has destroyed a relatively small number of the older men-of-war of the Allied Fleets, but it has failed to fulfil the hopes of the enemy when he determined to use it for attacking the ocean-borne commerce of the Allies. This later development was the result of the submarine's comparative failure, not of its success, in the war of attrition.

Germany embarked upon the policy of piracy on the high seas, not with a view to annoying us or causing us financial loss, but in the confident expectation that thereby we should be reduced to a condition bordering upon starvation. In the declaration issued in the beginning of February, it was stated that 'the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, are hereby declared a war area.' It was added that 'from February 18 every hostile merchant ship in these waters *will* be destroyed, even if it is not always possible to avoid thereby dangers which threaten the crew and passengers.' The statement of Germany's intention could not have been more specific. All communication between the British Isles and other countries was the subject of the interdict; it embraced not only

the ships bringing us food, raw materials and munitions and the other vessels carrying outwards our exports of manufactured goods, but also all the transports and store-ships which constitute the life-line of the British Expeditionary Forces engaged in France and the Gallipoli Peninsula. Official announcements reveal that the task of reinforcing and supplying Field-Marshal Sir John French and General Sir Ian Hamilton has proceeded without interruption or serious loss. During the period covered by the 'blockade,' tens of thousands of additional troops have been safely transferred from our shores to the Continent; and the enemy's operations have in no way interfered with the stream of merchant vessels carrying the munitions required by the troops.

What, in reviewing the campaign, has been our experience? Since Germany embarked upon her policy of piracy by sinking merchant vessels at sight, over 26,000 vessels of all nationalities have arrived in or sailed from the ports of the United Kingdom, and about 90 British merchant ships have been destroyed. Though the enemy, by disregarding international law and the dictates of our common humanity, has been able to inflict severe losses upon us, he has completely failed in achieving his purpose. Our ocean commerce has been maintained and, despite the atrocity committed when the 'Lusitania' was sunk with 1200 of her passengers and crew, other nations have not been deterred from trading with us. The new policy of piracy was entered upon when the attempt to interfere with our maritime communications by cruiser raids had been frustrated, and all the enemy's cruisers had been either destroyed or forced to seek internment in neutral ports. The later campaign, in spite of its illegalities and brutalities, has been even less successful than the legitimate *guerre de course* which marked the early period of hostilities.

On the balance, what have we and the Germans suffered? Our mercantile marine has been weakened by about a quarter of a million tons of shipping and many hundred non-combatants have been murdered. Incidentally the enemy has also destroyed or captured about 80 fishing vessels, contrary to the understanding hitherto subsisting between civilised Powers; and a considerable number of fishermen have been deliberately

assassinated. The Germans have inflicted upon us no military injury ; we are to-day exerting against them, both by sea and by land, more power than when the 'blockade' commenced ; and the main effect of their desperate measures, so far as we are economically concerned, has been the maintenance of marine insurance at a somewhat higher level than would otherwise have been the case. Germany, on the other hand, has had to pay a heavy price. No accurate details are available as to the number of submarines which have been lost owing to the operations of our forces or accidents ; it is certain that no inconsiderable proportion of the enemy's original flotilla has disappeared. No doubt it has been possible to replace the submarines which have been lost ; but the loss of so many highly trained and experienced officers and men is hardly replaceable.

Apart from the submarine blockade, the past three months have passed in the North Sea practically without incident. Since the battle-cruiser action off the Dogger Bank on Jan. 24, when the armoured cruiser 'Blücher' was sunk and the battle cruisers 'Derfflinger' and 'Seydlitz' seriously damaged, the High Sea Fleet of Germany has remained inactive. It has been claimed in an officially inspired article by Captain von Kühlwetter ('Times,' June 12) that this 'battle was decided in our [Germany's] favour,' and that the German Admiral was only prevented from turning it into 'an annihilating victory' owing to a combination of unfavourable circumstances beyond his control, principally the want of knowledge of the damage already suffered by our ships. It has also been claimed that 'the German shooting was better than the British, all through the engagement,' and that 'the German heavy guns found and kept their target better than the British.' Though the German public have been assured that this engagement resulted in a German 'victory' and that the British force narrowly escaped annihilation, it remains a fact that no squadron of heavy ships of the German High Sea Fleet has since ventured to show itself beyond the range of the shore fortifications and the influence of the protective mine-fields. For over six months the peace in the North Sea, which it was assumed in some quarters in the early

period of the war would be the scene of constant encounters between the opposing navies, has been undisturbed, except for occasional encounters between small craft and the destruction of merchant and fishing vessels. This in itself constitutes the most convincing evidence of the moral ascendancy which the British Fleet has obtained over the second greatest Naval Power of the world. From the opening of the war, the German Navy has been out-manceuvred and out-fought in every encounter which has occurred in the North Sea; and with every week that has passed its material inferiority has been increased, irrespective of the loss of morale which must have been incurred.

The operations in the Dardanelles have assumed a fresh phase. On March 18, the general naval attack on the forts in the Narrows was marked by the destruction of three of the Allied battleships, the 'Irresistible,' 'Ocean' and 'Bouvet.' There subsequently intervened a period of unfavourable weather, which prevented a resumption of the operations; and, in the meantime, it was realised that naval force alone could not achieve success. It was generally assumed, when the bombardment by the Allied men-of-war began, that adequate provision had been made for military support in order to enable the batteries put out of action by fire from the sea to be demolished by landing parties. That assumption proved unfortunately incorrect, the only military force available being the Royal Naval Division, consisting of a comparatively small number of officers and men. After the losses sustained on March 18, a period of six weeks intervened; and on April 25 a large force of British, Dominion and French troops was thrown ashore under the cover of the guns of the men-of-war and succeeded in obtaining a footing, in spite of determined opposition on the part of the Turks. It is impossible to read General Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, published on July 7, without being convinced that, if the Navy alone could not force the Dardanelles, the Army, unsupported by the guns of the men of war, could never have landed, and, having landed, could not have advanced or even held its ground. As Sir Ian remarks, 'the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army.'

The time has not yet come for reviewing in detail the action taken with a view to destroying the Turkish power in Europe. Events have, however, shown that, whatever defects there were in the original naval and military plans, the objective in view was of the utmost importance in its bearing upon the general course of the war. It is impossible to over-estimate the influence which the Dardanelles operations have exercised on opinion in Italy, Greece and the Balkan countries; and the demonstration in the eyes of the people of the Near East of the long arm of sea-power has been invaluable. Evidence of the impression which this new campaign made upon the naval and military staffs of Germany is provided by the decision to detach considerable bodies of naval and military officers to direct and stiffen the Turkish defence, and by the risks which must have been run in dispatching one or more submarines from northern to southern waters in the hope of thereby embarrassing the transport arrangements and injuring the ships of the Allied Fleets while engaged in supporting the military forces ashore. As a result of the new campaign initiated by the Allied Governments, Turkey as an Ally of the two Central Powers of Europe has become not a support, but a grave embarrassment. Every military consideration compelled Germany to attempt to save Turkey from annihilation; and the diversion of force has contributed to the weakening of the German arms in other theatres of war. On the other hand, the Allied Governments found in these operations employment for surplus men-of-war, for the most part obsolescent, which they possessed after making adequate provision to contain the main fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary. It was not to be expected that the Dardanelles could be forced without some loss. The eventual success of the operations will prove ample compensation for more considerable reductions in the strength of pre-Dreadnoughts than have yet been incurred.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

